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Abstract 
This thesis examines the reform of the legislative regime for governing offshore oil 
development on Australia's continental shelf. In particular, the thesis explores how 
several factors have combined to shape the Commonwealth's offshore petroleum 
legislation at various stages since its original enactment. The more important of these 
factors include questions of constitutional law, the impact of the emerging law of the sea, 
the Commonwealth's policy-making and administrative expertise, and the input of state 
governments and the oil industry to Commonwealth offshore policy. 
The thirty year history of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act can be considered as 
having evolved through four distinct phases. During the 1960s, the Commonwealth 
legislated to accommodate the states' much greater capacity to administer offshore oil 
development. The second phase of offshore policy in the 1970s is characterized by the 
Commonwealth's assertion of its superior legislative capabilities over offshore areas vis-
a-vis the states. Following the associated inter-governmental tension, the third 
evolutionary phase in the early 1980s represents a return to a collaborative offshore 
policy approach. The fourth phase corresponds with the current mature state of the regime 
wherein the Commonwealth now prevails in offshore petroleum policy but still involves 
the states directly in continental shelf policy making under Commonwealth law. Despite 
the responsibilities of the Commonwealth and states shifting over time because of the 
influence of the factors identified above, the participation of both spheres of government . 
in continental shelf policy has never been seriously doubted. This thesis argues that it is 
the joint exercise of decision-making powers by the Commonwealth and states that has 
provided stability to an otherwise volatile area of natural resources policy. 
In strictly legal terms, the Commonwealth could have asserted its jurisdiction in 
respect of the extended continental shelf when it first entered this legislative policy field 
in 1967. Because of the particular combination of factors prevailing at that time, however, 
the Commonwealth instead vacated to the states the policy field of offshore petroleum. 
The early role assumed by the states assured them of continued participation in the 
Commonwealth's offshore petroleum regime, even after offshore jurisdiction was divided 
three miles offshore in 1980 as part of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS). 
III 
At the same time, the Commonwealth has come to realize the necessity of state 
government input to its continental shelf regime. While the Commonwealth has 
increasingly legislated to reduce the role of the states in offshore petroleum policy, this 
sphere of government still participates directly in administering the continental shelf 
regime through the exercise of Commonwealth powers. 
That the Commonwealth has progressed its marine resources policies within the 
context of the OCS without sending Australia back into another phase of offshore 
disputation testifies to the maturation of this policy area, and the legal and administrative 
regimes established to govern offshore petroleum development. The thesis shows that the 
regime established under the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act has handled 
jurisdictional issues with a high degree of success through its evolving partnership 
between the Commonwealth and the states. Although the offshore petroleum regime does 
have some shortcomings, the legislation nonetheless provides a model by which 
jurisdictional differences over offshore resources can be overcome. Thus, the offshore 
petroleum regime established under the OCS arrangements has relevance for other 
federations struggling with offshore jurisdiction issues, particularly the United States. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction to the Study of 
Offshore Petroleum Policy in Australia 
1.1 THE STUDY IN CONTEXT 
This research was inspired by the attention in the literature given to the 
paralysed condition of the offshore oil development program in the United 
States. For several decades, the state and federal governments in the U.S. 
have clashed over the merits of offshore exploitation, especially in relation to 
oil development on the east and west coasts. It is well reported that many 
coastal states strongly oppose leasing and development proposals located in 
adjacent federal waters, but in respect of which they exercise little authority.' 
As a result of intense differences over the use of coastal resources, relations 
between the two spheres of government have become so bitter that the 
offshore petroleum regime has "simply broken down."2 
1 B. Cicin-Sam and R. Knecht, "Federalism Under Stress: The Case of Offshore Oil and 
California", in H. Scheiber (ed), Perspectives on Federalism (University of California, Los 
Angeles, 1987) pp 149-176; E. Fitzgerald, "Outer Continental Shelf Revenue Sharing: A 
Proposal to End the Seaweed Rebellion" (1985) 5 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and 
Policy 1-47; E. Fitzgerald, "Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Revenues: Coastal States 
Should Be Entitled to a Share" (1988) 16 Coastal Management 319-339; R. Grosso, "Federal 
Offshore Leasing: States' Concerns Fall on Deaf Ears" (1986) 2 Journal of Land Use and 
Environmental Law 249-285; M. Hershman, "Building a Federal-State Partnership for U.S. 
Ocean Resource Management", in M. Silva (ed), Ocean Resources and U.S. Intergovernmental 
Relations in the 1980s (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1986) pp 221-240; R. Hildreth, 
"Federal-State Revenue Sharing and Resource Management Under Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act Section 8(g)" (1989) 17 Coastal Management 171-191; E. Smith and S. Garcia, 
"Evolving California Opinion on Offshore Oil Development" (1995) 26 Ocean and Coastal 
Management 41-56; M. Walls, "Federalism and Offshore Oil Leasing Resources for the 
Future" (1993) 33 Natural Resources Journal 776-795; R. Wilder, "Sea-Change from Bush to 
Clinton: Setting a New Course for Offshore Oil Development and U.S. Energy Policy" (1993) 
11 U.C.L.A. Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 131-173; R. Wiygul, "The Structure of 
Environmental Regulation on the Outer Continental Shelf: Sources, Problems, and the 
Opportunity for Change" (1992) 12 Journal of Energy, Natural Resources and Environmental 
Law 75-180. 
2 R. Wilder, "Cooperative Governance, Environmental Policy, and Management of Offshore Oil 
and Gas in the United States" (1993) 24 Ocean Development and International Law 41-62, p 
42. 
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The problems with respect to differences over offshore oil policy in the 
U.S. derive from the separation of jurisdiction three miles offshore. 
However, to frame the dysfunctional regime as being an unfortunate but 
nonetheless inevitable consequence of federation simplifies the character of 
offshore oil development. Several analyses recognize that the latent tension 
between the federal and state governments over offshore oil is due to the fact 
that the benefits of development flow to the former while the latter 
jurisdiction bears all the costs. 3 A range of social, financial and 
environmental costs are associated with offshore petroleum, including: 
disruption to local lifestyle; the provision and maintenance of shoreline 
infrastructure; degradation of amenity value; and damage to the marine and 
coastal environment. 4 It follows that by better distributing the costs and 
benefits within the federal system a more equitable and agreeable regime can 
be emplaced. Hershman expresses the problem in succinct terms - 
This PCS] policy has been a major source of contention between federal 
and state governments ... Under current arrangements, states shoulder 
many of the environmental risks associated with OCS development 
while sharing few of the financial benefits with the federal 
government.5 
In contrast to the acrimony existing around much of the U.S. coastline, the 
offshore petroleum regime in Australia operates at present unencumbered by 
inter-governmental tension or conflict. Indeed, during 1998 two separate 
3 B. Cicin-Sain, "Ocean Resources and Intergovernmental Relations: An Analysis of the 
Patterns", in M. Silva (ed), Ocean Resources and U.S. Intergovernmental Relations in the 
1980s (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1986) p 241-262; C. Lester, "Contemporary Federalism 
and New Regimes of Ocean Governance: Lessons from the Case of Outer Continental Shelf 
Oil Development" (1994) 23 Ocean and Coastal Management 7-47; C. Lester, "Reforming the 
Offshore Oil and Gas Program: Rediscovering the Public's Interests in the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands" (1996) 30 Ocean and Coastal Management 1-42. 
4 R. Gramlin& Oil on the Edge (State University of New York Press, Syracuse, 1996); R. Knecht, 
'The Exclusive Economic Zone: A New Opportunity in Federal-State Ocean Relations", in 
M. Silva (ed), Ocean Resources and U.S. Intergovernmental Relations in the 1980s 
(Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1986) p 263-273. 
5 M. Hershman, "Ocean Management Policy Development in Subnational Units of Government: 
Examples from the United States" (19%) 32 Ocean and Coastal Management 25-40, p 29. 
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international surveys rated the north-west shelf of Australia as the most 
attractive area in the world for investing exploration dollars. 6 Because the 
regime created pursuant to the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) 
does work so well, the topic of offshore petroleum policy in Australia has 
been the subject of little analytical review compared with the situation in the 
U.S. This is true especially of the period subsequent to 1980 when the 
Offshore Constitutional Settlement (the OCS) was reached, at which time 
offshore jurisdiction as between the federal and state governments was 
finally settled in Australia. 7 
Discussions of the Australian petroleum regime emphasise that its success 
is due to the offshore mining code created by the Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Act which continues unbroken across state and Commonwealth 
waters [the federal level of government]. Decision-making continuity is 
achieved by having in place identical state and Commonwealth statutes to 
create a mirror policy framework on both sides of the three mile 
jurisdictional divide. The existence of identical legislation exposes operators 
to a single regulatory regime and provides consistency in title conditions over 
offshore tracts regardless of the location of prospective wells. It is this feature 
which many authors maintain underwrites the smooth operation of the 
Australian petroleum regime. 8 
6 "Upstream oil, gas profits top $2.1 bn but slump looms" The Australian, 9 March 1998; "Price 
drop no barrier to offshore field bids" The Australian, 22 June 1998. 
7 One exception to this generalization is found in White, who in 1994 remarked "... examples of 
beneficial co-operation are the Offshore Constitutional Settlement and the joint legislation 
by Commonwealth and States in the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts." M. White, Marine 
Pollution Laws of the Australasian Region (The Federation Press, Sydney, 1994) p 195. 
8 M. Crommelin, "The Mineral Exploration and Production Regime Within the Federal 
System", in P. Drysdale and H. Shibata (ed), Federalism and Resource Development: The 
Australian Case (George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985); M. Cron-unelin, "Federal-
Regional Cooperation: A Comparative Perspective", in J. Saunders (ed), Papers presented at 
the 2nd National Conference on Natural Resources Law, 1985 Managing Natural Resources in 
a Federal State (Carswell, Calgary, Canada, 1986) pp 295-321; R. Cullen, "Canada and 
Australia: A Federal Parting of the Ways" (1989) 18 Federal Law Review 68-83; C. 
Harders, "Commonwealth and State Jurisdiction Over Off-Shore Areas" (1977) 1 Australian 
Mining and Petroleum Law Association Journal 7-16. 
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Whilst legislative complementarity is certainly a strength of the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act [hereinafter the P(SL)A] interpretations 
focusing upon strictly legal aspects of resources titles tend to overlook the 
form of the regime created thereby. As I have argued elsewhere, it is the 
vesting in state ministers of Commonwealth executive powers in relation to 
federal offshore areas which is the foundation upon which the Australian 
regime operates so successfully.9 This empowerment is achieved pursuant to 
two mechanisms established under the Commonwealth P(SL)A. The more 
significant of these is the joint authority—a body comprising the relevant 
Commonwealth and state ministers—through which the states make 
exploration and production decisions jointly with the Commonwealth in 
respect of the extended continental shelf. As well, state ministers perform a 
range of minor functions exclusively on the Commonwealth's behalf acting 
as the designated authority. After much refinement of these mechanisms the 
P(SL)A regime can now be considered as entering a condition of maturity." 
As will be seen, although the resolution of jurisdiction was delayed 
several decades in Australia, the continental shelf is now well established to 
be beyond the ordinary decision-making competence of states. This thesis 
argues that it is the joint exercise of powers and making of policy by both 
spheres of government that more satisfactorily accounts for the operational- 
success of the offshore petroleum regime, rather more than simply having in 
place mirror Commonwealth and state legislation. Given the value of 
offshore petroleum resources, the challenging task is to reconstruct the 
history of the joint decision-making scheme and to thereby understand why 
9 N. Evans and J. Bailey, "Jurisdiction and Offshore Petroleum in Australia: Creating 
Symmetry Between the Commonwealth and States by Sharing Benefits and Avoiding Costs" 
(1997) 33 Ocean and Coastal Management 173-204. 
10 C. Hunt, "The Offshore Petroleum Regimes of Canada and Australia: Some Comparative 
Observations" (1990) 9 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association Bulletin 103-111. 
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the Commonwealth enacted the P(SL)A, instead of exercising its own 
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the continental shelf. 
1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
1.2.1 Background 
A recent review by Juda has documented the forty year evolution of the 
offshore petroleum regime in the United States." This thesis adopts Juda's 
evolutionary perspective to analyse the development and reform of 
Commonwealth policy towards offshore petroleum, employing legislation as 
its unit of analysis. In particular, the thesis examines the enactment and 
amendment of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act since its conception in 
1967, including administrative decisions and related judicial determinations. 
Essentially, the current work is concerned with interpreting the evolution of 
Commonwealth legislative policy towards offshore petroleum by exploring 
the particular political circumstances that led to amendment of the P(SL)A. 
Legislation represents the clearest expression and record of prevailing 
government intention in any area of public policy. The P(SL)A therefore 
provides the ideal lens through which to examine the evolving policy 
embodied within the offshore petroleum regime. To be sure, governments-
enunciate policy statements from time to time, but there is little worth in 
examining such pronouncements separately to legislation because the latter 
authority serves as the policy framework for action. 12 A leading Australian 
scholar recognises the intimate relationship between legislation and 
resources policy - 
11 L. Juda, "Ocean Policy, Multi-use Management, and the Cumulative Impact of Piecemeal 
Change: The Case of the United States Outer Continental Shelf" (1993) 24 Ocean 
Development and International Law 355-376. 
12 M . Hunt, .'Government Policy and Legislation Regarding Mineral and Petroleum Resources" 
(1988) 62 The Australian Law Journal 841-862 
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In a country where natural resources are the subject of extensive 
government ownership, resources law and public policy are inextricably 
linked. In the first place, resources law is the instrument for 
implementation of resources policy. The rights and obligations under 
resources titles give a much more accurate picture of government policy 
than most Ministerial statements. A failure to comprehend the policy 
ramifications of different resource titles makes the achievement of 
policy goals well nigh impossible. Secondly, resources law imposes 
severe constraints on resource policy by limiting the freedom of action 
of both the Commonwealth and the States. Again, a failure to 
comprehend the significance of these limitations diminishes the 
likelihood of achievement of policy goals. 13 
Perhaps the most notable feature of Commonwealth offshore resources policy 
is the diffidence with which this has been progressed through legislation. In 
fact, the Commonwealth's historic approach towards the offshore has been 
described as "leisurely". 14 Most commentaries of Australian marine policy 
have been prepared by legal scholars, and it is unsurprising that these 
frequently attribute the Commonwealth's legislative inaction to 
jurisdictional difficulties. 15 The most notable departure from these 
predominant legal interpretations is doctoral work by Haward. 16 Haward's 
thesis introduces an analytical framework for interpreting Australian marine 
policy, comprising such elements as: the politics of Commonwealth/state 
relations; the exchange between judicial and executive decisions; and the 
domestic implementation of international treaty law. 
This thesis complements and builds upon Haward's work in two 
important dimensions. Firstly, events are explained from a Commonwealth 
13 M. Crorrunelin, "Resources Law and Public Policy" (1983) 15 The University of Western 
Australia Law Review 1-13, p 13. 
14 White, op cit fn 7. 
15 See the following discussions: M. Crommelin (1986), op cit fn 8; R. Cullen, Federalism in 
Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Disputes (The Federation Press, Sydney, 
1990); R. Hildreth, "Managing Ocean Resources: New Zealand and Australia" (1991) 6 
International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 89-126; R. Lumb, "Australian Coastal 
Jurisdiction", in K. Ryan (ed), International Law in Australia (The Law Book Company, 
Sydney, 1984) pp 370-389; D. Rothwell, "The Legal Framework for Ocean and Coastal 
Management in Australia" (1996) 33 Ocean and Coastal Management 41-61. 
16 M. Haward, Federalism and the Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement (University 
of Tasmania, PhD thesis, 1992). 
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perspective rather than that of the states. That is, Haward reports the means 
by which states have remained viable in marine policy making in spite of 
increasing federal activity whereas this thesis seeks to understand why the 
Commonwealth permitted the states a paramount role in offshore policy. 
The second complementary point is that this thesis focuses upon offshore 
petroleum policy updated to 1998, whereas Haward examined the broad ambit 
of marine policy concentrating on the earlier OCS. 
As this thesis shows, jurisdictional difficulties—although of doubtless 
importance—were just one of several factors which influenced 
Commonwealth legislative policy for nearly four decades. The precise 
influence of jurisdiction on legislative policy arises from the fact that related 
uncertainties corresponded with increasing Commonwealth interest in the 
offshore, and indeed were the logical consequence thereof. It follows, 
therefore, that jurisdictional uncertainty had eventually to be resolved before 
the Commonwealth could substantially advance its policies through 
legislation. 
Considerable debate and dispute was devoted towards achieving an 
ultimate resolution of jurisdiction. However, upon closer inspection it 
becomes apparent that participation by both governmental spheres in 
offshore decision making has never been seriously doubted. Reviewing the 
evolution of the P(SL)A, it can be seen that each phase of development 
addressed how the two spheres of government could best be involved in 
petroleum policy given their prevailing circumstances. It is the satisfactory 
resolution of jurisdiction under the OCS that underpins the functionality of 
the P(SL)A and the mechanisms through which this is achieved, the joint 
and designated authorities. 
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1.2.2 Outline of the thesis 
Reform of the offshore petroleum regime has occurred in two distinct periods 
discussed by this thesis: jurisdictional settlements and regime maturity. The 
first period, from the early 1950s to the OCS of 1980, was concerned with 
broadly settling Commonwealth-state jurisdiction over offshore areas. 
Originally, the Commonwealth left the policy field vacant for the states to 
occupy, thereby assuring the latter of a substantial continued role in marine 
resources policy. In terms of policy developments in the 1970s, the legacy of 
early Commonwealth delays proved difficult to reverse, resulting in bouts of 
intergovernmental turbulence as the federal government struggled to assert 
its wishes offshore vis-a-vis the states. 
Subsequent to the OCS being settled in 1980, the P(SL)A regime has been 
amended to enable the Commonwealth to assume an increasingly superior, 
although non-exclusive, role in policy making with respect to continental 
shelf petroleum. The Commonwealth has succeessfully moulded the regime 
so that both spheres of government now contribute directly to policy 
development and decision making, but the wishes of the Commonwealth 
prevail in the event of disagreement. This evolution of the P(SL)A represents 
the second period of reform, reflecting the Commonwealth's growing 
confidence and maiurity as a legislative policy maker. 
The thesis chapters correspond with each of the evolutionary periods of 
the offshore petroleum regime. This chapter provides the context for the 
study by introducing the building blocks for understanding reform of the 
P(SL)A: the Australian Constitution and heads of power relevant to offshore 
petroleum; international sea law and its effect on Commonwealth legislation; 
and factors that have influenced the development of Commonwealth 
legislative policy. The review of the P(SL)A proper commences in Chapter 
Two, which covers the immediate post-Second World War period until 1967. 
This period of policy development is best thought of as one of avoidance as 
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the Commonwealth vacated to state governments the management of 
fisheries, as well as the rapidly emerging field of offshore petroleum under 
the Australian Petroleum Settlement. Chapter Three is the anitithesis of that 
earlier period, when two successive governments during the early 1970s 
sought to assert Commonwealth decision making exclusivity over the 
offshore. This brief foray—principally under the Whitlam government—
proved to be unsustainable, due in no small way to the radical redefining of 
Commonwealth/state relations it attempted. 
Chapter Four documents the period of new federalism after the extreme 
tension ending with the Fraser government's election at the end of 1975. 
Notwithstanding the return to the states of offshore responsibilities during 
this time, the Commonwealth retained for itself considerable decision 
making capabilities having growen accustomed to the newly found functions 
mandated under Whitlam. The maturation of the offshore petroleum regime 
beginning in 1983 under the Hawke Commonwealth is reviewed in Chapter 
Five. Although initially opposing the OCS emplaced by the Fraser 
government, Hawke learned to understand its constitutional bases and 
exploit the opportunities it provided to the Commonwealth. During this 
period offshore petroleum policy became further detached from the basic 
jurisdictional questions that had hitherto dominated intergovernmental - 
relations over the offshore. It is convenient to consider this period has the 
climax state of the offshore petroleum regime. 
The last two chapters discussed the contemporary period of policy 
development beginning in 1996. Chapter Six examines the effect of 
contamporaneous developments on the P(SL)A, mainly the national oceans 
policy and the Commonwealth resources policy statement. Neither of these 
initiatives is seen to cause a change in policy direction, but legislative and 
administrative action has nonetheless been needed to align the P(SL)A with 
these and other cascading events. In concluding the thesis, Chapter Seven 
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makes some observations on the evolution and success of the Australian 
model for offshore hydrocarbon development, especially in comparison with 
the U.S. approach. 
1.3 THE FRAMEWORK FOR COMMONWEALTH LEGISLATIVE POLICY 
The framework enabling the enactment of the P(SL)A comprises two sets of 
immutable parameters: the Australian Constitution and international sea 
law. The immutability of these documents arises from their status as sources 
of ultimate legal authority. In its pursuit of offshore petroleum the 
Commonwealth is essentially unable to alter either the Constitution or LOSC, 
and must develop policy relying upon the extant provisions of both. On the 
other hand, the distance from the Parliamentary floor of these parameters 
ensures that other influences shape the detail of particular legislative 
proposals. In other words, the Constitution and LOSC set the boundaries for 
legislative activity while the policy embodied therein is the product of the 
political context dominating at certain critical junctures. To properly 
understand the development of legislation it is therefore essential to 
appreciate both levels of the legislative hierarchy. This part outlines the 
constitutional framework while 1.4 following is devoted to the minutae of 
influences conducive to reform of the P(SL)A. 
The first section below introduces the Constitution and the powers to 
legislate its grants to the Commonwealth. Later discussions canvass in some 
length the nature and scope of legislative powers, so these provisions are 
only discussed here briefly. Similarly, section 1.3.2 introduces LOSC and 
foreshadows its effect on Commonwealth policy without dwelling on the 
convention's details, which are more suitably reported throughout the 
relevant parts of the thesis. The third section considers how judicial 
interpretations of the Constitution—especially those involving questions of 
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international law—have helped redefine the broad parameters for legislative 
policy. Notwithstanding its ultra-legal nature, the constitutional framework 
is shown to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the vicissitudes of 
Commonwealth/state interaction. Having framed legislative policy in terms 
of the Constitution and LOSC, part 1.4 then defines the context for the 
enactment and amendment of legislation by identifying a range of influences 
on the P(SL)A, such as Austalia's coastal orientation, growing knowledge of 
legal concepts pertaining to jurisdiction, and Commonwealth offshore 
expertise. 
1.3.1 Introduction to the Constitution 
Australia has existed as a federation of six internal states and two territories 
since the beginning of this century, although colonial origins date back to 
1788.17 The approach taken to offshore jurisdictional settlements, in terms of 
both policy and legal questions, has been shaped at least in part by historical 
antecedents. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the act of federation was 
the degree to which it preserved significant powers and functions of the 
states. Contrasting the respective roles of the states in Australia and the U.S., 
one observer remarked – 
Federalism appears to have a more co-operative, or at least consultative, 
character in Australian than in the United States. Perhaps the concept of 
States rights retains more appeal because it was never discredited by the 
institution of slavery. Or perhaps the smaller number of States makes 
intergovernmental dialogue more feasible. Or perhaps the High Court's 
more restrained interpretation of the Commonwealth's regulatory 
powers has discouraged federal action. At any rate, formal consultations 
between the Commonwealth and State governments seem more 
common in Australia than federal-State dialogue in the United States. 18 
17 The distinction between the two sub-national levels of government is of little practical 
relevance. Within the discussion, unless otherwise indicated all references to the states 
should be read to include the Northern Territory. Of Australia's other internal territories 
one—the Australian Capital Territory—is landlocked and irrelevant to offshore policy 
while New South Wales has assumed increasing responsibility for Jervis Bay. 
18 K. Murchison, "Environmental Law in Austalia and the United States: A Comparative 
Overview-Part 1" (1994) 11 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 179-192, p 181. 
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The authoritative source for the strength of Australian states is the 
Constitution, in particular, the specified legislative powers granted 
thereunder to the Commonwealth. The most important feature in this regard 
is that state parliaments may generally legislate with respect to all matters not 
reserved exclusively to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth's exclusive 
powers pertain mainly to places of national purpose—such as land set aside 
for aviation, defence and communications purposes—and the federal public 
service. 19 In most areas of policy, therefore, the power to legislate is conferred 
concurrently upon both levels of goverrunent. 20 
The Commonwealth's concurrent powers relevant to the offshore, as 
enumerated in section 51 of Part Five of the Constitution, Powers of the 
Parliament, are reproduced below. Because their application to offshore 
jurisdiction and resources policy will be seen in later chapters, it is necessary 
to comment upon these powers only briefly here. 
51. The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to 
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to:- 
(x) Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits; 
(xxix) External affairs; 
(xxxvii) Matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth by the 
Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States, but so that the . 
law shall extend only to States by whose Parliaments the matter 
is referred, or which afterwards adopts the law; 
(xxxviii) The exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request or with 
the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the States directly 
concerned, of any power which can at the establishment of this 
Constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom or by the Federal Council of Australia; 
19 Australian Constitution, s 52. 
20 The power pertaining to navigation and shipping needs to be mentioned for completeness. 
This power to legislate derives from a combination of common law and section 98 of the 
Constitution, pursuant to which the trade and commerce power [s 51(i)] is expressed to extend 
to the making of legislation with respect to shipping and navigation. M. White, op cit fn 7. 
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(xxxix) Matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this 
Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in 
the Government of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal 
Judicature, or in any department or officer of the 
Commonwealth 
In addition to the general concurrency of powers, two other sets of provisions 
further emphasize the cooperative character of the Constitution. The first are 
two Commonwealth legislative powers requiring the approval of the states 
for their exercise, while the other provisions protect the states from arbitrary 
Commonwealth action. The first-mentioned constitutional provisions are 
concurrent powers known as the reference and request powers, detailed 
above.21 The reference placticum empowers the Commonwealth to legislate 
with respect to matters refered by the states, while the request power is 
triggered at the states' unanimous behest. Legislation may be enacted based 
upon these heads of powers only at the initiative of the states. 
The reference and request powers are obviously curiosities. It seems that 
these legislative powers were probably included in the Constitution to enable 
the exchange of responsibilities between the two spheres of government, as is 
essential in a healthy federation. Notwithstanding the intention of these 
provisions, Haward notes that their limited use in enacting legislation 
highlights the reluctance of the states to further expand the Commonwealth's 
already considerable ability to legislate in most areas of policy. 22 
The other two constitutional provisions alluded to above provide for 
compensation to be payable by the Commonwealth, and circumscribe any 
unilateral alterations to the states. With respect to compensation, the 
Constitution restricts the Commonwealth to acquiring land only with 
21 Plactica 51 (xxxvii) and (xxxviii) respectively of the Constitution. 
22 Haward, op cit fn 16, pp 170-175. 
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compensatory action on just terms . 23 The convoluted process for altering the 
boundaries of states—specified in section 123—renders virtually unalterable 
any changes to the states as existing at federation. 24 As will be seen, these 
provisions have all been profound in both encouraging and restricting 
Commonwealth/state interaction in respect of the offshore. More 
fundamentally, though, the inclusion in the founding document of this array 
of provisions recognises and protects state interests from Commonwealth 
legislative excesses. In combination, these provisions make the Australian 
Constitution a "recipe for decentralization" •25 
It is finally important to mention section 109 of the Constitution. This 
section is critical in clarifying the operation of concurrent legislative powers. 
Section 109 ensures that in the event of conflict between state legislation and 
Commonwealth law enacted pursuant to a head of power, the latter will 
prevail and the state law will be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. 
Not surprisingly, the relationship between Commonwealth and state 
legislation has been the subject of considerable dispute, especially in the areas 
of offshore jurisdiction, resources policy and environmental law. The 
nation's supreme juridicial body, the High Court of Australia, has on a 
number of occasions adjudicated regarding the validity of federal and state 
legislative claims, Ciescribed further in the section 1.3.3. 26 For the moment it is • 
worth noting that s 109 was not conceived as a counter-veiling force to the 
cooperative tenet of the Constitution, but was devised much more narrowly 
23 Placticum 51 (xxxi) of the Constitution. 
24 Section 123 of the Consititution states: "The Parliament of the Commonwealth may, with 
the consent of the Parliament of a State, and the approval of the majority of the electors of 
the State voting upon the question, increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of the 
State, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed on, and may, with the like consent, 
make provision respecting the effect and operation of any increase or diminution or 
alteration of territory in relation to any State affected." 
25 R. Cullen, "The Encounter Between Natural Resources and Federalism in Canada and 
Australia" (1990) 24 U.B.C. Law Review 275-305. 
26 see, generally: G. Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (Butterworths, Sydney, 1992) pp 
76-94. 
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as a mechanism for resolving interaction in respect of particular legislative 
proposals. 
1.3.2 Australia and the Law of the Sea 
International law of the sea is relevant to national offshore resources policy 
for two reasons. Firstly, it provides the universally-agreed framework within 
which domestic exploitation occurs. Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 
the development of regulatory regimes is largely devolved to individual 
nations, unlike the situation regarding fishing and navigation where the 
international community is heavily involved in specifying rules of conduct.v 
Oil and gas exploitation take place within the sovereign power of the 
coastal state (Art. 2(1), 1958 Continental Shelf Convention; Art. 77 
LOSC). This implies that the coastal state is only marginally limited by 
the rules of international law in the exercise of its sovereign rights over 
the continental shelf. Hence the regulation of exploitation of the 
continental shelf takes place to a very large extent within the framework 
of the national legislation of the coastal state. 28 
In Australia's case the P(SL)A represents the conversion of international 
resources law into domestic legislative policy. LOSC is also very apposite to 
the present study of the P(SL)A for what it reveals about the 
Commonwealth's policy towards the continental shelf, a product of 
international treaty law [more in Chapter Two]. It is clearly in a nation's 
interest to support a convention favourable to its own domestic • 
circumstances, and to this end Australia has been an active participant in 
negotiating multi-lateral conventions, most notably the Law of the Sea. 29 
27 T. IJIstra, "Regional Co-operation in the North Sea: An Inquiry" (1988) 3 International 
Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 181-207, p 193. 
28 ibid . 
29 Australia's approach to the Law of the Sea Convention is returned to several times in the 
thesis where this helps frame domestic legislation. For discussions of Australian diplomacy 
generally, see: R Smyth, N. Flange and N. Burdess, "Big Brother? Australian's Image in 
the South Pacific" (1997) 51 Australian Journal of International Affairs 37-52; R. Woolcott, 
"Pathways of Modem Diplomacy" (1997) 51 Australian Journal of International Affairs 
103-108. For a discussion of Australia's role in Antarctic and regional marine policies, see 
respectively: A. Bergin, "Politics of Antarctic Minerals: The Greening of White Australia" 
(1991) 26 Australian Journal of Political Science 216-239 and A. Bergin and F. Michaelis, 
"Australia and the South Pacific: Implementing the UNCED Oceans Agenda" (1996) 20 
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The first LOS Conference was held in 1958. Australia was keen to see a 
wide definition of the continental shelf adopted at UNCLOS I, a policy 
described further in the next chapter. Fifteen years later [at the Third Law of 
the Sea Conference] the Commonwealth's negotiators were very adept at 
securing provisions beneficial to the country, an especial challenge given the 
blend of maritime features that needed to be satisfied simultaneously.3° These 
characteristics included — 
• as an island dependent upon shipping trade Australia was careful not 
to unnecessarily burden vessel traffic; 
• the Commonwealth was keen to protect its coastline from the 
growing incidence of pollution misadventures; 
• as a major producer of terrestrial minerals the prospect of a parallel 
offshore minerals regime posed particular challenges; 
• Australia was also in favour of retaining the older 1958 definition of 
the continental shelf.31 
The protracted time frame over which negotiations occurred [1973-1982] and 
the delay in the convention entering into force [1994] is widely known. 32 
Australia's policy towards LOSC remained unchanged over this extended 
Marine Policy 47-62. 
30 T. Mensah, "Background to the Law of the Sea Convention - Keynote Address", in M. 
Tsamenyi, S. Bateman and J. Delaney (ed), Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No. 3 The. 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: What it means to Australia and 
Australia's Marine Industries (Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 
Wollongong, 1996) pp 9-16. 
31 A. Bergin, "Australia and Deep Seabed Mining" (1982) 36 Australian Outlook 45-50; A. 
Bergin, "Australia and UNCLOS 3" (1983) 29 Australian Journal of Political History 427- 
439. 
32 D. Anderson, "Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the United Nations Convention at 
the Law of the Sea" (1993) 42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 654-664; D. 
Anderson, "LOS Convention: Status and Prospects" (1994) 18 Marine Policy 494-497; D. 
Anderson, "Further Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea" (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
886-893; W. Burke, "Importance of the 1982 UN Convention at the Law of the Sea and its 
Future Development" (1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law 1-4; C. Conroy, 
"The 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention; Entry Into Force and Australian 
Ratification" (1994) 3 Australian Environmental Law News 4-5; T. McDorman, "The Entry 
into Force of the 1982 LOS Convention and the Article 76 Outer Continental Shelf Regime" 
(1995) 10 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 165-187; I. Shearer, "The 
United Nations Convention at the Law of the Sea" (1994) 68 The Australian Law Journal 
308-311. 
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period, however, in spite of three different Commonwealth governments 
being in power. Indeed, Suter notes that it is "impossible to detect a change in 
policy" regardless of the political party in office. 33 
The seamless approach towards LOSC is important for what it illustrates 
about the bipartisan nature of offshore resources policy in the 
Commonwealth sphere. Although there have been perceptible differences 
between Liberal Coalition and Labor federal governments towards offshore 
petroleum, both domestically and in terms of LOSC, these gaps have 
narrowed during the evolution of the P(SL)A regime. As will become 
apparent in later chapters of this thesis, Commonwealth offshore petroleum 
policy has been influenced less by party politics than by the contextual factors 
shaping policy, introduced below. Likewise, the policies of the states with 
respect to offshore petroleum have also been bipartisan, reflecting the 
concerns and aspirations of this governmental sphere rather than being 
distinguishable by reference to the particular party in power. 
Another important point to be made regarding LOSC is the poor linkage 
between international law and Commonwealth domestic policy. Australia is 
notable in a world survey for its failure to convert new international 
maritime codes into federal legislation. 34 As Rothwell and Haward remark — 
Despite having much to gain from the Convention and being a strong 
supporter during its negotiation, Australia did not ratify the 
Convention till 1994.35 
Given the considerable benefits to be derived from securing control over 
offshore areas it is worth considering the Commonwealth's reticence in 
33 K. Suter, The History of the Development of the Law of the Sea - the Importance for Global 
Marine Conservation and Recommendations for Australian Action (World Wildlife Fund for 
Nature Australia and Humane Society International, Sydney, 1994), p 17. 
34 G. Galdorisi and J. Stavridis, "Time to Revisit the Law of the Sea" (1993) 24 Ocean 
Development and International Law 301-315. 
35 D. Rothwell and M. Haward, "Federal and International Perspectives an Australia's 
Maritime Claims" (1996) 20 Marine Policy 29-46, p 30. 
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legislating to this end. A partial explanation is likely found in the 
Commonwealth's generally cautious approach towards the offshore; it should 
come as no surprise that national implementation of LOSC has been so 
delayed in Australia given the history of marine policy development. 
Another suggestion for the delay experienced by the Commonwealth in 
legislating to give effect to LOSC pertains to lingering uncertainties over 
jurisdictional arrangements as settled by the OCS in 1980. 36 Although there 
are some unresolved difficulties presented by offshore jurisdiction these are 
likely secondary to other policy factors. Perhaps the most significant 
constraint to swift implementation arises from the fact that the foreign affairs 
portfolio dominated the Australian delegation to LOSC negotiating sessions 
whilst devoting scant attention to the administrative arrangements needed 
for implementation.37 Also, the convention is a package of mixed duties and 
obligations and the Commonwealth—like most of the developed world—is 
reluctant to support the package in entirety, especially in light of emergent 
legal precedents such as presented by the Teoh case. 38 The Commonwealth's 
general diplomacy with respect to international treaties, coupled with the 
desire to secure increased benefits over offshore resources while minimizing 
the international burdens associated therewith, seem to adequately explain 
Australia's eventual ratification of LOSC. 
As commented elsewhere by this author and others, the Commonwealth 
has recently legislated to avail itself of the benefits under LOSC relating to the 
36 A. Bergin and M. Haward, "Australia's Approach to High Seas Fishing" (1995) 10 The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 349-367, fn 2. 
37 R. Boardman, Global Regimes and Nation-States: Environmental Issues in Australian 
Politics (Carleton University Press, Ottawa, 1990). 
38 H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea - The Protection and Preservation of the 
Marine Environment", in K. Ryan (ed), International Law in Australia (The Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1984) pp 439-455; M. Herriman, "The Law of the Sea—A Delicate 
Balance of Rights and Responsibilities", in D. Tarte and P. Eiser (ed), Occasional Paper 
Number 7 Development of an Oceans Policy for Australia (Australian Committee for IUCN, 
Sydney, 1997) pp 21-31. 
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continental shelf.39 The enabling legislation has maximized controls over 
offshore petroleum without offending domestic arrangements for its 
exploitation, nor triggered judicial review. Whilst this approach reveals the 
clearest intention and maturity of the Commonwealth as a legislative policy 
maker it also highlights the highly settled state of affairs regarding offshore 
jurisdiction. 
1.3.3 The High Court and judicial activism 
The third element of the constitutional framework for the P(SL)A is High 
Court decision making. The High Court has traditionally held an enviable 
reputation for its application of strict legalism principles to judgements over 
the validity of Commonwealth and state legislation:10 With respect to 
decisions over interpretations of constitutional provisions, one observer 
notes that — 
The intention is to be ascertained from the ordinary and natural 
meaning of the words themselves, relying on the proper legal methods 
of construction and interpretation.41 
Over the past ten years or so, there are perceptions that the High Court's 
reputation has been tarnished by a growing elasticity in applying this strict 
legalistic doctrine. A number of high profile cases have revolved around 
liberal interpretations of common law theories and the reach of the. 
Commonwealth's legislative power, which in combination represent a 
distinctive departure from established legal precedents. These inconsistencies 
39 P. Brazil, "UNCLOS Comes into Force - Implications for Mining" (1995) 14 Australian 
Mining and Petroleum Law Association Bulletin 1-3; N. Evans, "LOSC, Offshore Resources 
and Australian Marine Policy" (1996) 20 Marine Policy 223-227; D. Rothwell, "Australia 
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" (1994) International Law News 
30-35. 
40 S. Gageler, "Foundations of Australian Federalism and the Role of Judicial Review" (1987) 7 
Federal Law Review 162-198; B. Galligan, Politics of the High Court: A Study of the 
Judicial Branch of Government in Australia (University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1987). 
41 H. Patapan, "The Dead Hand of the Founders? Original Intent and the Constitutional 
Protection of Rights and Freedoms in Australia" (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 211-235, p 
211. 
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arise from the High Court's occasional tendency to rule along apparent policy 
lines, as well as according to strictly legal theories. 42 In turn, heated 
accusations from both scholars and politicians have been directed at the High 
Court for straying into the realm of policy making, the province of elected 
governments.43 Cullen has remarked that the written word of• the 
Constitution has over time become less important in resolving political 
control over resources than drafters had originally anticipated." 
The High Court's judicial activism comes from its willingness to shape 
the operation of section 109 so as to give maximum effect to Commonwealth 
legislation. Where the Commonwealth evinces an intention to occupy an 
area of policy through the enactment of legislation the High Court has 
increasingly determined that no state law may enter into that same area. It is 
through positive interpretations of Commonwealth legislative policy, 
especially in relation to the external affairs power, that the nexus of power 
has generally shifted to the centre of the federation. 
The most expeditious affirmation of Commonwealth legislative 
paramountcy has been witnessed in the area of the environment. Beginning 
with Whitlam's Prime Ministership in the mid-1970s, the Commonwealth 
has assumed expansive environmental policy-making capabilities by 
displacing these same functions of the states. The avenue through which this 
has principally been achieved is the enactment of legislation based upon the 
external affairs head of power, s 51(xxix). 45 Over the past twenty years—and at 
an especially accelerated pace since the mid-1980s—environmental policy has 
42 P. Goldsworthy, "Ownership of the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf of Australia: An 
Analysis of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case (State of New South Wales and Ors v. 
the Commonwealth of Australia)" (1976) 50 The Australian Law Journal 175-184. 
43 See the following comments: "Courting a proper, mature relationship" The Australian, 24 
September 1997; "The jury is out" The Weekend Australian, 10-11 January 1998. 
" Cullen, op cit fn 25. 
45 See: Bates, op cit fn 26 and references contained therein. 
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become highly globalized with a commensurate proliferation of international 
environmental treaties.46 
The Commonwealth displays a strong commitment to discharging its 
domestic responsibilities relating to international law, a view in which it is 
concurred by the High Court. Perhaps the most pivotal determination of the 
potential ambit of the external affairs power was the 1983 Franklin Dams case. 
This judgement confirmed that the Commonwealth was able to halt 
construction of a dam in Tasmania by legislating to give effect to the World 
Heritage Convention.47 As a result of this and subsequent decisions, it is now 
well established that the Commonwealth can extend its legislative capacity 
into virtually any field by incurring international treaty obligations. 
The effect of judicial determinations are not always welcome by the 
Commonwealth, however. A 1995 decision by the Federal Court of 
Australia—the Gunn's case—exposed to environmental scrutiny a range of 
resource decisions which previously had been immune to external 
oversight.48 As shown in Chapter Six, it was this decision which in part 
compelled the first statutory environmental review of an offshore petroleum 
proposal located in Commonwealth waters. 49 The High Court has also 
interpreted the application of international treaty law to the 
Commonwealth's disfavour. In the recent Teoh case the High Court 
determined that the Commonwealth is bound by the duties and obligations 
46 D. Freestone, "The Road From Rio: International Environmental Law After the Earth 
Summit" (1994) 6 Journal of Environmental Law 193-218; M. Tsamenyi, "Trends in 
International Law Making: Implications for the Mining, Petroleum and Energy Industries in 
Australia" (1996) 15 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association Bulletin 118-120; D. 
Rothwell and B. Boer, "From the Franklin to Berlin: The Internationalisation of Australian 
Environmental Law and Policy" (1995) 17 Sydney Law Review 242-277. 
47 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625. 
48 Tasmanian Conservation Trust v Minister for Resources, Unreported, Federal Court of 
Australia, 10 January 1995. See also: J. McDonald and S. Mundienber& "Public Interest 
Environmental Litigation-Chipping Away at Procedural Obstacles" (1995) 12 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 140-147. 
49 N. Evans, "Offshore Oil Updates" (1996) 15 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law 
Association Bulletin 116-117. 
Chapter One 	 22  
arising from conventions even in the absence of implementing legislation. 50 
Federal governments of both persuasion have since introduced bills to 
overturn this particular ruling, insisting that the High Court has overstepped 
the boundaries between judicial and administrative decision making. 51 
The situation with respect to jurisdiction over the offshore has similarly 
been shaped by interpretations of international treaty law. The Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act (1973) Cth, the cornerstone of Whitlam's offshore 
policy, was enacted and subsequently upheld by the High Court based upon s 
51(x)cix) of the Constitution.52 As will be seen, so profound was this 
judgement that it was to later frustrate the Commonwealth's efforts to 
circumvent the essence of the High Court ruling and return some offshore 
authority to the states under the OCS. As intimated earlier though, the 
Commonwealth has generally not been so adventurous in advancing 
offshore resources policy through the national expression of international 
law. 
Whilst the legislation underpinning the OCS has not been directly 
reviewed by the High Court, a number of related judgements have 
commented favourably on the fabric of the offshore arrangements created 
thereby [more later]. The mid-1980s also witnessed a brief period of superior 
court cases between the state of Victoria and the Commonwealth in relation 
to provisions of the P(SL)A and the powers it gives to the joint and 
designated authorities. Chapter Five shows that the Commonwealth 
response to much of this litigation was to amend the P(SL)A to put beyond 
doubt its role in offshore petroleum policy. 
50 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Teoh (1995) 128 ALR 335. 
51 The Keating Labor government introduced the Administrative Decisions (Effect of 
International Instruments) Bill 1995 (Cth), which was passed by the House of 
Representatives cn 29 June 1995 but lapsed after being referred to the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Legislation Committee. On 18 August 1997, the Howard Liberal government 
introduced another bill of the same name which at the time of writing had not been enacted. 
52 New South Wales v the Commonwealth 135 CLR 337. 
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From this brief overview of the role of parliament and the courts in 
environmental and offshore resources policy it can be seen that judicial 
determinations seldom prescribe Commonwealth and state responsibilities, 
nor finalize boundaries between the two spheres. Court decisions plainly feed 
back into the political system through a decision-making loop, often leading 
to political accommodation rather than finally settling jurisdictional 
disputes.53 Indeed, Collins remarks that the aftermath of a judgement is as 
worthy of interpretation as the arguments leading to the initial decision. 54 
Other than Haward's work, the relationship between judicial review and 
intergovernmental interaction in offshore policy has been little studied 
within the Australian context. 55 He argues that the effect of High Court action 
confirming Commonwealth paramountcy has been to entrench the role of 
the states in broad policy through intergovernmental feedback. This eventual 
outcome occurred subsequent to both the Franklin Dams and Seas and 
Submerged Lands cases. 
Reviewing the role of the Constitution in respect of U.S. offshore 
relations, Anton argued that the form of policy making acceptable to both 
spheres of government is arrived at less through literal interpretations than 
by procedural means. That is, limitations on the exercise of federal authority 
are determined by state participation in the workings of the federal 
government without there being defined an exact blend between national 
purpose and states' rights. According to Anton, the Constitution is 
53 As discussed in the next chapter, the notion of political accommodation has been employed 
by one commentator to frame the first period of offshore petroleum policy in the mid-1960s 
when the Commonwealth entered into the generous Australian Petroleum Settlement. J. 
Taylor, "The Settlement of Disputes Between Federal and State Governments Concerning 
Offshore Petroleum Resources: Accommodation or Adjudication?" (1970) 11 Harvard 
International Law Journal 358-399. 
54 H. Collins, "Federalism, the States and International Affairs", in B. Galligan (ed), 
Australian Federalism (Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1989) pp 184-191. 
55 Haward, op cit fn 16, pp 30-40. 
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sufficiently ambiguous to allow accommodation according to whatever is 
permissible given the prevailing national mood — 
The most important contribution of the Constitution, however, is not 
some set of imaginary principles by which to determine the allocation of 
power, but a framework to guide the continuing debate of who should 
do what. The Constitution does not answer questions of power 
allocation so much as it provides a structure through which answers 
can be found.% 
Anton's interpretation of the constitutional shaping of U.S. 
intergovernmental relations captures the essence of Commonwealth/state 
interaction in respect of offshore petroleum in Australia. The Constitution 
provides the rigid parameters within which the spheres of government 
interact, but the actual allocation and exercise of power thereunder is 
influenced by several contextual factors, which the thesis now introduces. 
1.4 CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES ON COMMONWEALTH LEGISLATIVE POLICY 
The previous sections have introduced two sets of parameters—the 
Constitution and LOSC—that have served as the framework for 
intergovernmental relations offshore. This part identifies five factors which 
have influenced the evolution of the P(SL)A within this constitutional- 
framework. Unlike broad factors such as heads of power and international 
legal provisions which define the boundaries for Commonwealth/state 
interaction, the influences introduced here are understood by reference to 
each phase of the P(SL)A's evolution. That is, in various combinations these 
five influences provide the explanatory context for how law and politics 
56 T. Anton, "Models of American Intergovernmental Relations", in M. Silva (ed), Ocean 
Resources and U.S. Intergovernmental Relations in the 1980s (Westview Press, Boulder, 
1986) pp 1-36. 
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evolved at each phase to determine the form of the P(SL)A which emerged at 
that time. 
1.4.1 Extent of Australia's maritime domain 
The geographical basis to Commonwealth/state offshore relations is the 
country's vast coastline and control over adjacent offshore areas. Very few 
scholars have recognised the basic geopolitical fact that every Australian state 
has a long coastal margin, with attendant responsibilities for marine affairs, 
an oversight reflecting the legal orientation of most historical analyses. Any 
Commonwealth decision affecting offshore areas is therefore felt nationwide. 
Because the coastline is divided among all states—in other words, every 
Australian state has an offshore personality—the history of offshore 
settlements is largely characterised by state government unity in terms of 
their interaction with the Commonwealth. Opeskin and Rothwell articulate 
this influence in the following terms — 
Unlike the United States of America and Canada, all of the Australian 
states have extensive coastlines, a fact that has lent particularly sharp 
focus to disputes between the federal and state governments over 
sovereignty and the use of the territorial sea. 57 
As will become apparent, the states for some considerable time provided a 
powerful counter to the Commonwealth's offshore aspirations, due to their 
experience in marine resources management. The colonies all had active 
interests in offshore fisheries prior to federation, a situation preserved in 1901 
by the Constitution [s 51(x)]. 58 During the 1950s and 1960s when the 
Commonwealth entered the marine resources policy field, the states were 
united in their approach to obtain substantial controls over developmental 
fisheries and petroleum regimes. In this regard, the states were strengthened 
57 B. Opeskin and D. Rothwell, "Australia's Territorial Sea: International and Federal 
Implications of Its Extension to 12 Miles" (1991) 22 Ocean Development and International 
Law 395-431, p 396. 
58 M. Haward, "The Commonwealth in Australian Fisheries Management: 1955-1995" (1995) 2 
The Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 313-325. 
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in their claims to manage offshore resources because of the Commonwealth's 
own inabilities in this same area, a complementary factor introduced below. 
It is only since the OCS of 1980 that this unified alliance of states has 
dissolved somewhat, attributable to two particular developments. Firstly, 
since broad offshore responsibilities were finally settled, marine policy has 
developed in distinctly sectoral patterns contrary to the intention of the 
OCS.59 Also, as the viability of offshore prospects around the coastline has 
been disproved states have become disinterested in maintaining a national 
approach towards offshore oil. These two developments in particular are 
detailed at length in Chapter Five. 
In the event of offshore claims being reopened, however, it is conceivable 
that the states may again find unite in their negotiations with the 
Commonwealth because of the general commonality of state interests in 
relation to adjacent maritime zones. Such a proposition is supported by 
Burmester, who acknowledges that Australia's extensive coastline and the 
federal system of government present problems for legislative policy, but that 
the Commonwealth's approach has been to address matters on a "purely 
functional basis."60 Therefore, an issue affecting ocean and coastal policy 
broadly would be expected to elicit responses from all Australian states. 
1.4.2 Industry pressures and relations with the Commonwealth 
A well recognised influence on the early development of the P(SL)A was the 
context created by the pressing requirement to provide security of title over 
offshore tracts.61 As interest in the prospectivity of the Bass Strait oil fields 
59 M. Haward, "The Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement" (1989) 13 Marine Policy 
334-348. 
60 H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea", in J. Crawford and D. Rothwell (ed), The 
Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific Region (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995) 
pp 51-64, p 53. 
61 See: M. Crommelirt, "Offshore Mining and Petroleum: Constitutional Issues" (1981) 3 
Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Journal 191-213; Cullen, op cit fn 15; C. Harders, 
"Australia's Offshore Petroleum Legislation: A Survey of its Constitutional and its Federal 
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burgeoned in the mid-1960s, pressure mounted on the Commonwealth and 
Victoria to guarantee operators the security of newly granted titles. The 
enactment of legislation in 1967 immediately satisfied this requirement, if 
only temporarily. Following a Senate inquiry in 1970, doubts were cast upon 
the security of offshore titles which in turn encouraged the Commonwealth 
to assert itself offshore, thereby instilling in operators further doubt as to the 
security of their titles. 
Even the lauded OCS failed to convince offshore prospectors of the 
stability of the regime. For those shouldering the risks of exploration and 
production the settlement was viewed as just another stage in the saga over 
offshore oi1.62 The festering concern over title security was re-ignited with the 
election in 1983 of the Hawke federal government, and the commensurate 
deterioration of its relationship with state administrators of the offshore 
regime. Orchison describes this situation as a "complex triangular 
relationship between the petroleum industry, the Federal Government and 
the State Governments". 63 
As will be seen, oil companies in 1967 prevailed upon the 
Commonwealth to enact a regime that granted extremely generous terms of 
access, which they were able to do as a function of both their own influence 
and the Commonwealth's lack of assertiveness. Subsequent to that time, the 
Commonwealth has continuously redefined its relationship with the oil 
industry by enacting provisions to impose upon operators clear policy 
priorities, often to the latter's disapproval. As a consequence, relations 
between the Commonwealth and industry have become increasingly strained 
at different times, exacerbated by particular political climates prevailing at 
Features" (1968) 6 Melbourne University Law Review 415-428. 
62  K. Orchison, "Petroleum Exploration Offshore", in "Occasional Papers in Maritime Studies" 
Australia's Maritime Horizons in the 1980s (Australian Centre for Maritime Studies, 
Canberra, 1982) pp 66-71. 
63 Ibid, p 70. 
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certain times. Throughout the evolution of the P(SL)A, though, 
state/industry relations have always remained stable, a fact commented upon 
by Stevenson — 
The petroleum industry thus has a strongly favourable impression of 
state governments, unmixed with any perceptions of actual or potential 
conflict. The widely held belief, in Canberra and in the Labor Party, that 
a cosy alliance exists between state governments and 'the 
multinationals' has a large element of truth when applied to the 
petroleum industry." 
1.4.3 Jurisdictional uncertainty 
As with the need to provide security of title, jurisdictional uncertainties have 
provided the context for each evolutionary phase of the P(SL)A and also 
followed a not dissimilar pattern. 65 At each critical juncture of the offshore 
history—the 1967 settlement, enactment of the Seas and Submerged Lands 
Act, the OCS—jurisdictional uncertainties emerge as powerful influences on 
the P(SL)A regime. Commensurate with the resolution of jurisdiction over 
time, these uncertainties appear to become less relevant as a context for 
influencing inter-governmental interaction. 
A better appreciation of the influence played by jurisdiction is that whilst 
the intensity of debate has clearly reduced over time, so too has the method of 
resolution changed. As will be described, decision-making as between the two 
spheres of government has continued to shift within the P(SL)A regime since 
basic jurisdictional questions were belatedly settled in 1980. 66 The means for 
shifting Commonwealth/state responsibilities has been to amend the regime 
from within rather than confronting basic jurisdictional questions and risk 
reopening another chapter in the offshore saga. The context for these more 
64 G. Stevenson, Mineral Resources and Australian Federalism (Centre for Research cn Federal 
Financial Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1976), p 75. 
65 Crommelin, op cit fn 61; Cullen, op cit fn 15. 
66 Evans and Bailey, op cit fn 9. 
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recent legislative amendments is to be found partly in improved 
Commonwealth policy-making capabilities, introduced below. 
1.4.4 Federalism and intergovernmental relations 
The fourth and richest factor for understanding reform of the P(SL)A 
concerns how well Commonwealth and state governments relate at 
ministerial and bureaucratic levels within the context of changing 
perceptions of federalism. The currents of federalism have "ebbed and 
flowed" between Canberra and state capitals as a result of political swings, 
with obvious ramifications for marine policy. 67 These federalism movements 
in turn influence the relationship between ministers and officials from both 
spheres of government. 
Most authors tend to consider only the forces of federalism and centralism 
flowing at particular times. 68 Cullen, for example, exhorts a greater 
devolution of authority from the Commonwealth back to the periphery. 69 On 
the other hand, Crommelin supports diversity in governmental responses 
and seems content to allow centralizing tendencies to continue." As this 
author has commented in the literature, casting Australian offshore policy in 
these terms tends to take an unnecessarily pessimistic view of any difficulties 
presented by the vertical separation of powers.n 
A more useful contribution for understanding Commonwealth/state 
relations is made by Haward, who identifies intergovernmental fora as the 
outcome of continuous shifts in national political mood. 72 The mechanism 
67 P. Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: A Study in Prime Ministerial Power in Australia (Penguin, 
Ringwood, 1989). 
68 Framing intergovernmental interaction in this manner equates to Sawer's notions of organic 
and cooperative federalism. Sawer, G., Federalism Under Strain: Australia 1972-1975 
(Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1977). 
69 Cullen, op cit fn 25. 
" Crommelin, op cit fn 8. 
71 Evans and Bailey, op cit fn 9. 
72 In his thesis, Haward shows how the relative success of the states in maintaining an 
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commonly used to harmonise Commonwealth/state interaction in Australia 
is the ministerial council, although the role of senior officials acting through 
standing committees is equally crucial to the successful administration of 
these bodies73 Because intergovernmental fora require direct exchange 
amongst ministers and officials personal dynamics must necessarily 
influence the policies that emerge during movement along the centralism-
federalism spectrum. 
In a recent paper, Haward advocated the continued development of such 
intergovernmental fora in Australia — 
Given that all spheres of government have interests and responsibilities 
for aspects of ocean and coastal policy in Australia it is not surprising 
that intergovernmental relations loom large in the development and 
implementation of policies. While recognising the realities posed by a 
federal constitution, identification of the opportunities posed by 
intergovernmental institutional arrangements is important. These 
opportunities include facilitating interaction between officials and 
providing a means to operationise 'political will' in cross-jurisdictional 
policy areas. Recognising the role of such arrangements overcomes, in 
part, criticisms of excessive 'overlap' and/or 'duplication' between 
Commonwealth and State governments. Overlapping responsibility can 
provide for increased innovation and responsiveness and, arguably, can 
improve policy making and implementation. 74 
The cordiality or volatility of Commonwealth/state relations generally 
coincides with and reflects the prevailing variant of federalism, as filtered 
through the sympathies of state and federal governments. To be sure, during 
the formative years of the petroleum regime there was a clear alignment of 
policy along party lines. Over time, this philosophy has been superseded by 
the distinction of policies according to the sphere of government rather than 
their partisan political affiliation. In Stevenson's words "vertical conflict is 
offshore identity was due largely to their ability to work through intergovernmental 
processes and institutions; M. Haward, op cit fn 16. 
73 Ibid, pp 40-60. 
74 M. Haward, "Institutional Framework for Australian Ocean and Coastal Management" 
(1996) 33 Ocean and Coastal Management 19-39, p 20. 
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reduced, although not eliminated, when governments are controlled by the 
same party."75 
At certain periods the personalities of key players has further enhanced 
and aggravated dominant centralist or federalist tendencies. This meshing of 
personal and political influences occurred most visibly at several phases of 
the P(SL)A evolution. For instance, close relations between the Prime 
Minister and Premiers of oil-producing states produced outcomes favourable 
to Victoria and Western Australia on two identifiable occasions, 1967 and 
1982 respectively. The opposite effect is also observed. Strained relations 
between leaders of Labor state and federal governments provide the context 
for interpreting Commonwealth legislative and administrative action during 
the 1980s when much of the states' lingering decision-making exclusivity was 
displaced by the Commonwealth. 
It is finally worth commenting that intergovernmental agreements are 
primarily political means by which to achieve cooperation, because of which 
the decisions of most ministerial councils are legally unenforceable. 76 
Australian superior courts have therefore tended to support 
intergovernmental fora—quite strongly at times—but without giving these 
the imprimatur of legal endorsement?" As this thesis argues, the P(SL)A 
establishes several devices for achieving intergovernmental cooperation with 
respect to offshore petroleum policy. Most notable of these is the joint 
authority, however its subcommittee and the designated authority are also 
highly specialized mechanisms for policy sharing between the 
Commonwealth and states. Unlike most ministerial councils however, these 
devices are all the creation of legislation and their powers and functions are 
75 Stevenson, op cit fn 64, p 5. 
76 Crommelin, op cit fn 61. 
77 A. Gardner, "Federal Intergovernmental Co-operation on Environmental Management: A 
Comparison of Developments in Australia and Canada" (1994) 11 Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal 104-136. 
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tightly prescribed in law. It is precisely because of this statutory basis that the 
P(SL)A has been amended to allow the Commonwealth to reallocate the roles 
of the joint and designated authorities and government officials in policy 
making. 
1.4.5 Commonwealth offshore capabilities 
A final influence on the evolution of the P(SL)A is the Commonwealth's 
capability to regulate offshore petroleum. The context within which the 
legislation was first enacted was notable for the absence of any federal 
technical or administrative skills. Regardless of the influences at work in the 
1960s, the Commonwealth quite simply could not assume responsibility for 
regulating offshore petroleum nor setting policy, a position from which it for 
some time struggled to recover. 78 
Nonetheless, Commonwealth capabilities in this area have grown 
commensurate with its experience. The states are now less essential as 
administrators of the offshore regime. 79 Importantly though, participation by 
the states in respect of continental shelf decision making has never been 
doubted despite the Commonwealth's improved economic and technical 
capabilities. Indeed, the very fact that the Commonwealth has succeeded in 
balancing state input to its own policy development testifies to the former's 
decision-making capabilities.80 Each phase of the P(SL)A's evolution needs to 
therefore be placed in the context of the Commonwealth's capability to enact 
and administer offshore petroleum legislation. 
This chapter has introduced the elements necessary to explore the 
proposition underpinning the thesis—that the efficacy of the offshore 
78 P. Reid, "Commonwealth-State Relations Offshore Mining and Petroleum Legislation; 
Recent Developments: An Historic Milestone or Millstone?" (1980) 2 Australian Mining and 
Petroleum Law Journal 58-76. 
" Hunt, op cit fn 10. 
8° Evans and Bailey, op cit fn 9. 
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petroleum regime is found in the joint sharing of policy and decision making 
powers between the federal and state governments, but which has evolved 
over time to its present form wherein the Commonwealth may now exert 
ultimate supremacy. The Constitution and LOSC provide the framework for 
the enactment and administration of Commonwealth legislation. By 
reviewing the P(SL)A within the context of particular influential factors over 
time, it is possible to understand how the legislative regime has evolved 
within this constitutional setting. 
The thesis now turns to examine the first evolutionary phase of offshore 
petroleum policy in Australia, covering the period 1945 to 1967. This phase 
represents the first foray by the Commonwealth into the area of marine 
policy. During the corresponding period in the United States the federal 
government asserted its rights over the continental shelf through 
presidential proclamation and subsequent legislation, irrespective of states' 
wishes. In Australia, the influences identified above conspired against the 
Commonwealth taking assertive legislative action and the states—being 
better prepared for the offshore boom—instead assumed a substantial role in 
petroleum policy making and administration. 
Chapter Two 
The First Phase of Offshore Jurisdiction - 
1945-1967 
Despite having legislative powers with respect to the offshore, it was only in 
concert with growing international expressions of interest in marine 
resources following the Second World War that the Commonwealth moved 
tentatively to take advantage of newly accepted concepts of offshore 
jurisdiction. Unlike the jurisdictional assertions made by other claimant 
nations during the 1940s and 1950s, however, the Commonwealth's actions to 
improve its control over resources were motivated by neither a desire to 
expand its general capacity in this area, nor to usurp existing state roles. 
Rather, the Commonwealth acted—after some considerable delay—for two 
ostensible reasons concerning fisheries management: to fill a vacuum in the 
national system of fisheries laws; and to close jurisdictional gaps existing in 
an international sense which formative international law made permissible. 
The enactment of legislation to this end during the 1950s represents, at 
best, a cautious foray by the Commonwealth into a new policy area.' When 
considered in terms of UNCLOS developments pertaining to the continental 
shelf, and the failure to link these to related domestic initiatives, the 
Commonwealth's legislative approach towards marine policy appears 
deficient. That the Commonwealth so lacked confidence at the time was 
simply the outcome of its historical absence from the field of marine 
resources policy. 
This same interpretation of Commonwealth marine policy in relation to territorial sea 
developments was made forty years later: "Australia's decision ... demonstrates a fairly 
cautious approach to Australia's law of the sea policy interests." A. Bergin, "Australia 
Extends Territorial Sea to 12 Nautical Miles" (1991) 6 International Journal of Estuarine and 
Coastal Law 127-132, p 131. 
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Given these antecedents, it is unsurprisingly that the Commonwealth's 
minor role in marine policy was perpetuated during the second significant 
event of this developmental phase of offshore policy. The Australian 
Petroleum Settlement, an elaborate regime agreed upon by all governments 
in 1967, vested almost exclusive administration and control over offshore 
petroleum in the states. It is well recognised that the form the Settlement 
took in 1967 reflected uncertainties• over offshore jurisdiction, and the 
pressing need to provide security of title to operators.' Less well appreciated, 
however, are the several other influences which shaped the Settlement. 
These factors include the Commonwealth's deference to states' decision 
making superiority, and its compliance with state government and industry 
desires over the eventual form of the regime. 
The 1967 Settlement had the effect of securing the states as offshore policy 
makers. Several decades—and renegotiations of offshore positions—would 
pass before the Commonwealth was able to emplace a sustainable legislative 
regime wherein it exerted any substantial decision making powers. The main 
consequence of the 1967 Settlement, therefore, was that it established 
parameters—legal, political and industrial—for intergovernmental 
interaction with respect to offshore oil policy which have in varying degrees 
endured to the present day. Put another way, the partnership approach of the • 
current P(SL)A regime derives its basis from developments begun in the mid-
1950s. The three significant events of this first offshore phase—international 
maritime treaties, Commonwealth fisheries legislation and the 1967 
Settlement—are examined here as an insight into better understanding the 
evolution of the offshore petroleum legislation. 
2 R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Disputes (The 
Federation Press, Sydney, 1990) pp 61-63, 71. 
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2.1 EMERGENCE OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
2.1.1 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
Perhaps the first substantive development in the corpus of international 
maritime law dates back to 15th Century Europe, and the contributions made 
at that time by Grotius and Sheldon. 3 Efforts to define sea law this century 
began with a League of Nations conference held in The Hague in 1930. The 
Hague Conference of Parties marked the first truly international effort to 
codify an oceans policy regime in what Vallega terms the evolution of the sea 
use structure.' At the Hague conference, a number of participating nations 
favoured designating the strip of water adjacent to coastal States as their 
territorial seas.' No agreement was forthcoming in 1930, though, after which 
further efforts were stalled during the intervening war years.' Custom 
therefore remained the dominant approach to international sea law, until 
this was finally supplanted by treaty in 1958. 
Attention turned again to ocean policy affairs immediately following the 
conclusion of hostilities. A number of reasons can be proposed to account for 
this renewed global interest in the oceans. These include: 
• 	the concept of an exploitable continental shelf becoming increasingly 
attractive to nations; 
3 W. Ball, "The Old Grey Mare, National Enclosure of the Oceans" (1996) 27 Ocean 
Development and International Law 97-124; R. Friedheim, "Managing the Second Phase of 
Enclosure" (1992) 17 Ocean and Coastal Management 217-236; J. Green, "Antarctic EEZ 
Baselines: An Alternative Formula" (1996) 11 International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law 333-350; T. Mensah, "Background to the Law of the Sea Convention - Keynote 
Address", in M. Tsamenyi, S. Bateman and J. Delaney (ed), Wollongong Papers on Maritime 
Policy No. 3 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: What it means to 
Australia and Australia's Marine Industries (Centre for Maritime Policy, University of 
Wollongong, Wollongong, 1996) pp 9-16. 
A. Vallega, Sea Management - A Theoretical Approach (Elsevier Applied Science, London, 
1992). 
5  A. Morgan, "The New Law of the Sea: Rethinking the Implications for Sovereign Jurisdiction 
and Freedom of Action" (1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law 5-29. 
6  P. Bailey, "Australia and the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea", in D. O'Connell 
(ed), International Law in Australia (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1966) pp 228-245. 
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• growing interest in the offshore due perhaps to the heavy reliance 
upon terrestrial and littoral resources which occurred during the war; 
• the development of technological capacities to exploit resources 
further offshore; and 
• international willingness to contemplate new world orders and enter 
into international treaties, flowing from the cessation of hostilities.' 
The year 1945 is accepted as a watershed year in the evolution of oceans 
policy. That year, motivated by the importance of marine resources—
especially oil—President Truman proclaimed United States jurisdiction over 
the continental shelf.' The U.S. proclamation importantly distinguished 
between the continental shelf and the suPerjacent waters; the latter displayed 
the character of high seas and therefore were open to free and unimpeded 
innocent passage.' Notwithstanding that the United States claim explicitly 
preserved navigational freedoms, it nonetheless catalyzed other States to 
establish maritime zones adjacent to their shores." 
In his exhaustive treatment of the Law of the Sea, Attard documents the 
unilateral and regional claims made by coastal States during the 1950s." 
These offshore claims were at times extensive and ambitious—particularly in 
relation to Latin America—far exceeding the U.S. claim and being 
indefensible on the grounds of maritime custom. The disorder that ensued 
offshore lent considerable urgency to the need for an international remedy to 
7 Cullen, op cit fn 2 pp 13, 19-20; P. Reid, "Commonwealth-State Relations Offshore Mining and 
Petroleum Legislation; Recent Developments: An Historic Milestone of Millstone?" (1980) 2 
Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Journal 58-76. 
"Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea-bed of the Continental Shelf" Presidential 
Proclamation 2667, 28 September 1945, 10 Federal Register 12303 (1945). 
9 D. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
London, 1987); W. Ball, "The Old Grey Mare, National Enclosure of the Oceans" (1996) 27 
Ocean Development and International Law 97-124. 
10 R. Kenchington, Managing Marine Environments (Taylor & Francis, New York, 1990); A. L. 
Morgan, "The New Law of the Sea: Rethinking the Implications for Sovereign Jurisdiction 
and Freedom of Action" (1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law 5-29. 
11 Attard, op cit fn 9. 
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be reached. Knecht articulates this rapid deterioration in customary maritime 
law — 
• "This move by the United States represented a fundamental change in 
the ocean jurisdictional situation and it triggered similar action by a 
number of other nations over the next two decades. Nations without 
continental shelves invented other pretexts to support extension of 
their jurisdiction ... Latin American nations in particular found support 
in the U.S. move for their earlier notions of "patrimonial seas" and 
were quick to proclaim their own 200-mile zones, capturing valuable 
offshore tuna resources in the process."' 
European nations similarly made offshore claims during the 1950s. The 
extent of European offshore claims were modest compared with those in 
Latin America, though, being limited by several factors, such as the longer 
maritime tradition of Europe, a greater sense of custom, and the obvious 
potential for overlapping claimant boundaries.' Australia's continental shelf 
claims were more modest still, although for different reasons as discussed 
later. 
During the 1950s there was therefore a panoply of jurisdictional assertions 
arising from many quarters of the international coastal community, with 
little consistency or basis to the form and content of these claims. It was this 
effectively lawless behaviour, and the uncertainty it created for navigation 
and resource use, .that motivated the international community to respond to 
a problem that would only worsen. The response took the form of a 
settlement among all nations based upon convention; that is, a code resting 
upon treaty rather than custom.' Four treaties addressing most areas of ocean 
policy were concluded in 1958 at the United Nations Conference on the Law 
R. Knecht, "The Exclusive Economic Zone: A New Opportunity in Federal-State Ocean 
Relations", in Silva, M. (ed.), Ocean Resources and U.S. Intergovernmental Relations in the 
1980s (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1986), 263-273, pp 264-5. 
13 Attard, op cit fn 9. 
14 Bailey, op cit fn 6. 
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of the Sea (UNCLOS I) held in Geneva, two of which are relevant to the 
thesis and are introduced here.' 
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone was the 
most controversial of the UNCLOS treaties.' Essentially, the territorial sea 
treaty was a collision between the traditions associated with high seas 
freedoms and the interests of coastal States in securing controls over the 
maritime approaches to their coastlines.' At the Geneva conference 
agreement was reached on a number of territorial sea matters, such as: the 
drawing of baselines from which the territorial sea was to be measured; 18 the 
width of lines enclosing bays as internal waters; 19 rules applying to innocent 
passage;" and controls over immigration, customs and sanitation." What 
couldn't be settled in 1958, however, was the question of the width of the 
territorial sea, due to a combination of economic, political and also emotional 
reasons reported by Wilder.' The many newly independent nations 
advocated codifying a twelve mile territorial sea, a view in which they were 
opposed by the maritime powers of France, Britain and the U.S." In the 
event, because participants were unable to reach agreement over the 
15 Unlike some of the unilateral claims of the Latin American States of the pre-conference 
period, UNCLOS was careful to treat separately living and non-living resources. Two of the 
four conventions - High Seas (450 UNTS p. 82) and Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas (559 UN1S p. 285) - are of little relevance to jurisdictional 
developments as these pertain to the continental shelf, but should be mentioned very briefly 
for completeness. The Convention cn the High Seas largely codified existing notions of 
freedom of passage, while the Fisheries Convention ventured further by recognizing the 
special interests of coastal States in preserving fish stocks. Irt the event, though, the latter 
convention failed to lead to rational claims of jurisdiction (see, generally, Attard op cit fn 
9). 
16  Bailey,  op cit fn 6. 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (516 UNTS p 205) [CTSCZ]. 
18 CThCZfiCle 4. 
19 CTSCZ.Articles 5, 7. 
" CTSCZ.Articles 14-23. 
21 CTSCZ.Article 24. 
" R. Wilder, "The Three-Mile Territorial Sea: Its Origins and Implications for Contemporary 
Offshore Federalism" (1992) 32 Virginia Journal of International Law 681-746. 
23 Bailey, op cit fn 6. 
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territorial sea width this became the subject of a second UNCLOS meeting 
two years later, which again failed to settle the issue." 
Of greater relevance to offshore petroleum development was the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. This convention established a regime 
for defining the continental shelf and exploiting the resources situated 
thereon.' The convention defines natural resources of the continental shelf 
as comprising the non-living seabed resources of the seabed and subsoil, and 
also sedentary living organisms (because policy towards the latter help to 
demonstrate the Commonwealth's approach to offshore petroleum policy 
they are dealt with further in the following section)." The continental shelf is 
defined in the first of the Convention's fifteen articles as the submarine area 
adjacent to the coast seaward of the territorial sea. A crude formula was used 
to delimit the area to a depth of 200 metres, or beyond that "where the depth 
of the superjacent waters admit of the exploitation of the natural resources."' 
Within this zone, sovereign rights to exploit natural resources accrue 
exclusively to the coastal State, regardless of either occupancy or expressions 
to this end.' With respect to the former, the principle of sovereign rights was 
embodied in the convention in preference to the more encompassing 
sovereignty, because of the implied threats to high seas freedoms that this 
concept suggests.' Because these rights were based upon adjacency the accrual - 
thereof to coastal States did not depend upon any affirmative actions on their 
part.3° 
24 Attard, op cit fn 9; I. Shearer, "International Legal Aspects of Australia's Maritime 
Environment", in Australia's Maritime Horizons in the 1980s (Occasional Papers in 
Maritime Affairs: 1, 1982) pp 1-8. 
25 Convention on the Continental Shelf (499 UNTS p 311) [CCS]. 
26 CCS Article 2(4). 
27 CCS Article 1. 
CCS Articles 2(1), 2(2). 
" R. Lumb, The Law of the Sea and Australian Off-Shore Areas (University of Queensland 
Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1966). 
"Ibid. 
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Unlike the territorial sea convention, the regime with respect to the 
continental shelf evolved rapidly from customary to treaty law, being agreed 
upon with rather little difficulty and controversy due to several factors. 
Firstly, there was great urgency in putting beyond doubt individual 
competing claims over continental shelves and the resources located 
thereupon. 31 A second influence was the absence of a lengthy custom as 
existed in the case of the territorial sea, an intensely used stretch of coastline, 
which attached intimately to coastal nations?' The liberal definition of the 
continental shelf is also likely to have facilitated agreement upon the 
convention. 
As shown by the distance component of the continental shelf definition 
mentioned above, States' offshore jurisdiction would clearly creep further 
outwards as the development of technology so permitted. This definition was 
not intended to be ambulatory, however. 33 Rather, it was designed to 
compensate those coastal States possessing only narrow shelf areas. The 
criterion of exploitability was tempered by the 200 metre boundary, without 
which the notion of the continental shelf became detached from its very 
geographical basis.' Although it was recognized that technology would soon 
lead to abuse of the distance criterion,' the pace and scale of technological 
advancements for exploiting seabed resources was not anticipated at the time - 
of drafting.' In the absence of another internationally acceptable solution, the 
exploitability criterion—with its de facto permission to extend jurisdiction 
further offshore—was adopted by claimant States as a mechanism by which to 
secure control over continental shelf resources.' 
31 R. Lumb, "The Continental Shelf' (1968) 6 Melbourne University Law Review 357-369. 
32 Cullen, op cit fn 2 pp 19-20. 
33 Attard, op cit fn 9. 
34 D. O'Connell, "Problems of Australian Coastal jurisdiction" (1968) 42 The Australian Law 
Journal 39-51. 
35 Lumb, op cit fn 29. 
36 O'Connell, op cit fn 34. 
37 R. Lumb, "Sovereignty and Jurisdiction Over Australian Coastal Waters" (1969) 43 The 
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As is described in detail following, the Commonwealth was very slow to 
take advantage of the UNCLOS Conventions to assist in its pursuit of 
domestic offshore policy. Australia's belated adoption of the treaties relied 
upon the ambulatory interpretation of the continental shelf, though, unlike 
the approach of other coastal States." When UNCLOS DI negotiations begun 
in 1973, Australia argued strongly to retain the definition of the continental 
shelf agreed upon in 1958 because of the benefits to be gained by extending 
jurisdiction further offshore as technology permitted. Under the newer 
definition of the continental shelf, extended jurisdictional assertions incur an 
additional royalty cost which the Commonwealth sought to avoid until it 
could no longer resist moving to the updated regime [more later]. 
As can be seen, notions of freedom of the seas prevailed largely intact in 
the new conception of ocean order that emerged from UNCLOS." The 
continental shelf convention did represent a significant enclosure of 
submerged lands, though, especially given its lack of a customary basis as 
existed in the case of the territorial sea. Bailey opined that the rules emerging 
from the conventions had been developed by and for the benefit of the 
traditional maritime powers, but they still served the interests of nations 
recently acquiring nationhood or independence, such as Latin America." He 
considered that the conventions signed in 1958 embodied an "impressive - 
consensus" of what twentieth century international sea law ought to be." 
Lumb concurs in this view, commenting that UNCLOS I "... constitute(d) an 
Australian Law Journal 421-438. 
38 M. Landale and H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea - Offshore Jurisdiction", in 
K. Ryan (ed), International Law in Australia (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1984) pp 
390-416. 
39 J. Schneider, "Something Old, Something New: Some thoughts on Grotius and the Marine 
Environment" (1977) 18 Virginia Journal of International Law 146-164. 
4° Bailey, op cit fn 6. 
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affirmative recognition by a substantial section of the international 
community of the legal regime of the sea-bed". 42 
2.1.2 The Commonwealth and fisheries policy 
In spite of their wide acceptance, the conventions did not give rise to any 
policy development in Australia, nor lead to the enactment of legislation. 
Indeed, it was only in settling outstanding problems of federal and state 
jurisdiction many years after their entry into force that the conventions were 
finally invoked in Australia [as discussed in Chapter Three later]. Partly, this 
is understood by reference to Australia's general support of freedom of the 
seas. As a nation heavily dependent upon shipping the country's interests 
were best served by a territorial sea of minimal width." More generally, 
though, as shown throughout this thesis the Commonwealth has failed to act 
assertively with respect to jurisdiction over the continental shelf, and has for 
a confluence of reasons left much policy and administration of the petroleum 
regime to the discretion of the states. This failure to convert the treaties into a 
domestic regime reflects the Commonwealth's inertia in adopting 
international maritime regimes nationally through legislation—for reasons 
of law and policy, as will be introduced later—and its delay in availing itself 
of the benefits provided thereby." 
The first plunge by the Commonwealth into marine resources policy 
epitomizes these policy-making shortcomings. Despite being in possession of 
the fisheries head of power as introduced in Chapter One, the 
Commonwealth displayed few desires to manage marine resources, and was 
content to leave policy and administration to the states.' State governments 
Lumb, op dt fn 29, p 4. 
43 A. Bergin, "Australia and UNCLOS III" (1983) 29 Australian Journal of Political History 
427-439. 
A. Bergin, "Australia Adopts New Maritime Zones" (1992) 7 International Journal of 
Estuarine and Coastal Law 123-128. 
45 A. Harrison, "Marine Living Resources Policy in Tasmania", in R. Herr, R. Hall and B. 
Davies (ed), Issues in Australia's Marine and Antarctic Policies (University of Tasmania, 
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were also reluctant to accept any management by the Commonwealth of 
marine resources." It was only in the early 1950s that the Commonwealth 
entered the marine policy field by enacting two fisheries statutes and asserting 
limited sovereignty over the continental shelf. These Commonwealth 
enactments—the Fisheries and Pearl Fisheries Acts 1952 (Cth)—formally 
established in law for the first time the concept of Australian waters. More 
important than this legal recognition is the fact that neither statute was 
designed to displace state governments as fisheries managers. The two 
fisheries acts were intended explicitly to exert authority only "in the 
international sense."" 
The second reading speech for the Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth) observed that a 
need "had been felt for some considerable time" for Commonwealth law to 
regulate and control fisheries in waters beyond Australian territorial limits." 
In this respect, Haward observes that the proposal to develop fisheries 
legislation was first raised in 1947, but that several more years were to elapse 
before progress was made due to delays between governments in reaching 
agreement as to their respective roles." The main imperative for the 
Commonwealth to enter into fisheries policy was to provide the legislative 
capacity to regulate incidents relating to lawlessness, overfishing and piracy 
occurring in adjacent Victorian and New South Wales waters beyond three 
miles." A similar tale is told with respect to pearl fishing, except that the area 
involved was to the north of Australia and the perpetrators were Japanese 
Tasmania, 1982) pp 69-88. 
R. Herr and B. Davis, "The Impact of UNCLOS 3 on Australian Federalism" (1986) 41 
International Journal 674-693. 
47 Harrison, op cit fn 45. 
" Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 February 1952, p 564. It was noted that the 
development of federal legislation had begun in 1947 when the Commonwealth and states 
outlined an agreement to this end; the proposed legislation was delayed, however, due to 
what Harrison referred to as matters "unrelated to fisheries". 
49 M. Haward, Federalism and the Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement (University 
of Tasmania, PhD thesis, 1992) pp 86-92; Harrison, op cit fn 45. 
Hansard, Senate, 5 March 1952, p 802. 
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fishers, activity which lead to enactment of the companion pearl fishing 
legislation (discussed below). 51 
At this time, it was assumed by many in Parliament that three miles was 
the distance at which state jurisdiction ended, based upon s 51(x) of the 
Constitution." Seaward of this distance states were assumed to be powerless 
to regulate and control fishing activity. The ambit of the fisheries power is 
unclear, however. The wording of the placticum seems to be an attempt to 
retain pre-federation arrangements regarding fisheries by fusing colonies' 
desires to control adjacent resources with the need to minimize jurisdictional 
conflicts." Neither the inner nor outer geographical scope of the power can be 
clarified from the Constitutional Convention, but the policy behind the 
fisheries power seems to be a compromise to enable states to control fisheries 
to a distance three miles offshore. 54 
The Constitutional Convention also gave relatively little guidance as to 
the concurrency or exclusivity of powers over fishing. One argument is that 
until the Commonwealth exercised its legislative power the regulation of 
fisheries would remain with the states. 55 Another possible limitation 
presented by section 51(x) was the legislative incompetence of the colonies 
with respect to matters located outside their territory. There are implicit in 
the fisheries power limitations on the competence of states to legislate extra-
territorially — 
51 Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 February 1952, p 565. 
"The territorial limits, broadly speaking, define the jurisdiction of the States, and beyond 
those limits, and only beyond those limits, the Parliament of the Commonwealth may pass 
laws and make regulations on the subject of fisheries." Hansard, House of Representatives, 5 
March 1952, p 873. 
Haward, op cit fn 49, pp 86-90. 
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It does not automatically follow, however, that the States have 
exclusive legislative competence over fisheries within a three mile 
territorial sea ... there is a need to prove a nexus or connection between 
the State and the offshore activity that is the subject of legislation. The 
position remains that, in the case of the States, any legislative 
competence they may have over matters occurring in offshore waters is 
limited by their legislative incompetence.' 
The incompetence of states to legislate with respect to the offshore appears to 
therefore erode where there exists a sufficient nexus between the state and 
offshore areas. By enacting these Commonwealth statutes to first impose 
limitations upon Australian fishers, it was proposed to then extrapolate upon 
foreigners these same statutory provisions, thereby closing a gap in fisheries 
management.' The Commonwealth legislation was therefore purposed to 
create a framework for fisheries management throughout Australian waters 
by supplementing existing state regimes. Most importantly, this was achieved 
by vesting in states the federal authority to manage fisheries beyond three 
miles." 
Question as to the outer limit of Australian waters was raised in 
Parliament, but the Commonwealth was keen not pursue this issue." It was 
also suggested that the Commonwealth had no authority to delegate its 
power to the states.6° These queries were ignored, with the second reading 
speech emphasising that state jurisdiction would be preserved and projected - 
further offshore with the authority of Commonwealth law — 
I should like to make it quite clear that the Government has no thought 
of encroaching in any way upon the sovereign rights of the States in 
their own waters. In the implementation of a total pattern of fisheries 
practice and conservation, the Commonwealth legislation makes 
provision under which the administration of the laws, both State and 
Commonwealth, in the waters contiguous to the States, could be 
Ibid. p 33. 
57 Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 February 1952, p 875. 
58 Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth) s 7; Pearl Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth) s 8. 
59 Hansard, House of Representatives, 5 March 1952, p 873. 
60 Hansard, Senate, 5 March 1952, p 841. 
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supervised by State officials, to the degree necessary, under power 
delegated by the Commonwealth." 
The public record suggests that a convergence of factors encouraged the 
Commonwealth to delegate fisheries policy and administration to the states. 
Firstly, state fisheries agencies had the experience and capacity to extend 
further offshore the same functions they performed within three miles of the 
coastline. It was logical to employ this expertise throughout the expanse of 
Australian waters rather than restrict it to the narrow coastal strip of 
territorial waters. 62 Davis also notes that despite the rationale for the 
Commonwealth enacting fisheries legislation, the states still viewed the 
Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth) as an intrusion into a policy field they had hitherto 
considered their own.° Another factor influencing the approach was that the 
littoral extents of territorial waters and offshore jurisdiction were poorly 
defined in the Constitution and in practice, as introduced earlier. One of the 
attractions to the Commonwealth in delegating to the states federal authority 
was to avoid confronting the question of offshore jurisdiction." That is, by 
adopting the approach proposed within the bills not only was a gap in 
regulation and control over Australian fisheries filled and administrative 
duplication avoided, but so too was "the difficulty of determining the lines of 
demarcation between state and Commonwealth authorities." 65 
Notwithstanding the desires of all governments to implement this policy, a 
full three years were to pass before the Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth) was 
Hansard, House of Representatives [John McEwan, Minister for Commerce and Agriculture], 28 
February 1952, pp 564-565. 
' Senate Standing Committee on Trade and Commerce, Development of the Australian Fishing 
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" Although ignored at the time, the question of the Commonwealth delegating its own powers 
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subsequent chapters. 
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proclaimed, due to persistent difficulties in emplacing the necessary 
arrangements.66 Clearly, the fisheries regime emplaced by the 
Commonwealth was shaped by its own inexperience and historic absence 
from the policy field, and the consequential occupation of this space by the 
states, which had become entrenched since federation. 
2.1.3 Pearl Fisheries Act (No 2) 1953 (Cth) 
As part of this fisheries package, an Australian continental shelf was created 
for the ostensible purpose of further regulating and controlling the northern 
pearl fishery, which was exploited by Japanese fishers. To this end, the 
Governor-General in 1953 proclaimed sovereign rights over the continental 
shelf adjacent to Australia for the purposes of exploring and exploiting the 
natural resources thereof.' As with the earlier U.S. proclamation, these 
sovereign rights were expressed not to affect the high seas status of the 
superjacent waters. The Australian proclamation did differ slightly in that it 
stated these sovereign rights to be recognized within the corpus of 
international law, coming eight years after Truman's assertion. The preamble 
to the Proclamation reads — 
Whereas International Law recognizes that there appertain to a coastal 
state or territory sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil of the 
continental shelf contiguous to its coasts for the purposes of exploring 
and exploiting the natural resources of that sea-bed and subsoil: 
Cullen observes that "This proclamation was drafted in conformity with the 
provisional formulation of what was to become the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf." 68 As discussed further below, Australia ensured that its 
offshore claim was consonant with that being proposed internationally so as 
to put it beyond reproach in this respect. Immediately following this 
executive action, legislation affirming and reinforcing the content of the 
Haward, op cit fn 49 pp 84-86. 
67 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No 56, 11 September 1953. 
" Cullen, op cit fn 2p  19 [fn 33]. 
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proclamations was enacted. The Pearl Fisheries Act (No 2) 1953 (Cth) 
amended the original act of the same name by establishing a statutory 
continental shelf, and extending Australian jurisdiction in respect thereof to 
foreign fishers.' 
The effect of these actions was to place sedentary fishing firmly under 
Australian jurisdiction." However, the nature of Australia's claim over the 
continental shelf invites closer inspection for what this suggests about 
Commonwealth policy towards the offshore. Firstly, it is quite apparent that 
the federal government was prepared to assert jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf—and adjacent high seas fishing—with reservation. 
Australia acted authoritatively in an international sense, without challenging 
legal relationships of a domestic nature and only once discussion over the 
offshore had been opened by the claims of other nations. That is, despite 
being able to lay claim to a vast offshore area, the Commonwealth awaited 
moves by the international coastal community before itself moving in this 
direction. Even then, Commonwealth action was only a response to poaching 
by Japanese fishers and the legislative vacuum existing beyond three miles, 
rather than being a more assertive application of Commonwealth 
jurisdiction." Over time, this approach to policy has come to define federal 
marine policy, a position from which the Commonwealth has struggled to - 
recover. 
Debate on the amendents creating the continental shelf reveals the 
frustration of many members, who were keen to see the bill strengthened. 
Rather than declare the continental shelf appertaining to Australia to fall 
69 Pearl Fisheries Act (No 2) 1953 (Cth) s 4. 
70  L. Goldie, "Australia's Continental Shelf: Legislation and Proclamations" (1954) 3 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 535-575. 
71 Hansard, Senate, 5 March 1952, p 839; House of Representatives, 10 September 1953, pp 116- 
120, 122-129; Senate, 17 September 1953, pp 100, 103. 
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under Australian jurisdiction in entirety, the "safer approach"' was to vest 
in the Governor-General the power to proclaim areas selectively up to a 
depth of 100 fathoms." From the ensuing debate it transpired that the 
government's failure to proclaim any Australian waters since the 1952 
fisheries acts were enacted eighteen months previously cast doubt upon the 
ability of the proposed legislation to protect Australia's marine resources.' 
Put in the context of the growth in international maritime law permitting 
a more definitive Commonwealth offshore claim to be made, the Leader of 
the Opposition, Gough Whitlam, urged that federal powers be more expressly 
and clearly stated than in the "humiliating" bill presented to Parliament. 
This bill is the third attempt on the part of the Government in eighteen 
months to deal with this situation. Let us make the bill strong so that 
the Government will be able to exercise the power that it requires. This 
Parliament possesses great constitutional power in matters of this kind. 
Let us make the legislative power of the Parliament correlative with the 
constitutional power." 
In the minds of many legislators there was no doubt as to the Constitutional 
powers available to the Commonwealth to act assertively. Quite clearly, 
though, the government was pained not to offend international law,' and 
advanced the pearl fisheries bill on the basis that it reconciled this emerging 
area of law with the constitutional position." In this regard, the legislation 
was framed to better express the provisions available in international law 
than it was a reflection of the Commonwealth's Constitutional capacities. 
n Hansard, House of Representatives, 10 September 1953, pp 113-114, 121. 
Pearl Fisheries (No 2) Act 1953 (Cth) s 3(5). 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 10 September 1953, p 140; Senate, 17 September 1953, p 
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One concern pertained to the particular form of domestic sovereignty 
proposed by the implementing bill. The method of jurisdictional assertion 
invoked over the continental shelf was annexary assumption, a form of 
claim which acknowledged that jurisdiction was being asserted in respect of 
areas where no jurisdiction had existed previously. During Senate debate on 
the bill it was suggested that the alternative form of jurisdiction—declaratory 
assertion—was preferable, containing as it did the proposition that the extant 
state of legal affairs had a historical basis and was not newly being construed." 
Twenty years later, Commonwealth legislation enacted to challenge the 
arrangements reached during this earlier period was deliberately declaratory 
in nature, a tactic designed to provoke a challenge to its validity by the 
states." 
Prior to enactment of the pearl fishing legislation in 1952, Australia had 
not excluded foreign fishers from exploiting its waters, nor itself had exerted 
claims. Because of these circumstances, O'Connell acknowledged that an 
alternative to declaratory assertion based upon longevity of use had to be 
found for claiming the continental shelf." In the event, an annexary claim 
was made by marrying a statutory licensing system to notions of sovereign 
rights as being contemplated in preparation for the 1958 UNCLOS conference. 
Goldie commented that few problems of international law arose from this • 
arrangement despite claims to the contrary by Japan. 81 
Notions of continental shelf natural resources were originally restricted to 
minerals, stemming from the Truman proclamations and the doubtless focus 
Hansard, Senate, 17 September 1953, p 105. 
" The statute in question, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) was unusual by virtue of 
its declaratory nature; see, J. Waugh, Australian Fisheries Law Intergovernmental 
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81 Goldie, op cit fn 70. 
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thereof with petrolic resources. ° However, the verbaige and intention of 
those same proclamations permitted of a broad interpretation of natural 
resources, and it was by interpretting loosely the definition of resources that 
Australia lay claim to its continental shelf, primarily for regulating pearl 
fishing. Japan protested strongly at the Pearl Fisheries Act (No 2) 1953 (Cth) 
and the impositions it made in terms of access to the continental shelf. Bailey 
suggests that it was this protestation which lead the Commonwealth to 
embrace the wide definition of natural resources embodied in Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, and to work industriously in Geneva to see this 
definition adopted. 83 The Commonwealth, it seems, was keen not to offend 
international legal concepts by taking unilateral action in the pursuit of 
domestic policies. 
Several points can be made about the Commonwealth's entry into the 
marine resources policy field in the early 1950s. Firstly, no attempt was made 
to establish comprehensive legislation at the time of the continental shelf 
proclamation," despite the timeliness of linking fisheries developments with 
minerals policy. The petroleum potential of the continental shelf was 
broached by Whitlam during the passage through Parliament of the fisheries 
statutes ° - 
Recently, in the United States of America, various States wished to 
establish sovereignty over the continental shelf for the purpose of 
drilling for oil ...Is there any reason why we should seek to hide our 
desire to establish sovereignty over the continental shelf. If we wish to 
establish such sovereignty, we should make our intention clear in the 
definition of the continental shelf in this bill. In the event of oil being 
discovered in parts of the continental shelf, it is important that we now 
82 Hansard, Senate, 17 September 1953, p 103. 
83 Bailey, op cit fn 6. 
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make it clear that we are interested not only in pearl fisheries but also in 
establishing sovereignty over the continental shelf." 
The Opposition lamented that the opportunity to articulate an Australian 
ocean policy was being wasted: "... no further time should be lost in ensuring 
that the policy of the Australian Government shall be [similarly] clear and 
firm."" In spite of Opposition lamentations, the Government for the reasons 
outlined previously pertaining to inexperience resisted this argument in its 
policy approach. 
Following from this observation is the Commonwealth's lack of 
horizontal integration. Despite efforts at the time by the Commonwealth to 
secure a satisfactory continental shelf treaty, there was no attempt to 
consolidate this nationally through legislation. As will be seen in later 
chapters, the Commonwealth's approach to treaty implementation has 
matured considerably, and treaty provisions are now fully availed of in the 
support of domestic resource policies. 
The third point to be made is that the Commonwealth was again willing 
to abdicate to the states regulatory control with respect to the newly formed 
regime. It is recalled that the fisheries regimes enacted the previous year were 
returned to the administrative capabilities of the states. By the time that the 
Pearl Fisheries (No 2) Act 1953 (Cth) was enacted this arrangement appears to 
have become so emplaced that the question as to which jurisdiction should 
administer the continental shelf regime was never even raised. 
The Commonwealth, it seems, sought to avoid assuming a dominant 
position in the marine resources domain relative to the state governments, 
for reasons of policy, administration and capacity as much as legal 
uncertainty. This same admixture of influences explains petroleum 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 10 September 1953, p 111. 
8' Hansard, House of Representatives, 10 September 1953, p 140. 
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developments a decade or so later, although jurisdictional questions and 
militant state and industry interests assumed greater influence during 1960s 
regime developments. In 1958, though, relations between the 
Commonwealth and states were so cordial that the likelihood of 
jurisdictional questions being raised was attributable only to a third party 
litigant claiming the exclusivety of a particular sphere, rather than challenge 
as to jurisdiction over marine resources being brought by either sphere of 
government." A more astute commentator noted that the arrangement 
would survive only until exploitable quantities of petroleum were 
discovered offshore." In terms of the evolution of the petroleum regime, the 
absence of conflict during the 1950s had the effect of consolidating the role of 
states as marine resource managers, a situation from which the 
Commonwealth struggled to gain policy making and administrative 
capabilities a decade later. 
2.2 JURISDICTION OVER OFFSHORE PETROLEUM IN AUSTRALIA 
2.2.1 Background to jurisdictional questions 
Following the brief legislative activity of the 1950s, the Commonwealth prior 
to the mid-1960s continued to display few desires to manage marine 
resources, an attitude which complemented the states' reluctance to allow 
Commonwealth involvement in offshore policy. 90 Intergovernmental 
rivalry over offshore resources was therefore avoided as a policy issue?' 
Because of this lack of tension, the framework within which early petroleum 
development unfolded lacked any clarified jurisdictional or legislative basis. 
During the 1960s oil exploration began in earnest offshore Australia, and the 
88 O'Connell, op cit fn 80. 
89 E. Campbell, "Regulation of Australian Coastal Fisheries" (1960) 1 Tasmanian University 
Law Review 405-428. 
% Herr and Davis, op dt fn 46. 
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Commonwealth's interest in offshore resource—or rather, the lack thereof—
was carried over into its initial contribution to offshore oil policy.' The 
Commonwealth was clearly inexperienced in managing resources, and 
displayed little inclination to move in this direction." Consequently, the 
Commonwealth's involvement occurred through the fiscal measures it had 
at its disposal. Investment in exploration technologies was critical for 
maintaining the health of the infant petroleum industry. By providing 
taxation concessions and financial incentives for explorers, the 
Commonwealth was able to foster a robust investment climate and to thereby 
influence the speed and direction of offshore development.' 
During this period of investor confidence, questions concerning 
jurisdiction and legislative competence—already neglected—remained 
forgotten. In the absence of clearly assigned jurisdictional powers, petroleum 
development was regulated by states under onshore mining legislation that 
purported to apply in respect of offshore areas." Reid describes the situation 
thus - 
In the early 1960s, the Australian States individually sought to legislate 
to control offshore exploration and production following the ratification 
by Australia of the two 1958 Geneva Conventions. For example, 
Queensland passed the Mineral Resources (Adjacent Submarine Areas) 
Act of 1964 which boldly asserted that minerals found on or in the 
seabed below or beyond the territorial sea were the property of the 
Crown in the right of the State and Queensland sought to regulate 
mining in offshore areas by applying onshore mining and petroleum 
legislation to these activities." 
n R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too Many?" (1988) 6 
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The constitutionality of this legislation was of doubtful legality, given the 
extra-territorial incapacity of the states as described in Chapter One, and the 
arrangement survived largely on governmental faith, a fact that was 
recognised in the federal parliament.' That the states should regulate 
offshore petroleum was the product of history, attitude and convenience. In 
terms of historic influences, as shown at length the states were already the 
major actors with respect to offshore resources policy through their 
management of fisheries, a situation that was now ingrained and difficult to 
reverse. Attitudinally, the Commonwealth was disinclined—or at best 
indifferent—about assuming a substantial role in petroleum policy or 
administration, and lacked the expertise in this regard." The third point 
arises from the fact that the Commonwealth was not a significant land holder 
and did not have in place a parallel and easily adaptable system for allocating 
and disposing of resources. As noted in Parliament, it was therefore 
convenient that regulatory control should fall to the states." For several 
years, then, offshore development took place in a framework without any 
certainty in terms of its jurisdictional basis. 
The first hint of conflict over the role of the Commonwealth and the 
states in offshore policy corresponded to increasing interest in the 
exploitation of marine resources.'" By the mid-1960s the investment in 
technology was paying off and an oil boom seemed likely. Offshore reserves 
were emerging as a resource of national importance, attracting a greater 
interest by the Commonwealth in petroleum development policy in place of 
its previous complacency towards the offshore.' The Commonwealth 
" Hansard, House of Representatives, 18 October 1967, p 1942. 
" Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, p 2397. 
" Hansard, House of Representatives, 16 November 1965, p 2741. 
100 "The need to establish a legislative and administrative framework for offshore Australia 
intensified with increasing interest in offshore oil and gas exploitation." Rothwell and 
Haward, op cit fn 55 p 34. 
101 B. o Opeskin and D. Rothwell, "Australia's Territorial Sea: International and Federal 
Implications of Its Extension to 12 Miles" (1991) 22 Ocean Development and International 
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became increasingly keen to participate in the award of titles directly rather 
than having to rely upon financial measures to support title-holders in 
oilfield exploration. The legal basis of offshore titles—the extension to 
offshore areas of onshore instruments—was at best shaky, and by exposing 
the foundation of these titles to review, considerable doubt was cast upon the 
legality of costly rights granted by state governments in respect of vast 
offshore tracts.'" In Haward's terms, statutory changes were struggling to 
keep pace with exploration activity,'" leaving potential explorers in a 
position of considerable vulnerability. Governments were coming under 
"intense pressure" to put aside jurisdictional differences in order to negotiate 
a stable offshore petroleum regime, the two factors which are commonly held 
to account for the regime, the Australian Petroleum Settlement.' Although 
of doubtless influence in this respect, several variables identified earlier more 
fully explain the structure and provisions of the Settlement. 
Before turning to examine the Australian Petroleum Settlement and 
analysing its development, it is useful to first review the opinions prevailing 
at the time as to the assignment of offshore jurisdiction in Australia. 
Enormous intellectual effort has been expended in constructing jurisdictional 
arguments which have attempted, with varying degrees of accuracy, to blend 
municipal with international law principles. Given the importance of - 
international law for offshore jurisdictional issues, it is worth commenting 
briefly that the 1958 treaties were considered reliable as a law-making source 
for domestic purposes, based upon their customary and treaty nature. To the 
Law 395-431. 
1' Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, p 2376. 
103 M. Haward, "The Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement" (1989) 13 Marine Policy 
334-348. 
1' M. Crommelin, "Federal-Regional Cooperation: A Comparative Perspective", in J. Saunders 
(ed), Papers presented at the 2nd National Conference on Natural Resources Law, 1985 
Managing Natural Resources in a Federal State (Carswell, Calgary, Canada, 1986) p 295- 
321; R. Cullen, "Canada and Australia: A Federal Parting of the Ways" (1989) 18 Federal 
Law Review 68-83. 
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extent that the UNCLOS treaties were internationally consensual and not 
inconsistent with common or statute law, these could form the basis of 
legitimate Australian action. Without internal legal recognition, however, 
the precise effect of these conventions upon citizens, and the vesting of 
powers in the Crown, was considered doubtful."' However, it was the precise 
mechanism through which this recognition was to be given that caused 
considerable diversity in legal theories and arguments. 
In the following sections, the viewpoints propounded during the 1960s are 
reviewed to recreate the legal circumstances within which the 1967 
Settlement was reached. This review provides the basis for understanding the 
form and content of this original regime, and the analytical context for its 
subsequent evolution. 
2.2.2 Territorial sea 
There existed a greater consensus in 1967 insofar as the territorial sea was 
concerned than was the case with respect to the continental shelf. Authors 
widely subscribed to the view that the territorial sea fell under the 
jurisdiction of the states, although the arguments advanced in this regard did 
vary. Goldie's view was the simplest of all: he considered that jurisdiction 
within territorial waters was reserved to the states because section 51(x) of the 
Constitution mentioned above gave to the Commonwealth the express 
power to legislate with respect to fisheries beyond territorial limits."6 In this 
regard, Goldie presumably considered that using s. 51(x) to support the Pearl 
Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth) created a nexus pursuant to which federal 
jurisdiction could be exerted more broadly than in relation to just fish. 
C6 Ltunb, op cit fn 29. 
Goldie, op cit fn 70. 
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A similar logic is employed by Campbell l" who adopted the general 
Constitutional rule that all legislative powers not expressly conferred upon 
the Commonwealth Parliament reside with the states. The Constitution js. 
51(x)] is explicit with respect to Commonwealth power over fisheries only in 
waters beyond territorial limits, inside of which jurisdiction therefore rests 
with the states. Campbell does acknowledge the international dimension to 
territorial waters, but argued that the Commonwealth may act authoritatively 
in relation to territorial waters only as national sovereign, and not in matters 
of domestic legal concern. To assert property rights in the domestic sense 
would deprive the states of territory and violate section 123 of the 
Constitution pertaining to alterations to state boundaries.'" Based upon this 
rationale, Campbell accepts implicitly that the legislative scheme in place for 
fisheries was applicable to submerged minerals located in the same territorial 
waters. 
Other writers looked to alternative sources of Commonwealth law in 
relation to the offshore. According to Harders' analysis, the Commonwealth's 
Constitutional source with respect to territorial waters was s. 51(xxix), the 
external affairs power, pursuant to which the Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone was implemented in Australia.' In spite of his 
resoluteness on this point, Harder accepted that uncertainty arose as to which • 
sphere of government the territorial sea actually appertained. Harders 
doubted that the act of acceding to an international treaty eclipsed pre- 
Campbell, op cit fn 89. 
Section 123 of the Constitution stipulates the formula for altering the boundaries of states - 
The Parliament of the Conunonwealtit may, with the consent of the Parliament of a State, 
and the approval of the majority of the electors of the State voting upon the question, 
increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of the State, upon such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed on, and may, with the like consent, make provision respecting the effect 
and operation of any increase or diminution or alteration of territory in relation to any State 
affected. 
This complex definition becomes important in relation to later developments, particularly 
the 1980 Offshore Continental Settlement. 
C. Harders, "Australia's Offshore Petroleum Legislation: A Survey of its Constitutional and 
its Federal Features" (1968) 6 Melbourne University Law Review 415-428. 
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colonial ties of the states to territorial waters, which he held had survived the 
act of federation. To this end, he considered the fisheries power was useful in 
interpretting the ambit of Commonwealth offshore jurisdiction. According to 
Harders, nothing in section 51(x) either excluded the operation of state 
fisheries legislation within the territorial sea, nor mining laws in areas 
beyond. 
In a tour-de-force analysis of the interface between municipal and 
domestic law, Lumb termed the debate over territorial sea jurisdiction as an 
"irritating confusion" of the two legal positions."' He was particularly 
concerned with answering whether sovereignty over territorial waters was 
converted to the Commonwealth upon federation. In his analysis, Lumb 
recounted the various juridicial opinions as set down in cases determined in 
other coastal nations, and reconciled these with the effect in Australia of the 
1958 convention. His view held that the general capacity to legislate in respect 
of the seabed and superjacent waters was vested in state parliaments through 
the plenary power to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government 
of areas which were subject to state jurisdiction. This law-making capability 
included the enactment of legislation to develop offshore minerals lying 
beneath territorial waters. 
Lumb's opinion is reinforced by the clear intention of Constitutional 
drafters that states were to retain control of fisheries within territorial waters. 
Given this intent, he argued that the fisheries legislation constituted a 
framework for interpretting the scheme in place for minerals, and that it was 
inconceivable that this same intent could not be extended to encompass non-
fisheries resources. Indeed, this precise legal theory was in fact confirmed by 
the practice of states at the time of extending offshore their terrestrial mining 
regimes. 
110 Lomb, op cit fn 29. 
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Lumb conceded that the Commonwealth's legislative capabilities had 
increased by ratifying the UNCLOS conventions. However, he found a 
supportive argument for his general position in the fact that despite the 
Commonwealth entering into an oil pollution treaty in 1954, this entry did 
not deprive states of their pre-existing ability to enact laws combatting oil 
pollution within territorial waters." On balance, Lumb considered the 
proprietary rights of the state in the seabed had not been ousted: legislation 
enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament pursuant to external affairs and 
navigation powers could affect but not destroy the prerogative rights of the 
states to the seabed beneath territorial waters. In fact, Lumb held that one of 
the few functions exercisable by the Commonwealth with respect to the 
territorial sea was that of a purely international nature, namely, determining 
the outer limits of the territorial sea, a subject which eluded settlement at 
Geneva. 
An exhaustive discussion by O'Connell developed even further the 
arguments advanced by Lumb, with whose view he concurred in 
commenting that the effect of international law upon federal-state claims was 
neither clear nor predictable."' O'Connell adopted a minimalist view by 
conceding that states could claim their colonial boundaries as existed at 
federation. To answer the question as to what were these boundaries, he - 
posited that territorial waters were Crown land of the colonies, and they 
remained so after federation. In this respect he rejected as misconceived the 
doctrine of colonial extra-territorial incompetence, on the grounds that 
111  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954 (OILPOL) 
was the first international effort to protect the seas from pollution. The relevant 
Commonwealth law—Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act 1960 (Cth)—was expressed to apply 
outside of Australian territorial waters, which were covered by a battery of state statutes - 
Prevention of Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters 1960 (NSW); Navigable Waters (Oil 
Pollution) Act 1960 (Vic); Pollution of Waters by Oil Act 1960 (Qld); Pollution of Waters by 
Oil Act 1961 (SA); Pollution of Waters by Oil Act 1960 (WA); Oil Pollution Act 1961 (Tas). 
See: M. White, Marine Pollution Laws of the Australasian Region (Federation Press, 
Sydney, 1994). 
112 O'Connell, op cit fn 80. 
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legislatures of the colonies were exercising jurisdiction for the peace, order 
and good government thereof. Like Lumb, O'Connell looked to the original 
constitutional conventions and the intentions of the drafters to arrive at this 
opinion. 
In forceful terms he then went on to dismiss the thesis which held that 
property rights offshore inhere to the federal government as an incident of 
federation, remarking that this would give a "novel" twist to the principles of 
federalism. 
State Crown land cannot under any theory at present admitted in 
Australian constitutional law "slide" to the Commonwealth, and an 
Australian court would find great difficulty in deciding the question 
posed in this paper in any terms other than ownership, no matter how 
attractive it might be to approach the question from the point of view of 
the international competence of the Federal Government.' 
O'Connell concluded that while the Commonwealth was not inhibited from 
discharging any of it obligations arising under international law the states 
clearly owned territorial waters. 
Only one author seemed to raise any doubt insofar as jurisdiction over the 
territorial sea was concerned. Taylor' cautioned that because states did not 
have a long historical association with offshore waters based upon usage they 
were in a weakened position relative to the situation as existed in the United - 
States, where the states had actually been denied offshore jurisdiction. In this 
regard his comments concur with that presented earlier regarding Australia's 
proclamation and legislative assertion over the continental shelf, where it 
was suggested that an alternative to longevity of connection—or declaratory 
assumption—had to be found. 
113 Ibid. p 260. 
114 Taylor, op cit fn 94. 
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Taylor's comments, however, were clearly in a minority and less well 
developed than some of the other arguments surveyed. It is ironic that of all 
the opinions advanced this was the one which proved most juridicially 
correct, although for reasons which differed from those finally determined in 
the case New South Wales v the Commonwealth, discussed in the next 
chapter. The prevailing opinion was nonetheless that state governments 
exercised jurisdiction over the territorial sea, subject only perhaps to 
Commonwealth actions of an international nature relating to the 
international character of the territorial sea. 
2.2.3 Continental shelf 
The situation with respect to the continental shelf was the subject of less 
discussion, attributable to the fact that writers generally agreed the 
Commonwealth was the appropriate authority exercising jurisdiction over 
this area."' Lumb, for instance, concluded that the constitutional authority of 
the states did not uphold their legislative assertions over the continental 
shelf. 116  He considered that while the Commonwealth's incidental power—
section 51 (xxxix)—would have supported the enactment of federal legislation 
governing offshore development, the external affairs power provided a 
stronger basis for any such legislation. 
O'Connell contemplated the nature of jurisdiction sourced in the 
continental shelf convention."' In particular, he wondered whether the 
provisions for sovereign rights contained therein brought the continental 
shelf within the boundaries of signatory nations, or if this geographical area 
remained legally extra-territorial. That various state enactments attempted to 
forge a nexus between their legislative competence and the continental shelf 
seemed to acknowledge that the continental shelf was indeed extra-territorial, 
"'See, generally: Ibid; Ltunb, op cit fn 31. 
116 LW op cit fn 29. 
"' O'Connell, op cit fn 34. 
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perhaps even to the Commonwealth. Assuming that the continental shelf 
was beyond state boundaries, laws purporting to create a valid state titles 
regime must therefore be expressed to operate extra-territorially, and could 
only do so as exceptions to the general rule of incompetence. 
A limitation to the doctrine of state competency with respect to the 
continental shelf was raised by O'Connell. This is found in the fact that the 
states are incapable of dividing the continental shelf between themselves 
because this function belongs exclusively to the Commonwealth.' If the 
continental shelf was outside of the Commonwealth's realms also, it follows 
that the only laws possibly applicable in this circumstance were those enacted 
validly for extra-territorial activities. As mentioned already, this law-making 
power is reserved to the Commonwealth pursuant to its international 
personage. 119 Therefore, it was upon an evaluation of this shaky legal premise 
of extra-territorial competence that O'Connell determined jurisdiction over 
the continental shelf belonged to the Commonwealth. 
Harders' analysis is worth mentioning for completeness because he 
departs slightly from the conventional wisdom.' Although concurring with 
the majority view that the Convention on the Continental Shelf was 
properly the Commonwealth's responsibility, Harders argues against 
adopting a narrow view of state legislative competence. He considers that the 
states could legislate to exercise the rights associated with the convention to 
ensure its discharge in Australian law, without detracting from 
Commonwealth exclusivity in the international sense. To so act would "put 
in better perspective the place occupied by the legal assertions" during this 
period. 
118 The exclusivity of the Commonwealth to divide the continental shelf among the states is 
found in the fact that the continental shelf exists in an international context, where the 
Commonwealth only has sovereign personality. 
119 Constitution of Australia, s 51(x)cix). 
Harders, op cit fn 109. 
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It was in this climate that offshore jurisdiction was settled in 1967. 
Although there existed some confusion with respect to jurisdiction over the 
territorial sea, this was reduced in the case of the continental shelf which was 
widely held to accrue to the Commonwealth. This accrual was based upon the 
argument that an insufficient nexus or connection existed between the states 
and the continental shelf, as amplified by the existence of the 1958 
convention entered into by the Commonwealth. 
Despite the preoccupation with legal arguments during the formative 
period of the Australian Petroleum Settlement, the resolution of 
jurisdictional questions was reached on terms surprisingly close to those 
proposed above by Harders. He suggested that legislative implementation of 
the continental shelf convention could be effected by the states without 
offending the Commonwealth's international responsibilities. In other 
words, the strictly legal aspects of the Settlement were superseded by the 
political attractiveness of a particular option, an outcome which is 
understandable when considered in light of the minor offshore role in 
resources policy filled by the Commonwealth in the 1950s and 1960s. That is, 
although most commentaries were preoccupied with arcane jurisdictional 
problems, the outcome was less a reflection of legal uncertainties than it was 
a range of other influences. 
2.3 AUSTRALIAN PEI 	ROLEUM SETTLEMENT 
2.3.1 The 1967 Settlement 
Political negotiations to settle the legal problem of offshore jurisdiction began 
during the mid-1960s. Essentially, these negotiations were concerned to 
secure the validity of offshore titles without resorting to litigation, nor by 
challenging the jurisdictional bases of titles.' This security was achieved by 
121 Hansard, House of Representatives, 18 October 1967, p 1943; Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2187. 
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establishing a joint legislative scheme sourced in complementary state and 
Commonwealth statutes, ensuring that titles would be valid regardless of any 
eventual juridicial outcome. All governments were in agreement as to the 
broad scheme, but three years of negotiations passed between the 
announcement of this national solution and enactment of the enabling 
legislation!' The 1967 Australian Petroleum Settlement was the product of 
these protracted negotiations. 
Haward details the series of meetings held during the 1960s between the 
Commonwealth and the states, and shows the emphasis in these fora that 
was given to providing certainty and avoiding litigation!' The states also 
strongly opposed the original proposed revenue sharing arrangements. Over 
the course of negotiations the states obtained the Commonwealth's 
agreement that they should receive a majority of revenue from offshore 
production!' This outcome reflected the political view of the time that the 
states were the dominant administrators of the offshore petroleum regime, 
and were accordingly entitled to a greater share of royalties than was the 
Commonwealth. The view of offshore arrangements held by politicians was 
not shared by senior officials at the bureaucratic level, who resented th 
superior minerals expertise of the Victorian counterparts!' 
The oil industry was fully supportive of the Settlement, satisfying as it did 
their demands for security of title. The chair of ESSO remarked — 
We may therefore conclude first, that for the foreseeable future the 
relevant questions of sovereignty have been sufficiently resolved to 
' Cronurtelin, op cit fn 86; A. Dakin, "Future Patterns of Legislation for the Petroleum Industry" 
(1968) 6 Melbourne University Law Review 403-414; Harders, op cit fn 109. 
' Haward, op cit fn 49 pp 99-119. 
1" Rothwell and Haward, op cit fn 55. Compare Parliamentary statement of 16 November 1965 
p 2741 with the second reading speech of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Bill 1967 (Cth) 
two years later. In the earlier speech, royalties were to be distributed evenly between the 
federal and state governments; the final agreed upon ratio was 60:40 in the states' favour. 
' G. Stevenson, Mineral Resources and Australian Federalism (Centre for Research m Federal 
Financial Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1976). 
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assure the petroleum industry of the security of the exploration and 
petroleum rights granted under existing permits and licences ...possible 
Federal-State jurisdictional conflicts have been averted sufficiently to 
avoid awkward complications in government-industry relations ... I 
personally feel that the benefits to the nations as a whole of a 
developing Australian petroluem industry will be achieved at a much 
earlier date by the legislation now in force than if the whole gamut of 
litigation, friendly or foe, had been allowed to follow its endless 
course. 126 
The Settlement was clearly a political and not a legal solution to a problem of 
constitutional law. Because of this fact, the legislation could only reduce 
uncertainty over offshore jurisdiction rather than achieve the removal 
thereof. In 1967, Australia looked to the United States and learned from its 
legalistic approach to offshore development. Legislators were unmistakably of 
the view that the litigious experience of the U.S. should be avoided in 
Australia.' A political solution under which no litigation could occur was 
embraced by all governments as an alternative model. 
The intention and administrative scheme of the Settlement is amply 
illustrated in the second reading speech of the bill giving effect to the new 
offshore petroleum regime — 
In Australia the governments of the Commonwealth and the States 
believe that they have overcome these problems without recourse to 
litigation between governments. To achieve this result they have 
mutually agreed that without abating any of their constitutional 
claims—that without abandoning these claims—and that without 
derogating from their respective constitutional powers, they would 
enact legislation providing for a common mining code to apply 
uniformly throughout offshore areas including both the territorial sea 
and the outer continental shelf.' 
The Settlement consisted of two-parts, a political Agreement and 
complementary legislation. The Agreement, a twenty-six clause document, 
J. Hamlin, "Comment on Lumb" (1969) 43 Australian Law Journal 444447, p 446. 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 18 October 1967, pp 1102-3. 
Hansard, House of Representatives [David Fairbairrt, Minister for National Devlopment], 
18 October 1967, p 1943. 
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detailed the objectives and broad principles of a common code for offshore 
petroleum development agreed to by the state and federal governments.129 
The provisions of the Agreement were couched in hortatory language, 
committing all governments to consensus decision making. Legally-binding 
provisions were eschewed by the Commonwealth and the states in their 
efforts to avoid the potential for litigation.' 30 
• Supporting the Agreement and the cooperative framework it envisaged 
were Commonwealth and state statutes, the second part of the Settlement. 
The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts were needed to create the essential 
statutory titles to explore and produce offshore. This legislation was identical 
in title and provision except that the Commonwealth Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Act 1967 applied to waters right around the country, whereas the state 
acts applied to those offshore waters adjacent to each state. The scheme 
emplaced was therefore distinctive in two respects: Australian waters from 
low water mark to the continental margin were covered by overlapping 
Commonwealth and state statutes; and the legislation did not distinguish 
between the two offshore zones (territorial sea and continental shelf)."' 
Although reference to the Convention on the Continental Shelf was made in 
the preambles to the statutes—which were couched in terms consistent 
therewith—the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts did not purport to give - 
effect to the convention. As will be seen, though, it was by legislating to 
explicitly give effect to the conventions that the Commonwealth was able to 
intervene further in marine policy during the early 1970s.'32 
Agreement relating to the Exploration for, and the Exploitation of, the Petroleum Resources, 
and certain other Resources, of the Continental Shelf of Australia and of certain Territories 
of the Commonwealth and of certain other Submerged Land ("The Agreement"). 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 18 October 1967, p 1943; 26 October, p 2386; 31 October, p 
2457; Senate, 3 November 1967, p 2134; 6 November, p 2201. 
131 Lumb, op cit fn 31. 
132 Lumb contemplated three different means by which the UNCLOS conventions could be 
incorporated into Australian law: regulations promulgated by the Executive giving effect to 
the treaties; incorporation of the conventions into domestic legislation without any 
reference therein to the treaty text; the enactment of an approving statute with the treaty 
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The Settlement creatively divorced the issuance of titles from the question 
of jurisdiction by granting to each operator two identical titles—one issued 
under each of the Commonwealth and state laws—in respect of each licence 
area. As described in Parliament — 
The permittee or licensee will in fact have a dual authority. That is to 
say, his authority to explore or to exploit will flow to him both from the 
Commonwealth and from the State concerned.'" 
The logic behind this approach was that it removed the likelihood of the 
jurisdictional source of titles being challenged in court by aggrieved parties.' 
Neither unsuccessful tenderers nor licencees seeking relief from conditions 
would gain any legal ground by challenging the validity of the overlapping 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts. A judgement that clarified offshore 
jurisdiction and thereby invalidated either Act would by default subject an 
operator to the provisions of the other identical Act. Governments would be 
unlikely to question the authority of titles either—whether their source was 
state or Commonwealth law—as the Settlement was negotiated to avoid 
answering this very question, a commitment embodied in the accompanying 
Agreement.' In concept at least, this approach would effectively preserve the 
validity of offshore petroleum titles. 
For the overlapping statutes to function as intended the paramountcy of. 
Commonwealth legislation guaranteed by s 109 of the Constitution had to be 
negated. 136 To overcome this Constitutional limitation, section 150 of the 
scheduled as an appendix. The third option was specifically rejected by Lumb, who 
favoured a combination of the first two methods of implementation in Australia. In the 
event, it was the third method which was embodied in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 
1973 (Cth) enacted by the Whitlam Labor Government to assert jurisdiction over offshore 
areas, a point to which the thesis returns in some detail in Chapter 4. R. Lumb, op cit fn 29. 
Hansard, House of Representatives [Reginald Connor], 26 October 1967, p 2377. 
Crommelirt, op cit fn 104. 
135 Clauses 3, 4, 5 ,6, 10, 23 of the Agreement deal with, inter alia, requirements to confer, 
provide assistance, and to enact complementary legislation, consistent with the 
Settlement's focus upon agreement rather than adjudication. 
Harders, op cit fn 109. 
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Commonwealth Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act stated that it did not 
affect the operation of any similar state legislation. Several authors 
commented that despite its purspose, the existence of this provision neither 
assured the validity of petroleum titles nor protected the Settlement from 
court challenge.' Nonetheless, the legislation succeeded in protecting 
petroleum titles irrespective of any eventual resolution of outstanding 
jurisdictional questions. The legislation provided the statutory framework 
and guidelines for the offshore scheme while the Agreement contained the 
intergovernmental arrangements needed for its administration. Within this 
scheme, the Commonwealth's interest was safeguarded at essential points 
through "consultation and agreement by the States"," specified to be those 
areas of federal competency introduced earlier.' 
Through both its form and the negotiations leading thereto the 
Settlement was an ambitious and creative national scheme for developing 
offshore petroleum resources. The respective capabilities of the 
Commonwealth and states were reconciled in a framework which avoided 
jurisdictional questions yet satisfied the insistent need to provide certaintly of 
title. The important features of the regime are reflected in the following 
excerpt from the second reading speech for the P(SL)A - 
The Bill is an historic piece of legislation. It is one in which the 
Commonwealth Government and the several State Governments have 
joined together in a cooperative effort for the purpose of ensuring the 
legal effectiveness of titles authorising the search for or production of 
petroleum in and from our offshore areas. In this cooperative effort the 
States and the Commonwealth have pooled not only their respective 
137 Ibid; O'Connell, op cit fn 34. 
1' Hansard, House of Representatives, 18 October 1967, p 1944; Senate, 3 November 1967, p 2137. 
Clause 11 of the Agreement lists a number of matters of Commonwealth responsibility: 
trade and commerce with other countries and among the States, including navigation and 
shipping; external affairs; taxation, including taxes in the nature of duties of customs and 
excise; defence, lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys; fisheries in Australian waters 
beyond territorial limits; and postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services. These 
policy areas are those in respect of which the Commonwealth possesses legislative power, 
as corresponding to the heads of power listed in section 51 of the Constitution, described in 
the introduction. 
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jurisdictional powers but also their administrative and technical 
resources to produce a legislative scheme which we believe is unique in 
the world and which is suitable to a federal system of government.'" 
2.3.2 Implications of the Settlement 
The form of the Settlement confirms that both spheres of government were 
keen to set aside jurisdictional questions. In strictly legal terms, though, 
neither governmental sphere was abandoning its assertion of jurisdiction nor 
derogating from its respective constitutional powers; these were merely being 
held in abeyance."' The state-issued mining licences did present particular 
difficulties for governments, though, especially if the seabed was beyond both 
the boundaries of states and their legislative competence. By committing to 
the Settlement and thereby confirming the validity of these offshore titles the 
Commonwealth was nonetheless careful not to admit an excess of state 
competency, lest this subsequently erode its own jurisdiction."' In other 
words, neither sphere of government was prepared to concede legal rights.'" 
Avoiding jurisdictional problems and providing certainty of title were clearly 
instrumental in determining the shape of the Settlement. 
A particularly useful analysis of the form taken by the Australian 
Petroleum Settlement is provided by Taylor.'" By comparing the 1967 
Settlement with the situation that occurred earlier in the United States, he 
argued that the requirement for a successful resolution of jurisdiction was to 
concentrate upon the method of dispute resolution rather than being 
concerned with the nature of the dispute. To this end, Taylor characterized 
favourably the approach taken to offshore jurisdiction in Australia as "legal 
accommodation". Indeed, the effusive language employed in Parliament 
14° Hansard, House of Representatives, 18 October 1967, p 1941. 
'Hansard, House of Representatives, 18 October 1967, pp 1943, 1945, 1959. 
'Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2193. 
143 O'Connell, op cit fn 34. 
1" Taylor, op cit fn 94. 
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indicates the accommodating nature of the Agreement, which was described 
variously as: an article of good faith on the part of all governments; a serious 
declaration of the national interest; a statement of public interest; a fair go; 145 
a definite influence on the rate of investment; and a reasonable exercise of 
federal power.' 
Although there were obvious legal imperatives for reaching the 
Settlement, the political arrangements underpinning the Agreement were 
nonetheless expressed in terms exceptionally favourable to states."' As 
argued elsewhere by the author, three particular aspects of the Settlement 
reveal the extent of the concessions made by the Commonwealth to the states 
in pursuit of legal accommodation.' 48 Firstly, under revenue-sharing 
provisions of the Agreement, royalties were distributed between the 
Commonwealth and the adjacent state in the ratio 60:40 in the state's 
favour."' As mentioned, royalties were originally to be shared evenly 
between the two governmental spheres,'" but over the two years preceding 
the 1967 Settlement this ratio became modified to the final proportion. 
Of much greater significance than the distribution of royalties is the fact 
that by accepting the terms of the Settlement—in particular, the overlapping 
state statutes—the Commonwealth quitclaimed to states its own exclusive•
jurisdiction over the continental shelf. Legally, this was an excessive gesture. 
As described at length, in the event of a court case it was felt that states would 
probably have been able to mount a credible possessory claim over the three-
mile territorial waters. With respect to continental shelf areas, however, 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 November 1967, p 2576. 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, pp 2395-2397. 
147 Dakin, op cit fn 122. 
N. Evans and J. Bailey, "Jurisdiction and Offshore Petroleum in Australia: Creating 
Symmetry Between the Commonwealth and States by Sharing Benefits and Avoiding Costs" 
(1997) 33 Ocean and Coastal Management 173-204. 
149 Clause 19 of the Agreement. 
1.5° Hansard, House of Representatives, 16 November 1965, p 2741. 
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there seemed much less doubt that the Commonwealth would be held to 
exercise exclusive sovereign rights over resources. By enacting the P(SL)A, 
therefore, the Commonwealth conceded to the states a claim to which these 
governments were likely not entitled, in spite of its desire to limit state 
competency so that unresolved Commonwealth jurisdiction was not 
compromised umecessarily." 1 
The third and perhaps most striking aspect of the Settlement relates to 
administration of the newly formed petroleum regime. It was quite clear both 
by agreement and as effected by the complementary legislation that the 
regime was to be administered by state governments. 152 Rather than retain for 
itself an equal or even dominant decision making role, the Commonwealth 
delegated its decision-making authority under the Settlement to the states. 
This was achieved by Clause 9 of the Agreement, which stated that the 
Common Mining Code was to be administered by the designated authority in 
respect of each state, a role defined by the Commonwealth P(SL)A to be the 
responsible state ministers. 153 Through this mechanism, the states were 
bestowed with all the powers and functions available under the 
Commonwealth statute in each adjacent offshore area. It was by exercising 
responsiblities under these two overlapping schemes—acting as the 
designated authority and administering their own legislation—that states - 
were the decision makers for every aspect of offshore petroleum policy. The 
administrative arrangements reached in 1967 is depicted in Figure 2, wherein 
the state minister is seen to exercise all the powers available under both the 
Commonwealth and state P(SL)A. 
151 Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2193. 
1' Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, p 2378. 
153 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 s 14. 
State P(SL)A 
Commonwealth 
P(SL)A 
continental shelf 
Stevenson expresses the role of the designated authority in the following 
inistefed bilitates 
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Figure 2. Commonwealth-state offshore petroleum arrangements 1967 
terms — 
The states as 'designated authority' were virtually given a free hand to 
control offshore petroleum, since the federal government agreed to 
overturn their administrative decisions only if it could demonstrate 
that such action was required by one of its enumerated legislative 
responsibilities for such matters as defence, fisheries or external 
affairs.'" 
Aside from the practical implications of the designated authority, the 
constitutionality of this arrangement was questioned at the time. That is, 
whether the Constitution permits the power to administer a Commonwealth 
statute to be conferred upon a state minister.' It was precisely in response to 
this concern that the designated authority device was created; the 
Commonwealth's P(SL)A refers to the designated authority to avoid refering 
to the state minister directly.' Although this device was of questionable 
Stevenson, op cit fn 125p 38. 
155 "The Designated Authority nominated under the Commonwealth Mining Code is the 
repository of Commonwealth and State proprietary interests and he is in a true sense the 
agent of the Commonwealth as well as the State." Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 
October 1967, p 2378. 
Report - Senate Select Committee an Offshore Petroleum Resources (1971) p 7. This point of 
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efficacy, to this day the Constitutional question raised by the designated 
authority is still unanswered. As indicated in Chapter One, though, the 
judiciary has tended to take a favourable view of intergovernmental 
arrangements as being political rather than legal in nature. As a consequence 
the mechanism seems to be well established through positive commentary by 
Australian superior courts.' 
A number of other observations can be made about the features of the 
Settlement. One point which is often overlooked is the fact that the 
Settlement itself was not the product of complete support. In fact, the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) was described in Parliament as 
"legislation by exhaustion"." The bill was the subject of intense dispute from 
many members and senators in the Opposition as well as from the 
government.' These representatives opined that the Commonwealth 
exerted jurisdiction over the continental shelf and likely over the territorial 
sea also, pursuant to the external affairs power. 1" This jurisdiction was itself 
based upon common law principles as reinforced by the UNCLOS 
conventions. 161 By agreeing to the Settlement these dissenting views held 
that the Commonwealth was deliberately abdicating to the states its offshore 
law is returned to several times in the discussion. See: M. Crommelin, "Petroleum 
(Sumberged Lands) Act: The Nature and Security of Offshore Titles" (1979) 2 Australian 
Mining and Petroleum Law Journal 135-159. 
157 A. Gardner, "Federal Intergovernmental Co-operation at Environmental Management A 
Comparison of Developments in Australia and Canada" (1994) 11 Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal 104-136. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 November 1967, p 2574. Debate in the House filled 
over ninety pages of text over three separate days of debate, and an even longer period in 
the Senate. 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, pp 2386-7. The fact that dissent came 
from within the ranks of the sponsoring government was held as testament to legislation 
that was fundamentally a "bad mistake" (p 2389). 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 18 October 1967, pp 1944, 1954; 26 October, pp 2390, 2392- 
3, 2397; Senate, 3 November 1967, p 2135; 6 November, p 2185. 
161 Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, pp 2369, 2386; Hansard, Senate, 6 
November 1967, p 2184. 
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responsibilities. 162 In the words of one government opponent of the draft 
legislation — 
I know that what I have said will be unpopular in many quarters. I 
would not have said it—I do not lightly go against the Government—
unless I believed this was a matter of supreme importance in which the 
Government has made a rather bad mistake.' 63 
The Labor Opposition went further in its criticisms, bemoaning the fact that 
the Commonwealth had proclaimed a continental shelf in 1953 and acceded 
to the convention five years later, but then "typically, allowed the matter to 
rest". 164 As it had done during enactment of the Pearl Fisheries Act in 1953, 
the Opposition rejected the Government's petroleum legislation not for its 
attempt to emplace a policy framework, but for the delay in so doing and the 
precise terms thereof — 
We attack this legislation root and branch. We say that it is wrong both 
in principle and in form and that it is a further sacrifice of the natural 
assets of Australia and the birthright of its people ... Profound legal 
difficulties are said to have been overcome. What humbug this is, 
coming from a national government that has supinely allowed the 
States to intrude unconstitutionally into its sovereign field."' 
A number of objections to the Settlement were directed at the Agreement by 
which the whole scheme was to be administered. Despite being the 
cornerpiece of the offshore arrangements the Agreement was not given 
legislative support, and worked instead on the basis of political faith. 166 That 
is, the mechanism providing for Commonwealth consultation was written 
into the Agreement only—not the legislation—producing what Lumb terms 
"a lack of correspondence between the two". 167 In other words, the Settlement 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, pp 2385, 2390, 2394; Senate, 3 November 
1967, p 2154. 
Hansard, House of Representatives [William Wentworth], 26 October 1967, p 2389. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, p 2368. 
" Hansard, House of Representatives [Reginal Connor], 26 October 1967, pp 2367-2368. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, p 2395; 31 October, pp 2458-2459; 1 
November, p 2575. 
167 Lb, op cit fn 31 p 461. 
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relied solely upon the integrity of state governments for the framework to 
operate as agreed!" Furthermore, it was noted that by honouring the 
Agreement the Commonwealth was prevented by clauses 6 and 7 thereof 
from altering the legislation without state concurrence!" This proposition, 
which restricted Parliament's power to alter legislation, was untenable to 
many representatives, striking as it did at the very heart of the institution!" 
It was noted also that states could even dispute the Commonwealth's view 
on those few matters which the Agreement recognized as falling exclusively 
within the federal province!" In the words of one legislator, "There are in 
the Agreement some extraordinary provisions which apparently aim at tying 
the hands of the Parliament." 72 
In response to the profound objections raised in relation to the draft 
legislation it was proposed to refer the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Bill to a 
Senate committee for closer consideration!" Such a referral would ordinarily 
occur before legislation is passed by the relevant House, so that any 
recommendations arising therefrom could be incorporated into the bill. 
There was concern expressed, however, that the delay incurred while the 
committee conducted its review would translate to a two year drought in the 
production of offshore oil!' Consequently, the Senate agreed to pass the draft 
legislation unamended, whereafter it would be referred immediately to the • 
Senate Select Committtee on Off-Shore Petroleum for investigation in a 
1" Clause 26 of the Agreement reads "The Governments acknowledge that this Agreement is not 
intended to create legal relationships justiciable in a Court of Law but declare that the 
Agreement shall be construed and given effect to by the parties in all respects according to 
the true meaning and spirit thereof." In this respect, it was exclaimed in Parliament - 
"Beautiful sentiments! Most laudable sentiments!" Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 
October 1967, p 2372. 
'Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, p 2386; Hansard, Senate, 6 November 
1967, p 2185. 
1" Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, pp 2188-2189. 
171 Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2193. 
172 Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2184; House of Representatives, 26 October 1967 p 2386. 
1' Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2189. 
174 Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2212. 
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"leisurely, unhurried way."' The limitation to this approach was the fact 
that because a senator's statement could not rule that legislation was ultra 
vires. a challenge to the High Court would be required to determine the 
validity of arrangements, and it was therefore arguable to await the findings 
of the Senate Select Committee.' In the interest of national development, 
however, it was agreed to adopt the modified Committee motion. The report 
of the Committee, delivered at the very end of 1971, was to embolden the 
following two federal governments in their attempts to reclaim 
Commonwealth jurisdiction over the offshore. 
Given the persuasive arguments made in Parliament that the continental 
shelf fell within the sovereign rights of the Commonwealth—and the wide 
support in this regard found in the legal literature—the important task is to 
explain why the Australian Petroleum Settlement preserved a dominant, 
almost exclusive, role for the states offshore. The keenness of the state 
governments in adopting the 1967 Settlement is self evident: by entering into 
the Agreement they gave away nothing and secured jurisdiction over vast 
offshore tracts, an approach which was consistent with their historical 
approach to marine resources policy.' 77 Moreover, it was important to settle 
the matter expediently lest Constitutional questions frustrate the 
arrangements agreed upon.'" These factors provide only a partial explanation - 
of the form of the Settlement, though. Whilst the desires of states to settle the 
offshore situation provides the general basis for the scheme agreed upon in 
1967, this alone does not adequately explain the extent of the concessions 
made by the Commonwealth. At least one legal commentator at the time 
recognised this fact, remarking that "[I]t would be wrong, however, to 
175 Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2122. 
176 Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2196. 
' Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2185. 
178 Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2213. 
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suppose that the joint scheme was embarked upon solely, or even primarily, 
for reasons of law." 79 
2.3.3 Explaining the Settlement 
It is well reported that the motivation behind the arrangements reached in 
1967 was to avoid jurisdictional questions while providing certainty to 
operators, in the greater interest of national development.' As this section 
shows, interpretations of the Australian Petroleum Settlement are focussed 
narrowly upon the legislative framework enacted, and miss the better part of 
the story. Upon closer review of the public record it becomes apparent that 
the terms of the Settlement were the result of an admixture of influences, 
being the bargaining strength of state governments and the oil industry 
relative to the Commonwealth and the latter's technical and administrative 
limitations, which were themselves the perpetuation of the 
Commonwealth's historical absence from the marine resources field. By 
examining these factors more fully, the Settlement is better appreciated as 
being the product of the policy making capabilities of each governmental 
sphere in 1967 rather than simply the outcome of legal and jurisdictional 
uncertainties. 
The three influences which shaped the Settlement are captured succinctly 
in the following comment made in Parliament during debate on the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Bills - 
In our consideration of these measures [the draft legislation], we must 
acknowledge three things-the strong hand of Sir Henry Bolte [the 
Victorian Premier], the attitude of the oil companies and the weakness 
of the Commonwealth Government. If anyone wants evidence of issues 
of extreme importance, it is found here. I put it to the House this 
179 Harders, op cit 109 p 425. 
Croirunelin, op cit fn 104. Cullen in particular describes the Settlement as an arrangement 
steeped in agreement based upon the common goal of avoiding legal and Constitutional 
problems; Cullen, op cit fn 2 pp 61-64. 
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evening that many aspects of these matters ought to be more carefully 
considered, for they are the very crux of these Bills.' 
The discussion now turns briefly to consider these contextual factors. 
Although the influences are discussed separately below it will become 
obvious that all three are complementary and inter-related, and only by 
considering the three together is the shape of the Settlement fully 
understood. 
2.3.3.1 The bargaining position of the states 
The factor which perhaps most influenced the shape of the Settlement was 
the strength of the states relative to the Commonwealth. Hansard records 
show that the states as a bloc lead by Victoria dominated negotiations over 
the Agreement and legislation.' As shown already with respect to one aspect 
of the Settlement—royalty arrangements—the states persuaded the 
Commonwealth that they should naturally regulate the petroleum regime 
and be recompensed accordingly.' This same ability to prevail is also seen in 
terms of the Settlement more broadly. It is recalled that offshore activity 
during the 1960s was concentrated in waters adjacent to Victoria. It was 
therefore in this state's interest to secure an arrangement favourable to state 
governments within the context of the national approach to offshore 
petroleum that was being pursued. 
Parliamentary debates reveal that one individual, the Victorian Premier 
Henry Bolte, was particularly influential in shaping the Settlement. 
Stevenson also recognises Premier Bolte "played a central role" in negotiating 
the Settlement.' Over the course of intergovernmental negotiations Bolte 
directly petitioned the Prime Minister, Harold Holte, to ensure that the final 
181 Hansard, House of Representatives [Anthony Luchetti], 26 October 1967, p 2384. 
'82 Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, p 2394. 
Haward, op cit fn 49 pp 99-119. 
' Stevenson, op cit fn 125 p 68. 
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arrangement was generous to Victoria, and thereby to all the states. That the 
Prime Minister was so able to be influenced by Bolte was the subject of 
outrage during debate on the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Bills. The 
following comment expresses these sentiments, as well as identifies some of 
the other linkages which influenced the shape of the Settlement — 
One of the most dangerous features of this deal is the arrogant attitude 
of Victoria in particular towards the Commonwealth Constitution and 
to known international law governing control of the area outside the 
continental shelf. Mr Bolte has snapped his fingers at the 
Commonwealth Constitution. But with this unprecedented arrogance 
by the Bolte Government is the suppine surrender of the Holt 
Government to the noisy arrogance of both Mr Bolte and the oil 
monopoly. We have never in our history seen such a suppine 
surrender by a Commonwealth Government as we have seen over this 
dea1. 185 
Although Victoria was the state with the most at stake in 1967, it is equally 
important to recognize that the Victorian Government was merely the most 
vocal partner in an alliance comprising all Australian states. 186 With few 
exceptions, scholars have generally overlooked the fact that all the states of 
Australia have long coastlines, an influence introduced in Chapter One as 
having shaped Commonwealth-state interaction in all areas of Australian 
marine policy. 187 In terms of the 1967 Settlement, this incident of federation 
meant that every Australian state was at risk of ceding to the Commonwealth
• controls over potentially valuable offshore resources, precisely as had 
occurred fifteen years earlier in the situation regarding commercial fisheries. 
As will be seen, commensurate with the prospectivity of offshore areas being 
disproved over time states have become disinterested in pursuing a united 
petroleum policy, inversely to the Commonwealth's growing interests and 
confidence in this field. 
Hansard, House of Representatives [Gilbert Duthie], 26 October 1967, p 2390. 
Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2217. 
187  The few analyses which have identified Australian coastalness as an influence an marine 
policy are those by Evans and Bailey, op cit fn 148; Haward, op cit fn 46; Opeskin and 
Rothwell, op cit fn 101. 
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A second aspect arising from Australia's coastal orientation is that there 
was held in 1967 a common view of offshore jurisdiction at the state level 
regardless of the party forming government. Four of the six Australian states 
at the time were ruled by Liberal coalition governments while two—
Tasmania and South Australia—were governed by Labor. Yet for the reasons 
outlined above all state governments embraced the 1967 Settlement in a 
politically bipartisan approach to offshore resources policy, ensured by the fact 
of all states having coastal margins and possible offshore claims. This high 
degree of state political bipartisanship is also recognized by Haward as 
characterizing the Settlement. 188 
The willingness of the Labor states to support the Settlement infuriated 
the federal Labor Opposition. 189 As has been seen during Parliamentary 
debates, Labor was vitriolic in criticising the Commonwealth's failure to 
assert jurisdictional superiority over the continental shelf in 1967, espousing 
as it did a centralist approach to offshore policy. That the Labor states had 
agreed to the Settlement was seized upon by the Government as evidence of 
the success of the Agreement and the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Bills, 
and was used to lambast the Opposition — 
The Opposition has said that Mr Dunstan [South Australian Premier] 
and Mr Reece [Tasmanian Premier] were threatened and that they were 
cowards. How can they be anything but cowards if they do not believe in 
this Agreement—the Opposition has said they do not—yet signed the 
document? In other words, the Opposition makes the claim that these 
two Labor Premiers who, with the other four Premiers, signed the 
Agreement, were cowards ... I would like to know what more 
disgraceful attack could be made on two Labor Premiers by members of 
their own Party. 190 
Despite the passionate defence of state governments implicit in this comment 
and embodied in the Settlement, the extraordinary commitment the 
Haward, op cit fn 49 pp 112-113. 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, p 2393; Senate 6 November 1967, p 2215. 
' Hansard, Senate [Francis McManus], 6 November 1967, p 2216. 
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Commonwealth made to the states in 1967 needs to be placed firmly in 
perspective. Quite simply, the Settlement was not the result of a clearly 
articulated vision, and was arrived at less by Commonwealth design than it 
was by default. The influence of state governments, as found in their 
bargaining strength and offshore policy experience, cut across partisan 
political lines to profoundly shape the terms of the Settlement. 
In the next phase of juridictional settlements, Labor was able to advance 
its centralist policy with respect to the offshore over the strong protestations 
of Liberal and Labor state governments alike. An even more interesting 
development is that pursued by Liberal Commonwealth governments, which 
have also come to increasingly narrow their view of offshore federalism 
despite espousing an overt federalist philosophy. Subsequent to the 1967 
Settlement, no Commonwealth government has returned to the generous 
concessions originally made thereunder. This shift in policy reflects—in part 
at least—a growing confidence with marine resources policy making at the 
Commonwealth level, independent of the particular government in power. 
Liberal and Labor federal governments now differ only in the degree to which 
they exert the Commonwealth's paramountcy over offshore resources. 
2.3.3.2 The influence of the oil industry 
The states were joined by powerful industry interests in their efforts to settle 
offshore arrangements in 1967. That there was a need to create a reliable and 
certain regime for investment is beyond dispute. However, several major 
companies sought to preserve existing contractual arrangements that gave to 
them concessions far in excess of the needed investment stability. Haward, for 
example, notes that the state of Victoria had granted Esso-BHP rights to 
explore in respect of the entirety of Bass Strait. 191 This concern was echoed in 
Parliament — 
191 M. Haward, Institutions, Interests Groups and Marine Resources Policy (University of 
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I believe that the Commonwealth in this case has abandoned a very 
strong position that it had vis a vis the States and vis a vis the control of 
these waters and of the continental shelf and has permitted itself to 
rubber stamp an agreement that had been made between Victoria and 
Esso-BHP. The Commonwealth need not have done that. No doubt the 
Premier of Victoria felt the best bargain he could drive quickly would be 
the best in the long run because later on there would be questions on his 
constitutional right to make a bargain.' 
Under the Settlement, oil exploration companies would retain largely intact 
their pre-existing rights, an arrangement that caused some representatives 
especial disquiet.' Moreover, the agreed royalty rate of 11% was described as 
"disgracefully low".'" In the words of one senator — 
I submit, Mr President, that this Government has been dictated to by 
foreign owned and controlled petroleum companies that have the 
power to make and break governments in this country or any other ...It 
has been bulldozed by the oil companies into proceeding with these 
measures. 195 
The influence of the oil industry was clearly important in shaping the 1967 
regime, as shown particularly by its insistence on preserving existing 
conditions of access granted by state governments. The partnership between 
the oil industry and the attitude of state governments, together with the need 
to provide celerity to the nascent offshore regime, proved irresistable to the 
federal government. The Commonwealth appeared to succumb to this 
combined pressure and endorse a regime which gave to these other interests - 
considerable benefits, and little to itself. 
2.3.3.3 The Commonwealth's inexperience with resource development 
The third factor mentioned above—Commonwealth weakness—is 
essentially the denominator in negotiations over the Settlement. The 
Tasmania, MA thesis, 1986) p 177. 
'Hansard, Senate [Samuel Cohen], 6 November 1967, p 2213. 
I 9 3 Hansard, Senate, 6 November 1967, p 2229. See also Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 
October 1967, pp 2390, 2394. 
'Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, p 2390. 
1" Hansard, Senate [James Keefe], 6 November 1967, p 2229. 
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Commonwealth's legislative policy in 1967 was the legacy of its tradition of 
leaving to states the management of marine resources, dating back to 
fisheries policy in the 1940s and 1950s. As a consequence ot this earlier 
approach, the Commonwealth lacked the capacity to regulate offshore 
petroleum activity and was considerably weakened in its negotiating position 
during the 1960s. The Commonwealth's timidity, moreover, is also 
understood by reference to the international context for offshore petroleum 
development, where it has been seen that "Australia consistently sought 
international agreement first, and was not ahead of the field in the assertion 
of new maritime claims." 196 
It was observed by several commentators that the technical capability for 
regulating mining resided with the states, as derived from onshore minerals 
development activities!' As described previously, the Commonwealth was 
without capabilities in this area and was necessarily dependent upon the 
states for most of the technical and economic input to offshore petroleum 
policy and regulation. Moreover, by adopting the Settlement "Nile scheme 
has also done away with the need for an expensive duplication of 
Commonwealth administrative facilities in the mining field." 98 The 
Commonwealth therefore not only lacked any offshore capability but neither 
did it seek to develop same. 
In Parliament, the Commonwealth's "inexperience and lack of economic 
sophistication" was accepted as explanation for its delay in developing 
offshore resource policy capabilities. However, these excuses were 
condemned as sufficient reason for entering into the Agreement and enacting 
the quitclaim legislation!" It seems, therefore, that whilst the government 
Landale and Burmester, op cit fn 38p 391. 
Harders, op cit fn 109; Haward, op cit fn 49 pp 113-114. 
Lumb, op cit fn 31 p'461. 
I" Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 October 1967, p 2369. 
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and Opposition were prepared to admit to the Commonwealth's deficiencies 
in natural resources policy, the latter at least was unwilling to allow these to 
be perpetuated by the Settlement. In the event, the ease with which the states 
could extend offshore their regulatory regimes negated the Commonwealth's 
desires to emplace a similar regime, especially when put in the context of the 
pressures discussed already. The Commonwealth was simply unable to 
assume responsibilities for administering the offshore regime even if it so 
desired. 
2.4 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The Australian Petroleum Settlement was a framework within which 
certainty could be given to offshore petroleum titles while setting aside 
questions as to jurisdiction between the Commonwealth and states. 
Although these factors are well recognized as shaping the Settlement, a 
number of other influences explain why the Agreement and legislation 
giving effect to the Settlement amounted to a continued withdrawal by the 
Commonwealth from the field of marine resources policy. The 
Commonwealth's technical and administrative weakness, and the strength of 
the states and their arrangements with oil companies, fundamentally 
determined the shape of the Settlement. This chapter has shown that the - 
Settlement was not agreed upon as harmoniously as many legal 
commentaries suggest. As summarized in the bitter Parliamentary debates — 
Tongue in cheek, the State representatives at conferences with the 
Commonwealth have asserted State sovereignty over the continental 
shelf as a bargaining factor ... In any constitutional challenge to 
Commonwealth sovereignty over the continental shelf, an attacking 
State would not hit the deck. The Minister, the Prime Minister and their 
legal advisers, as well as their State counterparts, are well aware of this. 
Any State attempting to take this course would expose itself to 
justifiable legal humiliation and would wreck the flimsy political 
compromises on which this measure is based. The second reading 
speech made by the Minister is a classic example of argumentum ad 
ignorantiam. The simple truth is that the Commonwealth has 
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acquiesced and concurred, whether by sloth, indifference or otherwise, 
in the usurpation by the States of its sovereign powers.2" 
Stevenson confirms that such criticism of the Settlement is justified. He 
identifies three particular defects with the P(SL)A: the surrender to Victorian 
Premier Bolte of Commonwealth authority; the prominence given to foreign 
oil companies; and the undertaking to Parliament not to amend the 
legislation without the agreement of state governments. 2" 
In terms of shaping Commonwealth and state relations offshore, the 
consequences of the Commonwealth's policy approach as embodied in the 
Settlement were two-fold. Firstly, the dominance of the states as policy 
makers negated the requirement of the Commonwealth to develop its own 
marine policy expertise, capabilities that were already fundamentally lacking 
in the 1960s. Following from this, the early role of state governments as 
fisheries and then petroleum managers assured them of a continued key role 
in marine policy formation. 
The offshore petroleum settlement is therefore appropriately considered 
as a reflection of the roles that the two spheres of government could fill in 
policy and administration at the time given their respective capabilities, 
which includes but is not limited to knowledge of legal and Constitutional 
responsibilities. Confirmation of this argument is found in the observation 
that the extraordinarily lengthy debates surrounding the legislation were 
concerned with the appropriateness of the arrangements rather than the issue 
of jurisdiction. Explanation as to the Commonwealth's acquiescence to the 
Settlement seems found in a combination of continued inexperience and a 
reluctance to venture into an area of policy in which it had few capabilities. A 
leading Australian scholar captures the essence of this denouement — 
' Hansard, House of Representatives [Reginald Connor], 26 October 1967, p 2369. 
201 Stevenson, op cit fn 125. 
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"Mn the mid 1960s the discovery of extensive hydrocarbon reserves in 
Bass Strait led to discourse about the respective roles of the 
Commonwealth and states in maritime affairs and revenue sharing. 
Attempts were made to develop a collective 'Petroleum Agreement' 
(1967), based upon the notion of mirror legislation by both levels of 
government."202 [emphasis added]. 
The Commonwealth sought later to reclaim offshore authority, both directly 
and through less overt measures. But the approach laid down during the 
immediate post-war fisheries development took hold and shaped the 
Commonwealth's early experience with petroleum, a position which was in 
consequence difficult to reverse. It was only through direct challenge to this 
original arrangement—in particular, by explicitly raising the question of 
offshore jurisdiction—that the Commonwealth was able to effect change to 
the petroleum regime. 
As shown, questions pertaining to jurisdiction were certainly not the sole 
determinant of the 1967 Agreement and legislation, and were in fact 
overshadowed by other influential factors. In effect, though, avoiding 
jurisdictional questions forestalled future Commonwealth action because 
these had still to be answered before the Commonwealth could advance its 
own petroleum policies. In the words of one commentator - 
... apparently the States would not yield the appearances of power left to 
them ... the need to preserve the facade of State pretensions has 
obscured the true nature of what is occurring, and has given the 
impression that the Commonwealth is merely endorsing a division 
agreed upon between the States and legally effected by them.'" 
The discussion now turns to examine the second phase in the evolution of 
the offshore petroleum regime. During the early 1970s the Commonwealth 
sought to overturn the arrangements agreed upon in 1967 and assert 
B. Davis, "National Responses to UNCED Outcomes: Australia", in L. Kriwoken, M. 
Haward, D. VanderZwaag and B. Davis (ed), Oceans Law and Policy in the Post-UNCED 
Era: Australian and Canadian Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, London, 1996) pp 25- 
40, p 27. 
2°3 O'Connell, op cit fn 34. p 47. 
Chapter 2 	 89  
supremacy over the offshore, which it was able to do with full legal efficacy. 
However, the historical context of the P(SL)A assured the Commonwealth's 
approach of being shortlived, notwithstanding that some of the changes 
enacted under Whitlam outlived the government, and evolved to shape the 
third phase of the regime. 
Chapter Three 
Commonwealth Assertiveness and the Offshore - 
1968-1975 
The period 1968-1975 represents the second phase in the evolution of the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act. Two features of this period distinguish it 
from the immediate preceding years of the Australian Petroleum Settlement. 
Firstly, it was during this time that the Commonwealth made greater use of 
constitutional powers to advance its offshore resource interests through 
legislation, causing a rapid deterioration in relations with state governments 
and the oil industry. Because the congeniality of the arrangements made in 
1967 endured for so few years it is difficult to consider the Settlement a 
success, as has been commented in the literature. 1 Also, the years following 
the Settlement marked the beginnings of an increasingly bipartisan approach 
of successive federal governments towards offshore petroleum policy. Unlike 
the earlier situation when the Coalition Government and Labor Opposition 
espoused contrasting policies, governments of both persuasion during the 
early 1970s introduced legislation to assert Commonwealth paramountcy 
over the offshore: It is possible, therefore, to discern the beginnings of a - 
definable Commonwealth position with respect to offshore petroleum during 
this phase. 
The first move in this direction—the attempt in 1970 by the Gorton 
Government to enact the Territorial Seas and Continental Shelf B ill—
floundered because it had little support other than the Prime Minister's. 
Although Gorton lost the Prime Ministership over this fiasco—and the 
Government fell from power soon thereafter—the policy embodied within 
1 R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too Many?" (1988) 6 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 213-247. 
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the bill nonetheless signalled a shift in Commonwealth thinking towards 
offshore oil, both politically and within the bureaucracy.2 
The election of the Whitlam Labor Government in 1972 provided the 
political impetus to conclude what Gorton had been unable to do. As a matter 
of priority upon assuming office, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act was 
enacted to declare Commonwealth jurisdiction over the territorial sea and 
continental shelf, thereby triggering a High Court challenge by the states. This 
brief but radical period of offshore jurisdiction has been treated at length in 
the literature.' Generally ignored, however, is the fact that the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act was merely the offshore plank of a resources policy 
being developed from the centre. The legislation was therefore less a 
subjugation by the Commonwealth of offshore petroleum than it was a 
vehicle for implementing national policies for the conservation and 
development of marine resources.' 
The Commonwealth's desires to assert jurisdiction over the offshore were 
both shaped and enabled by a range of converging factors, not least of which 
was the emerging Law of the Sea Convention. During the formative 
UNCLOS III negotiations at this time the Commonwealth was able to better 
align its national marine policies with legal concepts gaining popularity 
internationally, and so harmonize the two policy areas. Law of the Sea policy 
2 G. Stevenson, Mineral Resources and Australian Federalism (Centre for Research on Federal 
Financial Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1976). 
3 M. Crommelin, "Federal-Regional Cooperation: A Comparative Perspective", in J. Saunders 
(ed), Papers presented at the 2nd National Conference m Natural Resources Law, 1985 
Managing Natural Resources in a Federal State (Carswell, Calgary, Canada, 1986) pp 295- 
321; R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Disputes The 
Federation Press, Sydney, 1990) pp 86-90; E. Fitzgerald, "The Seaweed Rebellion: Federal-
State Conflicts Over Offshore Energy Development in the United States, Canada, and 
Australia" (1992) 7 Connecticut Journal of International Law 255-309; R. Hildreth, 
"Managing Ocean Resources: New Zealand and Australia" (1991) 6 International Journal of 
Estuarine and Coastal Law 89-126. 
4 B. Galligan and C. Fletcher, New Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations and Environment 
Policy (Federalism Research Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1993). 
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in turn broadened the domestic bases of Commonwealth offshore legislation 
to encompass fisheries resources and protection of the marine environment.' 
This chapter recounts the brief but substantial period of Commonweatlh 
offshore ascendency between 1968 and 1975. Part one introduces several 
fisheries and petroleum policy events that compounded to encourage 
assertive Commonwealth action generally. The second part outlines 
resources policy under the Whitlam Commonwealth before the particular 
details of offshore legislative policy are reviewed in detail in the third part. 
From this chapter it appears that Whitlam's legacy was a notable shift in 
offshore responsibilities towards the Commonwealth, the content of which 
was massaged and refined, but not rejected by subsequent governments. 
3.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN FISHERIES POLICY 
Advances in fisheries law and policy during the late-1960s motivated the 
Commonwealth to strengthen its role in offshore policy generally, and 
particularly with respect to offshore petroleum legislation. There were two 
important dimensions to this expansion in fisheries policy: new legislative 
assertions pertaining to controls over sedentary fisheries and positive 
commentary by the High Court of Commonwealth offshore jurisdiction. Each - 
of these developments are discussed briefly below, especially in terms of their 
relevance to offshore petroleum legislative policy.' 
D. Rothwell and M. Haward, "Federal and International Perspectives on Australia's 
Maritime Claims" (1996) 20 Marine Policy 29-46. 
6 A third fisheries policy development at this time further evidences the Commonwealth's 
slow but growing interest in consolidating its jursdiction over marine resources. In 1968, the 
Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth) was amended to establish the 12-mile declared fishing zone (DFZ) 
to protect Australian fisheries from foreign fishing incursions. The DFZ was therefore the 
first assertion of offshore jurisdiction by reference to a fixed linear distance, unlike the 
P(SL)A which asserted Australian jurisdiction over the continental shelf without defining 
an outer limit. Although the Fisheries Act 1967 (Cth) fell short of establishing a territorial 
sea the DFZ was nonetheless viewed by some representatives as a positive move in this 
eventual direction. See: Hansard, House of Representatives, 8 November 1967, p 2348. H. 
Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea", in J. Crawford and D. Rothwell (ed), The 
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3.1.1 Continental Shelf (Living Natural Resources) Act 1968 (Cth) 
One year after the Australian Petroleum Settlement was reached the 
Commonwealth enacted the Continental Shelf (Living Natural Resources) 
Act (CSLNR Act) to bring the continental shelf firmly under Commonwealth 
jurisdiction for the purposes of conserving fish resources.' The CSLNR Act 
updated the sedentary fishing regime by repealing the Pearl Fisheries Act 1953 
(Cth) and replacing it with one based upon the provisions of the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf.' Because of the heightened political 
interest in offshore petroleum at the time debate on the CSLNR bill became 
distracted by the prospectivity of the continental shelf, as had occurred with 
the earlier Pearl Fisheries Act. It was perhaps logical that the two policy areas 
should converge somewhat, given that fisheries management and petroleum 
development alike have interests in the continental shelf. Rather than 
examining the proposed scheme for exploiting fisheries resources, however, 
debate on the Bill was devoted almost entirely to canvassing broader 
continental shelf policy options. 
Both the Government and Opposition took the opportunity to 
contemplate the nature of continental shelf rights and responsibilities 
available under the Convention. There were particular concerns over the 
technical and legal components to the Commonwealth's claims as these - 
related to offshore petroleum. 9 It is recalled from Chapter Two that the 
continental shelf was defined in 1958 by reference to a depth rather than a 
Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific Region (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995) 
pp 51-64; I. Shearer, "International Legal Aspects of Australia's Maritime Environment", in 
Australia's Maritime Horizons in the 1980s (Occasional Papers in Maritime Affairs: 1, 1982) 
pp 1-8. 
M. White, Marine Pollution Laws of the Australasian Region (The Federation Press, Sydney, 
1994). 
C. Harders, "Commonwealth and State Jurisdiction Over Off-Shore Areas" (1977) 1 
Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association Journal 7-16; R. Lumb, "Sovereignty and 
Jurisdiction Over Australian Coastal Waters" (1969) 43 The Australian law Journal 421-438. 
9 Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 November 1968, pp 3420, 3425, 3433-5. 
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fixed distance criterion.' Ten years later this approach was creating problems 
for Commonwealth policy-making as members struggled to temper their 
enthusiasm for developing offshore petroleum resources using new 
technologies with the constraints presented by the legal framework for their 
application. The Commonwealth's approach to this problem is amply 
expressed by the Attorney-General [Nigel Bowen] — 
Up to the present the sea covering the continental shelf has been a 
mental and technological hazard to development of the continental 
shelf ... We were prepared to remove the overburden on the land to get 
at the coal beneath but were not prepared to go through the water to get 
at the wealth on the sea bed. But technological advances in recent years 
have been of such a nature that we can now do this. Technology has 
advanced so far that exploration of the sea bed in other parts of the 
world is being carried out at great depth. We have seen, for example, in 
Australia the discoveries of oil in Bass Strait. Enormous wealth is there 
... This interest would be to extend our territorial claims—even our 
sovereignty—as widely away from the mainland as we could consistent 
with international law." 
Unlike the previous year when the Opposition was outraged by the P(SL)A 
and the Agreement, the CSLNR bill was received much more positively by 
Parliament. One outstanding problem, though, was the legislation's 
continued failure to declare the outer extent of Australian jurisdiction over 
the continental shelf.' The area to which the CSLNR Act applied was to be 
determined by proclamation at the prerogative of the Governor-General, a 
mechanism which allowed for offshore jurisdiction to be exerted selectively 
at a pace which comported with developments in international law." If 
enacted, however, it was claimed that the legislation would repeat the 
"neglect, the inefficency and the incompetence" of continental shelf policy 
enacted by the Pearl Fisheries Act fifteen years earlier by not effecting 
Commonwealth offshore control through a clear legislative assertion." 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, Artide H. 
11 Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 November 1968, p 3433. 
'Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 November 1968, pp 3420, 2342-5. 
13 Continental Shelf (Living Natural Resources) Act 1968 (Cth) ss 5, 11. 
14 Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 November 1968, p 3430. 
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This method for extending national sovereignty contained in the CSLNR 
bill was criticized for leaving doubtful the outer extent of Commonwealth 
jurisdiction, especially when compared with the provisions of the 
Continental Shelf Convention. Opposition members exhorted the 
Commonwealth to fully avail itself of those opportunities relating to depth 
and resources, particularly by allowing Australia's continental shelf to 
ambulate seaward. If challenged in this interpretation of offshore 
jurisidiction the Commonwealth should undertake to have it clarified in the 
courts, rather than continue to avoid answering this thorny question.' The 
Labor Opposition summarized the Commonwealth's approach thus - 
To me it is quite important that the parties to the convention had in 
contemplation exploitation of the continental shelf in certain cases well 
beyond the 200 metre limit-they did not define this limit. But the area 
of continental shelf within the 200 metres depth in the case of a nation 
such as Australia is a huge one. I would say that no nation in the world 
today has an easier means of asserting its domination over a vast area of 
continental shelf than has Australia ...My criticism of the Government 
is this: We have not used our tactical geographic and strategic advantage 
as we should have done. We have not led in asserting our very definite 
rights. We have in the process lagged far behind other countries. The 
Government, to put it very charitably, has been overly timid." 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Commonwealth's timidity in enacting 
continental shelf legislation is attributable in part to its policy of making 
offshore claims only when these are permissible internationally, whether - 
under treaty or customary law. This legislative approach is evident 
throughout all the evolutionary phases of the offshore petroleum regime. 
During the 1950s Australia moved to lay claim over offshore resources in 
parallel with UNCLOS I initiatives, an approach which is again seen in the 
15 Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 November 1968, p 3431. Upon election to government in 
1972, this very approach was pursued by Labor in the form of the Seas and Submerged Lands 
Act which was enacted specifically to provoke a judicial challenge and thereby invoke a 
final determination of offshore jurisdiction. 
16 Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 November 1968, p 3430. This comment was made by 
Rex Connor who as resources minister under the subsequent Whitlam Labor Government 
promoted a very assertive Commonwealth resources policy [more later]. 
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next chapter with respect to the Third Law of the Sea Conference and the 
resultant treaty text. Throughout UNCLOS III negotiations the 
Commonwealth worked assidiously to preserve the 1958 definition of the 
continental shelf—once it had belatedly comforted itself with this formula, 
that is—in preference to adopting a more precise measure of elongated 
offshore boundaries, because of the benefits to Australia of retaining the older 
formula." 
The Commonwealth's policy of acting in a manner that was consistent 
with international law is again unmistakable in 1968. During debate on the 
CSLNRAct the Government emphasized the international responsibility of 
its policy — 
Normally Australia, in its international dealings, has been one of the 
responsible nations of the world. It has tended to obey, observe and 
respect international law. It is possible for a country to set international 
law at naught ... This has not generally been Australia's approach. I 
believe that Australia's interests can be safe-guarded adequately in the 
present situation, particularly with the extremely fast pace of 
development in international law, without adopting a defiant attitude 
such as the one I have mentioned and taking a course of action which 
would put us outside the pale of international law.' 
The Commonwealth at this time also began to take a rather more active 
approach towards progressing the emerging legal code for international 
oceans law. In defence of its policy of linking foreign diplomacy with national 
legislative policy, the Government highlighted its role in preparatory work 
for LTNCLOS DI [discussed in detail in part 3.4 below[. 19 Moreover, criticisim 
by Labor of the CSLNR bill was temperate compared with the vitriol that 
characterized the 1953 and 1967 parliamentary debates. In combination, there 
A. Bergin, "Australia and Deep Seabed Mining" (1982) 36 Australian Outlook 45-50; A. 
Bergin, "Australia and UNCLOS 3" (1983) 29 Australian Journal of Political History 427- 
439; M. Landale and H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea - Offshore 
Jurisdiction", in K. Ryan (ed), International Law in Australia (The Law Book Company, 
Sydney, 1984) pp 390-416. 
18 Hansard, House of Representatives [Nigel Bowen, Attorney-General], 28 November 1968, p 
3436. 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 November 1968, pp 3435-6. 
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appears to be emerging a degree of political maturity and consistency in 
Commonwealth policy development by 1968. 
From the Parliamentary record it is evident that having debated at some 
length the national and international aspects of marine resources policy, 
there was an articulation by the Government and Opposition of the 
Commonwealth's legislative capability in this policy area. Notwithstanding 
the wishes of many members to expand Commonwealth legislative 
capabilities, the Continental Shelf Convention was clearly considered 
inadequate as an instrument by which this could confidently be achieved" - 
That Convention permitted a country to make a claim to the living 
resources on the sea bed out to a depth of 200 metres or to the limit of 
exploitability. At that time-1958—it was thought that 200 metres was 
about the limit to which you were ever likely to be able to exploit but as 
things have turned out the depth is somewhat greater now. In 
California exploration is going on at 1,500 feet ... This is the technical 
advance, and international law is attempting to keep pace with it.' 
The frustrations shared by parliamentarians on both sides of politics in 
relation to international law of the sea likely accounts for the 
Commonwealth's growing interest in advancing UNCLOS DT negotiations. 
Because the Coalition and Labor alike were exasperated by the imprecision of 
international law it is not surprising that a commonality developed in Law of 
the Sea policy—alluded to earlier—which has continued unchanged between • 
subsequent Commonwealth governments.' In other words, governments of 
both persuasions came to appreciate the existence of genuine Commonwealth 
interests in offshore resources. This same policy was emulated in the 
" Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 November 1968, pp 3420, 3424. 
21 Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 November 1968, p 3434. 
See, generally: A. Bergin, "Australia Adopts New Maritime Zones" (1992) 7 International 
Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 123-128; H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the 
Sea - The Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment", in K. Ryan (ed), 
International Law in Australia (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1984) pp 439-455; K. 
Suter, The History of the Development of the Law of the Sea - the Importance for Global 
Marine Conservation and Recommendations for Australian Action (World Wildlife Fund for 
Nature Australia/Humane Society International, Sydney, 1994). 
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bureaucracy but the input of different agencies and the oversight of several 
influential ministers meant that there were nonetheless emphases in policy 
priorities as between governments [more later]. 
A final observation needs to be about debate on the CSLNRAct. Unlike the 
passage through Parliament of the previous marine resources legislation this 
bill incited no discussion about the respective jurisdictional responsibilities of 
the Commonwealth and the states. Other than a brief reference to the 
Commonwealth's overtures to the states to enact uniform legislation for 
controlling sedentary fishing, the Parliamentary record is devoid of any 
deliberations as to the proper allocation of offshore jurisdiction.' 
Parliament's disinterest in this aspect of the bill is readily explained by the 
fact that sedentary fishing was limited to northern Australian waters, 
adjacent to states with little economic or demographic influence on the 
Commonwealth.' The particular curiousity worth highlighting is the silence 
of respresentatives as to the Commonwealth's power to legislate with respect 
to the continental shelf, especially following the endless argumentation on 
this very subject less than one year earlier in the context of the P(SL)A. It is 
difficult not to conclude that the CSLNR bill illuminates the disingenuity of 
the arguments presented in 1967 atesting to profound constitutional . 
uncertainties over offshore jurisiction. Regardless of these observations, the 
CSLNR Act had the effect of nurturing Parliamentary interest in offshore 
petroleum in the wake of the protracted P(SL)A debates, and thereby 
consolidating Commonwealth claims over the continental shelf. 
'3 Hansard, House of Representatives, 28 November 1968, p 3421. 
" In his monograph cn minerals and petroleum policy—discussed further in the analysis of 
Commonwealth policy under Whitlam—Stevenson demonstrates how the presence of 
organised political or other advocacies profoundly shapes the nature of governmental 
responses to resource allocation. Stevenson, op cit fn 2. 
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3.1.2 Bonser v LaMacchia (1969) 
The second fisheries policy development to influence the evolution of the 
P(SL)A was the prerogative of neither Parliament or the executive, but was 
the High Court decision in the case Bonser v LaMacchia.' This case reopened 
temporarily abeyed concerns over offshore jurisdiction, and was pivotal in 
Gorton's aborted legislative attempt and Whitlam's more succesful Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act.' The facts of this case were simple enough—LaMacchia 
was prosecuted for fishing six miles off the New South Wales coast with nets 
prohibited by regulations under the Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth). The prosecution 
was challenged on two constitutional grounds. Firstly, it was claimed that 
Commonwealth legislative power was limited to regulating fishing only with 
three miles of the coast, which was argued to be the limits of 'Australian 
waters beyond territorial waters' within the meaning of the Constitution.27 
The alternative argument held that if Commonwealth powers do apply to 
waters beyond three miles, Australian waters do not extend as far seaward as 
the outer limits proclaimed pursuant to the Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth). Because 
the case revolved around constitutional interpretation it was removed to the 
High Court. 
All six judges hearing the case found that the Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth)— 
expressed to operate only seaward of the three mile limit—was a valid - 
Commonwealth statute supported by s. 51(x) of the Constitution. LaMacchia 
was in turn guilty of commiting an offence against the Commonwealth. In 
deciding the case, the court found that it was not necessary to define the outer 
extent of Australian waters, but determined simply that a point six miles 
offshore was within the area to which the Fisheries Act applied.' A fact 
which has been widely reported, however, is that two justices took the 
Bonser v LaMacchia (1969) 122 CLR 177. 
26 Rothwell and Haward, op cit fn 5. 
27 Australian Constitution s 51(x). 
Bonser v LaMacchia (1969) 122 CLR 177. 
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opportunity to contemplate at some length theories of jurisdiction over the 
offshore.' Indeed, the Chief Justice commented that it was not possible to 
settle the case without so doing, a statement which Cullen found "a most 
doubtful assertion."3° O'Connell's estimation of the judges' method is more 
charitable, and proved to be highly prescient in foreseeing future events – 
Two judges ... devoted themselves to enquiring whether "beyond 
territorial limits" means beyond the low-water mark or beyond the 
three-mile limit. In doing so they stirred up one of Australia's great 
constitutional issues, which has ramifications not only in the fisheries 
field but in the field of mineral exploration and in other fields as well. 
Undoubtedly their judgements will provoke a litigious serial in 
constitutional law, the end result of which is difficult to predict.' 
In abbreviated terms, the decision strongly established that the offshore 
legislative capabilities historically resident in the Empire had accrued to the 
Commonwealth around 1900. Chief Justice Barwick formed the view that the 
area refered to in s. 51(x) of the Constitution—Australian waters beyond 
territorial limits—accrued to the Imperial Crown at an indeterminate date 
and this area was subsequently conveyed to the Commonwealth upon 
federation. These limits were distinguished from those of both the 
Commonwealth or states, the latter of which were bounded by the 
geographical low water mark. Threfore, the policy embodied in the Fisheries 
Act, that the states had a territorial sea, was misconceived. Barwick was  
concurred in this view by at least one other justice [Windeyer]. 32 
From this overview of Bonser v LaMacchia it is apparent that the High 
Court's judgement largely contradicted the policy embodied in the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Acts. Accepting the views of Barwick and Windeyer, in 
particular, precludes the possible accrual of the terrritorial sea to the states 
D. O'Connell, "The Commonwealth Fisheries Power and Bonser v. La Macchia" (1970) 3 
Adelaide Law Review 500-507; J. Waugh, Australian Fisheries Law (Intergovernmental 
Relations in Victoria Program, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 1988). 
3° Cullen, op cit fn 3p 85. 
31 O'Connell, op cit fn 29p 501. 
32 Bonser v LaMacchia (1969) 122 CLR 177. 
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upon federation, and certainly extinguishes the antecedent notion that the 
colonies exercised jurisdiction over these waters." Moreover, the expansive 
judgements considered that the operation of Commonwealth legislation in 
areas beyond three miles was only a partial exercise of a more potent power to 
legislate. 
Notwithstanding the apparent finality of Bonser v LaMacchia, O'Connell 
concluded that the states did have some extra-territorial powers to legislate 
with respect to offshore areas.' Waugh also interpreted the judgements as 
adverting neither a majority nor a unity determination of s. 51(x), despite 
confirming Commonwealth offshore powers." The states' suppressed or 
residual capabilities were eventually resuscitated in 1980 following the inter-
governmental tension of the early 1970s. At that earlier time, however, 
Bonser v LaMacchia served to compound the additive influences on the 
Commonwealth to exercise its legislative powers over the offshore, 
beginning with the Gorton bill in the following year. 36 
3.2 PETROLEUM POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
This section discusses two developments in offshore petroleum policy which 
occurred in the early 1970s. Firstly, the Senate Select Committee established in 
1967 in response to the P(SL)A reported during this time. Although the 
Committee commented positively upon the legislative scheme it made a 
number of critical recommendations relating to the need to clarify offshore 
jurisdiction. The so-called Gorton bill—the second related event—was 
presented to Parliament in 1970 where it was opposed by the states and the 
33 O'Connell, op cit fn 29. 
3° Ibid. 
35 Waugh, op cit fn 29. 
36 M. Haward, Federalism and the Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement (University 
of Tasmania, PhD thesis, 1992) pp 119-131; B. Opeslcin and D. Rothwell, "Australia's 
Territorial Sea: International and Federal Implications of Its Extension to 12 Miles" (1991) 
22 Ocean Development and International Law 395-431. 
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Federal Liberal Party. Gorton attempted to reduce the federal emphasis of the 
party, and the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf legislation was the 
offshore plank of this policy. The report of the Senate committee is discussed 
first below before its relationship to Gorton's offshore policy is described in 
greater detail following. 
3.2.1 Senate Select Committee on Off -shore Petroleum Resources 
It is recalled from Chapter Two that in agreement to pass the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act the Senate established a Select Committee to examine 
the jurisdictional basis of the Australian Petroleum Settlement, as well as the 
details of regime created thereby.' There were eight terms of reference 
framing the Committee's inquiry many of which are apposite to every phase 
of the P(SL)A's evolution — 
(a) whether the constitutional conception underlying the legislation is 
consistent with the proper constitutional responsibilities of the 
Commonwealth and the States; 
(b) whether the system of administration established by the legislation 
is the most effective to fulfil the purpose of adequate utilisation of 
Australia's off-shore resources of oil and natural gas; 
(c) whether the legislation makes adequate provision for free 
interstate trade in gas and oil; 
(d) whether proper provision is made in the legislation for adequate 
royalties, used in the national interest; 
(e) whether the areas of permits confirmed or authorised in the 
legislation are excessive; 
(f) whether proper provision is made relating to renewals to prevent 
stagnating oil exploration; 
(g) whether the legislation makes adequate provision for Australian 
ownership and/or control or Australian participation in the 
ownership and/or control of Australia's off-shore resources of oil 
and natural gas; and 
(h) the provisions of the legislation generally. 
' Hansard, Senate, 8 November 1967, p 2189. 
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The Committee delivered its voluminous 800 page report to Parliament in 
December 1971, four years after being originally constituted." An interim 
report addressing the first term of reference had been issued a year earlier in 
response to the Gorton Bill, discussed further below." Generally, the 
Committee accepted the ingenuous nature of the 1967 Australian Petroleum 
Settlement and the effort expended to overcome constitutional hurdles. In 
particular, the P(SL)A was considered not to be inconsistent with the offshore 
roles of the Commonwealth and states because the avoidance of litigation left 
this situation unresolved. 
A number of criticisms were directed at the Commonwealth government 
for its policy approach towards the 1967 Settlement, however. Firstly, the 
Committee reported that the constitutional conception underlying the 
legislation was inconsistent with what should be the proper relationship 
between Parliament and the executive. The manner in which the bills had 
been presented to Parliament for endorsement as a fait accompli in the 
context of the national Settlement was also criticized. Perhaps most 
importantly, the Committee noted that "the larger national interest is not 
served by leaving unresolved and uncertain" the allocation of jurisdiction as 
between the two spheres of government. 
In its report the Senate Select Committee lavished obvious attention upon 
broad constitutional questions. The Committee did importantly contemplate 
the nature of the designated authority created under the Commonwealth's 
P(SL)A. Chapter Two described how through this mechanism state 
governments administered the Commonwealth statute on the latter's behalf, 
and made all the exploration and production decisions available thereunder. 
The Committee expressed disquiet at this approach because it inappropriately 
Hansard, Senate, 8 December 1971, pp 2496-8. 
Hansard, Senate, 24 September 1970, pp 877-879. 
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removed from the Parliament any ultimate oversight of action authorised 
under a law of the Commonwealth — 
The Commonwealth Act is an Act which imposes responsibilities upon 
a Commonwealth Minister. But the responsibility of the 
Commonwealth Minister is limited to those decisions which, under the 
agreement between the Commonwealth and the States, are matters of 
Commonwealth responsibility. But many of the decisions which are 
made under the legislation are matters of State responsibility in respect 
of which the decisions are made by a State Minister • who also is a 
Commonwealth functionary. In respect of those decisisons there is no 
accountability to the Commonwealth Parliament." 
Although this criticism was eventually negated—in part at least—by the 
Commonwealth amending the P(SL)A during the 1980s to assume this 
responsibility for itself, the confusion created by the designated authority 
compounded under the Whitlam Government. Part 3.3 describes how the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act decisively removed the continental shelf to 
the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth, but had the undesirable effect of 
leaving decision making in respect of this area solely a state responsiblity." 
Even to this day the constitutionality of this particular intergovernmental 
arrangement has yet to be determined by the High Court. 
It is also necessary to introduce a parallel development occurring in 
relation to the Great Barrier Reef. As early as 1968, the Labor Opposition 
insisted that the Commonwealth should take unilateral action to protect the 
Reef against increasing foreign fishing, by usurping Queensland's assumed 
jurisdiction over the region." At the time the Commonwealth was unmoved 
despite its increased legislative interest in fisheries policy, described above. 
Several years later the Commonwealth and Queensland were entering into a 
stalemate over oil drilling on the Reef." The latter was clearly of the view 
4° Hansard, Senate, 24 September 1970, p 879. 
41 Hildreth, op cit fn 3. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 15 August 1968, p 227. 
Hansard, Senate, 8 December 1971, p 2505. 
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that the Reef was the property of the state while the Commonwealth was 
concerned at the possibility of environmental degradation. This conflict in 
turn contributed to the Commonwealth's attempt to enact the Territorial Sea 
and Continental Shelf Bill and assume jurisdiction over the offshore." 
As a result of the impasse between the two governments, a Royal 
Commission was established to investigate the problem, reporting finally in 
1976. The Royal Commission therefore overlapped the long awaited Senate 
Select Committee report, and concurred in recommending that offshore 
petroleum development be prohibited in the Reef.' As is described below, 
under Whitlam's Prime Ministership the Commonwealth finally legislated 
to wrest control of the Great Barrier Reef from Queensland in 1975. Chapter 
Four following shows that so accustomed to controlling the Reef had the 
federal government become by 1980 that the OCS preserved this offshore area 
to the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth. 
In the event, the actions of Gorton to assert Commonwealth jurisdiction 
offshore overshadowed the Committee's work." By introducing the 
Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill to Parliament many of the 
recommendations contained in the report were addressed by default rather 
than by informed deliberation. Despite its potential for shaping the evolution 
of the P(SL)A the Committee's report unfortunately languished, and failed to 
influence Parliamentary debate on the draft legislation. As Reid 
acknowledges — 
Given the almost non-existent public debate which accompanied this 
new legislation, it is not surprising that this report has not received the 
current attention it deserves.' 
"R. Kenchington, Managing Marine Environments (Taylor & Francis, New York, 1990). 
Report of the Senate Select Committee on Off-shore Petroleum Resources, p 36. 
" Cullen, op cit fn 3p 75. 
P. Reid, "Commonwealth-State Relations Offshore Mining and Petroleum Legislation; Recent 
Developments: An Historic Milestone of Millstone?" (1980) 2 Australian Mining and 
Petroleum Law Journal 58-76. 
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3.2.2 The Gorton Bill (1970) 
The Coalition Government in 1970 introduced to Parliament the Territorial 
Sea and Continental Shelf Bill to assert the exclusive right of the 
Commonwealth in respect of all offshore areas, with the exception of internal 
waters as existed at federation." The bill was designed to provoke a state 
challenge in the High Court in order to finally answer questions of offshore 
jurisdiction, building upon the decision in Bonser v LaMacchia—the same 
tactic employed by the Labor Government three years later after the first bill's 
eventual failure. The second reading speech captures the elements of the 
Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill – 
In these circumstances, the Government feels that, without prejudice to 
the petroleum agreement and to the action that has been taken in 
pursuance of it, the constitutional issue should now be decided once 
and for all, and without delay. Until it is so decided, the 
Commonwealth cannot either disclaim responsibility for what is done 
in off-shore areas or itself take appropriate action. The Bill asserts what 
the Government believes to be the rights of the Commonwealth, 
broadly in accordance with the judicial views I have mentioned. If the 
States are not prepared to accept as definitive the judgments of the Chief 
Justice of Australia and Mr Justice Windeyer in Bonser v. La Macchia, it 
is their right to commence proceedings which will raise squarely for 
decision by the full High Court any issues they wish to contest." 
Despite its provocative tenor, the Gorton Bill—as the draft legislation became 
known—was not conceived to displace the role of state governments in 
offshore petroleum policy, as the second reading speech indicates. As 
originally proposed, the legislation would allow the 1967 petroleum 
arrangements to continue while a companion bill enabling Commonwealth 
exploitation of submerged minerals would be enacted." Offshore minerals 
policy would thus become the province of the Commonwealth while the 
petroleum regime would continue unchanged.' Indeed, it was hoped that 
48 Hansard, House of Representatives [Reginald Swartz, Minister for National Development], 
16 April 1970, p 1276. 
49 Hansard, House of Representatives, 16 April 1970, p 1280. 
5° Hansard, House of Representatives, 16 April 1970, p 1277. 
51 Hansard, House of Representatives, 16 April 1970, p 1282. 
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the administrative functions of the states with respect to the P(SL)A could be 
extended to the proposed minerals regime — 
We would hope that the States would be willing to administer the area 
beyond 3 miles from low water mark on behalf of the Commonwealth 
and that this administration might run concurrently with identical 
State legislation operating in the area from low water mark to the 3 mile 
limit. The competence and expertise of the State Mines Departments 
and their officers would be of considerable help in this matter.' 
The Gorton Bill would also not interfere with the international dimensions 
of offshore jurisdiction, but was designed to address only its domestic 
dimensions." The implication of the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf 
Bill was that henceforth state legislative powers over the offshore must be 
read subject by reason of s 109 of the Constitution to the paramount force of 
Commonwealth law. Clause 13 of the bill did not of itself exclude the 
operation of existing laws—such as the P(SL)A—which would need to be 
amended on a statute-specific basis. 
A month after the draft legislation was tabled it was stalled in Parliament, 
and Prime Minister Gorton was besieged by forces within and without his 
party. Haward observes that hostility to the Gorton Bill was two-dimensional. 
The most visible tension over the bill's policy was felt vertically between the 
Commonwealth and the states. As occurred previously in the context of the 
Australian Petroleum Settlement, Liberal coalition states joined with those 
under Labor governments in condeming the draft legislation. 
Horizontal tensions were also experienced within the federal 
parliamentary party, which was sensitive to the states and took umbrage at 
the Gorton Bill. Equally, many members of the federal Liberal Party had an 
endemic personal dislike of Gorton. In the words of one of his loyal 
Hansard, House of Representatives [Nigel Bowen, Minister for Education and Science], 15 
May 1970, p 2250. 
53 Hansard, House of Representatives, 16 April 1970, p 1278. 
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ministers, the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill "provided 
ammunition to those waiting to get rid of John Gorton."' Personal relations 
amongst the most senior politicians therefore appears again as an influential 
factor in shaping legislative policy. As was seen in 1967, the intervention of 
the Premier of Victoria ensured that the Settlement would be very favourable 
to that state. During the next phase the personal actions of the 
Commonwealth Minister for Minerals and Energy inflamed the already tense 
inter-governmental and industrial relations of the Whitlam Government.' 
As a result of these considerable influences on the fate of the Gorton Bill, 
an irreparable rift soon grew between the Prime Minister—who favoured 
abandoning the heavy federalist emphasis of the government—and both the 
parliamentary party and state governments. So hostile, in fact, was the Liberal 
Party to Gorton's vision with respect to the offshore that his demise as Prime 
Minister is attributed to the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill.' The 
Labor Opposition originally supported the Prime Minister's approach, having 
consistently clamoured for a clear assertion of Commonwealth jurisdiction 
over the offshore for twenty years. In the face of a backbench revolt over the 
bill, however, Gorton was left isolated and only narrowly survived a motion 
of censure against him moved by Labor.' Rothwell and Haward succinctly 
express the problem thus — 
54 Haward, op cit fn 36p 126. 
In his chronology of jurisdiction in the United States, Wilder documents the influence of one 
particular Interior Secretary, Harold Ickes, an the resolution of inter-governmental tension 
over the territorial sea. See, R. Wilder, "Is This Holistic Ecology or Just Muddling Through? 
The Theory and Practice of Marine Policy" (1993) 21 Coastal Management 209-224. 
Cullen, op cit fn 3p 75; Haward op cit fn 36 pp 123-127. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 15 May 1970, p 2327. The Labor opposition's hypocrisy on 
the subject of the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill was not lost on 
parliamentarians. Despite its support for this legislation the opposition moved to censure 
the Prime Minister rather than enact the bill and thereby achieve Commonwealth 
jurisdiction over the offshore. As one Government member remarked in voting down the 
censure motion: "The Opposition, as a matter of tactics, has moved a motion of censure and 
has been loud in its demand for State rights. But everybody in this House knows that the 
Federal policy of the Labor Party is to wipe out State parliaments and to put all power in 
the hands of the Federal Parliament. Therefore, it is almost a comedy to hear members of 
the Labor Pary standing up and supporting State rights. If this vote of censure were carried, 
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The appointment of a new Prime Minister saw the Commonwealth 
government introduce legislation in 1970 which asserted 
Commonwealth sovereignty offshore from the low water mark. This 
bill was withdrawn in the face of considerable opposition from within 
the government party room and from State governments. It was, 
however, an indicator of a substantial challenge to the relatively 
congenial arrangements established under the 1967 Petroleum 
Agreement." 
It is not unsurprising that the Gorton Bill had such a fateful reception. 
Although the draft legislation did not seek to immediately undo the 
Austalian Petroleum Settlement it was nonetheless a portent of shifts in this 
direction, and was appropriately termed "creeping centralism" during 
Parliamentary debates.' It was the procedure by which federalism was being 
eroded, rather than the erosion per se, that derailed Gorton and his bill. The 
particular point of order stemmed around the Commonwealth's pledge to 
inform states of impending offshore legislation so that the latter may input to 
revisions of the Settlement; that is, the Commonwealth was held by 
Parliament to honour the 1967 Agreement. 6° 
Parliament's concern over this procedural problem—moreso than the 
veracity of the Gorton Bill—is amply evidenced in Parliamentary debate – 
The same authoritarian, arrogant Prime Minister who was capable of 
doing that moved in again. He said: 'I, Gorton, will provide a Gordian 
solution. I will provide the solution. We will go right ahead. We have a 
judgment (Bonser v. LaMacchia). To hell with the States. Let them rot. 
We will assert to the full our sovereign rights'. The Commonwealth has 
those rights. I said this in the House when the off-shore oil legislation 
was being discussed some 3 years ago, in 1967. The Commonwealth 
undoubtedly has these rights. I am not dealing with the merits of the 
legislation; I am dealing with the facts as they are. They are quite 
simple 61 
it might well lead to a further erosion of State powers." House of Representatives, 15 May, 
1970 p 2273. 
Rothwell and Haward, op cit fn 5p 35. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 15 May 1970, p 2273. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 15 May 1970, pp 2250-1, 2325-7. 
61 Hansard, House of Representatives [Wilfred Hughes], 15 May 1970, p 2273. 
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In spite of its failure to receive the endorsement of Parliament, the Gorton 
Bill nonetheless made several important contributions to the development 
of Commonwealth marine resources policy. Firstly, it signified a substantial 
move by the Commonwealth to assert its jurisdiction over offshore areas 
through legislation. That this was done in defiance of state wishes enhances 
the significance of the draft legislation. The Gorton Bill also represents the 
beginnings of a bipartisan policy towards the offshore. Although the Liberal 
Party revolted against the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill, Gorton's 
successor to the Prime Ministership, William McMahon, retained the bill on 
the Parliamentary agenda rather than withdrawing it completely, an action 
which evidences an enduring change in offshore policy within the Liberal 
coalition government.' 
A third contribution to legislative policy prompted by the Gorton Bill is 
observed in the avenue that the states elected to follow to negate the 
Commonwealth's policy shift. Rather than simply resorting to the courts to 
seek redress state governments were aware of their considerable expertise in 
offshore petroleum development and how this could be used in interacting 
with the Commonwealth. As Stevenson describes the situation — 
Only limited use was made of the judicial process as a means of resisting 
federal initiatives. When the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill 
was introduced in 1970, Tasmania, Queensland and Western Australia 
supported the idea of challenging it before the High Court, while 
Victoria and South Australia inclined to the view that any attempted 
federal takeover could more effectively be frustrated by withholding 
administrative co-operation. As it turned out, the shelving of the bill 
and the overthrow of Mr Gorton by the Liberal caucus made it 
unnecessary to do either.' 
Haward, op cit fn 36 pp 127-131. A similar dichotomy in policy and practice is also seen in the 
next chapter. The Fraser Liberal government, which succeeded Whitlam's centralism by 
advancing an ostensible federalist offshore policy, capitalized upon the expansion in 
Commonwealth functions emplaced by the latter without ever returning to the pre-existing 
state of marine affairs. M. Haward and G. Smith, "What's New About the 'New 
Federalism'?" (1992) 27 Australian Journal of Political Science 39-51. 
Stevenson, op cit fn 2p 69. 
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Another two years passed before the draft legislation was again before 
Parliament. Hansard debates reveal the states' latent anxiety at the prospect of 
a judicial determination of offshore powers through a test case of the 
Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill." During this period an uneasy 
truce prevailed between Prime Minister McMahon and the Premiers. On the 
one hand the Commonwealth was persuaded by a united state position not to 
proceed with the bill and thereby risk a breakdown in offshore arrangements; 
the states, however, were discomfitted by the bill remaining on the 
Parliamentary notice paper." In the event, Parliament was prorogued for the 
1972 federal election without the bill being passed into law. 
In a twist of irony that didn't escape at least one author, the Senate Select 
Committee delivered its report into the 1967 Settlement—with its 
recommendations to resolve offshore jurisdictional responsiblities—at the 
same time as Gorton was being removed as Prime Minister." It was because 
of this untimely sequence of events that the report failed to influence 
offshore petroleum policy in a manner befitting its potentiality.' With the 
semblence of a Commonwealth offshore petroleum policy beginning to 
appear, it would only take the right political circumstances for the intention 
of the original Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill to be realized in 
legislation. 
3.3 COMMONWEALTH RESOURCES POLICY UNDER THE WHITLAM GOVERNMENT 
3.3.1 Introduction to the Whitlam Commonwealth 
The Whitlam Government was elected to office in 1972, capitalizing on the 
ill-fated Gorton Bill "which almost dismembered the then governing 
"Hansard, House of Representatives, 18 October 1972, p 2770. 
65 Haward, op cit fn 36 pp 127-131. 
66 
 
Ibid. pp 150-153. 
67 Reid, op cit fn 47. 
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Coalition"." At this time, a variety of influences external to Australia was 
combining to motivate the Commonwealth to more actively intervene in 
domestic resources policy. These events included the growth of Japan as a 
seemingly inexhaustable market for Australian minerals, and the success of 
OPEC in raising oil prices, leading to the ensuing 'energy crisis'. Because these 
resource industries expanded so rapidly in Australia—almost dependent 
upon foreign markets and capital—it became apparent that foreign interests 
were deriving an unduly large share of benefits through high profits and low 
costs.' 
In terms of marine resources policy, Whitlam's particular infamy was to 
enact the Seas and Submerged Lands Act and deprive the states of their 
claims over offshore waters and seabed resources. Whilst the empiricism of 
this event is very well documented and beyond dispute, a common deficiency 
of analyses is their failure to give adequate cognition to the context in which 
the statute was enacted." By overviewing the Whitlam Government's 
approach to federalism it is possible to inject a basis to Commonwealth 
legislative policy that is typically missing from discussions of the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act, and to thereby understand the statute as a policy 
instrument of broad offshore application beyond the control of petroleum 
resources. 
The most important feature of Whitlam's Prime Ministership was the 
distinctive blend of nationalism it brought to Commonwealth policy making. 
Unlike earlier Labor governments that had long sought the abolition of the 
states, Whitlam departed from this philosophy by accepting the role of sub- 
" Ibid, p 61. 
Stevenson, op cit fn 2. 
Crorrunelin, op cit fn 3; R. Cullen, "Canada and Australia: A Federal Parting of the Ways" 
(1989) 18 Federal Law Review 68-83; Cullen, op cit fn 3 pp 86-90; R. Lumb, "Australian 
Coastal Jurisdiction", in K. Ryan (ed), International Law in Australia (The Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1984) pp 370-389. 
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national governments and concentrating instead on implementing 
Commonwealth policies within the constraints of the federation.' One 
mechanism employed by the Commonwealth to advance its policies within 
the states was the expanded use of grants under s. 96 of the Constitution.' 
Whitlam's modified nationalism is described by Galligan — 
Whitlam was instrumental in changing the Labor Party's old hard-line 
abolitionist stance, but remained at heart a rational centralist. His 'new 
federalism' was a heady mixture of Labor's traditional preference for 
national policy-making plus a humane concern for improving the 
quality of life in needy local and regional areas through targeting federal 
money for programmes designed in Canberra." 
A parallel strategy of the Whitlam Government was to rely heavily on its 
constitutional powers to enshrine Commonwealth policies in legislation. It 
was this approach which most aroused state government objections, 
especially where the Commonwealth sought to enter areas of policy that were 
traditionally the province of the states, such as minerals and petroleum.' As 
discussed in the following part, Whitlam's efforts to legislate in respect of 
these resources were fiercely resisted by the states, who were joined by 
organised industry interests in opposing Commonwealth legislative 
incursions into the resources policy field. 
Notwithstanding the purposeful move by the Commonwealth into new . 
areas of policy, Whitlam eschewed framing his Government's approach in 
centralism versus federalism terms. Instead, he promoted the need for 
71 J. Warhurst, "Transitional Hero: Gough Whitlam and the Australian Labor Party" (1996) 31 
Australian Journal of Political Science 243-252. 
n Section 96 of the Australian Constitution reads as follows - During a period of ten years after 
the establishment of the Commonwealth and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise 
provides, the Parliament may grant financial assistance to any State cn such terms and 
conditions as the Parliament sees fit. The disbursement of funds to state governments under 
this provision—known as special purpose grants—is now a common feature of 
Commonwealth policy. 
B. Galligan, "A Political Science Perspective", in B. Galligan (ed), Australian Federalism 
(Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1989) pp 45-68, p 49. 
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Commonwealth oversight in most policy areas to ensure that Australian 
interests and welfare were protected and enhanced nationally. In his own 
words — 
It is a grotesque caricature to depict the program of the Australian 
Government in centralist terms ... It is true that these programs 
specified new initiatives and called for vigorous action by the national 
Government ... It should be equally recognised that these national 
initiatives and actions required cooperation with the States and the 
involvement of the States and local government. Action, reform, 
involvement by the national Government are not necessarily 
centralism.' 
The Prime Minister's conception of national policy-making comprised five 
identifiable elements, three of which are relevant to offshore resources policy 
and are usefully listed here. These are: the direct involvement of the federal 
government in financing and planning new functions, especially where 
national involvement was needed to achieve equality; Commonwealth 
willingness to accept responsibility for services which hitherto imposed 
burdens on the states; and continuing cooperative planning at the Ministerial 
and official level in areas where national and state responsibilities overlap.' 
It was in the details of these program elements that intergovernmental 
and industrial conflict arose, only to continue unabated for much of the Labor 
Government's terms. Whitlam considered operationalizing his new . 
federalism to be "very much about an attempt to bring our federal system and 
our federal machinery up to date"?' Updating the federation in this manner 
amounted to wholesale reform of Commonwealth/state relations, however, 
which very soon proved to be unsustainable. Indeed, it has been suggested 
that all Whitlam's attempts at procedural and structural reform failed, either 
E. Whitlam, "The New Federalism: A Review of Labor's Programs and Policies", in R. 
Mathews (ed), Making Federalism Work - Towards a More Efficient, Equitable and 
Responsive Federal System (The Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, 
Canberra, 1976) pp 1-13, p 3. 
76 Ibid. 
Ibid, p 11. 
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at the time or very soon after the change of government in December 1975." 
The Commonwealth's reformist failures have been attributed to the inability 
of the governmental system to absorb readjustment on the scale attempted by 
Whitlam - 
Since its election in 1972, the present Government has attempted to 
expand Federal roles both within areas generally agreed to be Federal 
responsibilities and into areas hitherto left to the States ...In so doing it 
has created new departments and authorities within its own 
administration, shuffled and re-shuffled exising departments, and 
attempted to build networks of regional institutions. Little of this has 
been done neatly or without conflict Moroever, different sections of 
the Government have developed different conceptions of the directions 
that should be followed ...Labor's activities in office have placed great 
strains on the policy-making and co-ordinating capacities of the 
machinery of government. The new bureaucratic growth has been 
poorly integrated with established institutions, and established 
institutions and practices have often had difficulty meeting the 
Government's demands." 
The desire of Whitlam to enhance the Commonwealth's role in national 
policy and administration were frustrated by their ambition. Legal and 
political inertia partly accounts for this frustration, but the problem is also 
due to the confrontational and impatient style of the Labor Government." 
Put simply, Whitlam's reforms were stalled by "the counter-veiling federal 
forces that his roughshod centralist approach aroused."' 
3.3.2 Commonwealth resources policy and state/industry relations 
The obstacles encountered by the Commonwealth in policy-making generally 
were amplified in the particular case of resources policy. The source of this 
additional resistance was the states' ownership of resources located within 
their boundaries, and the control over offshore petroleum granted by the 1967 
" D. Jaensch, The Hawke-Keating Hijack (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1989). 
P. Weller and R. Smith, "Setting National Priorities: The Role of the Australian Government 
in Public Policy", in R. Mathew (ed), Making Federalism Work - Towards a More Efficient, 
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Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1976) pp 81-96, pp 83-84. 
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Settlement. The Labor Government failed to appreciate the extent to which it 
was compelled to rely upon the states for administering the offshore regime. 
As well, the strength of state bureaucratic links with the resources industry 
were underestimated by the Whitlam ministry. 
3.3.2.1 The state/industry alliance 
Prior to the Whitlam Government coming to power, relations between the 
mineral industries and the Commonwealth "insofar as they existed at all" 
were friendly but not intimate.' The quality of this relationship deteriorated 
soon after the change of government as the Commonwealth insisted upon 
observing the referral mechanism contained in the Agreement—whereby the 
designated authority refered to the Commonwealth matters of national 
importance—which had been ignored for the several years of the 
Settlement's life." 
Stevenson provides a detailed account of the interaction between 
Whitlam's resource minister, the Commonwealth and state mining 
bureaucracies, and the influential oil industry." The Commonwealth 
resources minister—Rex Connor—was viewed as an extreme centralist who 
sought to maximise the Commonwealth's role in resources policy. Connor 
was also very disdainful of the close relationship between industry and the. 
state governments. It was remarked that he "had a low opinion of the 
Australian Mining Industry Council (AMIC) and the Australian Petroleum 
Exploration Association (APEA), which previous governments had accepted 
as legitimate spokesmen for the mineral resource industries.' The 
Stevenson, op cit En 2p 75. 
Cullen, op cit fn 1; R. Cullen, "The Encounter Between Natural Resources and Federalism in 
Canada and Australia" (1990) 24 U.B.C. Law Review 275-305; Hildreth, op cit fn 3. 
84 Stevenson, op cit En 2. 
Ibid. p 77. The approach of the Whitlam Government towards industry is contrasted to the 
very workable relations between these two spheres ten years later under the Hawke Labor 
Government, when the minister worked tirelessly to rebuild Commonwealth/industry trust 
[Chapter Five]. 
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uneasiness of these relations is observed by Stevenson in the particular case 
of pioneering development on the north-west shelf — 
The state government, whether Labor or non-Labor, shared with 
Woodside-Burmah the common objectives of beginning production as 
soon as possible ... Because of these common objectives, the firm and 
the state as 'designated authority' under the 1967 agreement enjoyed a 
harmonious relationship. This very fact, in the eyes of Connor and 
other federal Labor politicians, seemed to confirm their suspicion that 
state governments, regardless of party affiliation, could not be trusted to 
stand up to 'the multinationals'. 86 
Perhaps the lowest point in Commonwealth/state resources relations was 
Connor's refusal to convene any meetings of the Australian Minerals 
Council while he was minister. The Council was the peak intergovernmental 
body comprising all Australian resource ministers, established immediately 
following the 1967 Settlement with a view to coordinating policy between 
governments. Such was his distrust of the state/industry nexus that Connor 
discontinued meetings of the Council during his ministerial term, despite 
overtures from the states that he use this mechanism for intergovernmental 
dialogue." 
Ill-feeling between the two spheres of government was mirrored at the 
bureaucratic level. Connor's newly created department responsible for 
administering the Commonwealth's P(SL)A resented the role of the states in . 
offshore petroleum development, an attitude that had simmered since the 
1967 Agreement was reached [observed earlier in Chapter Two]. Perhaps the 
cause of this resentment was recalcitrance on the part of the Commonwealth 
bureaucracy that its relationship with the states was one of necessity. The 
timeliness of political conflict therefore provided the opportunity for latent 
" Ibid. p 41. The north west shelf of Western Australia was emerging in the early 1970s as the 
second highly prospective area after Victoria's Bass Strait, and soon outpaced the latter as 
the country's primary hydrocarbon-producing region. Later chapters will show how the 
productivity of the north west shelf secured the state of Western Australia special 
concessions under the OCS, which were subsequently eroded by the Commonwealth under 
Labor governments in the 1980s. 
Ibid. 
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differences between the Commonwealth and state agencies to be exacerbated, 
thus ensuring a breakdown in the P(SL)A regime even before the question of 
offshore jurisdiction was challenged by the Seas and Submerged Lands Act. 
The interplay of these several influences is captured precisely by Stevenson — 
In addition, many of the civil servants who comprised the Department 
of Minerals and Energy under the Labor government had been 
transferred from other departments, such as Trade and Industry, where 
there had been little need to take state governments into consideration. 
Thus both politicians and bureaucrats tended to ignore the states and to 
consult them as little as possible ...Even without attitudes such as this 
on the part of federal politicians and civil servants, the increasing 
involvment of the federal government in mineral resource policy 
would have led to conflict with the states. It would have done so 
because any intrusion by the federal government into an area of policy 
that had previously been left almost entirely to the states was bound to 
be regarded by the state governments as a threat to their power." 
3.3.2.2 The Petroleum and Minerals Authority 
A number of authors discuss the role of the Petroleum and Minerals 
Authority as the key instrument through which the Whitlam Government 
sought to intensify the Commonwealth's interests in resources policy." The 
Authority was established for two main purposes: to enter into commercial 
arrangements to explore for and produce minerals and petroleum on behalf 
of the Commonwealth; and to assist in implementing the Whitlam 
Government's policy of a higher Australian ownership of natural resource. 
industries. To this end, the enabling legislation, the Petroleum and Minerals 
Authority Bill, was expressed so as to maximize the scope of Commonwealth 
legislative powers with respect to natural resources policy." The motivation 
88 Ibid. pp 29-30. 
Haward, op cit fn 36 pp 145-147; M. Hunt, "Government Policy and Legislation Regarding 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources" (1988) 62 The Australian Law Journal 841-862; Reid, op cit 
fn 47; Stevenson, op cit fn 2. 
" The Petroleum and Minerals Authority was empowered to exercise its functions in a federal 
territory, on the contintental shelf or under the territorial sea, elsewhere in Australia so as 
to facilitate trade and commerce, and to ensure the supply of petroleum and minerals for 
defence. Each of these functions corresponds with an enumerated constitutional head of 
power [refer Chapter One]. 
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behind the legislation is amply seen in Connor's second reading speech, 
wherein he referred to the circumstances of the 1967 Settlement — 
It was the policy of our predecessors to make their contribution to the 
search for and development of our petroleum resources by a variety of 
indirect means including payment of subsidies and special tax 
arrangements, and to accept the abuses necessarily associated with such 
a system ... The great difference between them and us was their policies, 
which exposed Australian initiatives to overseas acquisition and 
control. We believe this policy resulted from a misunderstanding of the 
national interest, ignorance of the effects of internationalisation, neglect 
of the real needs of the Australian community, under-confidence in the 
capacity of their fellow Australians, and fear of the consequence of 
failure." 
Australian resources history shows that there had never been any serious 
deliberation given to the idea of a Crown body to exploit and develop 
resources." The governmental role was to to provide incentives and to 
oversee and regulate commercial activities on the assumption that 
development was the province of private enterprises. The concept of a 
Commonwealth resoures authority was therefore anathema to an influential 
coalition of industry, state governments and the Liberal Opposition. The 
latter two considered the proposed authority as a derogation of private 
interests in mineral and petroleum development, while industry was 
ideologically opposed to the creation of a national body for engaging in the 
commercial development of resources." This collection of opponents - 
ensured that the draft legislation would be received by Parliament with 
misgivings, and was in turn instrumental in its ultimate demise. 
The circuitous journey of the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Bill 
through Parliament in 1973/4 and into the High Court is described by 
Howard." After its introduction into the Senate in December 1973, the bill 
91 Hansard, Senate, 4 December 1973, pp 4245-6. 
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was adjourned and then defeated in April 1974, whereafter which it was 
immediately reintroduced to the lower House. After being defeated a second 
time by the Senate the draft legislation became one of the triggers for the 1974 
double dissolution election, and was one of the six bills passed during the 
historic joint sitting of Parliament. 
Subsequent to its enactment, a High Court challenge by the states resulted 
in the legislation being invalidated because of constitutional constraints 
pertaining to Parliamentary double-dissolutions." As will be described in the 
next part, this same tactic was unsuccessfully repeated in relation to the Seas 
and Submerged Lands because of this latter statute's solid constitutional 
foundation. That the Petroleum and Minerals Authority should incite such 
intense opposition reveals the depth of sentiment towards Commonwealth 
resources policy, especially when the legislation was being driven by a 
ministry insensitive to state government desires." 
3.4 WHITLAM AND MARINE RESOURCES LEGISLATION 
3.4.1 Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) 
As Chapter Two reveals, Whitlam and the Labor Opposition had railed 
against the Coalitio. n Government's approach towards marine resources since • 
enactment of the Pearl Fisheries Act in 1953. Upon assuming office in the 
1972 federal election, Whitlam announced his intention to introduce 
" Australian Constitution, s 57 requires that three months must elapse between a bill being 
rejected by one House of Parliament after having been passed by the other, before it may be 
reintroduced to the first House for a second reading. If the bill is twice rejected by the second 
House a trigger for a double dissolution election is then created, following which election 
the bill may be presented to a joint sitting of both Houses. In the case of the Petroleum and 
Minerals Authority Bill, the requisite three months duration had not been satisfied, and 
the legislation was therefore invalidly enacted by the Parliament. 
" The Minister for Resources and Energy in the Howard Liberal Government many years la ter 
[Warwick Parer] was to note with some satisfaction that Commonwealth/industry relations 
under Whitlam had deteriorated to the extent that the Commonwealth was pointedly not 
invited to attend the 1974 APEA annual conference. See: Chapter Seven. 
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legislation, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act, to declare Commonwealth 
jurisdiction over the offshore. By enacting this legislation it was hoped to 
provoke a High Court challenge to clarify the festering question of offshore 
jurisdiction — 
I congratulate the Minister for Minerals and Energy (Mr Connor) on the 
introduction of this Bill. It is much the same as what is termed the 
Gorton Bill—the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill. It was 
promised by the Prime Minister (Mr Whitlam) in his policy speech in 
1972. It was mentioned in the Governor-General's address to the 
Parliament in 1973. It will allow the legal position as to sovereignty to be 
exercised by the States and the Commonwealth to be determined in the 
High Court. In fact, the Minister virtually said this in his second reading 
speech ... He said that because he knows full well, as he knows now, that 
you can never reach any finality with the States about it. They are 
opposed to it and the only way this matter can be determined is if it goes 
to the High Court." 
When first presented as a bill, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act (SSLA) 
consisted of three parts. The first part contained the preambular and 
preliminary details, referring importantly to the 1958 UNCLOS conventions 
which were appended as schedules to the statute [more below]. Part Two 
addressed the core issues of offshore jurisdiction. Sovereign rights over 
continental shelf resources were declared by the SSLA vested in the Crown in 
right of the Commonwealth." This provision meant that states were 
deprived of any claim to jurisdiction over the continental shelf. As suggested . 
earlier, this component of the draft legislation was most predictable and 
assured of being held valid in the inevitable High Court case. 
More disturbing to the states were those sections of the SSLA which dealt 
with the territorial sea." Despite being formally recognised through 
inscription in s. 51(x) of the Constitution, the three mile territorial sea had 
since federation existed as a vague product of customary law, jurisdiction 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 17 May 1973, pp 2319. Also, House of Representatives, 17 
May 1973, pp 2338, 2341; Senate, 30 May 1973, pp 2063, 2074. 
" Seas and Submerged Lands Act. 1973 (Cth) s 11. 
" Cullen, op cit fn 3 pp 107-108,222-223. 
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over which it was widely assumed had accrued to the states as a legacy of 
colonial antecedents. The territorial sea became legally codified in Australia 
by the SSLA, but exclusive sovereignty over this strip of water was vested in 
the Commonwealth rather than in the states.'" This action ended state 
territory at the low water mark of the beach, shattering attitudes and practices 
in excess of what states might reasonably have expected on the basis of 
prevailing opinion. 
In addition to the substantive provisions of the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act it is important to also emphasise the declaratory nature of the 
statute. The theories behind declaratory and annexary assumption were 
canvassed in Chapter Two, where it was seen that the less assertive method 
of jurisdiction—statutory annexation—was adopted in the Pearl Fisheries Act 
1953 (Cth). By contrast, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act employed the 
more provocative method of jurisdictional declaration, which contained the 
assumption that pre-existing rights held by the Commonwealth were being 
formally codified for the first time' [a point returned to later in the 
discussion of the ensuing case, New South Wales v the Commonwealth]. 
Section 16 of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) also saved the 
operation of state laws insofar as these didn't express any claim to offshore 
areas. The existence of this provision enabled states to continue to manage: 
fisheries, for example. 
The third part of the SSLA was an exclusive Commonwealth regime for 
governing the exploitation of non-hydrocarbon minerals from the low water 
mark to the edge of the continental shelf. As originally introduced to 
Parliament, the SSLA was to leave intact the regime created pursuant to the 
P(SL)A despite bringing the offshore under Commonwealth jurisdiction.' 02 
w° Seas and Submerged Lands Act. 1973 (Cth) s 6. 
Cullen, op cit fn 1. 
102 Hansard, House of Representatives, 17 May 1973, p 2316. 
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Aside from the unusuality of this arrangements—described further in section 
3.3.3 below—the state governments were doubtful of the Commonwealth's 
commitment not to alter the 1967 Settlement arrangements.' From 
Parliamentary debates it also appears that confusion prevailed in both 
Government and Opposition ranks as to the implications for offshore 
petroleum of the draft legislation. 
Haward documents the Whitlam Government's haste in pushing the bill 
through Parliament as urgent legislation.'" The bill was introduced and 
passed by the House of Representatives in only two sitting days in May, but 
not before the Coalition urged for a new offshore pact to be struck with the 
states, which were united in opposing the draft legislation." 5 It was in the 
Senate that the bill became delayed — 
All the State Premiers are opposed to this legislation. They want to be 
consulted. They do not want to see arbitrary, unilateral action taken to 
deprive them of a lot of their powers ...One of the reasons why the Bill 
ws not proceeded with previously was that all the States—not just one 
of them—objected at that time. This is a State House. In the final 
analysis, we represent the States.'" 
Despite Whitlam's desire to settle the offshore jurisdictional problem, the 
winter Parliamentary recess held the draft legislation in abeyance. During the 
next session the Coalition agreed to support the bill with the deletion of Part 
III, the mining code for offshore minerals. Part of the reason for deleting this 
part was the concern that it would leave in utter confusion the status of 
offshore titles if the bill was not subsequently upheld in entirety.' It was also 
suggested that to exclude the states from the proposed offshore mining 
regime was illogical.' 08 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 17 May 1973, pp 2328, 2333. 
104 Haward, op cit fn 36 pp 137-146. 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 17 May 1973, pp 2315, 2337, 2344. 
' Hansard, Senate [Alexander Lawrie], 30 May 1973, p 2074. 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 17 May 1973, p 2305. 
108 Hansard, House of Representatives, 17 May 1973, pp 2318, 2339. 
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The draft legislation was therefore finally passed by the Senate without the 
offshore mining code. The Government in the lower house accepted the 
amendment and the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) became law in 
December. The deleted code for offshore mining was introduced as a separate 
bill to create a Commonwealth mining regime seaward of the low water 
mark. Unlike the Seas and Submerged Lands Act, the minerals bill twice 
failed to pass the Senate—on the grounds that the draft legislation should 
await the High Court challenge—and became one of the bills triggering the 
1974 double-dissolution of Parliament, along with the Petroleum and 
Minerals Authority Act. Later chapters document how the petroleum and 
minerals regimes have converged in approach since the events of 1973 as a 
result of major changes in the marine policy framework. 109 
As mentioned, the Commonwealth had advanced its legislation by 
placing Australian domestic jurisdiction within an international context. The 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act purported to be based upon the international 
treaties that dated from the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea convened in 1958 to tackle the growing problem of extra-territorial 
maritime claims. The Seas and Submerged Lands Act was the instrument by 
which the Commonwealth, as national government, implemented these 
treaties in Australia by legislating pursuant to s. 51(xxix), the external affairs - 
power. Although the Commonwealth has come to advance domestic policies 
by incurring international treaty obligations and appending these as 
schedules to statutes, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) represents 
the first express use of this mechanism. 
109  A statute creating a regime for offshore minerals was enacted as part of the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement in 1981, and updated in 1994 in response to the Law of the Sea 
Convention entering into force; more in Chapters Four and Five. 
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During the pre-Settlement period in 1966 Lumb canvassed the avenues by 
which the UNCLOS conventions could be given domestic effect.' Three 
options were contemplated at that time–the promulgation of regulations by 
the executive, absorption of the conventions into legislation text, and the 
annexation of the treaties to enabling legislation. The lattermost of these 
options was dismissed by Lumb because it was untried as a legislative strategy. 
Seven years later, however, it was the mechanism prefered by Whitlam to 
declare Commonwealth jurisdiction. 11 ' As discussed in section 3.3.4, the 
nexus between Law of the Sea and Commonwealth legislation was 
strengthened by Whitlam in his efforts to emplace a national marine 
resources policy. 
3.4.2 The petroleum legislation after the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 
Insofar as petroleum development was concerned, the effect of the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act was to render invalid the state legislation. Given that 
all offshore territory was vested in the Commonwealth, the states were left 
without control over even the territorial sea. The SSLA did not of itself 
regulate activities in the territorial sea or continental shelf, however; further 
Commonwealth legislation was needed to alter existing administrative 
arrangements for offshore petroleum."' The role of state governments in - 
offshore policy and administration was essentially preserved intact as a 
hangover of the 1967 Settlement. The curious situation therefore arose 
whereby the Commonwealth P(SL)A—the prevailing offshore statute—
continued to be administered by state ministers acting in their capacity as 
designated authority. 
110 R. Lumb, The Law of the Sea and Australian Off-Shore Areas (University of Queensland 
Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1966). 
111 Rothwell and Haward, op cit fn 5. 
112 Harders, op cit fn 8. 
Chapter 3 	 126  
Chapter Two recounted how the technical and administrative capacities of 
the states was an influential factor shaping the 1967 Settlement. Stevenson 
describes how the state governments fully exploited the strength of their 
position in the P(SL)A regime to derail the Commonwealth's resources policy 
under Whitlam.' The exploration permits originally issued pursuant to the 
Agreement—mainly in relation to the north-west shelf and Bass Strait—
expired in 1974 and 1975, and the Commonwealth argued that these could not 
be renewed or reassigned until the High Court had ruled on the validity of 
the SSLA. Although the Agreement required the states to consult with the 
Commonwealth before making leasing decisions to afford the latter an option 
of witholding its consent, Western Australia and Victoria ignored this 
requirement and announced their intention to unilaterally issue permits – 
The most important weapons with which the state governments could 
resist federal intervention into mineral resources policy were their own 
administrative and legislative powers ...in the case of offshore oil and 
gas, which were not in fact the property of the states, the de facto control 
which they had been permitted to exercise since the 1960s enabled them 
to frustrate the federal Labor government's plans with considerable 
success. All the states which had granted offshore exploration permits 
under the terms of the 1967 agreement ignored Mr Connor's request 
that the permits not be renewed until the High Court had decided on 
the validity of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act. All were able to do 
this with impunity, despite the fact that the offshore petroleum was 
strongly suspected to be, and ultimately proved to be, the property of the 
federal government.'" 
In response to state obstructionism, Connor cautioned petroleum companies 
not to accept any instruments issued by the state governments, prompting the 
Western Australian Premier [Sir Charles Court] to issue a retaliatory warning. 
In hindsight, the internecine relations experienced amongst Argyle's 'iron 
triangle' participants during this time possibly fractured the industry/state 
consanguinity which was hitherto so pronounced.' Unsurprisingly, 
113 Stevenson, op cit fn 2. 
114 ibid, p 70. 
115  R. Argyle, "Governmental Powers Over Petroleum Recovery Rates-Offshore Western 
Australia" (1983) 15 The University of Western Australia Law Review 14-32. 
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petroleum companies lost interest in exploring on Australia's continental 
shelf during this period, which the Commonwealth perceived as attempted 
intimidation, further inflaming tensions. As Stevenson notes, "Thus 
relations on both sides went from bad to worse."' 
In terms of tracing the evolution of the P(SL)A into the next phase, it is 
important to reiterate that although all states were dispossessed of offshore 
identity by the SSLA its effect upon offshore petroleum was limited to the 
two prospective states. Only Victoria and Western Australia lost tangible 
benefits in 1973, subsequent to which intergovernmental interaction with 
respect to offshore petroleum is seen to become increasingly specific between 
the Commonwealth and one of these states — 
Although the controversy over the bill in 1973 involved all of the states, 
the continuing conflict over offshore petroleum increasingly narrowed 
down to a confrontation between the federal government and Western 
Australia. The other states, aside from Victoria, were protecting their 
rights to hypothetical petroleum that probably did not even exist.' 
The judicial challenge to the SSLA launched by the states was therefore not 
motivated to recover rights to offshore resources. It was more fundamentally 
concerned with identity within the federation, as well as to curtail the 
potential for Commonwealth intrusion into other areas of marine policy. 
3.4.3 Commonwealth marine environmental policy 
The Seas and Submerged Lands Act was clearly an ambit statement of the 
Commonwealth's offshore resources policy. It is important also to recognise 
that this statute was the vehicle through which Whitlam was able to 
introduce proposals for protecting the marine environment. The more 
successful component of this legislative policy was enactment of the Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth). 
"6 Stevenson, op cit fn 2p 78. 
117 /bid, p 40. 
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Commonwealth concerns over the Great Barrier Reef had been festering 
since the late 1960s with fishing by Japanese vessels in nearshore waters of the 
Great Barrier Reef. The Commonwealth's partial response at that time was to 
legislate to control access to Australian waters by creating the DFZ and the 
licensing regime under the Continental Shelf (Living Natural Resources) Act. 
In the expectation that the High Court would uphold the SSLA, the Whitlam 
Government in 1975 enacted the GBRMPA to assert Commonwealth 
jurisdiction over the Great Barrier Reef, in spite of trenchant resistance by the 
Queensland Government.' Notwithstanding the New Federalism policy of 
the subsequent Fraser Government, the Commonwealth retained to itself 
control over the Great Barrier Reef under the terms of the OCS after 
returning the three miles of coastal waters to the states [more in Chapter 
Four] 119 
The less successful component of Whitlam's marine environmental 
policy was to enact a legislative package addressing pollution of the sea.' 
During the early 1970s, a series of marine pollution incidences witnessed 
around the Australian coastline underscored the Commonwealth's belief that 
a national solution to marine pollution was needed. These incidences 
118 A. Gilpin, The Australian Environment (Sun Books, Melbourne, 1980); Haward, op cit fn 36. . 
119 The legislative activism of the 'Whitlam Commonwealth with respect to the environment 
has been acknowledged by several authors. In short succession four statutes addressing 
environmental impact assessment and nature conservation were enacted by the 
Commonwealth. This spurt of legislative policy-making is described by Davis: "These 
issues were brought into sharper focus and debate during the period of environmental concern 
of the early 1970s, when many governments enacted legislation aimed at improved 
environmental protection, new forms of land use allocation and management, as well as 
enlargement of National Parks and protected areas jurisdiction. The reformist Whitlam 
Government followed this trend, enacting four statutes which now constitute the foundations 
of Federal environmental policy: The Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 
(1974), The Australian National Parks & Wildlife Conservation Act (1975), The Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park Act (1975), The Australian Heritage Commission Act (1975)." B. 
Davis, "Federal-State Tensions in Australian Environmental Management: The World 
Heritage Issue", in K. Walker (ed), Australian Environmental Policy (New South Wales 
University Press, Kensington, 1992) pp 215-232, p 217. See also: M. Cronunelin, 
"Commonwealth Involvement in Environment Policy: Past, Present and Future" (1987) 4 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 101-112; R. Fowler, "Environmental Law and its 
Administration in Australia" (1984) 8 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 10-49. 
120 Burmester, op cit fn 22; Hildreth, op cit fn 3. 
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included arsenic dumping off Western Australia, mercury poisoning of 
sharks in Victorian waters, and the grounding of the 'Oceanic Grandeur' in 
the Great Barrier Reef.' Whitlam made marine pollution a central issue in 
attacks on the Government before assendirtg to office.' In particular, the 
Opposition advocated the enactment of Commonwealth legislation based 
upon the trade and commerce and external affairs head powers to enable it to 
intervene in marine pollution policy.' Once in power, the Labor 
Government committed itself to enacting legislation to occupy the field of 
marine pollution policy, based upon the resolution of jurisdiction achieved 
by the SSLA. This commitment is made explicit by the Environment 
Minister, Moss Cass — 
We will be doing a lot more in our own territories and, after the 
constitutional issues particularly relating to the company power and the 
Territorial Sea have been made clear, we hope to use such power to 
encourage good planning of the coastline in the States ... Again, after 
our constitutional power is clarified, we will be looking at this act [the 
National Environmental Policy Act] when we design a Marine 
Environment Protection Act for Australia. This is an act which has 
already been the subject of discussions which I have had with my 
department. It will be based on the Fishery power as well as the 
Territorial Sea power once this is settled. 124 
Before being able to capitalize upon its confirmed jurisdictional capabilities, 
with respect to both resources and the environment, The Whitlam Labor 
Government fell from office. Boardman notes that had Whitlam survived 
beyond 1975, the confirmation by the High Court of the SSLA would have 
"consolidate[d] the Commonwealth's authority as the main level of 
government in Australia empowered to formulate marine pollution 
121 R. Boardman, Global Regimes and Nation-States: Environmental Issues in Australian 
Politics (Carleton University Press, Ottawa, 1990). 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 12 September 1970, p 1122. 
1' Boardman, op cit fn 121. 
1' M. Cass, "Progress?"paper presented at The Impact of Human Activities on Coastal Zones 
(Australian UNESCO Committee for Man and the Biosphere, Sydney, 1973) pp 175-179, p 
177. 
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policy. "125 The important point to emerge from these developments is the 
intention of the SSLA to enable Commonwealth action in many areas of 
marine policy. As well, the SSLA was the bridge between national and 
international marine policy—for both the conservation and development of 
resources—which the discussion now introduces. 
3.4.4 Australia and UNCLOS III under Whitlam 
This section describes the Whitlam Government's policy towards the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea during its early stages 
between 1973 and 1975. Because of the brevity of Labor's term in office, most 
of the substantive negotiating sessions occurred under the subsequent Fraser 
Government [nine sessions compared with three]. Australia's contributions 
to the final treaty are therefore more appropriately detailed in the following 
chapter. The present description serves mainly to highlight the 
Commonwealth's UNCLOS position originally propounded under Whitlam. 
Earlier discussions alluded to a remarkable consistency in policy between 
successive Commonwealth governments as the defining feature of 
Australia's approach to the Law of the Sea, along with its perpetual caution 
not to make unilateral offshore claims. I26 Reasons proposed for these 
characteristics include a growing commonality between political parties as to • 
the role of the Commonwealth in marine resources policy, and the 
difficulties faced by Labor and Coalition governments alike over the domestic 
limitations of international sea law. Notwithstanding that the 
Commonwealth's UNCLOS policy was remarkably consistent over a twenty 
years period, encompassing preparatory work through final ratification, some 
policy emphases are nonetheless observed between Whitlam and Fraser, as 
well as later Labor and Coalition governments in the 1990s. 
'Boardman, op cit fn 121 p 69. 
126 Burmester, op cit fn 6; Suter, op cit fn 22. 
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A notable feature of Whitlam's Prime Ministership was his promotion 
generally of Australian activity in international affairs, and at LTNCLOS in 
particular.' Beginning with the first negotiating session in 1974, Australia 
under Whitlam's helm pursued the development of a comprehensive Law 
of the Sea package. The main elements of this policy included — 
• claiming rights to the edge of the continental margin (discussed 
further below); 
• promoting the concept of a 200-mile offshore zone while stressing 
freedom of navigation; 
• opposing any widening of the territorial sea beyond three miles 
because of the restrictions to navigation presented thereby; 
• liberalizing marine scientific research but vesting in coastal States the 
power to regulate such activity; 
• extending the powers of the coastal State to control marine pollution; 
• supporting the notion of seabed mining and the International Seabed 
Authority (more later).' 
The Fraser Government maintained the Commonwealth's desire to ensure 
universal support for a Law of the Sea package generally, and particularly 
with respect to the continental shelf. Although other policy areas became less 
important under Fraser, Bergin notes that "The margin goal was the top 
priority over the life of the Conference."' The main distinction between the 
two governments' Law of the Sea policy was Whitlam's attempt to enhance . 
powers for protecting the marine environment, and support for an enclosed 
offshore zone. 13° 
127 Ibid, Suter. 
Bergin (1983), op cit fn 17. 
A. Bergin, "Australia's Contribution to the Convention", in M. Tsamertyi, S. Bateman and J. 
Delaney (ed), The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: What it Means to 
Australia and Australian Industries (University of Wollongong, Wollongong, 1996) pp 17-41, 
p35. 
130 Details of developments regarding extended offshore zones are described in Chapter Four 
following, when the Commonwealth finally in 1978 asserted limited jurisdiction out to 200 
miles. It is worth recalling that during the early 1970s Australia still only claimed the 
continental shelf and the 12-mile declared fishing zone. 
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As the previous section showed, Whitlam was concerned with advancing 
domestic policy interests more broadly than just in terms of offshore 
petroleum, and this approach was projected into international fora. 
Immediately prior to UNCLOS in 1973, the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships was being concluded, at which Australia 
argued for stronger coastal State controls over marine pollution. The 
proposed measures failed to materialize, however, and the proposition was 
deferred to Law of the Sea negotiations where the same hard line was 
originally advanced. 131 The Commonwealth was similarly enthusiastic for 
the concept of an enclosed offshore zone during the first few negotiating 
sessions, but this enthusiasm also abated with the change of government. 
The Commonwealth's Law of the Sea policy reveals an alignment 
between national and international sea law. The Seas and Submerged Lands 
Act was clearly intended to clarify Commonwealth/state jurisdiction, but it 
was also the instrument by which the Commonwealth could adopt 
international maritime codes domestically.' As Herr and Davis remark, 
whilst UNCLOS "did not instigate or sustain the Whitlam Government's 
resolve to make the claim [SSLA], it only reaffirmed the logic of national 
primacy offshore."' In the event, the demise of the Whitlam Government 
saw a moderated approach towards pollution control ushered in, as described • 
further in the next chapter.'" 
The area where the Commonwealth displayed the greatest consistency 
over time in its Law of the Sea policy was in relation to the continental shelf. 
131 Boardman, op cit fn 121. The Commonwealth's frustration at its lack of success with respect 
to the marine environment tempted it to act unilaterally, as revealed in an ambiguous 
statement made at that time: "Australia reserves its position entirely to impose whatever 
conditions it may lawfully impose within its jurisdiction to protect from pollution the 
marine environment adjacent to Australia." Burmester, op cit fn 22p 446. 
132 Bergin, op cit fn 129. 
133 Herr and Davis, op cit fn 92 p 691. 
134 Burmester, op cit fn 22; Hildreth, op cit fn 3. 
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Following Arvo Pardo's precipitous plea to the United Nations in 1968 the 
'Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor 
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction' was established. Within a year, 
the Committee had been transformed into a permanent Seabed Committee 
charged with preparatory responsibilities related to UNCLOS III, a forum in 
which Australia involved itself heavily in an effort to have its preferred 
continental shelf regime accepted.' 35 The Attorney-General explained the 
Commonwealth's involvement in the Seabed Committee as a strategic 
response to domestic jurisdictional problems - 
A committee of thirty-five states was appointed by the Convention on 
the Continental Shelf to look into the control of the deep-sea bed 
beyond the coastal state boundaries of the continental shelf. Australia 
was a member of this committee ... This would enable Australia not 
only to advance the interests of underdeveloped countries but also to 
safeguard our interests in whatever course this committee takes in 
dealing with the sea bed beyond the coastal boundaries. I suggest that the 
Government has been extremely active in this field. It is really a travesty 
of the facts to suggest that it has been timid and has not been active.' . 
The Commonwealth's interest in contributing to the development of the 
new seabed regimes is easily understood. Firstly, the Commonwealth was 
keen to preserve the continental shelf regime established by the convention 
arising from UNCLOS I, having become comfortable with the definitions 
contained therein. Australia also considered that the proposed international. 
seabed area should neither encompass nor intrude into the existing 
continental shelf of coastal States. In other words, the seaward limit of 
national jurisdiction determined the inward extent of the new seabed 
regime.' 37 The two offshore mining regimes would therefore exist in 
parallel.' In Bergin's terms - 
135 Bergin (1982), op cit fn 17. 
136 Hansard, House of Representatives [Nigel Bowen, Attorney-General], 28 November 1968, pp 
3435-6. 
137 Shearer, op cit fn 6. 
Bergin, op cit fn 129. 
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The 1958 Convention was, from Australia's point of view, satisfactory as 
it did not define the limit of coastal state jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf in a way that would forfeit oil and gas resources off 
Australia's broad shelf. Australia was thus anxious to ensure that 
valuable areas of shelf would not pass from national jurisdiction to the 
jurisdiction of Pardo's proposed ISA.'" 
In 1973, the Commonwealth expressed its policy option seeking to extend 
jurisdiction to the edge of the continental margin, pursuant to the 1958 
Convention. The method of granting exploration permits and production 
licences within graticular blocks, or 'picture frames', negated the need to 
define the outer limit of the continental margin.' The Whitlam 
Government nonetheless conceded that a more precise definition of the 
continental shelf would be needed to better mesh the international seabed 
regime—the 'common heritage of mankind'—with that of the coastal 
State. 141 Chapter Four describes how Australia's insistence on this point 
distinguished it from other parties over the life of the Conference. 
Whilst optimizing control over the continental shelf was the 
Commonwealth's priority in terms of Law of the Sea policy, less attention 
was directed to the relationship between the continental shelf regime and the 
proposed exclusive economic zone. As Attard observes, it is quite possible to 
maintain a continental shelf without an overlying zone because the latter 
requires express proclamation, unlike the continental shelf which is more 
easily extended if the natural prolongation so allows.' This position was 
articulated by the Australian delegate to the second negotiating session in 
1974 — 
First, it was necessary to respect existing sovereign rights to coastal States 
over the resources of the natural prolongation of their land territories, 
as in the case of their territories above sea level. Secondly, the 
' Bergin (1982), op cit fn 17 p 46. 
140 Landale and Burmester, op cit fn 17. 
"1 Ibid. 
142 D. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
London, 1987). 
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submerged lands mass of certain States extended beyond 200 miles. In 
the case of some countries, including Australia, the extension was only 
a small area ... Thirdly, the Convention should define not only the area 
of the continental shelf but also the rights and duties pertaining to it. 
They were already well established, having been embodied in the 1958 
Geneva Convention ... The rights and duties of the coastal State in 
relation to the superjacent waters would be dealt with in connection 
with the proposed 200-mile economic zone; beyond 200 miles, the 
superjacent waters would, of course, be part of the high seas.' 
•Under the successive Fraser Government, the Commonwealth came to 
emphasise the distinction between the continental shelf and superjacent 
waters, and gave effect to the latter almost with reluctance.' The eventual 
adoption in Commonwealth legislation of the updated LOSC regimes in 1994 
perpetuated this distinction, although the framework created by the OCS was 
as much the cause of this perpetuation as any desire to keep the regimes 
separate [more in later chapters]. 145 
It is necessary to also briefly foreshadow the composition of the 
Commonwealth delegation to UNCLOS because of its importance in 
sharpening Australia's policy approach during negotiations. The Law of the 
Sea task force was established in the latter part of 1974, with the Department 
of Foreign Affairs as the nominated lead agency. From the outset, this 
department was in disagreement with the Commonwealth's minerals and 
energy portfolio interests in terms of how aggressively Australia should • 
pursue its policy of asserting coastal State jurisdiction to the margin of the 
continental shelf. As will be seen in Chapters Four and Six, Australia did fare 
very well from the Law of the Sea Convention, notwithstanding that the 
Commonwealth's foreign policy interests did prevail over certain resource 
Ibid p 138. 
'R N. Evans, "LOSC, Offshore Resources and Australian Marine Policy" (1996) 20 Marine Policy 
223-227. 
145  D. Rothwell, "Australia and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" (1994) 
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exploitation policies, as a result of the lead agency status given to Foreign 
Affairs. 1" 
3.4.5 New South Wales v the Commonwealth 
The final important marine policy event to occur during the Whitlam 
Government was the conclusion to the Seas and Submerged Lands Act. All 
the states were dispossessed of offshore terrritory by the SSLA and predictably 
challenged the validity of the statute in the High Court. As mentioned, 
because prospective offshore basins were localized to just two areas the 
motivation for states to seek collective redress was not the desire to regain 
control over petroleum resources, but rather umbrage at the loss of state 
identity."' The two petroleum-producing states—Western Australia and 
Victoria—did effectively lose sovereign rights over proven offshore reserves 
as a consequence of the SSLA, and although the legislative regime had been 
left intact Whitlam had quite plainly delayed rather than precluded altering 
these arrangements.'" For these reasons, all Australian states led by New 
South Wales enjoined in action in 1975 seeking to have the SSLA declared 
invalid. 
A number of questions pertaining to offshore jurisdiction were answered 
by the High Court in the ensuing case, New South Wales v the• 
Commonwealth.'" The accumulation of these questions was the proposition 
that if the territorial sea and continental shelf were within the limits of states 
as a consequence of colonial roots, and neither federation nor the 
international personality of Australia vested these areas in the 
Commonwealth, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act was invalid because it 
146 Bergin (1983), op cit fn 17. 
'47 P. Goldsworthy, "Ownership of the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf of Australia: An 
Analysis of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case (State of New South Wales and Ors v. 
the Commonwealth of Australia)" (1976) 50 The Australian Law Journal 175-184. 
1" Hansard, House of Representatives, 10 May 1973, p 2006. 
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altered state boundaries without observing the formula specified in section 
123 of the Constitution.' On all matters the case was determined 
resoundingly in the Commonwealth's favour. Whilst some of these findings 
were entirely foreseeable the High Court also articulated several unexpected 
judgements. The more significant rulings included that — 
• the Seas and Submerged Lands Act was a valid exercise of the external 
affairs head of power as it implemented the purposes of an 
international treaty; 
• the same power also supported the SSLA in a literal sense as its 
subject matter—offshore waters—were geographically external to 
Australia; 
• the Commonwealth was the only Australian entity recognizable for 
the purposes of international treaty law; and 
• offshore rights accrued to the Commonwealth as an incident of 
federation in 1901 rather than to the states, as was previously assumed 
to be the case.' 
It was unsurprising that the continental shelf fell within the exclusive 
legislative province of the Commonwealth as this ruling concurred with the 
legal opinion stretching back to at least 1967. Considerably more difficult for 
the states to accept were those aspects of the decision pertaining to the 
territorial sea. The High Court ruled that states did not have any claim of 
sovereignty over the adjacent territorial sea, for two discernible reasons.. 
Firstly, because this strip of water was the product of an international treaty to 
which Australia was signatory jurisdiction accrued to the Commonwealth 
pursuant to the external affairs power. However, the judgement went further 
Opeskin and Rothwell, op cit En 36. "Australia's Territorial Sea: International and Federal 
Implications of Its Extension to 12 Miles" (1991) 22 Ocean Development and International 
Law 395-431. Section 123 of the Constitution spells out a formula for altering the boundaries 
of states: "The Parliament of the Commonwealth may, with the consent of the Parliament 
of a State, and the approval of the majority of the electors of the State voting upon the 
question, increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of the State, upon such terms and 
conditions as may be agreed on, and may, with the like consent, make provision respecting 
the effect and operation of any increase or diminution or alteration of territory in relation to 
any State affected." 
151 New South Wales v the Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337. 
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in considering the common law bases of the territorial sea. The High Court 
determined that sovereignty over the territorial sea had belonged to the 
Commonwealth since federation, and never in fact belonged to the states 
whose colonial ties to adjacent waters had been eclipsed by the act of 
federation. In other words, even in the absence of UNCLOS and the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act the territorial sea became exclusively the sovereignty of 
the Commonwealth. 
The declaratory nature of the SSLA gave effect to the Commonwealth's 
antecedent claim to the territorial sea. Cullen observes that this method of 
jurisdictional assertion particularly offended the states in 1973 because of its 
suggestion that the Commonwealth had a historical basis to its offshore 
claims, which the High Court did finally confirm.' Waugh explains the 
feature of the declaratory approach — 
It was a characteristic of the provisions being considered by the Court 
that, in effect, they declared the existence of the power by which they 
were enacted. The sovereignty described in the Act included the power 
to declare its existence. To uphold the Act is not to say that the 
sovereignty there declared is conferred by its provisions; rather, it is to 
say that the declaration is a valid description of power existing under 
the Constitution and anterior to the Act. The Act was thus an exercise of 
a previously untried power. 1" 
In spite of its scope, the decision in New South Wales v the Commonwealth . 
did not directly contemplate the P(SL)A regime. Several key issues pertaining 
to the offshore petroleum legislation therefore went begging. Firstly, the High 
Court did not consider the legality of the states administering 
Commonwealth law as the designated authority. Harders notes that the 
nature of sovereignty over the territorial sea was also unclarified as to 
whether the Commonwealth enjoyed an exclusive or concurrent authority to 
regulate resources development.' 
' Cullen, op cit fn 1. 
153 Waugh, op cit fn 29p 7. 
Harders, op cit fn 8. 
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Perhaps most importantly, the attempt of the Settlement to manufacture 
consistency between the Commonwealth and state legislation was also left 
outstanding. To avoid the operation of s 109 of the Constitution [the 
inconsistency provision] Chapter Two described how section 150 was 
included in the Commonwealth P(SL)A to allow both overlapping statutes to 
apply to the same area.' If some state powers with respect to offshore 
petroleum were left intact by New South Wales v the Commonwealth, the 
latter's P(SL)A was probably assured of paramountcy by section 109. 1' The 
High Court was generally silent on the thorny issue of the administration of 
the P(SL)A. Nonetheless, the SSLA and the resultant case almost certainly 
rendered invalid the offshore petroleum legislation of the states. Cullen 
notes that the state P(SL)Acts were "early casualties" of the High Court 
decision — 
This conclusion followed from the finding in the Commonwealth's 
favour which suggested that the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 
(Cth.) was in force in the whole of each of the adjacent areas of the 
states, leaving no scope for the operation of the state 'mirror 
legislation'. And, in so far as state 'mirror' legislation asserted any 
sovereignty in the adjacent areas, it likely was inconsistent with the Seas 
and Submerged Lands Act.' 
To enable the overlapping statutes to operate as intended the Commonwealth's Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act was stated not to affect the operation of any similar state 
legislation Es. 1501 At that time doubt was cast upon the efficacy of this device. 
Cullen, op cit fn 1. 
Cullen, op cit fn 3 p 91. 
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Figure 3. Commonwealth-state offshore petroleum arrangements 1973 
Because of the High Court's silence, though, the states were able to serve in 
their capacities as designated authorities until a new offshore petroleum 
regime was emplaced years later under the OCS. 158 In a bitter twist of fate, the 
Whitlam Government fell from office three days after the New South Wales 
v the Commonwealth judgement was delivered, effectively negating the 
need to immediately revisit the offshore arrangements because the incoming 
Fraser Government's New Federalism platform. The effect of the 1975 
decision was to therefore confirm that Commonwealth rather than state law 
applied in the offshore areas while leaving the administrative arrangement 
unchanged. This curious legal situation is depicted in Figure 3. 
3.5 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER THREE 
The most apparent trend of the period between 1970-75 was the assertiveness 
on the part of the Commonwealth to emplace national legislative policies for 
developing and conserving resources. Two successive Commonwealth 
158 Crommelin, op cit fn 3. 
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governments took a more active role in marine policy during this time, 
motivated by a number of growing problems over resources and the 
environment. Two evolving features in particular are worth highlighting: a 
narrowing in approach between governments towards a Commonwealth 
offshore resources policy; and the enactment of legislation as the vehicle 
through which this could be progressed, regardless of state concerns.' 
Whilst factors such as marine pollution and the emerging Law of the Sea 
explain the impetus towards greater Commonwealth involvement in 
offshore legislative policy, these do not fully account for the complete reform 
in Commonwealth/state interaction attempted during this period, nor the 
consequential deterioration in relations. The balance of the explanation is 
found in the emergence of a political ideology driven by centralist Prime 
Ministers of both parties—Gorton and Whitlam—who were keen for the 
Commonwealth to intervene more directly in offshore resources policy. 
Whitlam was more successful than his predecessor in legislating to assert 
Commonwealth jurisdiction over the offshore. In the event, 
intergovernmental forces conspired to prevent the Whitlam Government 
from appreciating the Commonwealth's newly confirmed powers. The 
necessity for state administration of the P(SL)A regime enabled state 
governments to foil the Commonwealth's expansive offshore policies. As 
Mathews notes "... by withholding prompt commitment of their 
governments to joint schemes, State ministers may attempt to put pressure 
on the Federal Government."' To this end, the states were aided by the 
strength of their relationship with the petroleum industry. The absurd 
situation therefore arose whereby the Commonwealth exercised complete 
jurisdiction offshore to the preclusion of the states while the latter sphere of 
' Herr and Davis, op cit fn 92. 
Weller and Smith, op cit fn 79 p 93. 
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government used administrative means to frustrate the Commonwealth's 
leglislative policies. 
The case New South Wales v the Commonwealth convincingly 
vindicated the Commonwealth's legislative actions towards the offshore. 
This judgement also raised new issues and left some questions unanswered. 
The most important of these related to the states' ability to administer the 
offshore petroleum regime in light of the High Court's decision in 1975. 
Before political and administrative readjustment could occur to better 
comport with this legal imperative, the Whitlam Government fell from 
office, due in no small way to the strain placed on the federation by several 
years of internecine relations. 
Stevenson describes this intergovernmental and industrial tension in the 
following terms - 
The fall of the Labor government at the end of 1975 was obviously 
welcomed by most, if not all, of the mining and petroleum firms in 
Australia. But it is too early to say what long-term effect the experience 
with Labor will have on the industry's relations with the federal 
government. The industry is aware that the trend towards greater 
federal intervention in mineral resource policy began before December 
1972 and can never be entirely reversed ... The general feeling among 
mining and petroleum people seems to be that Labor governments are 
innocuous at the state level, but that at the federal level they can do 
considerable to the industry. 161 
Notwithstanding the sweeping changes in national mood ushered in 1976, 
Western Australia and Victoria were still confronted with uncertainties over 
offshore petroleum. Moreover, all the states were dissatisfied with New 
South Wales v the Commonwealth and were anxious to regain both the 
territory and identity lost to the Commonwealth. It was this anxiety that 
drove the offshore jurisdictional conflict into the third chapter of its history, 
which the thesis now examines. As will be seen, the Offshore Constitutional 
161 Stevenson, op cit fn 2 p 78. 
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Settlement reached in 1980 gave to Western Australia a very favourable 
arrangement with the Commonwealth in the context of this national 
framework, as a function of political relations and the booming north-west 
shelf ventures. This state therefore fared much better than did other states, 
but secured this position to a large extent at the Commonwealth's 
convenience. 
Chapter Four 
Cooperative Federalism and Offshore Petroleum — 
1976-1983 
The third phase of the evolution of the Petroleum Submerged Lands Act 
represents the antithesis of the inter-governmental hostility of the Whitlam 
era. Under the precedent Labor Government, the Commonwealth boldly 
entered into areas of policy which hitherto had been the unchallenged 
province of the states, most confrontantionally by asserting jurisdiction over 
the offshore. In 1975, the Fraser Coalition Government came to power riding 
a wave of anti-Whitlam backlash known as New Federalism, which sought to 
restore the federal balance and readmit the states to a substantial offshore role. 
Political opportunism, and the impossibility of ignoring the role historically 
occupied by the states, combined to ensure that the respective roles of the 
Commonwealth and states would be restored to the offshore situation which 
approximated that pre-dating the Whitlam Government. This new 
arrangement was termed the Offshore Constitutional Settlement [OCS]. 1 
Much has been made of the cooperative spirit embodied in the OCS, and 
the return to the states of jurisdiction over the three-mile territorial sea. As 
well, the OCS provided for the input of these governments into resource 
regimes located in Commonwealth waters beyond.' Most analyses tend to 
focus upon fisheries regimes, however, and overlook the detailed content of 
M. Haward, "The Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement" (1989) 13 Marine Policy 
334-348. 
2 M. Crommelin, "Offshore Mining and Petroleum: Constitutional Issues" (1981) 3 Australian 
Mining and Petroleum Law Journal 191-213; R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Revenue Raising: A Case 
of One Government Too Many?" (1988) 6 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 213- 
247; B. Davis, "Federal-State Tensions in Australian Environmental Management: The 
World Heritage Issue", in K. Walker (ed), Australian Environmental Policy (New South 
Wales University Press, Kensington, 1992) pp 215-232; R. Hildreth, "Australian Coastal 
Management: a North American Perspective" (1992) 9 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 165-174. 
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the minerals and petroleum legislation. Moreover, the intention of the OCS 
is often overstated in interpretations of the New Federalism period. For 
example, the fact that the OCS was never an integral part of Fraser's New 
Federalism policy is often overlooked by scholars.' As has been recognised by 
several others, though, despite the Fraser Government returning to the states 
some important marine policy capabilities, these were quite marginal 
compared with those exercised by this sphere of government prior to 1972. 4 In 
other words, although the Fraser Government retreated from the exclusive 
Commonwealth marine policy role achieved by the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act, it nonetheless retained the significant capabilities it had acquired 
under Whitlam, particularly in terms of offshore petroleum policy. 
This chapter documents the development of the OCS, and examines in 
detail the form of the enabling legislation and the new offshore petroleum 
regime. The first part discusses several influential factors leading to the OCS 
in 1980 while part 2.1 details at length its constitutional bases. In the third 
part, the offshore petroleum regime is described and analysed where it is seen 
that the Commonwealth amended the P(SL)A to guarantee the states a 
continued role in continental shelf policy. On the one hand, the legislation 
enabled the Commonwealth to ultimately prevail in relation to petroleum 
decisions made in respect of the continental shelf, having become accustomed - 
to the exercise of important policy making powers under the P(SL)A. At the 
same time, the states continued to administer exclusive decision-making 
powers of the Commonwealth under that same statute. 
M. Haward, Federalism and the Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement (University 
of Tasmania, PhD thesis, 1992) pp 160-165. 
N. Evans and J. Bailey, "Jurisdiction and Offshore Petroleum in Australia: Creating Symmetry 
Between the Commonwealth and States by Sharing Benefits and Avoiding Costs" (1997) 33 
Ocean and Coastal Management 173-204; R. Kay and C. Lester, "Benclunarking the Future 
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4.1 BUILD-UP TO THE OCS 
4.1.1 Fraser's New Federalism 
The Whitlam Government's ascendency was as brief as it was volatile. Just 
three days before the High Court delivered its decision in New South Wales v 
the Commonwealth, the federal government fell from office in spectacular 
and controversial fashion.' The immediate outcome of this series of events 
was in equal measure ironic and frustrating. Irony arose from the fact that the 
Whitlam Government was unable to exercise the Commonwealth's newly 
confirmed powers over the offshore, despite having agitated for the 
clarification of these for two decades and enacting legislation to this end in 
1973. The situation was frustrating as the incoming Fraser Coalition 
Government inherited a lpgislative scheme it did not desire in entirety, and 
was compelled to dismantle the Seas and Submerged Lands Act framework by 
use of extraordinary legal and political means.' 
Under Fraser's leadership, the Commonwealth returned to an inter-
governmental style that was strongly supported the notion of states' rights. 
The important characteristics of this New Federalism policy included — 
• distributing income tax revenue in fixed proportions to state and local . 
governments; 
• increasing the financial independence of the states; and 
• replacing the s. 96 special purpose grants favoured by Whitlam with 
general assistance to enhance state and local autonomy. 
On 11 November 1975 the Governor-General dismissed the Labor government and dissolved 
Parliament because the Senate—which was controlled by the Coalition—refused to pass the 
annual appropriation bills and the government could not gain supply for governing the 
country. Following the federal election the Coalition formed government and Malcolm 
Fraser became Prime Minister. The constitutional crisis, as this incident is known, represents 
the only use by the Governor-General of the reserve powers of that office. 
6 Haward, op cit fn 1. 
Chapter Four 	 147 
Groenewegen reviewed the Coalition's restoration of political faith in 
federalism as a system of government and determined that Fraser's New 
Federalism was seen as a reaction to the excesses of the Whitlam 
Government.' Other commentators caution, however, that analyses which 
emphasise inter-governmental financial adjustments overlook the 
contribution of the Fraser Government to broad Commonwealth/state 
reform. For example, Haward and Smith dismiss as overly simplistic the 
belief that Fraser was simply a catharsis to his predecessor.' Under Fraser, the 
Commonwealth sought to reduce the role of the federal government by 
returning to the traditional Coalition position of developing policy 
sympathetic to the states. Fraser committed the Commonwealth to not acting 
unilaterally in relation to contentious policy areas, such as the environment 
and offshore jurisdiction.' As Haward and Smith observe — 
The states' reaction to Whitlam's new federalism forced the Liberal 
Party to overhaul its bland party platform. Under the leadership of 
Malcolm Fraser, the Liberal Party adopted commitment to cooperative 
federalism which diametrically opposed Whitlam's confrontationalist 
approach ...Most attention was focused on the proposals to restructure 
the taxation sharing arrangements with the states and local 
government. Although this element attracted the most interest, the 
implementation of the new federalism in areas such as the offshore, 
companies and securities, and external affairs proved to have greater 
longevity than the tax sharing proposals." 
This reformist view of the Fraser Commonwealth is shared by Saunders and 
Wiltshire, who describe New Federalism as a rare attempt to devise a 
coherent philosophy for major public sector activity.' In particular, Saunders 
and Wiltshire considered in some depth the inter-governmental 
7 P. Groenewegen, "The Political Economy of Federalism, 1901-81", in B. Head (ed), State and 
Economy in Australia (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1983) pp 169-195. 
1' M. Haward and G. Smith, "What's New About the 'New Federalism'?" (1992) 27 Australian 
Journal of Political Science 39-51. 
9 Ibid. 
p 45. 
11  C. Saunders and K. Wiltshire, "Fraser's New Federalism 1975-1980: An Evaluation" (1981) 26 
Australian journal of Politics and History 355-371. 
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arrangements instituted by Fraser in relation to international matters, an area 
of especial concern to state governments. The participation of the states in 
UNCLOS III—the international policy area most relevant to offshore 
petroleum resources—is discussed in section 4.1.3 below. It is convenient, 
however, to introduce these mechanisms here because of what they reveal 
about state involvement in Commonwealth processes at the time. 
Firstly, it is important to recall that the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 
1973 (Cth) was upheld, based in part upon the external affairs head of power. 
Writing in 1981, Saunders and Wiltshire contemplated the extent of the 
Commonwealth's power to legislate with respect to external affairs, and 
suggested of expansive portents — 
Pursant to s. 51(xcix) of the commonwealth Constitution the 
commonwealth Parliament has power to legislate with respect to 
'external affairs'. The precise limits of the power are uncertain ...As the 
subjects of international concern become more diverse the power of the 
commonwealth to legislate pursuant to s. 51(xxix) for matters hitherto 
considered exclusively of state concern increases correspondingly. 
Whether, if this process continued, judicial limits eventually would be 
placed upon the categories of international arrangements which could 
be implemented in this way is a matter for speculation only." 
Only two years later, the celebrated Tasmanian Dams case [introduced in 
Chapter One] was heard, wherein Commonwealth legislation implementing 
the World Heritage Convention was upheld. In spite of the Commonwealth's 
obvious capacity to exclude the states from international affairs, between 1977 
and 1979 principles and then procedures specifying state involvement were 
reached in Premiers' Conferences. There were five elements to these 
arrangements — 
(i) states were to be informed in all cases and at an early stage of any 
treaty discussions Australia decided to join; 
(ii) the Commonwealth would consult with the states before legislating 
to adopt a treaty affecting a legislative area within the states' 
Ibid. p 367. 
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traditional area of competence, to provide the latter jurisdiction 
with the option of first legislating to give effect to the treaty; 
(iii) representatives of the states were to be included in delegations to 
appropriate international fora, to enable them to be informed and 
provide a view to the Commonwealth, but not to share in making 
policy decisions for Australia; 
(iv) the Commonwealth was to consider seeking the inclusion of 
federal clauses in individual treaties that intrude upon matters 
handled under state law; and 
(v) before becoming party to a treaty containing a federal clause the 
Commonwealth would first ensure that the laws of the states 
conformed with the mandatory treaty provisions.° 
On the one hand, these arrangements represented concessions to the states 
that were consistent with the spirit of New Federalism, and were a means 
through which state governments could participate in international treaty 
making. Upon closer inspection, though—especially of clause (iii)—it is 
apparent that the Commonwealth severely limited the extent to which the 
states could meaningfully contribute to policy development. These 
limitations are considered further in relation to later Australian Law of the 
Sea deliberations, but for the moment it is sufficient to recognize that the 
Commonwealth in the mid 1970s was cautious about returning to the states 
the expansive roles these governments previously occupied. 
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that despite the pronouncement 
and political efforts of the Fraser Government to redefine 
Commonwealth/state interaction, the expectations of New Federalism went 
largely unrealized. Galligan and Fletcher note that whilst Fraser took the heat 
out of inter-governmental relations, "little else was achieved"." Similarly, 
the Fraser experiment ultimately "created more discord between Prime 
13 R. Herr and B. Davis, "The Impact of UNCLOS Ill m Australian Federalism" (1986) 41 
International Journal 674-693. 
14 B. Galligan and C. Fletcher, New Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations and Environment 
Policy (Federalism Research Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1993). 
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Minister and Premiers than was expected in December 1975"." Groenewegen 
suggested that the Liberal Party philosophy of expanding state functions to 
strengthen federalism was incompatible with the pervasive contraction of 
government for policy and political reasons.' 
At the same time, though, it is important to acknowledge the 
Commonwealth's own agenda. This sphere of government had clearly 
become accustomed to the expanded policy making role it had so recently 
acquired. Notwithstanding the broad direction of inter-governmental 
relations under Fraser, Kay and Lester noted that the Commonwealth was 
reluctant to relinquish too much of the power it had gained under Whitlam — 
His successor, Malcolm Fraser (Liberal) came to office with a pro-states 
platform, avowing to redress the financial indpendence to the states. 
This too was branded "New Federalism". However, Fraser's 
government either found this too difficult a task, or enjoyed its 
increased power too much, to change the status quo.17 
The context for efforts to redefine inter-governmental relations were thus a 
hybrid of state government desires to assume their former privileged 
positions, and the Commonwealth's willingness to permit them some 
latitude in this regard while reserving to itself the more significant policy 
functions. This characterisation applies to broad public policy directions as 
well as to the particularities of offshore federalism. 
4.1.2 High Court decisions and offshore jurisdiction 
As was seen in the preceding phase of the offshore saga, High Court decisions 
delivered in tandem with a shift in political mood enhanced the 
Commonwealth's wherewithal to emplace a new offshore policy framework. 
During the pre-OCS negotiation period, two judgements fueled efforts to 
redefine the roles of the Commonwealth and states in marine resources 
Groenewegen, op cit fn 7 p 186. 
16 /bid. 
17 Kay and Lester, op cit fn 4p 269. 
Chapter Four 	 151  
legislative policy. Although these decisions are more directly relevant to 
fisheries management than petroleum development, they are reviewed here 
to better appreciate the illustrate the continued influence of the High Court 
on offshore jurisdictional arrangements. 
4.1.2.1 Pearce v Florenca 
The facts of Pearce v Florenca were simple enough, as with the earlier case 
Bonser v LaMacchia. The defendent, Florenca, was prosecuted under the 
Fisheries Act (1905) WA for catching undersized fish within two miles of the 
Western Australian coast, and sought to have the charges dismissed on the 
grounds that the provisions of the Fisheries Act were inoperative beyond the 
low water mark. At the time, the Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth) was expressed to 
apply only beyond three miles, for the reasons canvassed in Chapter Two. The 
defendent argued that the Western Australian legislation—the only 
legislation applying to the area where the offence occurred—was invalidated 
by the decision in New South Wales v the Commonwealth." 
The judgement in Pearce v Florenca was handed down in mid-1976. The 
High Court unanimously upheld the validity of the Fisheries Act 1905 (WA) 
on two grounds. Firstly, it was determined that the capacity to legislate in 
respect of areas three miles seaward of the coastline was within the state's 
extra-territorial legislative competence. Also, there was no conflict between 
the Western Australian fisheries legislation and the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act 1973 (Cth).' 
On the first point, the High Court held the fact that the Western 
Australian Fisheries Act purported to extend offshore to the traditional three- 
18 R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Disputes (The 
Federation Press, Sydney, 1990) pp 91-92; J. Waugh, Australian Fisheries Law 
(Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria Program, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 
1988). 
19 Pearce v Florenca (1976) 135 CLR 507. 
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mile limit provided the sufficient nexus to render the law valid. Moreover, 
the opinion was advanced that the power of states to legislate extra-
territorially was not even necessarily limited to three miles. In terms of the 
relationship between the Fisheries Act 1905 (WA) and the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act, the High Court confirmed that s 16 of the latter statute 
enabled the concurrent operation of state legislation which did not assert 
sovereignty or sovereign rights in relation to offshore areas (the savings 
provision). 20 Because the Fisheries Act did not express any such claims, it was 
therefore protected by the savings provisions of the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act and was unaffected by the ambit of the latter statute.' 
The decision in Pearce v Florenca represented a welcome source of 
support for efforts to overcome the difficulties presented by the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act. More remarkable, though, is the fact that two related 
High Court judgements made within the space of a year—New South Wales 
v the Commonwealth and the the present case—could at the same time 
favour both the Commonwealth and the states. Haward shows how the 
decision in Pearce v Florenca influenced the shape of OCS negotiations in 
much the same way as Bonser v LaMacchia had encouraged the 
Commonwealth to introduce legislation asserting its jurisdiction over 
offshore areas in the early 1970s. The High Court judgement was thus an • 
important legal affirmation of the policy tenets that were being promoted in 
Commonwealth/state dialogue during the mid-1970s, which led finally to the 
OCS. 
20 1n the previous chapter, the intention of including section 16 in the Seas and Submerged Lands 
Act 1973 (Cth) was discussed. The purpose of this provision was to enable other laws—
primarily fisheries—to continue to operate unaffected by the declaration of Commonwealth 
jurisdiction achieved by the SSLA. However, the High Court did not canvass the effect of 
section 16 in the earlier test case New South Wales v the Commonwealth. 
21 Pearce v Florenca (1976) 135 CLR 507. 
Chapter Four 	 153 
4.1.2.2 Raptis v South Australia 
Raptis v South Australia was another case ostensibly involving fisheries. Its 
relevance to OCS negotiations pertained to the drawing of baselines 
demarcating the inner extent of offshore zones. The particular issue being 
considered was the placement of lines drawn by the Commonwealth 
enclosing indented coastlines. The vehicle through which this capability was 
tested was the prosecution by South Australia of a fisher operating without a 
state licence in waters landward of nearshore Kangaroo Island. As well as 
challenging the validity of the Fisheries Act 1971 (SA) the plaintiff also sought 
a declaration as to the delimitation of state and Commonwealth waters. 22 
The judgement—delivered in June 1977—found that the fish had not 
been caught in waters under the jurisdiction of South Australia. The waters 
in question comprised neither the three-mile territorial sea or state internal 
waters, nor were these within South Australia's territorial limits. South 
Australian legislation therefore did not apply and the Fisheries Act 1952 (Cth) 
was the only applicable law." 
In terms of the formative OCS, Raptis v South Australia compelled the 
Commonwealth to draw the territorial sea baselines with great caution, so as 
not to offend either domestic or international law. Particular difficulties with. 
baseline drawing were encountered in relation to the Great Barrier Reef.' As 
well, massive tidal movements on the north-west shelf were critical in 
determining offshore boundaries, and in turn the areas within which the 
Commonwealth and Western Australian offshore petroleum legislation 
operated.' Section 4.2 shows how finalization of the OCS was delayed a 
22 Cullen, op cit fn 18 pp 94-96. 
Raptis v South Australia (1977) 138 CLR 346. 
" Haward, op cit fn 3 pp 180-187; J. Prescott, "An Agenda of Political Maritime Issues for 
Australia", in Australia's Maritime Horizons in the 1980's (Occasional Papers in Maritime 
Affairs: 1, 1982) pp 51-65. 
25 Hansard, Senate, 21 May 1980, p 2604. 
Chapter Four 	 154  
number of years after the inter-governmental arrangments had been settled 
and the enabling legislation enacted because of baseline complications.' 
4.1.3 UNCLOS and offshore resources policy 
Emerging Law of the Sea principles helped to shape the Commonwealth's 
policy towards offshore oil during the 1970s, as had occurred during the 
earlier evolution of the P(SL)A regime. The life of the Coalition federal 
Government coincided with UNCLOS III negotiations between 1976 and 1982, 
thereby enabling continuity in policy making to be maintained. Australian 
Law of the Sea policy over this time reveals the Commonwealth's increasing 
maturity and confidence in its interactions with other nations, as well as its 
growing internal authority vis-a-vis the state governments and industry. This 
authority is seen in both negotiations over the treaty text, and the conversion 
of its provisions into Commonwealth legislation. 
4.1.3.1 Overview of UNCLOS III 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was "the largest, 
longest and most complex exercise in multilateral diplomacy ever 
undertaken by the U.N."' Negotiations lasted nine years, from December 
1973 to December 1982, and States' Parties met 15 times. The sheer size of the 
UNCLOS agenda and its ambitious scope explain why the conference. 
continued to run for such an extraordinary period.' Put quite simply, the Law 
of the Sea Convention sought to contemplate and establish a legal code for 
almost every contemporaneous dimension of oceans policy." 
Haward, op cit fn 1. 
'7 A. Bergin, "Australia's Contribution to the Convention", in M. Tsamenyi, S. Bateman and J. 
Delaney (ed), The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: What it Means to 
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On the one hand, the very ambition of LOSC ensures its strength and 
universality. The consensual negotiating style pursued over nine years 
enabled a diversity of positions to be accommodated within the final treaty 
text. This was especially true with respect to the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) concept?' At the same time, though, the conference was a highly 
politicized event. Because LOSC was also the only major international treaty 
•not framed by drafters, the result was an unwieldingly large legal instrument 
that is in parts inconsistent and ambiguous?' 
A further twelve years elapsed following the conclusion of UNCLOS ifi 
and the convention's belated entry into force. As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, this delay was due at least in part to the difficulties experienced by 
nations in satisfying such a bewildering array of rights and obligations?' Since 
LOSC entered into force in 1994 nations have embraced its provisions with a 
fervour rarely seen in international affairs?' In spite of its protracted history, 
the Law of the Sea Convention now provides the basis for new regimes to 
legitimate and regulate all areas of marine policy [see Chapter Five]. 
3°  "No new principle of the law of the sea has ever been established so rapidly and of such a 
startlingly novel and important character." I. Shearer, "International Legal Aspects of 
Australia's Maritime Environment", in Australia's Maritime Horizons in the 1980s 
(Occasional Papers in Maritime Affairs: 1, 1982) pp 1-8, p 6. 
31 Ibid. 
32 K. Suter, The History of the Development of the Law of the Sea - the Importance for Global 
Marine Conservation and Recommendations for Australian Action (World Wildlife Fund for 
Nature Australia/Humane Society International, Sydney, 1994). 
P. Bimie, "Law of the Sea and Ocean Resources: Implications for Marine Scientific Research" 
(1995) 10 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 229-251; W. Burke, 
"Importance of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its Future Development" 
(1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law 1-4; D. Freestone, "The Road From Rio: 
International Environmental Law After the Earth Summit" (1994) 6 Journal of 
Environmental Law 193-218; G. Galdorisi, "The United States Freedom of Navigation 
Program: A Bridge for International Compliance with the 1982 United Nations Convention 
cn the Law of the Sea?" (1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law 399-408; C. 
Joyner and E. Martell, "Looking Back to See Ahead: UNCLOS III and Lessons for Global 
Commons Law" (1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law 73-95; A. Morgan, "The 
New Law of the Sea: Rethinking the Implications for Sovereign Jurisdiction and Freedom of 
Action" (1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law 5-29; J. Van Dyke, "Modifying 
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: New Initiatives on Governance of High Seas Fisheries 
Resources: the Straddling Stocks Negotiations" (1995) 10 The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 219-227. 
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4.1.3.2 Australia at the Conference 
Australia's contribution to the form of the Convention has been well 
reported in the literature. In his doctoral work, Bergin documents how 
Australia was a very influential participant at the Conference, both within 
and without the negotiating sessions.' He remarks that - 
Given that more than 150 nations attended UNCLOS III (virtually every 
country in the world) and that between 2000-3000 delegates attended 
most sessions, these judgements testify to the diplomatic skill and effort 
by Australia over the life of the conference. They also underscore the 
importance Canberra attached to the negotiations.' 
Other leading commentators have concurred in ranking Australia in the 
group of most important countries at UNCLOS BI. 36 The Commonwealth's 
role at the Conference has been described varyingly in the following terms - 
• Australia was one of six countries that achieved more 'clout' at the 
conference than would be expected at the international leve1; 37 
• the Australian delegation had a 'high degree of respect and 
influence';" and 
• Australia's delegation leader Keith Brennan was described as a 'pillar' 
of UNCLOS diplomacy." 
That Australia was such an important player at the Conference is a function 
of the Commonwealth's objective to reach a comprehensive treaty, and its 
determination that no issue—especially deep seabed mining—should scuttle 
negotiations." Whilst the Commonwealth was clearly committed to 
34 A. Bergin, Australia and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (The 
Australian National University, PhD thesis, 1990). 
35 Bergin, op cit fn 27 p 19. 
36 E. Miles, "The Structure and Effects of the Decision Process in the Seabed Committee and the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea" (1977) 31 International 
Organization 159-234; J. Nye, "Ocean Rule Making from a World Politics Perspective" (1975) 
3 Ocean Development and International Law 29-52. 
37 C. Sanger, Ordering the Oceans (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1987). 
38 Bergin, op cit fn 27. 
" J. Evensen, "Three Procedural Cornerstones of the Law of the Sea Conference: The Consensus 
Principle, the Package Deal, and the Gentlemen's Agreement", in J. Kaufmann (ed), 
Effective Negotiation Case Studies in Conference Diplomacy (Martinus Nijhoff, Dortrecht, 
1989) pp 75-92. 
4° A. Bergin, "Australia and Deep Seabed Mining" (1982) 36 Australian Outlook 45-50. 
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emplacing a new world order for the oceans, LOSC also provided timely 
support to the Commonwealth's efforts to finally settle offshore jurisdiction 
domestically.' As such, Law of the Sea negotiations proceeded in parallel 
with domestic OCS developments, cognizant of how the two policy 
endeavours could usefully be linked. With the exception of the margin claim 
[discussed below] Australian goals were generally consistent with the broad 
thrust of the Conference. The Commonwealth did not often depart from the 
dominant or collective view on issues, but instead worked industriously to 
ensure that its policies would be absorbed within the final treaty.' Australia's 
LOSC claims were therefore orthodox and uncomplicated, nor did the 
Commonwealth acted precipitously, a theme that has been repeated 
throughout this thesis. 
4.1.3.3 The Commonwealth's continental shelf policy 
The Commonwealth's highest—and indeed, most controversial—priority at 
UNCLOS 111 was to enhance its controls over the continental shelf. There 
were two components to this policy which saw Australia generally 
marginalised from the views of other nations: extending to the edge of the 
continental margin [the shelf, slope and rise] the area of continental shelf 
accruing to coastal States; and opposing revenue sharing for minerals 
extracted from this extended continental shelf.' Because the Australian 
continental shelf extended well beyond 200 miles in many places it was not in 
the Commonwealth's interests to accept a shelf delimited by reference to a 
fixed linear distance, as was being proposed in UNCLOS ifi negotiations." 
41 Bergin, op cit fn 27. 
42 H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea - The Protection and Preservation of the 
Marine Environment", in K. Ryan (ed), International Law in Australia (The Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1984) pp 439-455; H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea", in J. 
Crawford and D. Rothwell (ed), The Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific Region (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995) pp 51-64. 
43 Bergin, op cit fn 40; A. Bergin, "Australia and UNCLOS III" (1983) 29 Australian Journal of 
Political History 427-439. 
" Australia's claim to the edge of the continental margin was consistent with the view it had 
advocated with increasing confidence over the preceding twenty years, and had most 
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Chapter Three showed that the Commonwealth had come to interpret in 
broad terms the definition of the continental shelf contained in the 1958 
Convention. The Commonwealth distinguished the continental shelf regime 
from the EEZ, and saw no difficulty in extending the continental shelf to the 
edge of the margin where natural prolongation so allowed.' This definition 
of the continental shelf was particularly significant in relation to the 
emerging north west shelf oilfields, which potentially extended a considerable 
distance offshore." 
Relying upon the ambulatory criteria contained in the Continental Shelf 
Convention—that nation State jurisdiction over the continental shelf 
extended to a depth of 200 metres or beyond where technology admitted of 
exploitation—the Commonwealth during the 1970s granted exploration 
permits over the wide continental shelf. Because the Commonwealth 
favoured the geomorphololgical aspects of the continental shelf it sought to 
have these recognised and preserved in the proposals for a new continental 
shelf regime.' The trenchant position adopted by Australia regarding the 
continental shelf lead to the country generally being isolated on this 
particular matter, nothwithstanding its otherwise widely supported 
contributions to UNCLOS ILL" 
insistently advanced in the International Seabed Committee beginning in 1968 [discussed 
earlier in 3.3.4]. Indeed, Australia's influence in negotiations on deep seabed mining and the 
continental margin was attributed to its participation in the preparatory work of the 
Committee. See, M. Landale and H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea - 
Offshore Jurisdiction", in K. Ryan (ed), International Law in Australia (The Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1984) pp 390-416. 
45 Consistent with the high priority the Commonwealth placed on Law of the Sea policy, 
Australia in 1979 declared the Australian Fishing Zone to strengthen arguments for 
codifying this concept in the final treaty text. However, it appears that the Commonwealth 
acted to declare the AFZ more to present a unified regional South Pacific bloc to the UN 
than out of a desire to obtain expanded fisheries responsibilities. See: Herr and Davis, op cit 
fn 13. 
46  M. Landale and H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea - Offshore Jurisdiction", in 
K. Ryan (ed), International Law in Australia (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1984) pp 
390-416. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Bergin, op cit fn 27. 
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Other wide margin States accepted the need to return to the international 
community some of the benefits accruing to coastal States from extended 
continental shelves, a policy to which the Commonwealth was opposed." As 
a result of its isolation on the continental margin, Australia shifted its 
approach from one of vociferous, high profile opposition to a more moderate 
tactic designed to minimize the costs of extending jurisdiction further 
offshore." As Bergin notes, Australia devoted "an enormous amount of 
diplomatic energy" to its margin policy." The Commonwealth did concede 
that a more precise definition of the continental shelf was needed than that 
contained in the 1958 Convention. Australia eventually settled on the 
complicated delimitation formula proposed by Ireland, even though this 
proposition detracted from the notion of natural prolongation, which was 
hitherto the basis of the Commonwealth's interpretation of the continental 
Complementing the continental shelf debate was the topic of deep seabed 
mining. The regime for the deep seabed is important to continental shelf 
policy for two reasons. Firstly, the limits of the two areas are coterminous; 
that is, the edge of the legal continental shelf forms the boundary of the 
international seabed. During negotiations, Australia successfully argued that 
the international seabed regime could not include nor intrude upon the • 
The final Law of the Sea Convention contains a formula specifying the royalty payments 
payable by coastal States to the International Seabed Authority in respect of development 
occurring on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles. After five years of production, a royalty 
of 1% of production value shall be paid by the coastal State, increasing by 1% each year to a 
maximum of 7% thereafter which the rate will be fixed [Article 82]. The Australian 
delegation did not accept that these provisions would contribute to improving aid to less 
developed countries, but would simply deter offshore exploitation. See: Landale and 
Burmester, op cit fn 46; J. Prescott, "Problems of Drawing Australia's Maritime Boundaries", 
in R. Herr, R. Hall and B. Davis (ed), Issues in Australia's Marine and Antarctic Policies 
(University of Tasmania, Hobart, 1982) pp 17-31. 
Bergin, op cit fn 27. 
51 Ibid. 
52  The details of this formulation are discussed in the next chapter in the context of the 
Convention's entry into force and the Commonwealth's legislative implementation thereof. 
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continental shelf, which was covered by a separate regime." Secondly, 
Australia's deep seabed policy highlights the extent to which the minerals 
industry could influence Commonwealth decision making. Being a major 
producer of land-based minerals—especially nickel—the Commonwealth was 
wary of the risk to traditional producers of subsidised deep seabed mining.' 
For most of UNCLOS III, Australia echoed Canada's policy opposing 
subsidisation of minerals mined from the deep seabed. In 1980, however, the 
Commonweath's well articulated position was unexpectedly reversed as a 
result of direct petitioning of Prime Minister Fraser. Just before the 9th 
session of UNCLOS, the Chairs of Western Mining and CRA approached 
Fraser to seek a reversal of the Commonwealth's position on seabed mining, 
on the grounds that this would potentially expose the market place to price 
distortions. Against the advice of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the 
Prime Minister accepted this argument and directed the Australian delegation 
to support subsidisation. Although this policy change was in the event 
shortlived the example reveals the ability of the minerals industry to 
influence key individuals, as recently as 1980." 
4.1.3.4 Explaining the Commonwealth's approach 
The Commonwealth's Law of the Sea policy needs to be interpretted in light. 
of two broad sets of factors. The first of these relates to foreign policy and 
international diplomacy.' With the exception of the seabed regimes, 
Australia acted so as not to jeopardize the Commonwealth's "desire to work 
towards a comprehensive Law of the Sea Convention", 57 and resisted making 
assertive offshore jurisdictional claims. This approach was generally 
Bergin, op cit fn 43. 
K. Brennan, "Recent International Developments Regarding the Law of the Sea", in R. Herr, 
R. Hall and B. Davis (ed), Issues in Australia's Marine and Antarctic Policies (University of 
Tasmania, Hobart, 1982) pp 3-16. 
Bergin, op cit fn 40. 
56 Bergin, op cit fn 27. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 13 April 1978, p 1516. 
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consistent with its traditional law of the sea policy, and Australia's support 
more generally for multi-lateral treaty making and international orders. In 
this respect, the integrity and continuity of the Australian delegation has 
already been acknowledged. 
At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, the Commonwealth 
saw the opportunity to clarify and secure control over• seabed resources, 
domestically as well as in the international context. The new arrangements 
emplaced by Fraser to foster state government input to international treaties 
were introduced earlier. UNCLOS HI proved an early test of the efficacy of 
these arrangements and Fraser's New Federalism. Burmester noted at the 
time — 
It is too early to tell what effect the new arrangements will have in 
practice. Their implementation will depend largely on the political 
commitment of any Federal Government to maintain close 
consultations ...In the area of international conferences, the States for 
the first time have had a representative attached as an adviser to the 
Australian delegation to the Seventh Session of the Law of the Sea 
Conference ... In the area of legislative implementation of treaties, it 
remains to be seen whether separate State and Commonwealth 
legislation to implement treaties will work effectively, particularly in 
those areas involving major Commonwealth responsibilities, such as 
the area of the marine environment.' 
During the pre-OCS, period the states were keen to become involved in 
coincidental UNCLOS III developments, with a view to availing themselves 
of any opportunities derived therefrom. Haward observes that state interest 
in Law of the Sea policy was heightened by the attention being given to 
marine policy domestically, and this encouraged all state governments to seek 
permanent representation on the Australian delegation. In the event, the 
Commonwealth permitted one state representative to join the delegation on 
a rotational basis, beginning in 1978." Herr and Davis note that this 
58  H. Burmester, "The Australian States and Participation in the Foreign Policy Process" (1978) 
9 Federal Law Review 257-283, p 282. 
59 Haward, op cit fn 3 pp 179-181. 
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concession was rather marginal, especially as the state government involved 
was required to meet their own costs." Explanation for this attitude is found 
in Fraser's resolve not to negotiate with the states on UNCLOS matters, 
especially given his early reversal on domestic matters under the OCS [more 
in the following part[. 61 
The Commonwealth also allowed the minerals resources industry some 
direct—albeit marginal—input to UNCLOS proceedings. At the 9th session in 
mid-1980, representatives from AMIC and APEA were attached to the 
Australian delegation to the Law of the Sea, but were included on the 
Commonwealth's strict terms. Writing at that time, Reid implied that this 
dialogue was an improved but nonetheless insufficient move - 
A more belated (but nonetheless welcome) development has been a 
series of consultations held in Australian capital cities between the 
leader of Australia's delegation (Ambassador Keith Brennan) and 
representatives of Australia's offshore industry (both petroleum and 
mining interests). These meetings have provided a useful forum for an 
exchange of views between Government officials and industry on 
current developments in the international arena which will have 
significant implications for further Australian offshore activities.' 
Horizontal tensions experienced during UNCLOS Ill effectively limited the 
input of industry and state government to Australia's delegation. 
Negotiations raised questions within the federal government over the 
respective roles of portfolios, and the Department of Foreign Affairs as lead 
negotiating agency was able to strengthen its position relative to other 
agencies.' The pre-eminence of Foreign Affairs ensured that the domestic 
interests of state governments were kept distant from the international 
Herr and Davis, op cit fn 13. 
61 P. Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: A Study in Prime Ministerial Power in Australia (Penguin, 
Ringwood, 1989). 
62 P. Reid, "Commonwealth-State Relations Offshore Mining and Petroleum Legislation; Recent 
Developments: An Historic Milestone of Millstone?" (1980) 2 Australian Mining and 
Petroleum Law Journal 58-76, p 59. 
63 R. Boardman, Global Regimes and Nation-States: Environmental Issues in Australian Politics 
(Carleton University Press, Ottawa, 1990). 
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negotiating position. This in turn accounts for the emphasis given to the 
diplomatic aspects of law of the sea policy compared with national marine 
resources issues. Commonwealth bureaucratic influences were therefore 
more deterministic of offshore sea law policy than other political factors. 
Despite Australia's concerted efforts to have its preferred continental shelf 
regime adopted within LOSC, the final hybrid regime to emerge at the end of 
1982 was a hybrid of many opportunities. As the next chapter shows, although 
the regime is not ideal from Australia's perspective, the Commonwealth did 
fare very well from the Convention. Because LOSC was not well articulated 
with domestic policy developments proceeding in parallel, the 
Commonwealth was able to settle internal offshore arrangements without 
complications of an international nature arising. Put another way, the OCS 
was concerned solely with the details of domestic legislative arrangements 
while the Law of the Sea Convention provided the international parameters 
within which Commowealth offshore resources policy was developed. 
4.2 THE OFFSHORE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT 
4.2.1 Negotiating the OCS 
In spite of the expectation of a return to a more equitable variety of - 
intergovernmental relations under Fraser, Haward makes the point that the 
Offshore Constitutional Settlement was not an original element of New 
Federalism." The OCS did, however, come to be seen as a demonstration of 
the Commonwealth's commitment to brokering a new offshore accord 
favourable to state concerns, within the framework of renewed 
Commonwealth/state interaction. 
" Haward, op cit fn 3 pp 152, 160-163. 
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The public record confirms how Fraser very quickly rethought the 
offshore problem. Soon after being elected to office in 1976, the Prime 
Minister in reply to a letter from the Western Australian Premier, Charles 
Court, advised the latter that jurisdiction over the offshore was now settled in 
favour of the Commonwealth, and that sovereignty in respect of the 
territorial sea was not negotiable.' The letter read in part 
I have received similar approaches from the Premiers of Victoria and 
Tasmania. I am writing now to inform you that the important question 
thus raised has now been considered by the Commonwealth 
Government. The position of the Government is that it regards the 
High Court decision in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case, that 
sovereignty over the territorial sea is vested in the Commonwealth and 
not in the States, as having settled the general issue of sovereignty over 
the territorial sea. In taking this position my government has had regard 
to the advice it has received from its law officers that the 
Commonwealth Government could not legally accede to the States' 
requests." 
In remarkably short time, however, the Commonwealth had retreated from 
this position and commenced negotiations with the states to return to this 
sphere of government some offshore powers and functions. That Fraser did 
so rapidly reverse the Commonwealth's stated position with respect to the 
offshore was invoked repeatedly by the Labor Opposition as evidence of the 
Government's weakness in interacting with the states. It is now a matter of 
Australian political and legal history that the territorial sea was returned to - 
the states under the OCS.67 Less well recognized, though, is that the 
Reid, op cit fn 62. 
" Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 2524. 
67 M. Crommelin, "Federal-Regional Cooperation: A Comparative Perspective", in J. Saunders 
(ed), Papers presented at the 2nd National Conference m Natural Resources Law, 1985 
Managing Natural Resources in a Federal State (Carswell, Calgary, 1986) pp 295-321; 
Cullen, op cit fn 18; B. Davis, "National Responses to UNCED Outcomes: Australia", in L. 
Kriwoken, M. Haward, D. VanderZwaag and B. Davis (ed), Oceans Law and Policy in t h e 
Post-UNCED Era: Australian and Canadian Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, 
London, 1996) pp 25-40; N. Evans, "LOSC, Offshore Resources and Australian Marine Policy" 
(1996) 20 Marine Policy 223-227; M. Haward, "The Offshore", in B. Galligan, 0. Hughes and 
C. Walsh (ed), Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 
1991) pp 109-128; R. Kenchington, Managing Marine Environments (Taylor & Francis, New 
York, 1990); D. Rothwell, "The Legal Framework for Ocean and Coastal Management in 
Australia" (1996) 33 Ocean and Coastal Management 41-61. 
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Commonwealth retained for itself the capacity to prevail in offshore 
decisions—as acquired pursuant to the Seas and Submerged Lands Act—
while readmitting the states to a substantial role in resources policy and 
administration. As will become apparent, while the Commonwealth 
equivocated in negotiations on some matters of policy—such as fisheries 
management—it vetoed state proposals in respect of other priority areas such 
as the Great Barrier Reef. 
Haward recounts the constant high level interaction between the 
Commonwealth and the states—typically at the prime minister—premier 
level—over the several years following the change of federal government." 
Through multiple political and bureaucratic iterations broad agreement had 
been reached by late 1977 as to the principles of the framework that would 
become the Offshore Constitutional Settlement. At this preliminary stage, the 
mechanisms which would enable enactment of the OCS legislation were first 
canvassed [discussed further in the next section]. As stated, the most urgent 
concern of state governments was to recoup from the Commonwealth 
jurisdiction over the territorial sea. The OCS also established regimes 
wherein state governments would participate in decision making for marine 
resources located in Commonwealth waters beyond. Examples of the latter 
arrangements include the role of states in fisheries, minerals and petroleum • 
regimes . 69 
The most difficult offshore arrangements to be settled were those 
applicable to the fishing sector. Unlike the situation with offshore petroleum, 
" Haward, op cit fn 3 pp 160-178. 
69 A comprehensive description of the OCS agreed arrangements is found in Haward, op cit fn 1. 
It is worth individually highlighting the legislative regime for offshore minerals enacted 
in 1981 as part of the OCS. The Minerals (Submerged Lands) Act 1981 (Cth) was passed by 
the Commonwealth Parliament without difficulty, based heavily upon the P(SL)A. 
However, the legislation was not proclaimed and did not come into force for another ten 
years. The M(SL)A was repealed and replaced with new laws in 1994 as part of the 
Commonwealth's response to the entry into force of the Law of the Sea Convention [see 
Chapter Five]. 
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where activity was limited to just two adjacent states, all state governmemts 
had interests in managing commercial fisheries, the precise situation that had 
occurred 30 years earlier. This diversity of state interests in respect of fisheries 
frustrated the conclusion of OCS fishery arrangements, a topic returned to in 
Chapter Five." 
The state governments also insisted that a formal written agreement, the 
OCS document, should accompany the arrangements eventually reached.' 
The reason that states such an agreement stemmed from the persistent delays 
encountered in finalizing agreed arrangements in some sectors, and enacting 
the necessary legislation. While the basis for some of these delays were the 
complicated constitutional issues associated with the offshore framework 
being developed, difficulties were encountered in relation to technical details 
in baseline drawing, and policy matters such as the residual role of the 
Commonwealth after readjustment of inter-governmental functions. 
It was not until the 1979 Premier's Conference that the OCS was finally 
endorsed by heads of government. A comment made by Fraser soon 
thereafter encapsulates not only the essence of the new settlement but the 
various influences upon its form – 
There have been arguments over the last ten, twelve or fourteen years 
that have been difficult for the Liberal Party and for the nation; offshore 
sovereignty and High Court cases which gave authority to the 
Commonwealth. It would have been possible to say to Dick Hamer in 
relation to Bass Strait, or to Sir Charles Court in relation to the North-
West Shelf: 'Well, the Courts have given us sovereignty and we are 
going to exercise it totally. Our Department of National Development 
will move out into the states and you can get out of this area. Is is of no 
concern to you!' This is precisely what the Labor Party has said that they 
will do. But we have set about in a painstaking way to negotiate a set of 
agreements on mining, drilling, fishing and the management of 
resources offshore. We have come to an agreement with all the states- 
" See: Anon., "OCS now extends to five States" (1987) 46 Australian Fisheries 16-17. M. 
Haward, "The Commonwealth in Australian Fisheries Management 1955-1995" (1995) 2 
The Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 313-325. 
The Offshore Constitutional Settlement: A milestone in cooperative federalism. (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1980. 
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Labor and Liberal—in a truly historic set of documents which have 
established agreement. We have done this without having to go to a 
referendum. We have done it without dispute. We have done it in a 
way which establishes a common sense relationship between the 
administration of the states and of the Commonwealth.' 
A few close observers of the offshore saga have remarked that the 
Commonwealth under Fraser was confronted with the reality of assuming 
sole administrative and technical responsibilities over vast offshore areas." 
As recounted in the previous chapter particularly, although federal expertise 
with respect to offshore petroleum had improved over the intervening years 
the Commonwealth was still incapable of assuming exclusive jurisdiction for 
administering the resources of the continental shelf. At the same time, state 
governments were restless to regain offshore identity and capability. It was 
the merging of these two positions, as much as the espoused New Federalism 
policy, that profoundly shaped the final form of the OCS. 
Within the fabric of this national mood, strong support for the OCS 
emanated from a number of influential individuals involved in 
negotiations, at both official and ministerial level. With respect to the former, 
solicitors-general of both spheres of government, and the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General, were especially crucial in translating the 
outcome of OCS negotiations into a coherent legislative framework.' More. 
fundamental to the OCS was the influence of several key ministers, especially 
the premiers of Queensland and Western Australia, those states most 
desperate to readjust offshore relations. The role played by Premiers Court 
n M. Fraser, "The Commonwealth and the States", in D. White and D. Kemp (ed), Malcolm 
Fraser on Australia (Hill of Content, Melbourne, 1981) p 156. 
Evans and Bailey, op cit fn 4; Opeskin and Bothwell, op cit fn 4. 
74 The Minister for Home Affairs was moved to effuse in Parliament that - "I cannot condude 
without expressing particular appreciation of the efforts of the Standing Committee of 
Attorneys-General ... The Standing Committee and its legal advisers have carried out that  
brief with great success, all the mote gratifying in that it was accomplished in a spirit of 
frankness and goodwill. I should also express particular thanks to the Parliamentary 
Counsel concerned for drafting the history-making legislation involved. I also thank officers 
of the Attorney-General's Department who were involved. Hansard, House of 
Representatives, 23 April 1980, p 2171. 
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and Bjelke-Petersen is revealed by the extent and intensity of debate in 
Parliament of the OCS. 
Several key Opposition figures were scathing about the OCS and the state 
governments' ability to shape the new offshore accord. Most notable amongst 
these opponents was then shadow minister for minerals and energy, Paul 
Keating, who like Whitlam before him led the attack on the Coalition's 
offshore policy and went on to become prime minister. During debate on the 
enabling legislation, Keating attacked the prime minister for being persuaded 
by Court and Bjelke-Petersen to return the territorial sea to the states against 
his original undertaking — 
Attempts by the recalcitrant State Premiers, Sir Charles Court and Mr 
Bjelke-Petersen, to overturn or to circumvent the High Court decision 
should have been treated with disdain. The subsequent policy of the 
Commonwealth represents an about-face, particularly by the Prime 
Minister from the position he held in late 1976. 75 
Similar attacks were repeated by the Labor Opposition in the Senate. Peter 
Walsh, later to become resources minister under the subsequent Labor 
Government, accused Fraser of acquiescing to the state premiers — 
Now we find that Mr Fraser has reversed his position. Why would Mr 
Fraser reverse absolutely the position he held three and a half years ago? 
The reason is that he is a coward ... the historical record shows that 
every time a confrontation occurs between Charles Court, Bjelke-
Petersen and the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister caves in.' 
The premiers of Queensland and Western Australia were motivated to 
protect marine policy interests peculiar to their respective states. The priority 
in the case of Western Australia was offshore oil, as it was for Victoria, 
notwithstanding that the latter state was being displaced as the primary 
prospective offshore area. As the only oil-producing states, these 
governments therefore had the most to regain in terms of offshore title and a 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 2531. 
76 Hansard, Senate, 21 May 1980, p 2616. 
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decision making role within the new Commonwealth regimes. The premiers 
of these states were persistent and forceful in OCS negotiations, especially 
Premier Court, who was able to extract a regime tailored to Western Australia 
[more in part 4.3]. On the other hand, because Victoria and Western Australia 
alone had interests in seabed prospectivity these states could not rely upon 
the diversity and unanimity of a state bloc to prevail in negotiations with the 
Commonwealth, as was the case with fisheries management. 
Queensland's issue of concern was jurisdiction over the Great Barrier 
Reef. In his thesis, Haward recounts the Commonwealth's resolve to retain 
intact Whitlam's Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act, in spite of the return to 
the states of jurisdiction offshore to three miles." The Emerald Agreement 
was finally reached in mid-1979, wherein the GBRMP Act would apply 
unchanged to the Great Barrier Reef. The concession to Queensland was the 
creation of a ministerial council—the prefered inter-governmental 
mechanism in Australia—involving the relevant Commonwealth and 
Queensland ministers responsible for setting broad policy. With this 
agreement, the first section of the marine park was proclaimed following the 
drawing of baselines around the reef." 
The Emerald Agreement was not reached without difficulty and cost, 
however. Over the course of several years, Fraser became increasingly 
impatient with Queensland's intransigence to finalize the Great Barrier Reef 
component of the OCS." From the public record, the Commonwealth's 
resolve to retain control over the Great Barrier Reef is unmistakable, a rare 
point on which it was supported by the Labor Opposition." As a result of 
these polarised, resolute views, the relations between the prime minister and 
n Haward, op cit fn 3 pp 180-185. 
78 R. Kenchington, Managing Marine Environments (Taylor & Francis, New York, 1990). 
79 A. Gilpin, The Australian Environment (Sun Books, Melbourne, 1980). 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 April 1980, p 2171; 1 May 1980, pp 2530-2531. 
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Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen became strained to the extent that these 
government leaders often sent senior officials to meetings in their stead." 
Finally, it is important to again note the distinction between Labor's 
attitude in the Commonwealth sphere and the view of Labor state 
governments. While the federal Labor Opposition considered the scheme as 
the wholesale destruction of Whitlam's grand design the two states under 
Labor governments supported the OCS." As with the case of the 1967 
Settlement, this inconsistency between Commonwealth and state Labor views 
was seized upon by the government as both testimony of the credibility of its 
scheme, and to highlight the Opposition's desires of exercising exclusive 
Commonwealth jurisdiction over the offshore. These sentiments were amply 
reflected in the words of the Minister for Science and the Environment — 
The Labor Party has been embarrassed by two State Labor governments 
which have recognised the crass stupidity of the Labor Party's platform, 
and which recognise the fairness and the correctness of this Federal 
Government's approach ...The fact is that the Labor Party's policy is so 
stupid that it has been thoroughly thrown out by two State governments 
of the Labor Party's own political persuasion." 
4.2.2 The Coastal Waters legislation 
The OCS returned jurisdiction over the territorial sea to the states by creating 
for the first time i Commonwealth/state divide three miles offshore. From - 
the aggregation of High Court judgements and extant legislative provisions it 
was recognised that title and power with respect to offshore areas were 
different legal constructs, and could be treated separately without necessarily 
being in conflict. The separation of jurisdiction into two discrete components 
was the avenue seized by the Commonwealth and the states to give effect to 
Haward, op cit fn 3 pp181-182. 
82 Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 April 1980, p 2169; 1 May, p 2582. See: Haward, op cit 
fn 1. 
Hansard, House of Representatives [David Thomson, Minister for Science and the 
Environment], 1 May 1980, p 2529. 
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the OCS. The two elements to the formative framework were therefore 
empowering the states to legislate to a distance three miles offshore, and 
extending their limits over this same area. 
Several avenues through which these two fundamental requirements 
could be met were originally considered, including — 
• amending the SSLA to achieve the policy intention of the OCS; 
• a national referendum under section 128 of the Constitution to vest 
jurisdiction over the territorial sea in the states; 
• constitutionally extending state boundaries three miles offshore 
Es 123]; 
• enacting quitclaim legislation based upon the external affairs power 
Es 51(xcix)]; and 
• legislating pursuant to the request power Es 51(x)ocviii)], the 
mechanism eventually relied upon. 
All governments, state and federal, were reluctant to rely upon a 
constitutional referendum to reverse New South Wales v the 
Commonwealth because of its high likelihood of failure." As discussed 
further below, an important factor in this regard was the federal Labor 
Opposition's continued support for the Seas and Submerged Lands Act, and 
its vow to dismantle the OCS upon re-election to government. The states 
were opposed to simply amending the SSLA because of its vulnerability to. 
future amendment or repeal." To satisy these many demands a legislative 
package consisting of fourteen Commonwealth Acts, as well as supportive 
state legislation, was needed." 
84 Reid, op cit fn 62. 
Haward, op cit fn 3 pp 187-191. 
" In addition to the principal statutes discussed in-text, a number of Commonwealth 
Amendment Acts were passed to give effect to the Offshore Constitutional Settlement and 
create a consistent jurisdictional framework. Legislation amended to this end included Acts 
governing fisheries, navigation, shipwrecks and pipelines, as well as the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Acts. 
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The OCS hinges upon two key statutes known as the Coastal Waters 
legislation. The Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) confers upon 
states extra-territorial legislative powers with respect to their coastal waters, 
which are defined in the Act as being internal waters and the three-mile 
territorial sea adjacent to each state." Whilst the term "coastal waters" 
encapsulates two bodies of water, it was introduced to also enhance the 
association between coastal waters and the adjacent state, thereby obviating 
the international dimension of the territorial sea as embodied in the SSLA." 
The operation of the State Powers Act was importantly limited to three miles 
in the event of the territorial sea being expanded for international purposes." 
At the time of its enactment the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 
engendered considerable academic debate. The Preamble to the Act refers 
unusually to the constitutional head of power upon which it is based. The 
head power in question, section 51(xxxviii) of the Constitution, relates to the 
enactment of legislation by the Commowealth at the request, or with the 
concurrence, of the states. That is, the power to enact federal legislation 
pursuant to this section of the Constitution is driven by the states." 
During negotiations, opinions across all jurisdictions narrowed upon the 
request power for the legal and political reasons outlined above. Officials and 
legislators held very real concerns as to the efficacy of the s 51(xxxviii) 
mechanism, which had hitherto never been used to support legislation." 
Every state Parliament in 1979 nonetheless enacted legislation couched in the 
87 Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) ss 5, 3(1). See, D. Rothwell and M. Haward, 
"Federal and International Perspectives on Australia's Maritime Claims" (1996) 20 Marine 
Policy 29-46. 
88 Cullen, op cit fn 2. 
89 Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) s 4(2). 
9°  The precise wording of s 51(xxxviii) is found in the discussion of the Constitution in Chapter 
Two. 
91  Anon., "Distribution of Offshore Constitutional Responsibilities Between the Commonwealth 
and States" (1979) 53 The Australian Law journal 605-606; Hansard, House of 
Representatives, 23 April 1980, p 2167. 
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terms of the s 51(x)ocviii) head power, requesting the Commonwealth to 
legislate to vest in the states jurisdiction over coastal waters." The intention 
of the State Powers Act is expressed by the Prime Minister during 
Parliamentary debate on the OCS – 
This Bill is one of an historic package of Bills which will be introduced 
today to give legislative effect to the off-shore settlement reached at the 
Premiers Conference in June last year. The implementation of the off-
shore settlement represents a great milestone in Commonwealth-state 
relations ... The present Bill—the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Bill—is 
the cornerstone of the package. It is being introduced in response to 
legislation that has been recently enacted in each of the States requesting 
the passage by the Commonwealth Parliament of such a Bill ... Those 
Bills provide the legal basis for State rights and activities in the off-shore 
area. This is on the basis that the territorial sea is an area best left for 
local jusrisdiction—except on matters of over-riding national or 
international importance." 
The companion statute to the powers legislation is the Coastal Waters (State 
Title) Act 1980 (Cth). The State Title Act appears to be based upon the external 
affairs head of power, relying upon the geographical interpretation of this 
power provided in New South Wales v the Commonwealth." Chapter Two 
introduced the strict formula for altering state boundaries that are spelled out 
in the Constitution. Because of these constitutional limitations the State Title 
Act is constructed so as not to claim adjacent seabeds as state territory. 
Notwithstanding this explicit limitation, there are convincing arguments that 
state boundaries have been extended offshore as a consequence of the State 
Title Act, as canvassed in the following section. 
To avoid attracting these constitutional restrictions, the State Title Act 
vests in states proprietary rights and title over the seabed and water column 
The Western Australian legislation was the Constitutional Powers (Coastal Waters) Act 
which was also prefaced by a lengthy Preamble that attempted to forge a connection 
between the Commonwealth statute, the OCS and the constitutional head of power. Similar 
request legislation appeared in other State Parliaments, thus satisfying the constitutional 
requirements for the Commonwealth to enact the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act. 
93 Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 April 1980, p 2165. 
Crommelirt, op cit fn 2. 
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of coastal waters as if this area was within state boundaries." However, 
granting title over coastal waters without altering the geographical limits of 
states meant that the ability of state parliaments to legislate over these same 
waters was doubtful. The State Powers Act therefore operates to fill the 
possible legal vacuum left by the creation of sovereign title alone under the 
State Title Act. 96 It was the titles legislation that was considered to provide 
certainty to offshore interests, as stated by the Minister for Home Affairs 
during the second reading speech — 
The Bill, when proclaimed to come into force, will vest in each of the 
States proprietary rights and title in respect of land beneath the coastal 
waters adjacent to the State and within the sovereignty of the 
Commonwealth ... the present Bill, by conferring rights of ownership on 
the States, will support the grant of legislative powers to the States in 
the off-shore area and provide an assurance to the States that the 
settlement will have permanency and stability.97 
As the following section shows, the State Title Act ensured that the OCS was 
unable to be reversed, as was intended. 
4.2.3 Altering the OCS legislation 
Second only to the states' endeavours to have returned to them jurisdiction 
over the territorial sea was the requirement that this return should be 
irreversible. Premier Court had explicitly raised this issue at the 1978 
Premiers' Conference." The Labor Opposititon had made clear in Parliament • 
its intention to reclaim Commonwealth jurisdiction over the territorial sea 
when it was elected to office in the future, as it had done in 1973 upon 
election of the Whitlam Government. The OCS would likely have withstood 
a legal assault of this kind because of the complex construction of the new 
settlement. Part of this resilience was due to section 51(xxxviii) of the 
95 Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 (Cth) s 4(1). 
Cullen, op cit fn 18 pp 110-112. 
Hansard, House of Representatives [Robert Ellicott, Minister for Home Affairs], 23 April 
1980, p 2171. 
" Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 2526. 
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Constitution, the head of power upon which the Coastal Waters (State 
Powers) Act was enacted. 
As mentioned, prior to passage of the State Powers Act this head of power 
had never before been used by the Commonwealth to enact legislation." It 
was accepted by the Commonwealth that in the event of a court challenge this 
untried Constitutional power might not uphold every provision of the State 
Powers Act.' °° Nonetheless, this approach was preferable to the doubtful 
prospect of a constitutional referendum succeeding, the other likely form 
ofrecourse for the return to states of coastal waters. 101 The Coalition 
Government's refusal to seek popular endorsement of the OCS through a 
referendum was one of several matters that most offended Labor, especially 
given the radical redefining of Commonwealth and state offshore jurisdiction 
that this achieved. As the shadow Attorney-General, Lionel Bowen, stated — 
That is the reason why this Government is so anxious to put this 
legislation through; not in the national interest, but on the basis that we 
would have a de facto alteration of the Constitution without consulting 
the people of Australia ... There is no right or propriety to think that this 
Government will alter the Constitution of Australia on the basis that 
this is a request from Sir Charles Court ...This is an attempt to bind a 
future Labor government without any reference to the Australian 
people.'' 
Legal commentarities echoed these doubts as to the method of legislating, that 
is, relying upon the request head of power rather than seeking public 
" Section 51(xviii) of the Constitution has only been used once since the Coastal Waters (State 
Powers) Act, in equally unusual circumstances. The head power was used to enact the 
Australia Act 1986 (Cth) which was part of a three-way legislative arrangement involving 
the U.K. Parliament, the Commonwealth and the Australian states, the purpose of which 
was to effectively sever all pre-federation legal ties with Great Britain. 
100 Anon., "Distribution of Offshore Constitutional Responsibilities Between the 
Commonwealth and States" (1979) 53 The Australian Law Journal 605-606. 
M. Croirunelin, "Petroleum (Sumberged Lands) Act: The Nature and Security of Offshore 
Titles" (1979) 2 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Journal 135-159; R. Cullen, Federalism 
in Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Disputes (The Federation Press, Sydney, 
1990). 
102 Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, 2536-7. 
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endorsement through a referendum. An editorial written at the time opined 
that — 
... with all due respest to the Government and to the Attorney-General, 
the reliance on s. 51, pl. (xxxviii) of the Constitution for the validity of 
certain of the Acts seems to be something of a gamble, for quaere 
whether s. 51, pl. (xxxviii) was intended to confer powers of so far 
reaching a nature as to bring about a radical restructuring of 
Commonwealth and State constitutional responsibilities, without 
recourse to the power of amendment of the Constitution conferred by s 
128." 
Clearly, there were serious doubts clouding enactment of the legislation. In 
order to undo the OCS, moreover, the Commonwealth had to consider 
whether the State Powers Act could be repealed without state request 
legislation under section 51(xxxviii) of the Constitution. It is possible that 
because the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act finds its origin in extraordinary 
state legislation, then similar legislative action by the states is needed to 
repeal the Act. 1" The counter argument is that once enacted, the State Powers 
Act is no different to any Commonwealth law and is subject to normal 
parliamentary processes of amendment.' To be sure, any statute that is 
beyond the power of the legislature to deal with subsequent to enactment is a 
legislative peculiarity. 1" The State Powers Act is an unusual statute, of course. 
On balance, it seems that the ambit of the s 51(xxxviii) head of power is 
clarified by its emphasis on the requirement for state request legislation. 
Without the necessary state requests, it is possible that the Commonwealth 
has no constitutional source upon which to base repeal of the Coastal Waters 
(State Powers) Act because the authority to legislate was exhausted with 
passage of the original statute. 
'Anon., op cit fn 91 p 518. 
Croxrunelin, op cit fn 2; Cullen, op cit fn 2. 
105 Hansard, Senate 21 May 1980, pp 2612-13. See: Cullen, op cit fn 18 pp 112-116. 
Crommelin, op cit fn 101. 
Chapter Four 	 177  
In addition to the question of repealing the State Powers Act, the Labor 
Opposition also contemplated the validity of the statute. The essence of this 
argument is that s 51(xcxviii) may be relied upon to enact legislation at the 
request of the states in relation "to the exercise within the Commonwealth of 
the power in question". As has been seen, a series of successive High Court 
judgements had determined unequivocally that offshore waters were outside 
the boundaries of the Commonwealth. The Coastal Powers Act therefore 
applied to waters that were not within the limits of the Commonwealth but 
in respect of which legislation could be enacted to operate with extra-
territorial application. Gareth Evans, an Opposition senator who was to 
become attorney-general under the next Labor Government, rejected the 
validity of the legislation on the ground that s 51(x)ocviii) could only be used 
to support legislation enacted within the Commonwealth – 
... I suggest that it is very difficult indeed to argue that this is to be 
regarded as an exercise of power within the Commonwealth, under the 
proper meaning of section 51 (=Mil). In any challenge to this 
legislation-4 can assure the Government that such a challenge can be 
expected, certainly if Labor returns to power federally—it will certainly 
be argued that the legislation is unconstitutional on that ground 
alone.'" 
The legal and constitutional situation with respect to the Coastal Waters 
(State Title) Act is less arcane as this statute is not sourced in the same • 
extraordinary state request legislation. The issue here is generally not so 
much the Commonwealth's ability to repeal the statute than it is the 
compensation that may be payable as a result thereof. In other words, 
repealing the State Title Act may amount to an acquisition of property by the 
Commonwealth, thereby entitling states to compensation on just terms as 
specified in s 51(vod) of the Constitution.' 
1' Hansard, Senate, 21 May 1980, p 2610. See also: House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 
2527. 
"8 Cullen, op cit fn 18 pp 119-122. 
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Less clear, though, is what "just terms" implies with respect to acquisition 
of the states' coastal waters. Monetary compensation for the loss of coastal 
waters could be staggering if just terms equated to the economic value of 
resources located within state waters around the Australian coastline, if this 
value could even be imputed. The opposite position has also been suggested. 
That is, because states only acquired rights over coastal waters under the State 
Title Act repealing this statute would not result in any loss requiring 
compensatory action by the Commonwealth. 109 Another scenario involves 
the alienation by the state of any title over coastal waters granted pursuant to 
the State Title Act, the situation that arises whereby state governments award 
to a developer title over a portion of state waters. The subsequent 
reacquisition of those waters by the Commonwealth would render the latter 
liable to pay just terms compensation to the title holder, regardless of any 
liability payable to the state as argued above.'" 
For these constitutional reasons, the vesting in states of proprietary rights 
and title to the seabed under the State Titles Act was considered to render the 
OCS irreversible, a result Labor found "particularly objectionable". "' 
Rothwell and Haward concur in noting that the grant of title to the states 
represents probably the most irreversible part of the Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement.' It is therefore somewhat surprising that the head of power -
upon which the titles legislation is enacted is left unclear. During 
Parliamentary debates, the relevant provision was suggested to be the external 
affairs power, or even the "emerging concept of inherent powers associated 
with the Commonwealth status as a sovereign national entity. 11113 
Hansard, Senate 21 May 1980 p 2613; Cullen, op cit fn 2. 
11° Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 2527. See also: Reid, op cit fn 62. 
" 1 Hansard, Senate, 21 May 1980, p 2611. 
Rothwell and Haward, op cit fn 87. 
113 Hansard, Senate, 21 May 1980, p 2611. 
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The absence of an identified head of power generated a final legal issue 
relating to the State Titles Act namely the ability of the Commonwealth to 
divest itself of title over the territorial sea. Labor Senator Evans—who proved 
himself to be a most learned and skillful protagonist of the OCS legislation—
explained the problem in the following terms – 
The basic threshold question here is: Does the Commonwealth have a 
proprietary right to the seabed of a kind that it can now give away 
because the seabed is not part of the Commonwealth itself? ... It is a 
matter of argument—I put it no higher than this—rather than a matter 
of assertion or a matter of assumption whether the Commonwealth has 
the authority to engage in the kind of proprietary divestiture which is 
purported to be accomplished here.'" 
Quite simply, the complexity of the bipolar OCS potentially exposed the 
Commonwealth and developers to a new array of unasked legal questions. 
4.2.4 The OCS in review 
The OCS was obviously very complex—perhaps necessarily so—because it 
had to satisfy so many legal and political considerations. Its design also reflects 
the requirement that no government alone could dismantle the new 
jurisdictional settlement.' Even so, doubts persisted regarding the durability 
of the accord." 6 The OCS framework was described at the time as being only 
another chapter in the struggle for control of offshore resources."' Comment 
on the OCS has tended to focus upon highly specialized questions of law, and - 
messages as to the legislation's efficacy are mixed. On the one hand, the 
Commonwealth was willing to return to the states jurisdiction over the 
territorial sea, and encouraged these governments to participate in offshore 
114 Hansard, Senate, 21 May 1980, p 2611. 
115 Cullen, op cit fn 2. 
116 K. Orchison, "Petroleum Exploration Offshore", in Australia's Maritime Horizons in the 
1980s (Occasional Papers in Maritime Studies, Australian Centre for Maritime Studies, 
Canberra, 1982) pp 66-71. 
117 R. Argyle, "Governmental Powers Over Petroleum Recovery Rates-Offshore Western 
Australia" (1983) 15 The University of Western Australia Law Review 14-32; Reid, op cit fn 
62. 
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resource regimes located in Commonwealth waters beyond.' However, 
Fraser was initially determined not to cede jurisdiction, and appears to have 
done so on well defined terms, preserving to the Commonwealth superiority 
in matters of national significance.' A number of provisions of the Coastal 
Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) illustrate this point. 
Firstly, the State Powers Act stated that the law-making capabilities given 
thereby to states were not to be exercised inconsistently with any 
Commonwealth law, a provision resting on the federal supremacy clause of 
the Constitution Es 109]." The inclusion of this provision ensured that the 
Commonwealth's capabilities to legislate with respect to the territorial sea 
were not hindered by the OCS. No other powers arrangements would be 
altered, and in all respects normal Commonwealth paramountcy applied 
regardless of state legislative capabilities over coastal waters granted by the 
State Powers Act.' 
The Commonwealth's paramount position is also supported by 
amendments to the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth). In order for 
the jurisdictional arrangements of the OCS to be implemented, some change 
to the Seas and Submerged Lands Act was needed to dispose of the legal 
difficulties presented by New South Wales v the Commonwealth. When 
enacted in 1973, the Seas and Submerged Lands Act preserved as effective all 
state laws except for those that dealt with offshore sovereignty and sovereign 
rights over resources, which were by declaratory assertion vested in the 
Commonwealth.'" 
118 Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 2537. 
Haward, op cit fn 1; Haward and Smith, op cit fn 8. 
12° Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) s 7(c). 
121 Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 2167. 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) s 16(1)(b) read, in part "The preceding provision of 
the Part do not limit or exclude the operation of any law of a State ... except in so far as the 
law is expressed to vest or make exercisable any sovereignty or sovereign rights ...'. 
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To give effect to the OCS, the SSLA was amended awkwardly to declare 
that state legislation passed under the framework created by the Coastal 
Waters (State Powers) Act was not to be treated as invalid under the former 
statute.' As was mentioned earlier, Fraser originally favoured amending the 
SSLA in this fashion to underpin the OCS, until state premiers insisted that a 
more permanent basis be emplaced. In strictly legal terms, the situation 
presented by the amended SSLA is highly confusing.124 More importantly, the 
construction of this legislation implies that rather than surrendering to states 
sovereignty over the territorial sea, the Commonwealth retains jurisdiction 
which it chooses not to exercise. 125 
A final point of the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act relating to the 
paramount role of the Commonwealth is found in its international 
dimension. At the time that the OCS was being formalized, the international 
community was contemplating approving twelve mile territorial seas 
through the treaty being negotiated at UNCLOS III. As discussed earlier, the 
Commonwealth was purposeful in keeping the two policy developments 
separate, notwithstanding the significant domestic implications of the LOS 
Convention. So successful was this approach that parliamentary debates on 
the OCS scarcely referred to Law of the Sea policy. 126 Moreover, the State 
Powers Act expressly limited the breadth of the Australian territorial sea to - 
three miles for the purposes of domestic jurisdiction, even in the event of the 
breadth being expanded to twelve miles for international purposes.127 The 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) s 16(2) reads, in part "A law of a State ... shall not 
be taken to be within the words of exception in paragraph (b) of sub-section (1) if the law is 
otherwise within powers with respect to particular matters that are conferred on the 
legislature of the State ... by the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 ...". 
1" Crommelin, op cit fn 2. 
G. Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (Butterworths, Sydney, 1992); R. Hildreth, 
"Managing Ocean Resources: New Zealand and Australia" (1991) 6 International Journal of 
Estuarine and Coastal Law 89-126. 
126 Hansard, Senate, 21 May 1980, p 2612. 
127 Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) s 4(2). See: H. Burmester, "Australia and the 
Law of the Sea", in J. Crawford and D. Rothwell (ed), The Law of the Sea in the Asia 
Pacific Region (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995) pp 51-64. 
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Commonwealth was clearly reluctant to allow the anticipated additional area 
of coastal waters to accrue to the states. 1" Opeslcin and Rothwell comment 
that – 
This provision (of the Coastal Wates (State Powers) Act) clearly 
contemplated a future extension of Australia's territorial sea and sought 
to avoid the expansion of state legislative jurisdiction beyond 3 miles in 
that event. 1" 
Several provisions of the Coastal Waters (State Title) Act reinforce the 
observation that the Commonwealth returned offshore jurisdiction to the 
states selectively. The long title of the State Titles Act acknowledges that 
coastal waters are within Commonwealth sovereignty, a provision that 
would appear to complement the amended SSLA. 1" More significantly, title 
over the Great Barrier Reef—the subject of protracted dispute between 
Queensland and the Commonwealth—remained with the Commonwealth 
in spite of the return to states of the three-mile territorial sea. 131 The New 
Federalism policy continued to apply to environmental protection more 
generally, however, and the other environmental statutes enacted by the 
Whitlam Government were amended to remove much of their potential 
application to areas of state decision making. 132 The obligations placed upon 
government authorities still affected by these environmental laws—
Commonwealth agencies, basically—were also diluted from the original-
enacted versions. The net effect of these amendments was the 
1213 Herr and Davis, op cit fn 13. 
Opeskin and Rothwell, op cit fn 4 p 409. 
1" Ibid. 
131 Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 (Cth) s 4(3) declared that rights and title created 
pursuant to the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth) continued to operate 
unaffected by the OCS legislation, preserving to the Commonwealth effective ownership of 
the reef region. See: Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 April 1980, p 2171. J. Prescott, op 
cit fn 49. 
132  Boardman, op cit in 63; M. Crommelin, "Commonwealth Involvement in Environment Policy: 
Past, Present and Future" (1987) 4 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 101-112. 
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Commonwealth's continued control over the Great Barrier Reef matched by a 
more general withdrawal from environmental policy matters.' 
Another point to arise from the State Title Act concerns the establishment 
of straight baselines around Australia.' The drawing of baselines to form the 
inner limit of the territorial sea is very important in apportioning offshore 
areas in both the national and international sense. The further seaward that 
these baselines are drawn the greater is the area of sea that falls under state 
jurisdiction."' By drawing baselines far from the coastline, however, the 
Commonwealth risks incurring the opprobrium of the international 
community. 
The LOS Convention being concluded in concert with the OCS updated 
the formula for baseline drawing contained in the 1958 Territorial Sea 
Convention. There were two notable departures between the two treaties, 
though, which assisted the Commonwealth with its offshore claims. The 1982 
Convention dropped the earlier requirement restricting the drawing of 
straight baselines to low-tide elevations only where permanent installations 
had been erected. Also dropped was the older criterion requiring that baseline 
determinations include an "economic interest peculiar to the region 
Several examples illustrate the strength of the OCS and the Commonwealth's refusal to 
prevail over state legislation with respect to the marine environment [other than the Great 
Barrier Reef]. Firstly, in 1980 the Commonwealth acted to ban whaling by enacting the 
Whale Protection Act 1980 (Cth) but did not apply this legislation to the narrow strip of 
state coastal waters. Similarly, the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 (Cth) 
enacted in sympathy with the attention being given to the offshore applied to state coastal 
waters only if the Commonwealth is satisfied that the states themselves have not 
legislated to cover this field. The Commonwealth also refused to intrude upon state coastal 
management even though the opportunity arose to link developments in this area with 
marine policy initiatives being progressed under the OCS. See: R. Hildreth, op cit fn 125. 
The principle of straight baselines departs from the custom where low water mark equates 
with the territorial sea baseline. This principle allows straight baselines to be drawn across 
heavily indented coastlines, thereby enclosing gulfs, bays and island chains within the 
boundaries of coastal States. 
US Prescott, op cit fn 49. 
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concerned, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a 
long usage"!" 
Relying upon these provisions emerging under the LOSC umbrella, 
boundaries were finally closed around Australia in early 1983 thereby 
bringing the OCS into effect [discussed further in Chapter Five]. Prescott 
observes that while state governments had not unduly delayed the 
finalisation of baselines, progress had been rather slower than was anticipated 
by the Commonwealth!' Although generally of little economic relevance, 
the importance of baseline coordinates was amplified in the case of the highly 
prospective north west shelf of Western Australia. In this region, tidal flows 
range to a depth of nine metres with a linear distance of several miles. 
Parliamentarians and commentators alike recognised that claims over 
offshore deposits were thus dependent upon the precise location of 
baselines!' In the event, the baselines adopted by the Commonwealth were 
drawn very modestly compared with those permissible under international 
law!" The resolution reached in terms of baseline drawing is perfectly 
captured by Burmester - 
In a federal State like Australia there are always tensions between State 
Governments, which have an interest for their own jurisdictional 
purposes in an expansive view of baseline entitlements, and the 
national Government, which has an interest in not making excessive 
claims from an international law point of view. The 1983 baselines 
136 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Continguous Zone, Arts 4(3) and (4), respectively. See, 
D. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
London, 1987). 
Prescott, op cit fn 24. 
Delays in the drawing of straight baselines postponed the declaration of marine parks on the 
east and west coasts of Australia. The Commonwealth and Queensland disputed the western 
boundary of the first section of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, thereby strengthening 
the Commonwealth's resolve to retain control over the reef. On the west coast, proposals to 
declare Ningaloo Marine Park were held in abeyance several years until baselines were 
drawn and the inner boundaries of state and Commonwealth waters settled. Hansard, 
Senate, 21 May 1980, p 2604; Prescott, op cit fn 49; Report of the Ningaloo Marine Park 
Working Group, National Parks Authority, 1983; Reid, op cit fn 62. 
Opeskin and Rothwell, op cit fn 4 p 409. 
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represent a compromise in this regard between the desires of the State 
and Commonwealth Governments.' 40 
4.3 THE OFFSHORE PETROLEUM REGIME UNDER THE OCS 
4.3.1 Outline of the scheme 
The approach to petroleum development under the OCS retained a strong 
sense of Commonwealth/state cooperation in offshore exploration and 
production. However, substantial modifications were needed to give effect to 
the OCS. The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) was amended to 
agree with the coastal waters legislation; that is, to apply seaward of the 
territorial sea out to the edge of the continental shelf as defined in the 1958 
Convention, which remained appended to the P(SL)A. State legislation was 
repealed and replaced with new statutes of the same name which applied 
between the coastline and the limit of coastal waters. The amended 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts therefore created a mirror legislative 
regime because the identical state and Commonwealth statutes were now 
complementary rather than overlapping, thereby creating a consistent 
regulatory regime across the waters of both jurisdictions. Section 150 of the 
Commonwealth P(SL)A, included in 1967 to allow the two statutes to operate 
in parallel, was repealed to ensure that each statute operated to the exclusion 
of the other within their respective areas of application. 141 
The evolution of the offshore petroleum regime ensured that the states 
retained a significant decision—making role under the OCS, even though the 
waters under their jurisdiction were insignificant compared with the 
situation that existed before 1973. Indeed, the resolution of the offshore 
petroleum regime may well have driven the whole °CS."' At the same time, 
Burmester, op cit fn 42 p . 
141 Cullen, op cit fn 2. 
Herr and Davis, op cit fn 13. 
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the admission of the states to a offshore role recognised that exclusive 
Commonwealth control of the continental shelf was unrealistic. The 
legitimacy of state governments in offshore petroleum policy is reflected in 
the substantial roles they were given under the updated regime. 
State ministers were vested with three separate positions under the OCS 
petroleum arrangements, the most easily understood being that filled within 
state waters. Relevant state ministers were empowered under the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Acts of the states to regulate petroleum development in 
their respective coastal waters, which are defined in terms consistent with the 
definition adopted in the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act."' Broadly, these 
powers relate to the grant, renewal and variation of statutory instruments to 
explore for and produce petroleum in coastal waters. The state's jurisdiction 
to develop offshore resources within three miles of the coast is essentially 
exclusive, subject to the paramountcy of Commonwealth law as enshrined in 
the State Powers Act. 
Further offshore in Commonwealth waters the P(SL)A regime is more 
intriguing and complicated than the state regime located in coastal waters. 
Reviewing the Commonwealth's component of the offshore petroleum 
regime suggests of the continuing strength of the states' in offshore 
petroleum development. The amended Commonwealth Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act establishes two functionaries in relation to each of the 
seven adjacent areas—that is, the continental shelf adjacent to each 
Australian state—charged with policy making and administration of the 
regime. These functionaries are termed respectively the joint and designated 
authorities. 
In the case of Western Australia, the statute was the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 
(WA). 
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The peak decision-making body is the joint authority, a two-person 
authority comprising the Commonwealth and relevant state minister.'" The 
joint authority is vested with vital functions relating to the initial award and 
renewal of petroleum instruments, equivalent to those available to the state 
minister under the mirror Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts in coastal 
waters.' 45  In the event of disagreement between the joint authority members 
regarding development approvals, the Commonwealth's decision prevails, a 
provision that reflects the dominant—and indeed, exclusive—role that the 
Commonwealth could insist upon as a matter of law. 1" Through the joint 
authority the states therefore contribute directly to petroleum decision 
making in a manner which ignores the strict constitutional circumstances of 
offshore jurisdiction. 
The third role filled by state ministers is that of designated authority, 
continued under the Commonwealth Act but modified from its antecedent 
form begun in 1967. In the previous regime, the designated authority was the 
only decision maker offshore, exercising both state and Commonwealth 
powers in respect of each adjacent area. The designated authority was 
continued by the OCS-amended Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) 
although with reduced powers and functions, the bulk of these having been 
transferred to the joint authority.'47  The role of the designated authority was • 
revised to be concerned with more routine aspects supportive of petroleum 
recovery from the continental shelf, rather than with policy decisions 
pertaining to the award of insrtuments. To this end, the Commonwealth 
P(SL)A assigned to the designated authority a range of powers including those 
relating to the advertisment of blocks; renewal of exploration permits; 
1" Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) s 8. 
J. Forbes and A. Lang, Australian Mining and Petroleum Laws (Butterworths, Sydney, 1987). 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) s 8(D)(3). See: Bothwell and Haward, op cit fn 
87. 
147 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) s 14. 
Figure 4. Commonwealth-state offshore petroleum arrangements 1982 
Commonwealth, 
P(SL)A 
State P(SL)A 
adrninistered : by/COmerionwealtehkstateb 
administe 
3 mdes 
200 miles or continental shelf (whichever is fuithest) 
continental shelf 
dministgiedbildkk4fted 
Chapter Four 	 188 
application for production licences; and carrying out of works.'" Figure Three 
depicts the sharing of Commonwealth and state powers in the OCS-amended 
petroleum regime. 
4.3.2 State participation in the P(SL)A 
The intention and purpose of the P(SL)A amendments were amply conveyed 
by the prime miniMer during the second reading speech for the OCS statutes – - 
Perhaps the most important of these is the Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Amendment Bill which is designed to give effect to revised 
arrangements for the administration of off-shore petroleum mining 
outside the territorial sea. Day-to-day administration will continue to be 
in the hands of the designated authority appointed for the adjacent area 
of each State—that is, the State Minister. But, as a new step, a statutory 
joint authority is to be established for each adjacent area consisting of 
the Commonwealth Minister and the State Minister, to deal with major 
matters arising under the legislation. In the event of disagreement, the 
views of the Commonwealth are to prevail. Off-shore petroleum 
mining inside the outer limits of the territorial sea is to be the 
responsibility of the States alone ...The new arrangements will ensure 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) ss 20(2), 31(5), 39A(5)(b) & 40(4)(b), s57(4), 
respectively. 
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that national interest in off-shore petroleum activities can be asserted 
while retaining the valuable role that the States currently play." 9 
The Coalition Government was patently committed to enacting legislation 
which would preserve the capacities of the states in administering the 
Commonwealth's offshore petroleum regime, but wherein the latter could 
ultimately prevail. Put in terms of the High Court's decision in the Seas and 
Submerged Lands case, the involvement of the state governments in the 
Commonwealth's P(SL)A regime is remarkable. Notwithstanding the inter-
governmental support for the new arrangements, the Labor Opposition 
rejected the sectoral arrangements for offshore petroleum, as it had done with 
the OCS generally. 
Labor's hostility towards the OCS stemmed in part from the rejection 
contained therein of the offshore policy first articulated by Whitlam and 
implemented through the SSLA. The Labor Party strongly propounded the 
view that the P(SL)A should be administered by the Commonwealth to the 
exclusion of the states. Bill Hayden, the leader of the Opposition, noted that it 
would be extremely difficult to develop a national energy policy for Australia 
under the P(SL)A, a Labor directive dating from Whitlam's efforts in the early 
1970s. To this end, then shadow spokesperson on resources and later prime 
minister, Paul Keating berated in Parliament - 
We are not at issue with the questions of the States having control over 
ports, estuaries, harbours, and some fishing rights. That is not at issue. 
The thing at issue is simply this: who runs oil in Australia offshore, the 
Commonwealth or the State Ministers for Mines?'" 
4.3.2.1 Joint and designated authority powers 
The most important apparent role of the states in offshore petroleum policy 
was to be realized acting as a member of the joint authority. 151 The Minister 
149 Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 April 1980, p 2168. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 2537. 
151 Saunders and Wiltshire, op cit fn 11. 
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for Trade and Resources, Doug Anthony, summarised the role of the joint 
authority during the second reading speech — 
... the joint authorities would be responsible for: major matters relating 
to titles (granting or refusal, renewal, transfer, farm-ins et cetera), 
determining conditions of titles including work and expenditure, 
directions of a permanent or standing nature ... Schedule 1 lists those 
sections of the principal Act which require a decision by the joint 
authority. In schedule 5, clause 59 of the Bill are listed those sections of 
the principal Act which the Commonwealth Minister, at his discretion, 
may refer to the joint authority for a decision. As I mentioned earlier, 
these are the important decisions which have a significant bearing on 
the overall implementation of the legislation.' 
Notwithstanding the enthusiasm given by the Commonwealth to the joint 
authority model, Haward remarks that the states were reluctant to enter into 
a joint authority arrangement whereinunder they would be compelled to 
yield to the Commonwealth.' In consequence, the influence of the 
designated authority became elevated over its original intended role through 
the discretion given to this functional position, as enhanced by imprecision 
in drafting the designated authority's powers and functions. 
A point of particular concern was the power of the designated authority to 
order the rate of petroleum production to be varied. Powers with respect to 
variation in recovery rates are found in s 58 of the P(SL)A, "Directions as to 
recovery of petroleum". Analyses of designated authority powers concentrate - 
on the extent of the state ministers' capability to direct title holders to alter 
their work practices under this section. The joint authority was clearly the 
body empowered to order the recovery of recoverable petroleum not being 
produced by a licence holder.' However, the situation with respect to 
altering the rate at which petroleum is being recovered was confused by the 
152 Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 2173. 
153 Haward, op cit fn 1. 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) s 58(1). 
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fact of this latter power residing with the designated rather than the joint 
authority.' 
Argyle argues that because the designated authority was vested with 
administrative or routine responsibilities, any decision by the state minister 
to alter production was limited to the circumstances of that individual 
licence.' At the same time, the construction of the P(SL)A meant that the 
Commonwealth was unable to influence the designated authority's 
deliberations to alter production rates, creating uncertainty as to the role of 
the two authorities in setting and administering offshore petroleum policy. 
Schedule 5 to the P(SL)A listed a range of functions that were referable to the 
joint authority at the discretion of the Commonwealth minister, to provide 
the latter with the opportunity to review decisions made by the states. 
However, varying the rate of production was not one of these identified 
functions. Reid identified similar difficulties in relation to regulating, making 
permanent directions, and other Commonwealth responsibilities, including 
determining royalties.' As Chapter Five shows, the Commonwealth soon 
thereafter amended the P(SL)A to clarify some of these ambiguities, to ensure 
that it could prevail in continental shelf policy. 
4.3.2.2 The Schedule 4 agreement with Western Australia 
OCS-amendments to the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act singled out 
Western Australia for preferential treatment compared with other states. The 
form of this treatment was an Agreement entered into between Western 
Australia and the Commonwealth, applicable only to Commonwealth waters 
adjacent to that state." The Agreement was principally an elaborate 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) s 58(3). 
Argyle, op cit fn 117. 
Reid, op cit fn 62. 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) Schedule 4 Agreement between the Government 
of the Commonwealth and the Government of Western Australia relating to legislation in 
respect of offshore petroleum resources. 
Chapter Four 	 192  
mechanism to prevent the Commonwealth from prevailing in joint 
authority decisions in respect of waters adjacent to Western Australia, except 
if the decision endangered or was prejudicial to the national interest [a 
concept discussed briefly further below]. 1" 
In the exceptional situation of national interest, the Agreement required 
that an attempt had first to be made between the premier and prime minister 
to resolve differences, elevating the decision from the level of minister as 
ordinarily applied in the case of joint authority decision making. 160 Upon 
fulfilment of protracted procedural requirements, the prime minister could 
finally prevail if a resolution between the Commonwealth and state leaders 
could not be reached. In other words, the Commonwealth could only prevail 
in relation to Western Australian continental shelf decisions if the matter 
jeopardized the national interest, and even then a lengthy prime ministerial 
decision had to be made. The Agreement was codified as a Schedule to the 
Commonwealth P(SL)A and thereby given the force of law, unlike the 
Agreement under the 1967 Settlement. 161 Argyle expresses the legal situation 
offshore Western Australia thus — 
Absent prejudice to the national interest, the views of the Western 
Australian State Minister may ultimately prevail in decisions of the 
joint authority. 162 
Part of the negotiating position Western Australia assumed vis-a-vis the 
Commonwealth in the late 1970s was attributable to the personal strength of 
the state Liberal Coalition premier, Charles Court. 163 Court's influence was 
identified as shaping the new P(SL)A regime as significantly as Henry Bolte 
had done ten years earlier in the case of Bass Strait off Victoria. 164 A second 
Saunders and Wiltshire, op cit fn 11. 
' Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) Schedule 4 c 2. 
161 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) s 8D(9), Schedule 4. 
'Argyle, op cit fn p 17. 
163 See, Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 April 1980, pp 2525, 2551, 2553; Senate 21 May 
1980, p 2605. 
164 Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 2531. 
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factor underpining the Schedule 4 Agreement was geographical in nature. In 
Parliament, the "remoteness and other special circumstances" of Western 
Australia were held to justify the Commonwealth entering into 
arrangements peculiar to this state.' As stated earlier, the emerging viability 
of the north west shelf oilfields and their very great distance from Canberra 
ensured that Western Australia was able to insist upon favourable terms 
during OCS negotiations.' Stevenson noted the undeniable importance of 
state governments in resources policy at the time — 
... the state level of government has acquired vitally important 
economic functions and responsibilities. State departments of mines 
have become the primary focus of dealings with the public sector for 
some of the most important firms in the Australian economy. State 
capitals, especially Brisbane and Perth, have become places where 
important decisions are made to a far greater extent than they were in 
the early 1960s ... Their control over mining leases and exploration 
permits give them influence and power that cannot be ignored by the 
private sector, by the federal government, or by Australia's trading 
partners overseas. 167 
Predictably, the Schedule 4 Agreement was lamented by the Labor Opposition 
as "one of the worst sell-outs" of the OCS because it denied the 
Commonwealth from exercising a veto over Western Australia.' As with 
'65 Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 April 1980, p 2173. 
Lingering doubts concerning state legislative power over coastal waters prompted most states -
to pass legislation to extend explicitly their law-making capability to the three-mile 
territorial sea. Western Australia was one of the states to so legislate by enacting the 
Offshore (Application of Laws) Act in 1982. Two remarks perhaps explain why the states—
and Western Australia in particular—should take this precautionary legislative action. 
One reason relates to latent concerns harboured by states over the reliability of offshore 
jurisdictional arrangements. Not reassured by the preceding years of jurisdictional 
uncertainty, states acted decisively to put beyond doubt as best they could their assertion of 
general extra-territorial legislative competence. Secondly, frontier hydrocarbon areas 
opening up on the north west coastal area of Western Australia motivated the state to put 
beyond doubt its capacity to exercise jurisdiction over coastal waters. The Offshore 
(Application of Laws) Act 1982 (WA) was the state's attempt to secure a valid claim to the 
lucrative deposits that were lying offshore in its coastal waters. It is likely also that 
Western Australia was using this approach as a lever to extend its reach to Commonwealth 
waters. That is, an assertive claim over state coastal waters assured the state of 
participating in the development of petroleum deposits located further offshore on the 
contintental shelf. 
1 ' G. Stevenson, Mineral Resources and Australian Federalism (Centre for Research on Federal 
Financial Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1976), p 86. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 2551. 
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the role of the designated authority, the Agreement was swiftly dismantled by 
the Labor Government upon its return to office [Chapter Five]. 
4.3.2.3 Commonwealth relations with industry 
It is informative to observe the waning influence of the oil industry on the 
form of the P(SL)A. During OCS negotiations, three matters of especial 
concern were raised by the offshore petroleum industry: the non-
reviewability of designated authority decisions under the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) [a concern first raised by the 1971 
Senate Select Committee]; the question of whether offshore petroleum titles 
constituted a proprietary interest that were recompensable in the event of 
their resumption; and the inclusion of s 103A which enabled the suspension 
or cancellation of titles in pursuit of the national interest.' 
Most of the above concerns were ignored by the Commonwealth in its 
amendments to the P(SL)A. Indeed, the Commonwealth was urged in 
Parliament to legislate assertively to secure offshore resources from 
exploitative development by industry conglomerates.'" Those concessions 
which the oil industry was able to achieve in 1980 are attributable more to the 
Department for National Development arguing for their inclusion in the 
amending legislation than to the efforts of APEA or AMIC, let alone. 
individual companies. Reid describes the waning influence of the oil industry 
in these terms — 
At the industry level, the Australian Petroleum Exploration Association 
lodged a submission on 30 November 1977 with the Commonwealth 
Department for Natural Resources in which it proposed certain 
amendments to the existing Petroleum Submerged Lands Act based o n • 
nine years' experience of operations under that legislation. Subsequent 
attempts by industry representatives to ascertain further details on the 
progress of the negotiations were resisted by both Commonwealth and 
169 Reid, op cit fn 62; Argyle, op cit fn 117. 
'Hansard, Senate, 21 May 1980, p 2605. 
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State officials with the explanation that "the issue was too sensitive 
politically. u171 
This situation contrasts to that existing just ten years earlier when offshore 
operators were seen to have largely prevailed in their interactions with both 
spheres of government. During the next evolutionary phase of the offshore 
petroleum regime, the oil industry is seen to have become further 
marginalised in terms of its ability to influence Commonwealth resources 
policy. Whilst the relationship between industry and government is partly 
found in the persuasion and philosophy of the party in power, the 
Commonwealth has clearly become more assertive in dealing with the 
influential oil industry, and very much determines the pace and direction of 
offshore activity, as well as maintaining the regulatory framework. 
4.4 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER FOUR 
The Offshore Constitutional Settlement was a mixture of shared 
Commonwealth and state responsibilities, constructed mindful of emerging 
international influences but reassigning jurisdiction within the national 
context.' Within this framework, the offshore petroleum regime was crafted 
to ensure that offshore development could proceed with certainty and be 
assured of continuity beyond the life of the Fraser Government. Through the• 
joint authority device states were able to participate directly in the award of 
Commonwealth titles to explore for and produce petroleum from the 
continental shelf, the key policy decisions available under the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth). These decisions were ultimately a 
Commonwealth prerogative if state and federal governments disagreed over 
a particular application, or more likely, over the policy goal towards which an 
individual licence decision was intended. In this regard, the arrangements 
171 Reid, op cit fn 62p 64. 
Crommelin, op cit fn 2. 
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imposed an additional burden upon the Commonwealth in waters adjacent 
to Western Australia. 
Through the position of designated authority the states also made 
decisions concerning the administration of mining titles in respect of the 
continental shelf on the Commonwealth's behalf. The totality of the 
petroleum regime was therefore an arrangement whereby the state 
governments exercised effective sovereignty within coastal waters while 
assisting the Commonwealth to set policy for and administer the resources of 
the expansive continental shelf. 
Prime Minister Fraser captured the intention of the P(SL)A regime during 
debate on the Offshore Constitutional Settlement, as well as alluding to some 
of the influences thereupon — 
The present Bill—the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Bill—is the 
cornerstone of the package ...The remaining Bills in the package—the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Bill, the Navigation Amendment Bill 
and the Historic Shipwrecks Bill—give effect to the agreed arrangements 
to apply in relation to particular areas of off-shore activity both within 
and without the territorial sea. Here again, from a position where the 
Commonwealth has full constitutional authority, the Commonwealth 
has chosen to recognise the concerns of the States, to find a solution 
which will utilise the skills and expertise of existing administrations 
and will allow a sharing of resources that should benefit the nation as a 
whole. In this way, the Commonwealth is acting in the true spirit of 
federalism.'" 
Notwithstanding Fraser's effusive comments, the P(SL)A regime is best 
considered as a fascinating, even experimental, inter-governmental model for 
offshore resources policy. On the one hand, the states were rewarded with the 
return of coastal waters as part of the OCS, and in this sense politics triumped 
over legal realities. As well, state ministers were vested with considerable 
decision-making powers in respect of the extended continental shelf, a 
striking situation when put in the perspective of the High Court decision in 
173 Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 April 1980, p 2165. 
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New South Wales v the Commonwealth.' The cooperative arrangements of 
1967 fundamentally shaped the policy approach taken in 1980, as did 
formative international legal principles, the personal influences of the 
Queensland and Western Australian premiers, and the New Federalism 
policy of the Commonwealth. 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the states were satisfied with 
a protracted and complicated settlement that gave them little in political and 
economic gain compared with the earlier 1967 arrangements.' This narrow 
view holds that the return to states of their coastal waters under the OCS 
placated modest offshore demands in a highly visible commitment to new 
federalism. Such opinions, however, ignore the very considerable powers and 
functions given to state ministers as both joint and designated authority, 
however. 
On balance, it is fair to say that the Commonwealth realized the necessity 
of admitting the states to an offshore role but was reluctant to divest itself of 
its. expanded decision-making competence and capability to veto non-
negotiable items. The Commonwealth defined the terms and conditions by 
which states would be readmitted to an offshore role, and was cautious not to 
return an excess of authority and territory to the states pursuant to the OCS. 
Stevenson is one observer to understand the gradual but unmistakable 
centralizing of legislative policy that continued under Fraser, within the 
context of renewed federalism — 
While the last two chapters [of his monograph] have not provided a 
complete account of the federal government's mineral resource policies 
in the early 1970s, they have contained enough information to suggest 
the general trend of policy. The most consistent tendency was for the 
federal government to intervene increasingly in the management of 
mineral resources, rather than leaving it to the private sector or the 
states. In the judgement of many observers, this tendency first became 
174 Crommelin, op cit fn 132; Herr and Davis, op cit fn 13. 
1' Cullen, op cit fn 18 pp 219-222. 
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noticeable when Mr Gorton was Prime Minister. It continued under Mr 
McMahon, accelerated sharply under Mr Whitlam, and seems to be 
abating only slightly under Mr Fraser.' 
Given the tortuous history of offshore resources policy, including the Labor 
Party's opposition to the OCS and the Commonwealth's greater offshore 
presence, it is unsurprising that the offshore industry in particular held little 
hope that the amended petroleum regime would be any more successful than 
its antecedent versions. At the time that the OCS was -enacted, an APEA 
spokesperson expressed doubt that the new regime would endure beyond the 
next federal election - 
... the extent of the political achievement should be tempered with the 
political reality that this does not represent a bipartisan solution and 
that it is open to political and constitutional challenge by a future Labor 
government or an aggrieved party. The legal means for enacting this 
political settlement, while representing ingenous and at times 
innovative legal drafting, at the same time contain the seeds for possible 
legal challenge. To this extent the new package introduces wider 
elements of political and legal uncertainty in areas which had been left 
'on the shelf under the 1967 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act.' 
The thesis novV. -um.s4:#1:3 examine -how th4 P(SL)A regime endured following 
- 
the change in federal government soon after the OCS was brought into 
operation. Despite having campaigned so intensely against the legislation, 
upon election to office the Labor Government reneged on its pledge to 
dismantle the new offshore arrangements, instead amending the P(SL)A to 
further redistribute joint and designated authority responsibilities—and 
therefore the roles of the states and Commonwealth—in offshore petroleum 
policy while leaving the OCS framework intact. Chapter Six following reveals 
how the coastal waters legislation to this day still provides the parameters for 
Stevenson, op cit fn 167 743, 
177 Orchison, op cit fn 116 p 
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accommodating Commonwealth/state interaction in this volatile area of 
marine policy.' 
' Fraser remarked during debates that the OCS would provide for a "mutually acceptable 
accommodation of interests". Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 April 1980, p 2166. This 
same expression was used previously to characterize the original 1967 Settlement. 
Chapter Five 
Commonwealth Policy Maturity and Offshore Petroleum — 
1983-1995 
The fourth and longest evolutionary phase of the Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Act was overseen by the Hawke Labor Government. Despite initially 
advocating a return to an interventionist style of government—Labor's more 
traditional approach to public policy—Hawke came to appreciate the federal 
system of power and learned to work within its constraints. This revised 
approach to policy making has been referred to as Labor's reconciliation with 
federalism.' 
In terms of offshore petroleum, Labor had expressed its intention to assert 
full and exclusive jurisdiction over the offshore when it was returned to 
office, having made clear during parliamentary debates its opposition to the 
Offshore Constitutional Settlement. Labor's attitude towards offshore 
jurisdiction was partly vindicated by the actions of the Victorian state 
minister, who as designated authority attempted to control the production of 
Bass Strait oil in the early 1980s by exploiting the ill-defined designated 
authority powers.' Rather than legislating to repeal or overturn the OCS, 
however, the Commonwealth instead amended the P(SL)A on a number of 
occasions to ensure that the Commonwealth was able to assume a much 
expanded role in offshore petroleum policy. That the P(SL)A was reformed in 
this manner without reopening thorny jurisdictional issues bears testament 
to the Commonwealth's maturity as an offshore policy maker? 
B. Galligan and D. Mardiste, "Labor's Reconciliation with Federalism" (1992) 27 Australian 
Journal of Political Science 71-86. 
2  R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Revenue Raising: A Case of One Government Too Many?" (1988) 6 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 213-247. 
3  C. Hunt, "The Offshore Petroleum Regimes of Canada and Australia: Some Comparative 
Observations" (1990) 9 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association Bulletin 103-111; 
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Despite the improved capability of the Commonwealth to legislate in 
respect of the continental shelf, there are still notable deficiencies in its 
legislative strategy towards offshore petroleum. Most obviously, in 1994 the 
Commonwealth legislated to implement only the resource—related 
provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention while neglecting other areas of 
marine policy.' Coastal management has also been neglected by the 
Commonwealth as a policy area, while offshore oil development escaped 
external environmental review until this situation was remedied by a Federal 
Court decision against the Commonwealth in 1995. Between the years 1983 
and 1995, therefore, the P(SL)A regime is best characterised as one of 
Commonwealth legislative activity designed to ensure that the national 
interests in offshore petroleum could be progressed with few constraints of an 
inter-governmental, industrial or environmental nature. 
The first part of this chapter introduces the Hawke Government's 
approach to policy making and the Offshore Constitutional Settlement. Part 
two focuses upon reform of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act, showing 
how the Commonwealth has come to assert its jurisdictional superiority 
while continuing to retain the states as partners in the continental shelf 
regime. The third part of the chapter discusses related coastal and ocean 
initiatives within this context of Commonwealth policy—making maturity. 
M. White, Marine Pollution Laws of the Australasian Region (The Federation Press, 
Sydney, 1994). 
4 D. Rothwell, "Australia and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" (1994) 24 
International Law News 30-35; N. Evans, "LOSC, Offshore Resources and Australian Marine 
Policy" (1996) 20 Marine Policy 223-227. Many of these other areas of marine policy, such as 
scientific research and environmental protection, are being addressed through the oceans 
policy being developed over 1997-1998 [Chapter Six]. 
Chapter Five 	 202 
5.1 THE COMMONWEALTH AND STATE/INDUSTRY RELATIONS 
5.1.1 The Hawke Government's approach to policy making 
A Labor Government was elected to office in March 1983, due in no small way 
to the popularity of its newly appointed party leader, Bob Hawke. Indeed, the 
error .  in judgement on Fraser's part in calling the federal election when he 
did has entered into Australian political history.' Unlike the style and 
approach to government of Whitlam and previous Labor leaders, Prime 
Minister Hawke showed a remarkable pragmatism in working with the 
states.' Galligan and Martiste argue that it was under Hawke's leadership 
Labor finally became reconciled with the structure of Australian federalism.' 
In this respect, it is important to note that Hawke was assisted in his 
endeavours by having four of the six states under "highly competent and 
stable" Labor governments.' Other commentators, however, promote the 
view that Prime Ministers Hawke and then Keating betrayed the centralist 
ideals of Labor.' 
As Hawke reconciled with Australia's federalist structure, so too did this 
reconciliation extend to and include organized business communities and 
employee groups. The basis of the Accord, as this method of engagement was - 
termed, is described by Davis. 10 The Accord was heavily predicated upon 
consensual dialogue and negotiation amongst government, business and 
trade unions with respect to wages policy. By involving all parties in a policy 
development process participants were bound thereby to its outcomes. The 
5 "Power over timing is everything" The Canberra Times, 15 August 1998. 
6 B. Galligan, "A Political Science Perspective", in B. Galligan (ed), Australian Federalism 
(Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1989) pp 45-68. 
Galligan and Mardiste, op cit fn 1. 
8 Galligan, op cit fn 6. 
9 D. Jaensch, The Hawke-Keating Hijack (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1989). 
K Davis, "Managing the Economy", in B. Head and A. Patience (ed), From Fraser to Hawke 
(Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1989) pp 
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Accord methodology eventually emerged as a model which could be applied 
to other antagonistic policy areas, such as the environment and offshore oil 
and gas development." 
As Fraser had done previously, the Commonwealth entered into 
arrangements with state governments to clarify the role of both 
governmental spheres in international matters. Guidelines on Treaty 
Consultation, prepared early during the Hawke Government's term, specified 
the extent to which the Commonwealth would defer to states on treaty 
implementation — 
The Commonwealth will consider relying on state legislation where the 
treaty affects an area of particular concern to the states and this course is 
consistent with the national interest and the effective and timely 
discharge of treaty obligations. However the government does not accept 
that it is appropriate for the Commonwealth to commit itself in a 
general way not to legislate in areas that are constitutionally subject to 
Commonwealth power." 
The Guidelines make apparent that the Commonwealth was prepared to 
allow the states some lattitude in international treaty implementation where 
this was appropriate, while reserving to itself the right to intervene as 
befitting its role as national government. This approach was consistent with 
the broad framework of Hawke's reconciliation with federalism. The 
operationalization of this approach in various marine policy sectors is - 
explored further in the following and later sections. 
5.1.2 Hawke and the Offshore Constitutional Settlement 
Despite the OCS having been finally reached in 1980, several more years 
lapsed before the legislation giving effect to the agreed arrangements was 
11 It is important to note that the Commonwealth under Hawke was not always so equable in its 
interaction with the states, but evolved to this new steady state of federalism. The 
transformation of the Commonwealth's intergovernmental interaction is best revealed in the 
context of environmental policy, described in Part 5.3 following. 
12 H. Burmester, "A Legal Perspective", in B. Galligan (ed), Australian Federalism (Longman 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1989) pp 192-216, p 205. 
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brought into force. The lack of petroleum prospectivity around much of the 
coastline meant that the states were ambivalent about legislating to establish 
the petroleum regimes applicable to their waters. Consequently, the state 
legislation applying to coastal waters was not enacted for a further two years 
following the Commonwealth's amendments to its P(SL)A. It was after the 
offshore petroleum legislation was aligned that the State Powers Act was 
proclaimed without incident in January 1982. 
Proclamation of the State Titles Act was abeyed another full year, due to 
technical difficulties in drawing closing baselines around the coastline to 
delineate the areas accruing to the Commonwealth and states [discussed 
previously in relation to the Great Barrier Reef]. After much delay new 
baselines were drawn and gazetted under the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 
on 9th February 1983, drawn conservatively to reflect the provisions of the 
recently signed Law of the Sea Convention." Five days later the State Title 
Act entered into force by virtue of these baselines, effectively putting the OCS 
beyond immediate alteration." The particular notoriety of this proclamation 
is that it occurred on the day that Parliament was prorogued for forthcoming 
federal elections, defying parliamentary customs about the role of caretaker 
governments." Given the considerable controversy already surrounding the 
means employed to enact the coastal waters legislation, the circumstances • 
within which the State Titles Act was proclaimed added to the heightened 
political interest in the offshore. 
The Labor Opposition was incensed by the tactic employed to bring the 
Offshore Constitutional Settlement into force. In remarkably similar 
13 The scale of the delay in bringing the OCS into force is revealed by the fact that in mid-1981, 
it was anticipated that baselines would be proclaimed by the end of that year. See, 
Department of National Development and Energy Annual Report 1980-81 (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1981). 
" Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No GN 25, 28 June 1983. 
15 M. Haward, Federalism and the Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement (University 
of Tasmania, PhD thesis, 1992) pp 207-210. 
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circumstances to those surrounding the decision in New South Wales v the 
Commonwealth, less than a month after the OCS legislation was formally 
proclaimed the Fraser Government was voted from office. Haward was one 
author to appreciate the irony of the situation facing the incoming Hawke 
Government, as had confronted Fraser with respect to Whitlam's offshore 
legacy, the SSLA. 16 The return of Labor to government potentially presented 
substantial problems for the preservation of the OCS, given the Opposition's 
condemnation of the legislation during its passage through Parliament in 
1980. There was some uncertainty as to whether Labor would legislate to alter 
the OCS in entirety, or amend just the minerals components.' 
Upon ascending to office, the Hawke Labor Government reviewed the 
OCS to ascertain the desirability or otherwise of retaining the legislative 
arrangements entered into by Fraser. The stated principle of Labor to undo the 
OCS was endorsed at the biennial ALP conference in 1984, and reiterated in 
the ALP Platform, Constitution and Rules two years later." Whilst remaining 
staunchly opposed to the OCS as a matter of philosophy, however, the Hawke 
Government satisfied itself that the policy and administrative arrangements 
thereunder were nonetheless working to the Commonwealth's benefit. 
Replying to a question on the subject in Parliament, Barry Jones, the minister 
representing the Minister for Resources and Energy, explained — 
The Government is of the view that title over the territorial sea should 
not have been transferred from the Commonwealth by the previous 
Government. However, the arrangements which were entered into as 
part of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement have been working 
satisfactorily and for this reason the Government does not intend to 
take action at the present time to regain title to the territorial sea. Nor 
does the Government intend to alter the current powers legislation. 
This approach will remain dependent on the continuing satisfactory 
operation of the existing arrangements which will be kept under review. 
16 ibid . 
17 M. Haward, "The Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement" (1989) 13 Marine Policy 
334-348. 
18 R. Herr and B. Davis, "The Impact of UNCLOS Ill cn Australian Federalism" (1986) 41 
International Journal 674-693. 
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The question of resuming title may be reconsidered by the 
Commonwealth should any of the States or the Northern Territory not 
be prepared to continue acting in ways compatible with the national 
interest while exercising powers under the OCS. 19 
That the Hawke Government should so completely reverse its position 
towards the offshore, as Fraser did in 1976 regarding the return of offshore 
jurisdiction to the states, is due to a combination of reasons. The 
constitutional problems were canvassed in detail in Chapter Four. Any 
attempt to alter the OCS would at the very least trigger another wave of 
judicial review. The Commonwealth in 1983 could not attempt to repeal the 
Coastal Waters Acts with any confidence as to the outcome, given the lack of 
a coherent opinion on the subject and the ambiguous precedent set by High 
Court interpretations. Moreover, had such repeal or amendment been 
possible, the Commonwealth would almost certainly have been confronted 
with liability for just terms compensation. With such uncertainties, the 
federal government was discouraged from challenging the OCS legislation 
directly. 
Very real political and policy reasons also help to explain the Hawke 
Government's decision not to confront the prospect of undoing the OCS. The 
political costs would have been enormous, especially coming so soon after the 
internecine inter-governmental disputes over the environment [discussed 
further in part three]. Perhaps most fundamentally, the decision not to 
challenge the OCS represents a realization on the part of the Commonwealth 
that the assistance of state governments was essential for administering the 
offshore petroleum regime. Legislating to assert an exclusive Commonwealth 
role over the continental shelf rejected the basic premise of inter-
governmental cooperation embodied within the OCS, a tactic which risked 
sending the country back to another phase of offshore disputes. 
19 Hansard, House of Representatives, 20 March 1986, p 1780. 
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The very considerable time between conceiving the OCS and bringing it 
into effect had the effect of forestalling the integration of the Settlement's 
various packages. As a consequence of the difficulties in finalizing some of 
the agreed arrangements, the character of the OCS shifted from its organic 
conception to a series of sectoral models.' The marine resources components 
of the OCS are described very briefly here while the environmental policy 
models are discussed in part 5.3. An elaborate account of their development is 
found in Flaward.21 
The P(SL)A regime was settled very rapidly, notwithstanding the delay in 
enacting the necessary legislation. As described in Chapter Four, the ease in 
settling the offshore petroleum legislation was due largely to the fact that only 
Victoria—and to a growing extent Western Australia—had tangible interests 
in offshore development.' The Commonwealth also enacted legislation 
creating a parallel regime for the development of hard seabed minerals 
located on the continental shelf, modelled very closely upon the amended 
P(SL)A regime. The offshore minerals regime was described by the 
Commonwealth in the following manner — 
The Minerals (Submerged Lands) Act 1981 was passed in June, 
completing the legislation action by the Commonwealth to implement 
the offshore mining arrangements agreed with the States. The new 
legislation foll'ows very closely the general approach adopted in the 
offshore petroleum legislation.' 
Although the Minerals (Submerged Lands) Act was enacted very easily— 
partly in recognition of an identified industry need—the legislation was not 
" D. Rothwell and M. Haward, "Federal and International Perspectives at Australia's 
Maritime Claims" (1996) 20 Marine Policy 29-46. 
Haward, op cit fn 15 pp 214-265. 
n R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Disputes (The 
Federation Press, Sydney, 1990) p 68; B. Opeskin and D. Rothwell, "Australia's Territorial 
Sea: International and Federal Implications of Its Extension to 12 Miles" (1991) 22 Ocean 
Development and International Law 395-431. 
Department of National Development and Energy Annual Report 1980-81 (AGPS, Canberra, 
1981) p 22. 
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proclaimed and brought into force for nine years. Stewart attributed this delay 
to the later realization that offshore minerals development generally lacked 
commercial viability, despite industry's earlier enthusiasm for the 
legislation." Indeed, the failure of state governments to enact reciprocal 
legislation—being those jurisdictions responsible for regulating onshore 
minerals activity—illustrates their indifference in pursuing offshore 
minerals exploration. Not long after finally becoming operational, the 
Minerals (Submerged Lands) Act was repealed and replaced by a modernized 
version, the Offshore Minerals Act, in concert with the Law of the Sea 
Convention entering into force [more later]. 
In contrast to the enactment of legislation for continental shelf resources 
fisheries arrangements took an extraordinarily long time to settle. The OCS 
provided for four types of management regimes — 
• Commonwealth management from the low water mark to the limit 
of the AFZ; 
• management by states throughout this same area; 
• joint authority management by both governments throughout the 
AFZ under either Commonwealth or state law; and 
• status quo managment, whereby the states manage fisheries within 
coastal waters and the Commonwealth assumes responsibilities in its 
waters beyond.' 
While it took until 1987 for OCS arrangements to be reached between the 
Commonwealth and five states as to the particular jurisdictional formula to 
be adopted for each fishery, New South Wales is yet to enter into such 
arrangements." The diversity of state approaches and management 
practices—stemming from colonial times—frustrated OCS negotiations over 
24 J. Stewart, "Offshore Minerals Act" (1991) 10 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law 
Association Bulletin 90-96. 
N. Evans and S. Bache, "Bycatch of Endangered Species: Jurisdiction and the Management of 
Fishing Activities" (1997) 14 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 468-473. 
'6  Anon., "OCS now extends to five States" (1987) 46 Australian Fisheries 16-17. 
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fisheries responsibilities, the same difficulty that confronted the 
Commonwealth when it first entered the fisheries policy area in 1953. It 
should be emphasized, though, that state governments were reluctant to 
agree to fisheries arrangments wherein the Commonwealth was the superior 
offshore partner.' The fact that all states had interests in fisheries 
management distinguished this sector from petroleum development. 
5.2 THE PETROLEUM (SUBMERGED LANDS) ACT AMENDMENTS 
5.2.1 Overview of the Hawke Government and offshore petroleum 
Because few states gained any material benefit from offshore development it 
was therefore inevitable that interest in maintaining an integrated policy 
approach would wane as each government re-evaluated its priorities over the 
1980s. Within this context, the Commonwealth amended the P(SL)A to 
ensure that its interests would prevail in the event of disagreement with the 
states over offshore petroleum policy. From 1983, the Commonwealth has 
opted for a series of amendments to consolidate its offshore decision-making 
capabilities rather than usher in a complete (fourth) overhaul of the regime. 
The approach has been to amend from within the jurisdictional 
framework, thereby avoiding further conflict and litigation which wholesale' 
repeal of the framework would provoke. The success of the Commonwealth's 
legislative program over the 1980s bears testament to its improved policy-
making capabilities. While the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) regime has 
survived intact since the time that the OCS was implemented, the internal 
structure of the regime has been substantially amended from that originally 
enacted under the OCS. These amendments sought to firstly redefine the role 
M. Haward, "The Commonwealth in Australian Fisheries Management: 1955-1995" (1995) 2 
The Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 313-325. See also: The Last 
Frontier: Managing Commonwealth Fisheries (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Primary Industries, Resources and Rural and Regional Affairs, Canberra, 
1997). 
Chapter Five 	 210  
of the Commonwealth and states in decision-making, and then serve notice 
to industry that it was dealing with a more forceful Commonwealth. 
5.2.2 Reforming the joint and designated authorities 
The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act was amended on three occasions 
during the 1980s to redefine the role of the Commonwealth and states in 
offshore petroleum policy. These amendments were substantially concerned 
with replacing the designated authority with the joint authority, thereby 
ensuring that both spheres of government—rather than the states acting 
alone, a legacy of the 1967 Settlement—were responsible for exercising 
Commonwealth powers in respect of the continental shelf. 
5.2.2.1 Redefining the designated authority's power to direct 
The first amendments to the P(SL)A to readjust the roles of the 
Commonwealth and states were enacted little more than a year after the OCS 
legislation came into force. These amendments were concerned ostensibly 
with the power to vary the rate of petroleum production. Chapter Four 
described how considerable =certainty surrounded the capacity of the 
designated authority to alter petroleum production under section 58 of the 
P(SL)A. Because this power resided with the designated authority it was 
assumed that the only test to be applied to decisions to alter production. 
related to good oilfield practice. Broader policy directions could therefore not 
be considered by the designated authority when altering rates of production." 
Argyle analyses the power in the following terms — 
The discretion vested in the Designated Authority under the 
Commonwealth Act to direct a licensee to increase or reduce the rate at 
which the petroluem is being recovered from a licence area, whilst cast 
in the widest terms, would be read down by a court of review, in 
appropriate circumstances, as authorising only decisions based upon 
considerations of good oilfield practice. On a proper construction of the 
Commonwealth Act, good oilfield practice is an expression limited in its 
'3 R. Argyle, "Governmental Powers Over Petroleum Recovery Rates-Offshore Western 
Australia" (1983) 15 The University of Western Australia Law Review 14-32. 
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application to methods of operations and does not extend to 
consideration of the national interest.' 
Argyle goes on to remark that the largely unfettered discretion embodied by 
section 58 would be interpretted by the courts on the basis of the bestowed 
Parliamentary intention of the policy objectives of the P(SL)A. The statute 
provides negligible assistance with this interpretation, however?' In other 
words, the legislation was poorly drafted with respect to the power to order 
offshore production to be varied. It was this poor drafting that led to the first 
major conflict between the two spheres of government over the exercise of 
powers under the OCS-amended P(SL)A. 
In February 1984, the Victorian minister, acting as designated authority in 
pursuance of the ill-defined s 58 powers, approved a substantial increase in 
production from the Fortescue field in Bass Strait. Cullen observes that this 
decision did not coincide with the view of the Commonwealth, principally 
because it meant that the royalty collection due to the Commonwealth was 
minimized.' As a consequence, the Commonwealth amended the P(SL)A to 
replace the designated authority with the joint authority as the responsible 
decision maker under section 58. The power to vary production was thereby 
removed from the exclusive province of the state governments to that of the 
Commonwealth and state ministers combined?' As well, the amendments . 
added to section 58 the authority for the joint authority to consider revenue 
generation when deciding to vary the rate of offshore production." In 
combination, the 1984 amendments enabled the Commonwealth to give 
" Ibid. p 15. 
3° Ibid. 
31 Cullen, op cit fn 2. 
32  E. Fitzgerald, "The Seaweed Rebellion: Federal-State Conflicts Over Offshore Energy 
Development in the United States, Canada, and Australia" (1992) 7 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 255-309. 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Amendment Act 1984 (Cth). See: Hansard, House of 
Representatives, 13 September 1984, p 1278. 
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effect to broad national priorities when making decisions relating to the 
production policies of individual operators. 
It is also worth highlighting the bipartisan nature of these amendments. 
During parliamentary debates, the Minister Assisting the Minister for 
Industry and Commerce, John Brown, remarked - 
I understand that the amendment has received the accord of the shadow 
Minister for Resources and Energy, Senator Chaney. I hope that the 
amendment covers all of the questions that were quite legitimately and 
sincerely asked ... As I understand it, this amendment, which has 
received accord from both sides in the other House, will in fact answer 
all those questions." 
In spite of Victoria's opposition to the legislation, Brown's comment 
confirms that the Government's amendments were readily supported by the 
Federal Opposition. This observation in turn affirms the proposition made by 
this thesis that the P(SL)A has evolved to reveal the emergence of a 
defineable Commonwealth position with respect to offshore resources, rather 
than narrowly reflecting the preferred offshore policy of either political party 
in the Commonwealth sphere. The offshore policy of both political parties 
has become indistinguishably different with the passage of time. 
5.2.2.2 Replacing the designated with the joint authority 
The second set of legislative reforms to the allocation of jurisdiction under - 
the P(SL)A were enacted in 1987. These amendments were similar in purpose 
and effect to the 1984 amendments, but redefined the roles of the joint and 
designated authorities across virtually every area of offshore policy and 
administration.' As well, the special arrangement entered into between 
Western Australia and the Commonwealth was repealed. 
34 Hansard, House of Representatives, 10 October 1984, p 2073. 
M. White, Marine Pollution Laws of the Australasian Region (The Federation Press, Sydney, 
1994). 
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The Hawke Government's review of the OCS was finally completed and 
reported in Parliament in 1987, four years after being commenced. At about 
the same time, Victoria and the Commonwealth were clashing over decisions 
made by the designated authority which affected the distribution of revenue 
from offhore development in Bass Strait, leading swiftly to judicial 
challenge.' In hindsight, the Victorian litigation merely confirmed the 
Commonwealth's view that it should prevail in relation to offshore 
petroleum policy, especially in terms of decisions made under the P(SL)A. 
The conclusion of these two events—the OCS review and litigation over 
decisions made by the designated authority—encouraged the Commonwealth 
to amend the P(SL)A so as to curtail the roles of Western Australia and the 
designated authority in the continental shelf regime. 
When introducing the findings of the review in Parliament, the Minister 
for Primary Industries and Energy, John Kern, announced that 
notwithstanding Labor's philosophical objection to the OCS, the sectoral 
arrangements thereunder were to be continued largely intact, endorsing the 
preliminary view of the Government introduced earlier. However, Minister 
Kerin indicated that changes of a substantial nature to the P(SL)A would be 
enacted as a result of the OCS review. In other words, the OCS framework was 
to be retained—although it was never likely to be dismantled, for the reasons' 
canvassed earlier—but the P(SL)A regime would be amended to enhance the 
role of the Commonwealth. Kerin announced that — 
The outcome was that the Government considered that the 
arrangements entered into by the Commonwealth with the States and 
the Northern Territory to administer activities in Austraia's offshore 
waters were working satisfactorily, and the Government therefore 
decided not to take action to regain title over the territorial sea and 
'6 In the case BHP Petroleum v. Balfour (1987) 61 ALJR 345 the High Court held that the 
designated authority had erred in a determination as to the location of a wellhead, with 
implications for revenue generation. Similarly, the Federal Court in Fordham and the State 
of Victoria v. Evans and others [unreported judgement, 13 November 1987] rejected the 
appeal by Victoria against a direction made by the joint authority, much to the chagrin of 
the designated authority. See: Cullen, op cit fn 2. 
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coastal waters. The review of the OCS did, however, identify certain 
administrative functions in the Commonwealth's offshore petroleum 
legislation which required change. These changes are to repeal the 
special arrangements with Western Australia whereby disagreements in 
the Joint Authority—the Commonwealth and relevant State Minister—
are resolved on a Premier—Prime Minister basis; and to allow those 
matters which were previously dealt with by the Joint Authority at the 
discretion of the Commonwealth Minister, to become automatically 
matters for Joint Authority decision.' 
The amendments were easily drafted and passed by Parliament despite the 
profound changes that these effectuated to the offshore petroleum regime. 
Firstly, Western Australia's privileged position was removed by repealing 
from the P(SL)A the relevant Schedule 4 and the corresponding part of the 
statute giving legal effect to the special arrangements [s 8(D)(9)[. Transfering a 
suite of designated authority powers and functions to the purview of the joint 
authority was similarly achieved by repealing Schedule 5—wherein were 
listed those matters that could be referred by the Commonwealth minister to 
the joint authority—and the enabling provision, section 8E. 33 The outcome of 
these changes Was that Western Australia no longer enjoyed the dominant 
position it did in terms of petroleum development on the adjacent north-
west continental shelf. As well, the states more generally lost those exclusive 
offshore decision-making powers belonging to the designated authority, 
which now became the province of the Commonwealth and states combined. 
as the joint authority.39 
With respect to the section 8E repeal, Minister Kern stated that matters 
with the potential to be referred by the Commonwealth from the designated 
to the joint authority at the latter's discretion had become dealt with 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 September 1987, p 584. 
38 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Amendment Act 1987 (Cth) ss 4, 5. 
" The powers resumed from the designated included those relating to: advertising the 
availability of exploration blocks Ns 20(1), (2)]; renewing permits to explore Es 31(5)1; 
notifying of available production licences Es 39A(5)(b)]; inviting applications to apply for 
surrended production licences Es 47]; and carrying out of works Es 571 
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administratively as if these had to be so handled." This practice occurred so as 
to avoid the delays associated with a formal referral, resulting in some 
confusion amongst operators as to the authority responsible for particular 
approvals decisions.' It was noted that the amendment would merely 
formalize what had become operational practice while reserving to the 
Commonwealth the ability to ultimately prevail in offshore policy, consistent 
with its position as national government with jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf - 
Our experience has been that, where a joint authority has been involved 
in decisions, the consultative provisions of the offshore petroleum 
legislation which are generally applicable have proved entirely 
satisfactory.42 
The other major jurisdictional amendment to the P(SL)A effected in 1987 was 
the revocation of Western Australia's favoured position. The Government 
rejected that state's claim that the importance of offshore petroleum 
necessitated the existence of special arrangements beyond those more 
generally applicable.' One representative reflected the Hawke Government's 
view that the Commonwealth should redefine its offshore responsibilities 
vis-a-vis those of Western Australia - 
I know that there is a joint agreement with Western Austalia. I 
understand that the Minister has said that Western Australia should 
not be given a privileged position, that it ought to be in the same sort of 
position as other states ... Whilst there has to be consultation and co-
operation and whilst the joint authority should be used to the 
maximum, if there is prolonged disagreement someone has to make a 
decision. I think that as we have many other joint authorities involving 
the States and the Commonwealth, the buck has to stop somewhere. In 
this instance the buck must stop with the Commonwealth." 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 September 1987, p 584. 
41  One backbencher [Keith Wright] bemoaned that "There were hold-ups in the decision—
making process ... bureaucratic rules that can make life in the market place unnecessarily 
difficult. This legislation is going down that track to remove those anomalies." Hansard, 
House of Representatives, 21 October 1987, p 1228. 
42 Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 September 1987, p 585. 
43 Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 September 1987, p 584. 
" Hansard, House of Representatives, 21 October 1987, p 1228. 
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The most remarkable aspect to this amendment was the silence it generated 
in Parliament. In the course of two hours of parliamentary time devoted to 
the bill the content of this amendment was scarcely mentioned, let alone 
being the subject of any debate.' Clearly, the Commonwealth had a settled 
view of the form that the P(SL)A regime should assume, and the legislation 
was the means by which to achieve this vision. The circumstances which 
supported the Hawke Government in its endeavours, however, were a 
function of politics and geography. 
In terms of political influences on the amendment, one Opposition 
backbencher [Warwick Smith] observed the lack of attention given to the 
repeal of Schedule 4. He remarked that this parliamentary indifference was 
largely a function of the tenor of the political relationship between the 
Commonwealth and Western Australian leaders - 
It is most interesting that we have not heard from Premier Burke about 
this legislation. It is very puzzling to know why ... Western Australia 
has a special arrangement existing at present, and that will be changed. It 
is surprising that we have not heard from Premier Burke. The Western 
Australian Liberal Government in 1980 agreed to it only on the basis of 
special arrangements ... Under the arrangements relating to the joint 
authority set in place to determine a lot of the issues involved with off-
shore exploration, any problems were to be resolved on a Premier-Prime 
Minister basis. That has now been removed. One may well speculate 
that that is because Mr Burke no longer gets on well with the Prime 
Minister.46 
The second factor which encouraged the Commonwealth to revoke Western 
Australia's favoured states was geographical. It has been stated several times 
previously that the north-west shelf burgeoned as the centre of offshore oil 
activity during the late 1970s. Several authors recognise that the location of 
offshore oil fields and the extensive Australian coastline have influenced the 
45 See: Hansard, House of Representatives, 21 October 1987, p 1186. 
' Hansard, House of Representatives, 21 October 1987, pp 1182-1183. 
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shape of the P(SL)A over time.' In 1987, the fact that offshore oil 
prospectivity was increasingly limited to the north of Western Australia, and 
therefore of no interest to the politically influential but unproductive eastern 
states, enabled the Commonwealth to follow its legislative path without fear 
of political backlash. An Opposition backbencher [Austin Lewis] was moved 
to comment in Parliament that "if New South Wales had offshore oil this 
Bill would not have been introduced"." 
5.2.2.3 The delegation of joint authority powers 
A third amendment to the jurisdictional components of the P(SL)A was 
enacted in 1991. This amendment was designed to relieve ministers of some 
of their decision-making duties by empowering them to delegate powers to 
agency executives. Evans and Bailey have analyzed joint authority decisions, 
and established that Commonwealth and state ministers since 1989 have 
become increasingly burdened by approving changes to the ownership of 
resource titles rather than making policy decisions relating to the pace and 
scale of offshore development.' In response to this emerging pattern, the 
P(SL)A was substantively amended by Parliament in 1991. Legislation enacted 
in that year enabled the joint authority ministers to delegate to agency 
executives all their powers, including those pertaining to leasing and 
development decisions. 5° 
Chapter Three discussed some of the inter-governmental tensions 
experienced by the Australian Minerals and Energy Council—the ministerial 
body overseeing offshore petroleum development—during the life of the 
Whitlam Government. Consistent with the cooperative spirit of the OCS, the 
47 N. Evans and J. Bailey, "Jurisdiction and Offshore Petroleum in Australia: Creating 
Symmetry Between the Commonwealth and States by Sharing Benefits and Avoiding Costs" 
(1997) 33 Ocean and Coastal Management 173-204; Opeskin and Rothwell, op cit fn 22. 
48 Hansard, Senate, October, p 1328. 
49 Evans and Bailey, op cit fn 47. 
5° Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Amendment Act 1991 (Cth) s 3. 
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Standing Committee on Offshore Petroleum Legislation was established by 
AMEC in 1981. Comprised of senior officials from all governments, the 
function of the Standing Committee is to facilitate decision-making harmony 
between the Commonwealth and states with respect to both routine 
administration of titles and common petroleum policy issues.' Hunt is one 
author to recognise the success of the AMEC Standing Committee since its 
establishment.' It was these officials who were bestowed with joint authority 
powers and functions by the 1991 P(SL)A amendments. 
The most immediate effect of the amendment legislation was to relieve 
the two ministers of having to approve the exchange of mining titles 
amongst oil companies, a function better managed by agencies without 
incuring the delay associated with ministerial approval. Because of this 
delegation of power, many joint authority decisions post-1991 were made by 
the Standing Committee rather than by the Commonwealth and state 
ministers. Following from this fact is a second, more important observation 
relating to the argument of this thesis. The act of legislatively endorsing the 
delegation of ministerial decision-making powers to senior agency staff 
underscores the success of the cooperative governance model. Only if the 
Commonwealth was confident with offshore decision-making arrangements 
would Parliament provide the ministers—as the joint authority—with the • 
capacity to divest their executive powers to the exercise of agencies. The 
amended P(SL)A regime is shown in Figure Five. 
51 Department of Resources and Energy Annual Report 1982-83 (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1983). 
52 Hunt, op cit fn 3. 
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Figure 5. Commonwealth-state offshore petroleum arrangements 1995 
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Parliamentary debates confirm that by 1991 joint ministerial decisions were 
becoming almost routine under the enabling legislation." Indeed, the 
Minister for Resources, Alan Griffiths, introduced the bill by lauding the 
power to delegate as streamlining administration without weakening 
ministerial authority over decisions, as disagreements would have to be 
referred back to joint authority ministers.' The statutory delegation of 
responsibilities therefore represents a logical maturation of the P(SL)A. 
5.2.3 Commonwealth policy towards industry 
In addition to redefining its role in offshore policy relative to state 
governments, the Commonwealth also legislated to substantially reform the 
terms of its interaction with offshore operators. These amendments are 
introduced here to further convey the tenor of the Commonwealth's 
interaction with industry as the offshore petroleum regime continued to 
mature during the latter part of the 1980s. 
53 Hansard, House of Representatives, 8 May 1991, p 3262. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 8 May 1991, p 3262. 
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5.2.3.1 The resource rent tax 
The first Hawke Government amendment involving offshore petroleum to 
offend industry was the resource rent tax (RRT). The RRT was an election 
commitment of Labor's to overhaul the existing royalty and excise regimes 
applying to offshore petroleum." Neither state governments nor industry 
were favourably disposed to the notion of a RRT, which was considered as a 
disincentive for future offshore activity." Even sympathetic Labor state 
governments were outspoken against the Commonwealth's proposal.' 
Nonetheless, the Hawke Government persevered in its policy to enact an 
RRT regime, and after considerable negotiations finally released a modified 
proposed tax that would apply to greenfields projects discovered after 1st July 
1984 rather than to existing projects. An explanatory memorandum published 
by the Commonwealth identifies some of the influences on the eventual 
shape and form of the RRT — 
Consultations were held with the industry and the States, and detailed 
written comments were received on the various issues raised by the 
Government's papers. Following those consultations and further 
deliberations, the Government has decided to narrow the focus of its 
RRT proposal to new offshore petroleum projects. The Government 
will maintain the current excise/royalty regime for existing offshore and 
onshore petroleum projects, including Bass Strait and the North West 
Shelf, and impose a separate lower excise regime on "new" oil from 
existing projects." 
The important point to be appreciated regarding the RRT is that the 
Commonwealth was able in the mid-1980s to promote its preferred offshore 
• policy through legislation, in spite of the opposition of industry and state 
• governments. This situation is contrasted to that existing twenty years earlier 
when the Comonwealth was seen to defer heavily to both of these influences 
A. Church, Natural Resource Taxation Policies (Centre for Research cn Federal Financial 
Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1985). 
Cullen, op cit fn 2; Haward, op cit fn 15 pp 214-226. 
B. Head, "Economic Development in State and Federal Politics", in B. Head (ed), The Politics 
of Development in Australia (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1986) pp 3-55. 
58  Outline of a "Greenfields" Resource Rent Tax in the Petroleum Sector (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984) p 1. 
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because of its own offshore incapacities. Haward documents the influence of 
two Commonwealth ministers—Peter Walsh and especially Gareth Evans—
in gaining the confidence of the oil industry upon assuming the resources 
portfolio early in the Hawke Government." 
The Commonwealth and industry operators disagreed with respect to the 
merits of an RRT. However, the personal efforts of the. ministers to fully 
inform themselves about the associated issues, rather than relying upon the
•advice of the bureaucracy, was instrumental in building trust." This brief 
overview of the RRT therefore provides the benchmark for Commonwealth 
offshore regulation in the 1980s, clearly in stark contrast to its interaction with 
industry in 1966-1967. 
5.2.3.2 The cash bidding regime 
A second, controversial amendment to the P(SL)A—to which industry was 
opposed—was the provision to enable cash bidding as an alternative method 
to the original work bidding arrangements for awarding exploration permits. 
Whilst the RRT and cash bidding were seen by the Government as closely 
related, industry treated the two policy reforms separately. The work program 
bidding system was introduced in 1967 to encourage offshore exploration at at 
time when little was known of offshore prospectivity. This system was based 
upon awarding permits to those applicants with the most ambitious offshore 
exploration proposals. The Hawke Government acknowledged that the work 
program system worked well, but considered it an inappropriate means for 
awarding exploration permits in areas that were highly prospective, or where 
initial assessments of prospectivity were subsequently disproved. Defects with 
the system identified by the Commonwealth included — 
" M. Haward, Institutions, Interests Groups and Marine Resources Policy (University of 
Tasmania, MA thesis, 1986) pp 190-235. 
60 Ibid, p 232. 
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• companies artificially inflating exploration programs to ensure the 
success of a bid; 
• difficulties with assessing the likelihood of an exploration program 
being completed as bidded; and 
• the cost of government administration needed to maintain the 
credibility of the work program bidding system. 61 
Vast amounts of parliamentary , time were devoted to the topic of cash 
bidding. The Hawke Government viewed cash bidding and the RRT as 
complementary measures designed to collect for the community a share of 
the economic revenue flowing from Australia's offshore petroleum 
resources.62 The oil industry and the Liberal Coalition were allied against cash 
bidding, however, arguing that the proposed system was inequitable and 
restrictive of offshore development. These polarised views of the cash 
bidding system were amply reflected in the comments of a Government 
backbencher, sounding surprisingly like comments expressed at each of the 
previous evolutionary periods of the P(SL)A — 
Cash bidding is one way that the Australian people can receive some 
compensation for the resources that belong to all Austalians. These 
resources do not belong just to the petrol companies. They do not belong 
to the multinational oil cartel. They belong to all of us, and why should 
we not get some money back for them? From the way that members of 
the Opposition have spoken so far in this debate today one would think 
that Australia was already owned by Esso Australia Ltd or BP Australia 
Ltd or any other company in the multinational cartel. It is wrong that 
we just give away our resources to overseas companies for them to 
plunder and exploit. Those resources belong to all of us here, and we all 
should share in the wealth of Australia.' 
Much of the debate on the amendments was occupied by the Opposition's 
exhortations against cash bidding made on behalf of the offshore oil 
industry." The major oil companies argued that cash bidding was a 
61 Proposed Amendments to the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act (Department of Resources and 
Energy, Canberra, 1984). 
62 Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 September 1987, p 588. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 23 September 1987, p 1187. 
""The coalition opposes the whole concept of cash bidding. The industry, respresented by the 
Australian Petroleum Exploration Association Ltd and the Australian Institute of Petroleum 
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disincentive to exploration because it diverted economic rent from the 
production phase to Commonwealth revenue, as did the RRT. The Coalition 
also considered that the revenue raised from cash bidding would be less than 
that from taxes on production. Essentially, these two parties rejected cash 
bidding as being an ineffectual attempt to enact another impost upon offshore 
development.' 
In the event, the Hawke Government relied upon the support of a 
Democrat senator [Norm Sanders] to pass the legislation through the upper 
house. Sanders had been personally involved in disputatious battles over 
offshore development in the United States, and took a very practical view of 
the policy goals embodied in the legislation." In terms of the evolving 
maturity of the P(SL)A regime, the important point to arise from this debate 
is the Commonwealth's resolve to enact the legislation creating the cash 
bidding system in spite of the intense objections it generated. In Hunt's view, 
this activity further demonstrates the Commonwealth's growing confidence 
and assertiveness with advancing its own offshore priorities. ° 
5.2.3.3 Setting conditions and providing information 
Two separate amendments to the P(SL)A during the 1980s were directed at 
increasing the Commonwealth's control over the oilfield practice of . 
operators. Firstly, several provisions were amended in 1987 to enable 
information on petroleum reserves to be made more readily available. The 
period for which information could be kept secret was reduced in 1984 from 
five to two years [s. 118]. As well, section 122 of the P(SL)A was amended to 
allow the Commonwealth to exercise greater control over the information 
Ltd, opposes it. The Northern Territory Government opposes it. The Western Australian 
Government opposes it." Hansard, House of Representatives, 21 October 1987 p 1182. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 21 October 1987, pp 1182-1184, 1233. 
" Haward, op cit fn 59 p 214. 
67 Hjt op cit fn 3. 
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collected by offshore operators." Prior to this amendment, the state minister 
was was empowered to direct an operator to provide the designated authority 
with information regarding a current operation. The Commonwealth 
amended this section in 1987 to allow the Commonwealth minister to now 
direct the designated authority in this regard. 
The second set of amendments—two years later—involving interaction 
with industry pertained to the imposition of conditions on instruments 
granted under the P(SL)A." Previously, the holder of an instrument could 
generally assume that an offshore title would be renewed absent any gross 
violation of a condition imposed by the joint authority. In 1989, the onus for 
complying with conditions was essentially reversed so that non-compliance 
became almost fatal to the renewal of any offshore title." 
Unlike many of the other industry-related amendments to the P(SL)A, 
these 1989 amendments attracted little attention in Parliament. It is likely that 
the low level of parliamentary interest in condition-setting amendments was 
attributable to the far greater attention being given to proposed changes to the 
revenue and fee structure dimensions. The lack of parliamentary attention 
did later lead to problems at the operational level. Since the amendments to 
condition-settiong in the late 1980s, the joint authority has had to vary or 
suspend the conditions attached to at least several resource titles in order to 
enable the title-holder to exercise rights to explore for petroleum.' 
68 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Amendment Act 1987 (Cth) s 15. 
69 Primary Industries and Energy Legislation Amendment Act (No. 2) 1989 (Cth) Sdi 1. 
" M. Crommelin, "Mining and Petroleum Titles" (1988) 62 The Australian Law Journal 863-877. 
71 Department of Primary Industries and Energy Annual Report 1991-1992 (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1992). 
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5.2.4 Trends in revenue sharing 
Monitoring changes in the distribution of petroleum revenue between the 
Commonwealth and states serves as a useful barometer of the evolution of 
the P(SL)A regime. Table One reports the available information relating to 
Commonwealth petroleum revenue since records were maintained soon 
after the original Settlement was reached in 1967. Two aspects in particular 
are highlighted by revenue-sharing arrangements: the changing importance 
over time of prospective areas around the coastline; and the prominence of 
Western Australia as an offshore partner. 
Perhaps the most notable observation from the table is the growth and 
decline in royalties derived from Bass Strait [notwithstanding the incomplete 
availability of data]. The productivity of Bass Strait peaked in the mid-1980s, 
reflecting the inflated price of oil during the later part of the 1970s. 72 
Subsequent to this time, the emergence of the North West Shelf as the 
dominant oil-producing offshore area is clearly shown. More importantly, it 
can be seen that a substantial portion—indeed, the majority—of petroleum 
receipts generated by the Commonwealth through its superior revenue-
raising capabilities is returned to the states. 
Within Western Australia's coastal waters, revenue is returned to the 
state in the ratio of 60:40 percent, as originally agreed in the 1967 Settlement. 
The rate of return is even greater in relation to production on the adjacent 
Commonwealth North West Shelf, where revenue-sharing arrangements are 
enshrined in legislation.n Since the North West Shelf became productive in 
1990, Western Australia has consistently received at least 70% of secondary 
72 Although oil prices peaked in 1980, delays in aligning production with price, coupled with 
the latency inherent in revenue-raising mechanisms, means that several years elapse 
between oil price fluctuations and revenue collection. 
73 The Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) explicates very complex formula by which 
the Commonwealth repays to the states a proportion of the value of production revenue 
within its waters as payment for administering the offshore petroleum regime [ss 129, 130]. 
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revenue raised from this Commonwealth area. The tenacity of Premier Court 
in negotiating the OCS arrangements has clearly realised dividends for the 
state that have long transcended the term of his government, with no 
indication of this trend abating, moreover. 74 
It is also worth noting from Table One the effect of the resource rent tax, 
discussed in the previous section. Since the RRT was introduced early in the 
1990s, the older crude oil levy has disappeared as a secondary revenue-raising 
levy. Additionally, it is apparent that offshore oil development has accreted 
and receded over thirty years as a source of revenue for the Commonwealth. 
The collection of offshore petroleum revenue is subject to the vicissitudes of 
oil prices. Notwithstanding the steady increase over time in barrel price—and 
therefore the overall importance of offshore petroleum to the 
Commonwealth—considerable fluctuation is experienced at the scale of 
individual years, with consequences for the Commonwealth's earnings. A 
detailed account and analysis of revenue dimensions is outside the ambit of 
this thesis, however. 
74  Premier Court is taken to mean Sir Charles Court, who was responsible for negotiating the 
special conditions under the OCS applicable only to Western Australia [as discussed 
previously], and is not a refence to his son and later premier during the 1990s, Richard Court. 
Table 1. Commonwealth/state secondary petroleum revenues 1969-1998 ($ M) [data held by Dept Industry, Science & Resources, Canberra] 
Year WA coastal waters Commonwealth waters Crude Oil 
Levy/RRT3 
Total Cth 
Revenue 
WA share (60%) Cth share (40%) North West 
Shelf (WA share)' 
Barrow 
Island 
Bass Strait2 
1969/70 3 3 
1970/71 10 10 
1971172 20 20 
1972173 24 24 
1973/74 30 30 
1974/75 36 36 
1975176 40 257 297 
1976/77 45 340 385 
1977/78 58 469 527 
1978/79 78 1226 1304 
1979/80 110 2270 2380 
1980/81 152 3108 3260 
1981/82 166 3164 3330 
1982/83 174 3468 3642 
1983/84 224 3651 3875 
1984/85 276 4202 4478 
1985/86 333 4019 4352 
1986/87 254 2062 2316 
1987/88 266 2056 2322 
1988/89 159 1188 1347 
1989/90 251 1232/42 1525 
1990/91 40.5 27 19 (14.3) 25 266 1354/293 1984 
1991/92 37.5 25 19 (18.5) 25 13 64/876 1021 
1992/93 33 22 22 (17.0) 20 N/A 116/1389 1566 
1993/94 13.5 9 51 (42.4) 22 N/A 62/1072 1217 
1994/95 28.5 19 81 (65.9) 13 N/A 27/865 1004 
1995/96 27 18 161 (112.6) 12 N/A 13/791 1002 
1996/97 24 16 256 (187.1) 15 N/A 10/1310 1607 
1997/98 21 14 303 (215.9) 7 N/A 15/906 1245 
1 North West Shelf (WA) indicates the total revenue collected by the Commonwealth and the amount returned to Western Australia as per the formula specified in ss. 129, 130 of the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) [approximately two-thirds of NWS royalties are returned to WA]. 
2 Bass Strait royalties include Western Australian OCS coastal waters royalty component between 1983 and 1990, and are subsumed within the RRT after this time. 
3 The crude oil excise was replaced by the resource rent tax in 1990 [refer text], since which time the levy has been applied only to "old oil" [production that pre-dated the new secondary tax 
regime] and declined in importance as a source of revenue. 
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5.3 COMMONWEALTH OCEAN AND COASTAL POLICY UNDER HAWKE 
5.3.1 Commonwealth intervention in environmental policy 
A number of ocean and coastal policy actions over the 1990s had implications 
for the offshore petroleum regime. To appreciate the relevance of these 
initiatives it is necessary to first overview the general thrust of 
environmental policy-making pursued by the Hawke Government. As 
occurred in the area of offshore petroleum policy, the Commonwealth 
similarly expanded into the traditional preserves of state government 
environmental policy making during the 1980s. The first and most infamous 
such move was the Hawke Government's action to halt construction of a 
dam on the Gordon-below-Franklin River in south-west Tasmania, a pre-
election promise which helped propel Labor to victory in the 1983 federal 
election. 
The saga of the Tasmanian Dams case has entered the corpus of 
environmental folklore in Australia, as evidenced by the volume of 
literatuse devoted to this ev_ent. 75 The means the Commonwealth employed 
to prevent the dam being constructed was to enact the World Heritage 
Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth), based upon the World Heritage 
Convention.76 Tasmania challenged the World Heritage Act in the High . 
Court, which upheld the legislation was upheld as being a valid exercise of 
the external affairs head of power.77 Subsequent to this early legislative action 
75 G. Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (Butterworths, Sydney, 1992); B. Davis, 
"Environmental Management", in B. Galligan, 0. Hughes and C. Walsh (ed), 
Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1991) pp 146-162; 
N. Economou, "Problems in Environmental Policy Creation: Tasmania's Wesley Vale Pulp 
MieDispute", in K. Walker (ed), Australian Environmental Policy (New South Wales 
University Press, Kensington, 1992) pp 41-57; R. Fowler, "Environmental Law and its 
Administration in Australia" (1984) 8 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 10-49; A. 
Kellow, "The Environment, Federalism, and Development: Overstated Conflicts?", in K. 
Walker (ed), Australian Environmental Policy (New South Wales University Press, 
Kensington, 1992) pp 203-214. 
76 Convention for the Conservation of the World Natural and Cultural Heritage. 
77 Commoealth v Tasmania (1983) 153 CLR 1. 
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the Commonwealth continued to intervene to protect the outstanding 
conservation values of rainforests in Queensland, as well as entering into a 
number of other environmental disputes.78 
5.3.2 Environmental accordism under Hawke 
As a result of this interventionist approach, deep divisions set in between the 
Commonwealth and states over land use and resources policy, as well as 
amongst federal agencies and key stakeholder groups. By the decade's end 
environmental policy-making was clearly in need of repair, out of which 
evolved a new paradigm, environmental accordism. 79 This new approach to 
environmental policy comprised three main components: ecologically 
sustainable development (ESD), the Inter-Governmental Agreement on the 
Environment, and the Resource Assessment Commission. 80 The lattermost 
of these models is described here because of its particular relevance to the 
marine and coastal environment and offshore development. 
78 Bates, op cit fn 72. 
79  D. Downes, "Neo-COrporatism and Environmental Policy" (1996) 31 Australian Journal of - 
Political Science 175-190; N. Economou, "Accordism and the Environment: The Resource 
Assessment Commission and National Environmental Policy-Making" (1993) 28 Australian 
Journal of Political Science 399-412. 
80 The Ecologically Sustainable Development Working Groups were established by the 
Commonwealth in 1989 in response to the World Commission an Environment and 
Development (the Brundtland Report). Nine cosmopolitan expert working groups were 
charged with reviewing the status of each major sector of activity with respect to ecological 
sustainable development, and proposing options for reforming these sectors so as to better 
achieve sustainability. Downes describes ESD in the following terms: "The ecologically 
sustainable development process represented Australia's most concerted attempt to form a 
broad environmental strategy. Importantly, it also signified the effort by the Hawke Labor 
government to involve key protagonists in the environment-development debate—notably 
business and environmental organisations—through participation in a governmental 
consultation process." Ibid, Downes p 175. The Inter-governmental Agreement cn the 
Environment was a document signed by all Australian leaders in 1992 which specified the 
roles and responsibilities of each jurisdiction in terms of protecting the environment. 
Although neither of these approaches found their basis in legislation they nonetheless 
generated a lot of interest, and influenced all stakeholders to enter into a more explicit 
dialogue when developing environmental policy. 
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5.3.2.1 The Resource Assessment Commission 
The Resource Assessment Commission (R.A.C.) was a statutory body created 
by the Resource Assessment Commission Act 1989 (Cth) as an attempt by the 
Hawke Commonwealth to seek alternative ways of settling disputes over 
resources development. Economou articulates the context within which the 
R.A.C. was legislation was enacted – 
The emergence of the RAC signalled a critical coincidence of the arrival 
of the environment as a policy issue of some national importance with 
the Hawke government's success in applying the structures and 
mechanisms of consensus politics to other problematic policy arenas. 
The nature and—more importantly—the conduct of environmental 
policy politics stood as something of an antithesis to the Hawke 
government's approach to economic policy and industrial relations ...It 
is clear that national environmental policy was dominated by purely 
pragmatic considerations in which cabinet's basic commitment to 
growth and economic development was tempered by acceptance of the 
argument emanating from environmental leaders and its own opinion 
polling that the environment commanded an electorally significant 
constituency whose support Labor enjoyed by virtue of its decision in 
1983 to prevent hydro-development of Tasmania's Franklin dam. 81 
The principal means through which the R.A.C. was to achieve dispute 
settlement was by conducting public inquiries at the referral of the prime 
minister. Schedule 1 of the Resource Assessment Commission Act stipulated 
that the R.A.C. should take an integrated approach to conservation and 
development, deeming that the net benefits to society of resource use should - 
be primary in decision making. At the conclusion of an inquiry the R.A.C. 
reported to the prime minister, who could then make a decision based upon 
transparent information gathered and presented through vigorous debate. 
Herein lay the strength of the R.A.C.. 82 The integrity of the R.A.C., guaranteed 
by its mandate and method, enabled it to conduct inquiries into three highly 
81 N. Eamomou, "Australian Environmental Policy Making in Transition: the Rise and Fall of 
the Resource Assessent Commission" (1996) 55 Australian Journal of Public Administration 
12-22,_pp 13-14. 
82 0. Stewart and G. McColl, "The Resource Assessment Commission: An Inside Assessment" 
(1994) 1 Australian Journal of Environmental Management 12-23. 
Chapter Five 	 231  
contentious areas of resources policy, including the coastal zone [more 
later[.83 
5.3.2.2 Inquiries into Australian coastal management 
Before examining the R.A.C.'s inquiry into the coastal zone and its 
contribution to Commonwealth coastal policy, it is helpful to briefly revisit 
the scope of theY Offshore Constitutional Settlement. It has been identified 
earlier in this thesis that the OCS deferred heavily to the sensitivities of states 
in a range of marine policy areas outside the resource sectors, such as whale 
conservation and sea dumping. The Commonwealth made little effort to 
intrude into these non-peak policy areas, and was content to leave 
environmental responsibilities in coastal waters to be covered by state 
legislation. 84 This same appoach was taken towards coastal management, an 
area of policy which the Commonwealth was reluctant to occupy both at that 
time and on several occasions since. 
At the same time that the OCS was being finalized in 1980 a House 
Standing Committee completed a review of Australian coastal zone 
management. 85 The review urged the Commonwealth to formulate a 
national coastal policy, but was careful not to recommend any action which 
would encroach upon states' responsibilities, a mood which was clearly . 
sympathetic to the OCS negotiations proceeding at the time.% 
Notwithstanding the possibility to at least usefully link the two 
developments, the report commented upon the OCS only in passing by 
83 Resource Assessment Commission, Kakadu Conservation Zone Inquiry Final Report 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991); Forest and Timber Inquiry 
Final Report (AGPS, Canberra, 1992); Coastal Zone Inquiry Final Report (AGPS, Canberra, 
1994). 
84  R. Hildreth, "Managing Ocean Resources: New Zealand and Australia" (1991) 6 
International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 89-126. 
85 Australian Coastal Zone Management (House of Representatives Standing Committee at 
Environment and Conservation, Canberra, 1980). 
86 Australian Coastal Zone Management, Paragraph 198. 
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referring to the ongoing heads-of-government discussions. Indeed, from the 
text of the report it is apparent that the House Standing Committee was 
careful to express the Commonwealth's interest in coastal management as 
secondary to the joint authority arrangements being developed by AMEC.87 
As Hildreth remarks, coastal land use issues were clearly not a priority item 
in 1980, in spite of the attention being focussed further offshore. 88 
Eleven years later another House of Representatives Committee delivered 
a second, slightly more insistent review of national coastal policy, entitled 
The Injured Coastline.89 This report considered that the Commonwealth had 
three roles in coastal environmental protection, namely: broad policy 
making; the provision and distribution of research and information; and the 
supportive resourcing of programs." However, despite noting that public 
participation in coastal management was limited to the environmental 
approvals process "... which did not always satisfy the demands of the 
community" the Committee still counselled against the Commonwealth 
adopting more accountable and participative models." The Injured Coatline 
instead "strongly believed" that the Commonwealth should initiate a 
national coastal strategy with the cooperation of state and local 
governments.92 
Quite clear from the review also was that the Commonwealth/state 
interface did not present problems for coastal environmental protection." 
The extent to which problems did exist was attributable to decision making 
87 Australian Coastal Zone Management, Paragraph 174. 
88 Hildreth, op cit fn 81. 
89 The Injured Coastline (House of Representatives Standing Committee an Environment, 
Recreation and the Arts, Canberra, 1991). • 
9° The Injured Coastline, Paragraph 6.10. 
91 The Injured Coastline, Paragraph 3.38. 
92 The Injured Coastline, Paragraphs 6.21-6.22. 
93  D. Crawford, "The Injured Coastline" - A Parliamentary Report cri Coastal Protection in 
Australia. Coastal Management, 20 (1992) 189-198. 
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fragmentation due to arbitrary administrative boundaries between public 
agencies, and their failure to consider cumulative effects in decision 
making.94 In other words, the vertical division of jurisdiction was not 
identified as a factor limiting the development of environmental policy in 
the coastal zone. To address these structural problems the Committee 
recommended that the Commonwealth should enact legislation specifying 
federal interests in the coastal zone and agreed national environmental 
guidelines.95 In this context, the federal consistency clause of the U.S. Coastal 
Zone Management Act was explicitly contemplated and rejected by the 
Committee as a model for the Commonwealth to emulate. Almost certainly, 
the prospect of importing to Australia the policy gridlock existing offshore 
California dissuaded the Committee from recommending the adoption of 
similar legislation [discussed further in Chapter Seven[.96 
The Injured Coastline clearly excused the Commonwealth from taking 
decisive legislative action in the area of coastal management. One 
commentator nonetheless enthused about the contribution to 
Commonwealth policy making of the parliamentary report - 
The Injured Coastline probably represents an important turning point 
concerning the development of a national approach to coastal 
management in Australia. Unlike many federal parliamentary 
committee reports in Australia it has a strong likelihood of success in 
seeing its recommendations implemented. 97 
The Injured Coastline elicited several government responses. Firstly, Prime 
Minister Hawke in 1992 directed the Resource Assessment Commission to 
undertake an inquiry into the coastal zone. It was hoped by the Government 
that the R.A.C. would provide a clear option for articulating the 
The Injured Coastline, Paragraphs 3.35-3.37. 
95 The Injured Coastline, Recommendation 12. 
96 R. Hildreth, "Australian Coastal Management: a North American Perspective" (1992) 9 
Environmental and Planning Law journal 165-174. 
97 Crawford, op cit fn 90. David Crawford served as secretary to the inquiry, and his 
enthusiasm for its outcomes needs to be interpretted in this context. 
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Commonwealth's role in coastal management. 98 The Commonwealth also 
prepared a draft coastal policy in light of the recommendations arising from 
The Injured Coastline, but was careful not to preempt the work of the R.A.C. 
Notwithstanding expectations which may have accompanied its 
investigation, when completed in November 1993 the R.A.C. Coastal Zone 
Inquiry largely repeated the findings of the 1991 House committee." The 
Coastal Zone Inquiry recommended that the Commonwealth should take the 
lead in initiating a National Coastal Action Program as befitting its role as 
national government, but commented that — 
[T]he Commonwealth, however, should not attempt to impose a 
uniform national coastal regulatory scheme. Rather, it should enact 
legislation to guide funding allocations by the Commonwealth to 
coastal zone management." 188 
As a result of the exhaustive review completed by the R.A.C. over two years, 
the Commonwealth in 1995 contented itself—belatedly—with preparing a 
detailed coastal policy statement. 181 The Commonwealth's coastal policy, 
Living on the Coast, was the Government's formal response to the reports of 
the House Standing Committee and the R.A.C., and the final version of the 
earlier draft coastal policy. 102 Living on the Coast reiterated the proper roles of 
the different spheres of government in coastal management, with particular 
98 Despite its considerable potential as a model for natural resources policy making, the R.A.C. 
endured for only a brief period. Although the legislation remains on the statute books m 
prime minister has referred any matter to the RAC for investigation since the Coastal Zone 
Inquiry. Two factors seem to account for the demise of the RAC in natural resouces policy 
making. The first is that the RAC was probably too successful in achieving its mandate of 
evaluating options for land use and providing unignorable advice to the government, given 
the rigour and transparency with which this was prepared and presented. The second 
reason why no further matters have been referred to the RAC is found in Hawke's 1992 
deposition as Labor leader by Paul Keating. The new prime minister prioritized 
development and favoured an incisive rather than consensus style of decision making, which 
in turn saw the environment suffer as a policy area. See: Downes, op cit fn 76; Economou, op 
cit fn 78. 
" Coastal Zone Inquiry (Resource Assessment Commission Final Report, AGPS, Canberra, 1993). 
w° Coastal Zone Inquiry. Paragraph 19.37. 
101 R. — Kay and C. Lester, "Benchmarking the Future Direction for Coastal Management in 
Australia" (1997) 25 Coastal Management 265-292. 
102 Living on the Coast - Commonwealth Coastal Policy (Department of the Environment, 
Sport and Territories, Canberra, 1995). 
Chapter Five 	 235  
emphasis on the cooperative arrangements reached under the OCS. 103 In 
terms of new initiatives to address coastal environmental problems, the 
policy articulated principles and objectives for coastal management, and 
committed some $53 million in funding over four years while eschewing 
new legislative or administrative arrangements. 104 
Several recent Australian commentaries have analysed the R.A.C. inquiry 
and the Commonwealth's resultant coastal policy. 105 Two important points 
emerge from these analyses confirm that coastal management would remain 
firmly under state jurisdiction. The first is the obvious strength of states' 
rights as given under the OCS, and the Commonwealth's desire to take credit 
for coastal initiatives without being additionally burdened. Kay and Lester 
describe this tendency in the following terms — 
It is worth reflecting on the approach taken by the commonwealth to 
promote the coastal package. During the process of developing the 
intergovernmental coastal initiatives ... there was a strong feeling 
among the state representatives that the commonwealth was asking 
what it should do in coastal management so that it could attempt to do 
these things itself, thereby taking credit for any initiatives.uk 
The second point from the Commonwealth's experience with coastal 
management relates to the particular form of the final settled approach. A 
number of reviews of coastal management were needed to motivate the 
government to enter this policy field, which it eventually did by releasing a 
policy statement and a modest amount of program funding. Aside from the 
1°3 Living on the Coast, section 2.1. 
104 Living on the Coast, section 4.2. 
105 B. Davis, "National Responses to UNCED Outcomes: Australia", in L. Kriwoken, M. 
Haward, D. VanderZwaag and B. Davis (ed), Oceans Law and Policy in the Post-UNCED 
Era: Australian and Canadian Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, London, 1996) pp 25- 
40; M. Haward, "Institutional Framework for Australian Ocean and Coastal Management" 
(1996) 33 Ocean & Coastal Management 19-39; L. Kriwoken and R. Cote, "Developments in 
Australian and Canadian Marine Environmental Management", in L. Kriwoken, M. 
Haward, D. VanderZwaag and B. Davis (ed), Oceans Law and Policy in the Post-UNCED 
Era: Australian and Canadian Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, London, 1996) pp 
215-242. 
106 Kay and Lester, op cit 98 p 280. 
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strength of the OCS, in choosing not to enact legislation modelled on the 
CZMA the Commonwealth has likely looked to the United States and been 
influenced by the near breakdown there of the federal offshore oil leasing 
program. By keeping the policy areas of coastal management and petroleum 
development separate, the Commonwealth is able to ensure that its offshore 
interests continue to operate unfettered by inter-governmental tensions over 
coastal management policy.w7 
5.3.2.3 The Gunn 's case 
The Commonwealth's approach to coastal managment is also seen in the 
area of environmental impact assessment. Partly in reaction to the approach 
of the Keating Government to environmental decision making and the 
demise of the R.A.C., a non-government organization in 1994 challenged a 
Commonwealth decision in the Federal Court. 108 Although the case was 
concerned ostensibly with the export of woodchips, the precedent of the 
judgement extended to all areas of Commonwealth resources decisions made 
pursuant to the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth). 
The Impact of Proposals Act was introduced in Chapter Three as being 
enacted as one prong of the environmental policy of the Whitlam 
Government. The Impact of Proposals Act applies to federal decision making,. 
namely projects undertaken by a Commonwealth instrumentality, those 
which require federal approval, or which occur in Commonwealth areas. 109 
Administrative Procedures established under the parent statute provide the 
detail for determining both the need for and the requirements of an 
1°7 Evans and Bailey, op cit fn 47. 
108 Tasmanian Conservation Trust v Minister for Resources and Gunns Limited. Unreported, 
Federal Court of Australia, NG 536 of 1994, 10 January 1995. 
109 Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth) s 5. 
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environmental impact statement (EIS) and public environment report 
(pEnno 
The Impact of Proposals Act represents a discretionary environmental 
strategy on the part of the Commonwealth. 111 At the time the legislation was 
enacted in the early 1970s the Commonwealth was keen to avoid the delays 
caused by NEPA in the U.S., and much as it had done in 1967 with respect to 
the original petroleum legislation, looked to the American experience. 112 One 
lesson the Commonwealth learnt was to avoid enacting legislation which 
exposed its decisions to judicial review, hence the emphasis upon ministerial 
and administrative discretion for specifying environmental impact 
assessment requirements, rather than this being prescribed in enforceable 
terms within the statute. As well, constitutional limitations as to the 
Commonwealth's capacity to legislate to intrude upon state decisions with 
respect to ETA defined the scope of the legislation. 113 In the words of one 
commentator - 
As a result ... the Australian system is characterised by an extraordinary 
amount of ministerial discretion, sporadic public involvement, and 
frequent calls for reform. 114 
110 Administrative Procedures under s 6 of the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 
1974 (Cth). The preparation of an environmental assessment document under the Impact o f • 
Proposals Act is very discretionary, being triggered solely by the "action minister". Under 
the Administrative Procedures, the minister whose department is either the proponent or is 
responsible for project approval determines whether a proposal will generate significant 
environmental impacts, and may therefore warrant formal assessment [Administrative 
Procedures paras 1.2.1, 9.5]. Upon completion of any assessment, the action minister shall 
then ensure that the recommendations arising from the EIA are "taken into account" and 
"given effect to" when implementing the proposal [Environment Protection (Impact of 
Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth) s 8). 
111  M. Crommelin, "Commonwealth Involvement in Environment Policy: Past, Present and 
Future" (1987) 4 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 101-112. 
112  M. Blumm, "The Origin, Evolution and Direction of the United States National 
Environmental Policy Act" (1988) 5 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 179-193. 
113  R. Fowler, "Environmental Impact Assessment: What Role for the Commonwealth?-An 
Overview" (1996) 13 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 246-259; J. Kiss, "Exploration 
and Environmental Issues" (1990) 64 Law Institute Journal 398-400; K. Murchison, 
"Environmental Law in Austalia and the United States: A Comparative Overview—Part 1" 
(1994) 11 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 179-192. 
114 Blumm, op cit 109 p 180. 
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Unsurprisingly, the Impact of Proposals Act has been applied only sparingly 
since its enactment. In this regard, it is opportune to comment upon the 
assessment of ann oil field located on the continental shelf adjacent to 
Western Australia. 115 As stated elsewhere by the author, the significance of 
this proposal, the Wandoo Full Field development, is that it represents the 
first time in relation to Commonwealth waters that a proponent has been 
required to prepare an environmental review document under the 
administrative procedures of the Impact of Proposals Act. 116 Several 
Commonwealth/state combined assessments have been conducted where 
proposals overlap state waters elswhere around Australia. In fact, one of the 
few previous applications of the Impact of Proposals Act to offshore oil 
activity occurred as a joint assessment during the negotiation phase of the 
OCS to demonstrate the cooperative governance regime of the P(SL)A. 117 
However, the Wandoo development is the only environmental impact 
assessment of an offshore oil proposal located wholly within Commonwealth 
waters since the Impact of Proposals Act was enacted. 
The Wandoo proposal was motivated at least in part by the 
administrative adjustments flowing from the Gunns case introduced 
above. 118 The Gunns decision widened the application of the Impact of 
Proposals Act to bring within the purview of Commonwealth EIA decisions - 
which previously have been subjected to environmental impact 
assessment. 119 In response to the difficulties presented by Gunns the 
Commonwealth acted to exempt a number of resource decisions from the 
115 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No GN 46,22 November 1995. 
116 N .  Evans, "Offshore Oil Updates" (1996) 15 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law 
Association Bulletin 116-117. 
117 R .  Nunn, "Comment an Environmental Assessment" (1978) 1 Australian Mining and 
Petroleum Law Journal 581-597. 
118 see, Department of Primary Industries and Energy Annual Report 1994-95 (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995). 
1195• Munchenberg, "Amendments to Commonwealth EIA Procedures" (1995) 12 Environmental 
and Planning Law Journal 235-237. 
Chapter Five 	 239  
Impact of Proposals Act rather than risk exposing its decision making to 
greater judicial review. 120 
Scholars have increasingly come to recognize that the discretion built into 
the Impact of Proposals Act has seriously compromised the statute's 
intention of publicly accountable environmental policy. 121 In terms of its 
application to outer continental shelf policy, it is apparent that the 
Commonwealth has administered this legislation so as to minimize any 
restrictions upon offshore petroleum activity, an observation which further 
suggests of the Commonwealth's maturity in the area of offshore resources 
policy. 
5.3.3 Law of the Sea Convention in Australia 
The Law of the Sea Convention finally entered into force late in 1994, twelve 
years after the treaty text was concluded. Commonwealth legislation ratifying 
the Convention was enacted to coincide with its entry into force, making 
Australia an original States' party. The Commonwealth's action was 
concerned principally with securing control over offshore resources, 
however, while delaying action with respect to many of the other treaty 
provisions. Both these themes are examined at length in the following 
sections. 
5.3.3.1 Entry into force of LOSC and Commonwealth resources policy 
The preceding chapters have chartered developments in the Law of the Sea, 
and the relationship between this body of law and Commonwealth domestic 
legislation between 1958 and 1982. Following conclusion of UNCLOS ifi, the 
1" Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No S 165 25, 5 May 1995. Several minor changes to the 
Administrative Procedures established under the parent statute have now been instituted. 
See, Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No GN 25,28 June 1995. 
121 j Court, C. Wright and A. Guthrie, "Environmental Assessment and Sustainability: Are We 
Ready for the Challenge?" (1996) 3 Australian Journal of Environmental Management 42-57; 
R. Fowler, "Environmental Impact Assessment: What Role for the Commonwealth?-An 
Overview" (1996) 13 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 246-259. 
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treaty was slowly but steadily ratified, with the 60th instrument of ratification 
being deposited by Guyana in November 1993. 122 The deposition of this 
instrument in turn triggered the entry into force of the Convention twelve 
months later.' 23 With the exceptions of Iceland and the former Yugoslavia, 58 
of the original sixty States ratifying the Convention were developing 
countries, a situation which prompted one observer of the Law of the Sea to 
exclaim, "This is an unprecedented state of affairs; the absence of 
industrialized countries is strildng." 124 
That the LOS Convention should be ratified exclusively by non-
industrialized countries is not so surprising. As Chapter Four described, 
developing countries were the main beneficiaries from LOSC, realizing as 
they did hitherto unknown controls over maritime domains and offshore 
resources. Notwithstanding the notable omission of western developed 
countries among the ratifying parties, the Convention nonetheless 
represented an impressive milestone in multilateral treaty making. 
Anderson frames the entry into force of LOSC in the following terms — 
As the number of parties grows, the Convention will prevail to an 
increasing extent. This provision signals rather clearly a formal stage in 
the process of evolution in the law of the sea. The law as it stood in the 
1960s is giving way more and more. The process of evolution began 
many years ago, at least by the 1970s when the 200-mile limit was 
accepted; but it has accelerated since 1982. Entry into force marks and 
formalises the change. The Convention of 1982 breaks new ground: new 
concepts abound. Entry into force of all Parts of the Convention means 
that States parties can take advantage of possibilities set out in the 
different Parts and Annexes. Equally, each State Party has to accept 
claims by other States parties based on the Convention. 125 
Consistent with its traditional support of UNCLOS, the Commonwealth in 
1994 passed legislation ratifying LOSC to ensure that Australia was aligned 
122 C. Conroy, "Agreement on Sea Law Within Reach After 20 Years" (1994) Insight 13-14. 
123 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 308. 
124 D. Anderson, "LOS Convention: Status and Prospects" (1994) 18 Marine Policy 494-497, p 496. 
125 0. Anderson, "Legal Implications of the Entry into Force of the UN Convention al the Law 
of the Sea" (1995) 44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 313-326, p 320. 
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with what Vallega termed the new sea use structure.' 26 One commentator 
describes the Commonwealth's ratification in terms of the history of 
Australian Law of the Sea policy — 
Following the necessary consultations with the States, industry and 
other interest groups, the Government decided that Australia should 
ratify the Convention prior to its entry into force on 16 November 1994. 
Australia will therefore be an original party to the Convention, an 
appropriate position given our traditional leadership role in the law of 
the sea negotiations. 127 
Rather than adopting the Convention in entirety, the implementing statute, 
the Maritime Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth), instead incorporated 
into Commonwealth law those parts of the Convention pertaining to the 
territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone. The relevant 
parts of the LOS Convention—Parts II, V and VI respectively—were 
scheduled in full to the amended Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth), 
replacing references to treaties dealing with the territorial sea and continental 
shelf signed at UNCLOS I in 1958. 128 The effect of these amendments was to 
expand the Commonwealth's control over marine resources, amounting to 
the articulated of a coherent policy direction. 
At the same time that Australia's EEZ came into effect, the continental 
shelf off north-western Australia and in several other well-chartered offshore 
areas was extended seaward a considerable distance beyond 200 miles, 
pursuant to Article 76 of LOSC. 129 This development was achieved by 
amending the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act to redefine the area to 
126 A. Vallega, Sea Management - A Theoretical Approach (Elsevier Applied Science, London, 
1992). 
127 C. Conroy, "The 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention; Entry Into Force and 
Australian Ratification" (1994) 3 Australian Environmental Law News 4-5, p 5. 
128 N. Evans, "LOS Convention in Australia and Senate Marine Pollution Inquiry" (1996) 13 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 3-5. 
129 Article 76 of the LOS Convention explicates distance and depth criteria upon which coastal 
States may make delineations of continental shelf areas. These maximum dimensions are 
350 miles distant from the baseline or 100 miles from the 2500 metre isobath. 
Chapter Five 	 242  
which this statute applied. 130 As has been discussed at length earlier, the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf defined offshore jurisdiction according 
to a depth and an exploitability criterion, a mix of criteria intended to 
compensate coastal States with narrow continental shelves. However, some 
coastal States abused these criteria by pushing legal shelf areas further 
seaward based upon the exploitability criterion. By acceding to the tighter 
legal definition of the continental shelf under LOSC, the Commonwealth has 
put itself beyond reproach in terms of claiming an extended continental shelf. 
The Convention does provide for coastal State exploitation of resources 
beyond 200 miles. In these situations the cost incurred is a royalty payable to 
the International Seabed Authority in respect of resources exploited outside 
of the EEZ. As was detailed in Chapter Four, Australia opposed this 
requirement at UNCLOS and delayed adopting the new definition until the 
treaty came into force. 131 Although the petroleum potential of the wide 
continental shelf and deep seabed is unknown, expected earnings from 
activity in this area will certainly absorb the additional royalty liability. 132 
The approach to offshore petroleum development has been applied to 
hard minerals mining as part of the Commonwealth's package approach to 
LOSC. The recently enacted Offshore Minerals Act establishes a mining 
regime parallel and similar to that which exists under the P(SL)A. Several 
authors have recognised that the minerals statute adopted the same joint 
authority structure of the P(SL)A, confirming the success of the joint decision 
making approach at overcoming offshore jurisdictional limitations.' 3 The 
Offshore Minerals Act also defines the continental shelf by reference to the 
1" Maritime Legisla ton Amendment Act 1994 (Cth) Schedule 1, amending the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) Schedule 2. 
131 Hildreth, op cit fn 81. 
132 A. Bergin, "Australia Adopts New Maritime Zones" (1992) 7 International Journal of 
Estuarine and Coastal Law 123-128. 
133 N. Evans, op cit fn 4; Rothwell, op cit fn 4. 
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petroleum legislation, a tactic designed to ensure consistency between 
regimes in terms of legal definitions and geophysical areas of application. 134 
The Offshore Minerals Act therefore applies to the same extended continental 
shelf area claimed by the Conunowealth for the purposes of petroleum 
development. Even allowing for the revenue sharing obligations associated 
with exploitation beyond 200 miles, it has been realized that Australia was 
one of the "great winners" under the LOS Convention. 135 
5.3.3.2 Limitations with the Commonwealth's implementation of LOSC 
The Commonwealth was clearly motivated to secure and enhance its control 
over the continental shelf, both during UNCLOS III negotiations and twelve 
years later when the resultant treaty entered into force. In haste to adopt the 
new provisions, however, a number of key policy areas were either poorly 
implemented or ignored. Changes to the fisheries regimes exemplify the 
former. Chapter Four reported how the Commonwealth established the 
Australian Fishing Zone in 1979 at the behest of its South Pacific neighbours, 
who were concerned to present a unified regional position at Law of the Sea 
negotiating sessions. It is only now that the Convention is in force that the 
Commonwealth has moved to the full EEZ regime. The existing AFZ regime 
has been retained, however, being redefined under the Fisheries Managment 
Act 1991 (Cth) as "the waters adjacent to Australia within the outer limits of 
the exclusive economic zone". 136 
At least two reasons have been proposed for the Commonwealth's 
legislative approach towards the offshore resources regimes. Firstly, the 
history of offshore policy in Australia meant that the OCS could not be 
threatened by legislative changes, and retaining the AFZ was one means by 
134 Ibid, Rothwell. 
135 P. Brazil, "UNCLOS Comes into Force - Implications for Mining" (1995) 14 Australian 
Mining and Petroleum Law Association Bulletin 1-3, p 2. 
136 Fisheries Managment Act 1991 (Cth) s 4(1). 
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which to best preserve existing fisheries arrangement. 137 It has also been 
suggested that Commonwealth agencies insisted on keeping the resource 
regimes separate. Retaining the AFZ ensured that extant legislation would 
continue to govern fishing and mining activities on the seabed and in the 
superjacent water space, "an approach which is certain to confuse." 138 
Stronger criticisms of the Commonwealth's LOSC policy apply to its lack 
of attention to provisions for protecting the marine environment. Prior to 
the Convention entering into force, Commonwealth jurisdiction over 
foreign vessels was limited to the enforcement of MARPOL provisions 
within the territorial sea. The Commonwealth has since legislated to expand 
its enforcement powers with respect to vessel-source pollution throughout 
the EEZ, consistent with Article 220 of the Convention. 1" 
Part XII of LOSC—Protection and Preservation of the Marine 
Environment—imposes upon coastal States the obligation to take action in 
six areas of marine pollution. 10 The more complex aspects of pollution 
policy—such as atmospheric deposition and land-based sources—were not 
the subject of legislative action by the Commonwealth. Moreover, legislation 
giving effect to Article 220 eschewed any connection with LOSC, unlike the 
Maritime Legislation Amendment Act to which were scheduled lengthy parts 
of the treaty text, quite clearly framed to implement the Convention. The 
Commonwealth was evidently cautious about incurring the wide 
environmental obligations flowing from LOSC. 141 
137 A. Bergin and M. Haward, "Australia's Approach to High Seas Fishing" (1995) 10 The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 349-367. 
138 Rothwell, op cit fn 4. 
139  Transport and Communications Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth) 
140  P. Birnie, "Maritime Policy and Legal Issues" (1994) 18 Marine Policy 483-493. 
141 Evans, op cit fn 4; Rothwell, op cit fn 4. 
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In response to the Commonwealth's partial implementation of the LOS 
Convention, a high-level Parliamentary committee in 1995 resolved to 
inquire into Australian marine pollution. 142 Although concerned primarily 
with the discharge by Australia of its obligations arising under Parts XII and 
XIII of the LOS Convention, the Inquiry's Terms of Reference also reach 
beyond the Convention and engage with issues of community input, 
recreational impacts, and biodiversity conservation. The logical response to 
the inquiry is the imperative to consider a national oceans policy. 143 
The topic of a national oceans policy is pursued further in Chapter Six. For 
the moment, it is worth highlighting the attempt by the Prime Minster's 
office to wrest control of marine affairs from line agencies as a first move in 
this directon, an event reported elsewhere by this author. 144 At the end of 
1995, scarcely before the Senate Inquiry had begun its work, the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC) made a concerted effort to assume 
responsibility for developing a national oceans policy, riding in the wake of 
the LOS Convention and related Commonwealth legislative activity. 145 At 
that time, the Science and Engineering Council (PMSEC) within PMC 
prepared a report for the Prime Minister's consideration, arguing therein that 
142 Evans, op cit fn 125. 
143 Senate Environment, Recreation, Communications and the Arts References Committee 
"Marine Pollution Inquiry" Hansard, Senate 26 June 1995. The year-long Senate References 
Committee inquiry is framed by four Terms of Reference: the adequacy of existing 
Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation to give effect to Australia's obligations 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and other international 
treaties, to address land-based and ship-sourced marine pollution and its effects; 
administrative arrangements required to better conserve the marine and coastal 
environment, including consideration of an oceans management policy and its 
implementation and the scientific research needed to achieve this; impact of pollution at 
water and sediment quality, marine biodiversity, and commercial and recreational users; 
and ways of maximizing local community involvement in all aspects of the assessment and 
management of marine and coastal pollution. 
1" Evans, op cit fn 113. 
145 Personal communication, Dr Frances Michaelis, Parliamentary Research Service, 19 April 
1996. 
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options for developing an oceans policy should be seriously pursued by the 
Commonwealth.m 
It is doubtful that PMC could have fulfilled the coordination role for such 
a grand initiative, given the tortuous history of offshore resources policy in 
Australia. Homeshaw also identifies fundamental problems with the PMSEC 
model which militated against this agency making meaningful progress with 
developing an oceans policy. 147 In the event, history repeated itself and the 
Liberal-National Coalition was returned to government in the federal 
election of March 1996 before the subject could be explored further. 
The change of government gave temporary respite to the idea of 
developing an oceans policy. As the next chapter describes, a year after 
assuming office the development of an oceans policy was reinvigorated by 
the Commonwealth. This time, however, it was driven by the Minister for 
the Environment, a cabinet minister with strong personal interests in marine 
environmental affairs. As is discussed further in the next chapter, it is 
precisely because of the ministerial nurturing of the nascent oceans policy 
that this development is likely to come to eventual fruition. 
5.4 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER FIVE 
The most notable feature of the period 1983 to 1995 was the Hawke 
Government's persistent and confident amendment of the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act to ensure that the Commonwealth assumed a more 
dominant role in offshore petroleum policy. This legislative strategy was 
146 Prime Minister's Science and Engineering Council Australia's Ocean Age: Science and 
Technology for Managing our Ocean Territory (Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, Canberra, 1995), Recommendation 1. 
147 "The establishment of such agencies often creates conflict because they usurp the 
coordinating, regulatory and allocative functions previously assinged to members of sectoral 
subgovemments." J. Homeshaw, "Policy Community, Policy Networks and Science Policy in 
Australia" (1995) 54 Australian Journal of Public Administration 520-532, p 529. 
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unlikely the product of a grand vision for offshore development, though. 
Rather, because offshore jurisdiction was so firmly—perhaps 
irreversibly—settled by the OCS, the Commonwealth was forced to search for 
creative or innovative means by which to advance its offshore policy 
priorities. A series of amendments to the P(SL)A enacted by the Hawke 
Government had the effect of expanding the role of the Commonwealth in 
offshore policy making. The particular mechanism employed, most 
effectively, for this purpose was to replace the designated by the joint 
authority in most areas of decision making. 
In her comparative study of the Canadian and Australian offshore 
petroleum regimes, Hunt keenly observes these amendments to the P(SL)A — 
Some informants have suggested that, under the 1967 Agreement's 
mirror legislation concept, it was difficult to orchestrate amendments 
between all the parties and, as a result, few amendments were made to 
the common mining code. These problems have all but disappeared 
under the 1979 Offshore Consititutional Settlement. The 
Commonwealth is now clearly in the driver's seat so far as 
amendments to its PSLA are concerned. While the States are consulted 
in advance of amendments, only serious political pressure would 
deviate the Commonwealth from the pursuit of its policy objectives. 
The erosion of the powers of the DA and the enhancement of the 
powers of the Joint Authority (JA) since 1983 amply demonstrate the 
Commonwealth's attitude that its policies should prevail in the 
adjacent areas. 148 
As well as amending the jurisdictional arrangements under the P(SL)A, the 
Commonwealth became visibly more active in its interactions with industry. 
In spite of strong protest from industry operators, the Hawke Government 
persisted in enacting rather radical changes to the revenue regimes and a 
miscellany of other conditions applying to offshore development on the 
continental shelf. A comment made by Norm Sanders, leader of the 
Australian Democrats [the party holding the balance of power in the Senate] 
148 Hunt, op cit fn 3 pp 107-108. 
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during debate on cash bidding encapsulates the outcome of these 
amendments — 
We have to start now getting away from the attitude that merely to drill 
for more oil will solve our problems ... This Bill is a step in the direction 
of putting the oil industry on notice that it will not bet exactly what it 
wants. It will get an adequate profit out of this, it will get a good enough 
deal, but it will not get exactly what it wants. 149 
The lengthy rule of the Hawke-Keating Government [twelve years] provided 
the offshore petroleum regime with a unique opportunity to mature, 
uninterrupted by inter-governmental disputes which had hitherto 
characterized the whole offshore saga. It is crucial to recognize that the 
continental shelf, the area to which the P(SL)A applies and where the vast 
reserves of offshore oil are found, is a Commonwealth place. The amended 
regime reflects the logic and necessity of joint decision-making in relation to 
this expansive offshore area, while reserving to the Commonwealth a right 
to veto designated authority decisions, or prevail in the event of 
disagreement between the Comonwealth and states. When reminded of the 
constitutional basis of the continental shelf, the reform of the P(SL)A during 
this fourth evolutionary period is considered as best evidencing the 
Commonwealth's maturity in developing and administering policy through 
legislation. 
Chapter Six of the thesis now updates to 1998 the P(SL)A under the 
Howard Coalition Government. Most of the tension and extreme redefining 
of offshore jurisdiction under the petroleum legislation has now obviated. 
The few years of post-Hawke Government have seen the extant regime 
largely consolidated. Several major policy initiatives have been commenced 
by the Commonwealth under the new government, and these are also 
introduced. 
149 Hansard, Senate, p 1332. 
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Current Developments in Offshore Petroleum Policy — 
1996-1998 
The extended Hawke-Keating Labor Government provided a continuity and 
stability in offshore resources policy that had until the 1980s been missing in 
Australia. Over this period the Commonwealth was able to significantly 
advance its marine resources priorities without reopening basic jurisdictional 
questions. Labor's thirteen year reign ended in March 1996 when the Liberal 
Coalition Government was returned to power. In the two years since that 
time the P(SL)A regime has been maintained largely unaltered, having 
reached a condition of maturity in terms of satisfactorily aligning 
Commonwealth and state offshore responsibilities and interests. There is 
however, a high level of Commonwealth/industry interaction. The strength 
of the relationship between the new government and the petroleum sector 
has provided the latter with the opportunity to have revisited some of the 
policies introduced by Labor which it opposed. Foremost amongst these is the 
resource rent tax. 1 
A number of technical matters relating to the determination of offshore - 
zones are also being addressed by the Commonwealth. The inner and outer 
margins of Australia's oceanic jurisdiction are being resurveyed to support 
additional claims over offshore areas under the Law of the Sea Convention. 
Both the baseline from which the territorial sea is drawn and the extended 
limits of the continental shelf may be drawn more generously now that 
Australia has ratified LOSC. Under provisions of this treaty, coastal States can 
claim continental shelves that exceed in width 200 miles, provided that these 
1 "Deep water producers seek resolution m tax changes" The Australian 10 March 1998; 
"Canberra reviews tax on gas fields" The Age 10 March 1998. 
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extended zones are mapped and delineated. The Commonwealth is therefore 
able to realize a much enlarged continental shelf, with implications for the 
development of offshore seabed resources. 
Another new initiative receiving a high profile is the oceans policy. The 
concept of an oceans policy has been the subject of occasional—if not 
tentative expressions of interest from academia and government, but 
without ever being converted into a statement of intention approximating a 
coherent policy.' The Howard Liberal Government is committed to 
developing an oceans policy to coincide with 1998, the United Nations 
International Year of the Oceans.' Perhaps most importantly, the policy defers 
heavily to extant resource regimes. Legislation governing marine resources 
activity will be continued without reform under the final oceans policy, in 
recognition of the utility of the legislative models in place. 
The development and status of the oceans policy as the vision of this 
government is outlined in the first part of this chapter. Part 2 then reviews 
the offshore petroleum policy initiatives of the Howard Government, while 
some of the specific matters relating to Australian offshore boundaries are 
introduced in the final part. 
6.1 THE COMMONWEALTH OCEANS POLICY 
6.1.1 Developing the Oceans Policy 
The previous discussions about the Offshore Constitutional Settlement have 
shown how the various arrangements agreed thereunder between the two 
2 A. Bergin, "Australian Ocean Policy - the Need for Review" (1986) 10 Marine Policy 155-157; 
W. Ederson, Australia and the Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention (ANU 
Law School, Canberra, 1987); Review of Marine Research Organisation (AGPS, Canberra, 
1993). 
3 Australia's Oceans - Oceans Policy Consultation Paper (Department of the Environment, 
Canberra, 1997). 
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spheres of government were conceived as an integrated package. The OCS 
was never intended to amount to an articulated oceans policy, however, even 
though most sectors of interest were included within its ambit. Seventeen 
more years were to pass before the notion of an oceans policy appeared on the 
governmental agenda. 
A certain momentum had to be generated before the Commonwealth 
would seriously contemplate embarking upon the path that might lead to an 
eventual policy. The main driver in this respect was a panoply of reviews 
concerning marine matters conducted during the early 1990s, some of which 
were canvassed in Chapter Five. Several influential reports addressing 
marine science and engineering also appeared around this time.' Davis 
identifies the important and timely confluence of these domestic events with 
those of an international scope, particularly the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development and the LOS Convention. He observes 
that twin foreign and domestic imperatives influenced the Commonwealth's 
eventual commitment to pursue a national oceans policy - 
In a very real sense there is no 'Australian' oceans policy as yet, but 
rather a multiplicity of narrow sectoral concerns reflecting the diverse 
priorities of each state and the Commonwealth. Numerous 
commentators have drawn attention to the fragmentation of oceans 
governance in Australia, but little remedial action has been taken ... In 
the case of Australian oceans policy it is less a question of whether 
duplication is occurring, but more a question of whether there is any 
holistic perspective at all. Thus far, Australia appears to have failed this 
test and now finds itself under pressure, given many international and 
domestic obligations to consider.' 
Clearly, the accumulation of expectations—both national 	and 
international—lent considerable insistence to the need for the 
4 See, Oceans of Wealth (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989); Review 
of Marine Research Organisation (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 
1993). 
5  B. Davis, "National Responses to UNCED Outcomes: Australia", in L. Kriwokert, M. Haward, 
D. VanderZwaag and B. Davis (ed), Oceans Law and Policy in the Post-LINCED Era: 
Australian and Canadian Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, London, 1996) pp 25-40, p 
26. 
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Commonwealth to prepare at least a policy basis underpining all offshore 
sectors. The presence of external factors—however influential—would not 
necessarily persuade the Commonwealth to develop this missing basis, 
however. Like other scholars, Haward recognizes the influence of such policy 
initiatives as the IGAE and ESD working groups on moves towards 
developing an oceans policy.' Importantly, though, he locates this trend 
within the context of evolving offshore intergovernmental relations and the 
improved vertical harmonization of marine resources policy. At the very 
least, Commonwealth agencies—and to a lesser extent research bodies—are 
communicating more openly across sectoral interests, and it is this exchange 
which greatly facilitated the ambitious oceans policy. 
The formal imprimatur to develop a national oceans policy came from 
the new Prime Minister, John Howard, one year after assuming office. In his 
speech to Parliament announcing the initiative, the Prime Minister explicitly 
referred to the philosophy underpinning the oceans policy — 
I am delighted to fulfil another election promise today by announcing 
the development of the coalition government's policy on Australia's 
oceans. This is a policy which will balance the needs of the 
environment with the needs of resource security and jobs. We will 
work with state and local governments and communities to put 
together a comprehensive strategy ... We will put in place a balanced 
and integrated .oceans policy ranging across all jurisdictions. This will 
provide certainty for both industry and the marine environment. The 
government believes one can reconcile the environment and 
development. 
Perhaps surprisingly, relatively few difficulties were encountered in defining 
the content of the oceans policy. Matters pertaining to administrative 
arrangements assumed almost insurmountable dimensions, however [more 
in the next section]. The attempt by the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet to adopt lead agency role on marine affairs [described earlier in 
6 M. Haward, "Institutional Framework for Australian Ocean and Coastal Management" (1996) 
33 Ocean and Coastal Management 19-39. 
Hansard, House of Representatives, 3 March 1997, p 1698. 
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Chapter Five] disappeared with the election of the Howard government. 
More creditable contenders for this coordinating role were the Departments 
of Industry, Science and Tourism, Primary Industries and Energy, and 
Attorney-General's. In the event, the task of preparing the oceans policy was 
given to the Environment Minister, Robert Hill. The enormity of his 
directive did not go unnoticed at the time of the Government's 
announcement — 
The Howard Government, confronted with the Herculean task of 
appeasing state interests, international interests, and commercial 
interests, has placed responsibility for the policy with the Minister for 
the Enviroment, Senator Robert Hill ...ministers are shy on divulging 
details about the policy's progress ... Certainly the issues underpinning a 
national ocean policy are politically volatile and the stakes are high for 
affected industries.' 
Charging the Environment Minister with oceans policy responsibility was 
almost inevitable as his portfolio was the one with true cross-sectoral 
perspectives. However, the directive to satisfy the multiplicity of offshore 
interests within the current legislative framework was in fact the greatest 
constraint to developing the oceans policy. Because each sector was 
determined to preserve its sphere of offshore activity there was little to really 
negotiate in terms of policy development. 
6.1.2 The Process and Substance of the Oceans Policy 
Following Prime Minister Howard's announcement of the oceans policy, an 
iterative process of drafting and consultation was undertaken leading to the 
release of a draft policy in May 1998. There were several parallel threads to the 
process. Firstly, an initial consultation paper released in March 1997 
stimulated a considerable volume of public submissions, which were collated 
and analyzed to help refine the policy over the year. A series of Issues and 
Background Papers were commissioned by the Department of the 
"Ocean awaits policy wake-up call" The Canberra Times, 18 January 1997. 
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Environment to elicit feedback in relation to specified topics, such as 
biological diversity and international legal instruments.' Workshops 
involving key stakeholders were also held around the country throughout 
the year, culminating with a public forum at Parliament House in December. 
The Environment Minister also established a Ministerial Advisory Group on 
Oceans Policy (MAGOP) to provide stakeholder feedback directly to his office, 
complementary to departmental efforts. Finally, portfolio marine agencies 
contributed to developing the policy through their own internal processes. 
Following the year-long policy development process, in May 1998 the 
Commonwealth released the draft oceans policy for a final round of public 
consideration." Every sector of marine activity was contemplated by the draft 
oceans policy. For the most part, the policy identified a number of issues 
associated with each sector and committed the Commonwealth to a course of 
action or a number of responses in respect of those sectoral issues. The 
responses were expressed in non-committal, hortatory terms, though, 
effectively ensuring that the basis of offshore regimes would not be revisited. 
Indeed, it was the strength of existing regimes that ensured the oceans policy 
would "retain and build on strengths in existing sectoral and resource 
management arrangements." 11 
The oceans policy was intended to therefore serve as a framework for 
better aligning activity across existing sectors. Within this developmental 
framework, the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act was referred to as a 
"leading example of joint Commonwealth-State natural resource 
management."' In terms of future directions the draft oceans policy 
proposed to — 
A list of the Oceans Policy Background and Issues Papers is provided in Appendix Three. 
" Australia's Oceans Policy—An Issues Paper (Department of the Environment, Canberra 1998). 
Ibid. p 10. 
Ibid, p 16. A - copy of the full oceans policy description of the P(SL)A is reproduced in 
Appendix Three. 
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Build on existing petroleum and minerals management regimes to 
incorporate ecosystem and cross-sectoral considerations in an integrated 
approach to marine resource use and access decision-making that is 
consistent with the principles of ecologically sustainable development 
and multiple and sequential use.' 
Quite clearly, the foundation of offshore policy, the Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement, was to be continued intact by the oceans policy, as had occurred 
several years earlier with the entry into force of the LOS Convention. This 
position with respect to the OCS was originally settled in the cabinet decision 
endorsing development of the oceans policy. 14 Notwithstanding cabinet's 
imprimatur of the OCS, it was recognised that "some changes to the OCS 
administrative arrangements may need to be considered"." 
As commented, the substantive framework of the oceans policy was 
settled fairly easily, the result of the exhaustive consultative process 
combined with the fact that no major readjustments of legislation were 
proposed. The greatest stresses on the oceans policy arose at its latter stages, 
when it became necessary to canvass institutional changes to give effect to the 
formative policy. A principal vehicle through which these options were 
being considered was MAGOP, which in early 1998 produced a report wherein 
it examined the question of new institutional arrangement models. The 
MAGOP report noted that — 
Unanimity was not reached on this issue. One view was that current 
institutional, planning and management arrangements are flexible 
enough to enable increased communication, coordination and 
consultation through these arrangements. A second view was that the 
current arrangements are fragmented and lack a strategic focus and 
integrated approach to the conservation of the ocean's biological 
diversity. New arrangements are needed to give a more strategic 
planning focus and to provide greater integration of use and planning.' 
"Ibid. p 48. 
14 Oceans Policy: CabinetPosition, (Cabinet-in-Confidence submission # JH96/0507, undated). 
" Ibid. 
16 Report of the Ministerial Advisory Group cn Oceans Policy-Australia's Oceans Policy 
(Department of the Environment, Canberra, 1998). 
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As of August 1998, the subject of institutional arrangements had not been 
settled. A Senior Officials Working Group on Institutional Arrangements 
was formed with the explicit purpose of progressing discussions on the 
matter.' It seems that the most likely model to emerge from ongoing 
negotiations over institutional arrangements is an intergovernmental oceans 
coordination forum located within the Department of the Environment, 
charged with coordinating marine policy between portfolio sectors but 
without intervention capacities. There are tensions over this reduced model, 
however, which have lead to the prospect of the states withdrawing from the 
oceans policy with the resultant product being a Commonwealth rather than 
a national policy.' 
6.2 THE HOWARD GOVERNMENT AND OFFSHORE PE 	TROLEUM 
6.2.1 The role of the Commonwealth Minister 
With the incoming of a new Commonwealth government it was to be 
expected that a new compact of intergovernmental and industrial relations 
would be entered into. Perhaps the notable aspect of the brief office of the 
Howard Government, however, is the effective continuation of the offshore 
petroleum legislation and policies commenced under Hawke. In fact, where 
different emphases in policy as between the Howard and Hawke 
Governments can be observed these are attributable to the continued 
maturation of the regime rather than to philosophical differences in politics. 
Put another way, despite the posturings of the new government there were 
few policy dimensions to distinguish the Commonwealth's approach to 
offshore petroleum under the two governments. The policy position that had 
17 Oceans Policy Status Report # 10 (Department of the Environment internal correspondence, 11 
August 1998). 
18 Standing Committee at Fisheries and Aquaculture, Meeting # 38 (4-5 August 1998, Hobart); 
Agenda No. B6 "Oceans Policy". 
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increasingly emerged since the early 1980s was maintained and refined under 
the Howard Government. 
The factor which most facilitated further refinement of the P(SL)A was 
the very personal interest in mineral resources of the Minister for Resources 
and Energy, Warwick Parer, and his close relationship with Prime Minister 
Howard. The confluence of these two factors was commented upon recently 
in the print media — 
... it was in the 1960s, with the Bass Strait oil discovery and 
development, that Parer was propelled into the industry ... So with 
Howard's long-standing friendship it was no surprise that, despite an 
innocuous parliamentary career in Opposition, Parer was rewarded with 
a ministry. His expertise in the mining industry was lauded as the 
perfect grounding for the resources and energy portfolio." 
In general terms, the Commonwealth is seen to have moved to better service 
the needs of the resource industries under the Howard Government. For 
example, the 1998 release of offshore acreage was noted as the largest ever 
conducted in Australia, being offered "in response to industry interest"." The 
release was also made under the work program bidding system rather than 
the much-resented cash bidding system introduced through legislation of the 
Hawke Government in 1987. 
Despite these micro-level policy decisions under the P(SL)A, there were - 
no changes to the legislation. As argued by this thesis, the legislative regime 
has matured to the extent that the Commonwealth has now aligned its 
interests relative to state governments and industry. The most important 
contribution to offshore petroleum policy made by the new government was 
to release a Commonwealth resources policy providing a framework for 
administering the P(SL)A. 
19 "A lifetime link with the mining industry" The Australian, 13 March 1998. Also, Address to 
Australian Coal Operations Conference, Wollongong, 18 February 1998. 
" Address by the Minister for Resources and Energy to the 1998 APPEA Conference Delivering 
National Prosperity, Canberra, 9 March 1998. 
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6.2.2 Minerals and Petroleum Resources Policy Statement 
The Commonwealth's first ever resources policy was released in early 1998. 
Minister Parer expressed his Government's sentiment towards meeting the 
needs of industry when lauching the policy statement - 
... Australia needs a clear and comprehensive strategy to ensure that our 
minerals and petroleum industries can use their strengths, energy and 
ingenuity to sustain and enhance their competitiveness. They will need 
to set world standards of performance, while meeting community 
expectations, in all aspects of their operations. To help these industries 
realize sustained and confident competitiveness, the Government has 
accepted that all Commonwealth decisions affecting the resources sector 
should be taken within a clear and cohesive framework of objectives 
and principles which recognizes its circumstances, importance and 
potential.' 
The resources policy is structured around five key elements: providing 
certainty to investors in terms of their rights and responsibilities; creating a 
competitive economic operating environment; supporting industry efforts to 
sustain wealth generation through value-adding; protecting the 
environment, workforce and broader community interests; and allowing 
industry to respond to international pressures and opportunities." Under the 
umbrella of the resources policy several subject areas were highlighted by 
either the Government or industry for revision. 
Firstly, the Government has undertaken to amend the P(SL)A to clarify - 
several areas of decision-making, as experience with the offshore regime has 
revealed some new or lingering problems. In launching the resources policy, 
Minister Parer stated that - 
The Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments are presently 
considering a package of amendments to the Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Act. This package seeks to improve legislative processes, 
streamline administration and remove unnecessary or outdated 
21 Address by the Minister for Resources and Energy at the Launch of the Commonwealth 
Government's Minerals and Petroleum Resources Policy Statement, Canberra, 2 February 
1998. 
Minerals and Petroleum Resources Policy Statement (Department of Primary Industries and 
Energy, Canberra, 1998), "Principles for Government Action". 
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requirements. One proposed amendment will change the term of 
Production and Pipeline Licences to facilitate long life projects such as 
LNG developments. Another proposal will provide developers with 
secure tenure over petroleum facilities located outside of a Production 
Licence area. A further proposal will seek to increase the turnover of 
acreage to encourage new exploration. The proposed amendments have 
been extensively discussed with industry, through APPEA, and there is 
substantial agreement on them. Industry involvement in this exercise 
has been most constructive and appreciated by all levels of 
Government.' 
A second subject area addressed by the resources statement is that of 
environmental approvals for petroleum development. The policy commits 
the Commonwealth to "streamlining its regulatory framework for 
environmental management" in all resources sectors.' With respect to 
offshore petroleum, this revised approach is to be achieved by promulgating 
objective-based regulations under the P(SL)A requiring operators to prepare 
environment plans wherein performance standards and criteria will be 
justified.' The new regulations are to be promulgated later in 1998. 
Regulations will succeed in meeting the Government's commitment of 
providing celerity to the offshore industry in terms of environmental 
protection requirements. The cost, however, is a further erosion of public 
accountability which would otherwise be available through formal 
environmental impact assessment. As was described in the previous chapter,. 
offshore development has with one exception avoided external 
environmental review.' This lack of oversight will be perpetuated through 
the modified regime proposed by the Government. Insofar as the argument 
advanced in this thesis is concerned, internalizing environmental review 
Address by the Minister for Resources and Energy, op cit fn 21; 5(b) Review of Offshore 
Petroleum Legislation. 
" Resources Policy Statement, op cit fn 22; Part Two "The Way Ahead". 
Address by the Minister for Resources and Energy, op cit fn 21; 5(f) Environment. 
In addition to the lack of external oversight, resources legislation is very poorly constructed 
to adequately address environemental issues. See, A. Bradbrook, "Energy Law: The 
Neglected Aspect of Environmental Law" (1993) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 1-19. 
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under the P(SL)A further demonstrates the Commonwealth's policy making 
capacities. 
The most contentious area of offshore petroleum decision-making being 
revisited by the resources policy statement is the resource rent tax. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, the RRT was introduced by the Hawke 
Government in 1987 to apply to greenfields projects, much to the chagrin of 
the offshore industry. Ten years later in the mid-1990s, the Australian 
Petroleum Production and Exploration Association in particular relied upon 
the sympathies of a receptive minister to broach the topic of repeal or 
amendment of the RRT legislation. Immediately following the election of the 
Howard Government, APPEA raised on the public agenda the issue of the 
RRT, suggesting that the petroleum industry could double in fifteen years if 
secondary taxes were abolished on deepwater oil developments and new LNG 
projects. APPEA chief executive [Dick Wells] cautioned "that Australia could 
lose the chance to develop new petroleum projects worth $60 billion if there 
were no change to the way they were taxed."' 
At that time, Minister Parer refused to give any assurance that the 
Commonwealth would remove the RRT, nor that it "considered such a 
move necessary."' Notwithstanding Parer's intimate association with the 
minerals resouces sector, the Government's position as articulated in the 
1998 resources policy statement remained non-committal towards abolishing 
the RRT. To break the impasse between the Commonwealth and industry 
over the RRT, the Government in March appointed an international oil 
expert from the University of Aberdeen to compare the Australian fiscal 
regime applied to offshore activity with other regimes around the world." 
'7 "Tax cut 'to double petroleum output- The West Australian, 18 June 1996. 
28 Ibid. 
29 "Resource tax review" Herald Sun, 10 March 1998; "Deep water producers seek resolution an 
tax changes" The Australian, 10 March 1998. 
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Some commentaries where hopeful that the appointment of an expert 
reviewer heralded a shift in Commonwealth policy towards the RRT. One 
newspaper suggested that the "Federal Government is edging closer to 
granting tax breaks for the development of remote oil and gas projects in 
water depths of more than 400 metres.' The oil industry was considerably 
more stoic in its response to the RRT review, having campaigned for more 
than two years—under an ostensibly sympathetic government—to have the 
RRT replaced. The nation's leading finance newspaper reported debate on 
RRT reform in the following terms — 
APPEA's next tax reform proposal revolves around gaining tax relief for 
risky deep-water exploration beyond the margins of Australia's 
continental shelf. Mr Heath [APPEA chair] said detailed discussions 
with the Federal Government were under way but no immediate 
resolution of the deep-water issue was likely.' 
From the public record, it appears that industry's expectations of a compliant 
government decision on the future of the RRT have been dashed. This being 
the case, the Government's resolve to inform the offshore 
industry—through policy decisions—that the Commonwealth was now 
setting the agenda for petroleum policy is again apparent. Aside from some 
shifts between parties as to minor operational matters, the parameters for 
offshore development in the Commonwealth sphere are now firmly 
established. 
In relation to the argument advanced in this thesis, the Commonwealth 
is seen to be strengthening its position through political and legislative 
means rather than by jurisdictional disputes, as shown in the evolution and 
maturity of the P(SL)A. It is also important to discuss recent evolutions in the 
offshore relationship between the Commonwealth and Western Australia. 
As occurred during the early 1980s, Liberal Coalition governments are now in 
"Canberra reviews tax of gas fields" The Age, 10 March 1998. 
31 "Oil and gas industry rides high" Financial Review, 9 March 1998. 
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power federally and the state of Western Australia. Despite the convenience 
for offshore policy making of this situation, dissent between the two 
governments is now beginning to foment over the distribution of offshore 
costs and benefits, an issue discussed elsewhere by this author.' The state 
government is increasingly burdened by the necessity of supplying onshore 
infrastructure to support offshore development located in Commonwealth 
waters, a contribution for which it receives little recompense. As offshore 
operators move further offshore to exploit petroleum reserves, and the state 
receives correspondingly less direct revenue through royalties, this situation 
is likely to deteriorate further. 
After nine months of negotiating with the new Commonwealth 
Government over the fiscal elements of the petroleum regime, the Western 
Australian Minister for Resources [Cohn Barnett] expressed his dissatisfaction 
with having to support Commonwealth offshore activity in this manner. 
... you have both Commonwealth and State jurisdiction and also a 
sequence of ad valorem royalties in the State areas and resources rent 
taxes in the Commonwealth areas. It seems to me that having ...a mix 
of different fiscal regimes is not productive for the industry in the long 
term. Unless we tackle that issue and get it right you will start to get 
investment decisions which are biased according to where the fiscal 
regime is. The Commonwealth (through company tax) is the major 
winner out of the oil and gas industry. But the State also has 
responsibility for infrastructure, both economic and social, such as 
schools and hospitals plus ... the administrative responsibility over 
safety and environmental law. I'm asking them to come to a sensible 
sharing arrangement which will allow everyone to win." 
The interesting message to come from this obvious expression of discontent 
on Western Australia's part is that there are possibly very real limits to the 
utility of the joint authority arrangement. Whilst the state obviously benefits 
32 N. Evans and J. Bailey, "Jurisdiction and Offshore Petroleum in Australia: Creating 
Symmetry Between the Commonwealth and States by Sharing Benefits and Avoiding Costs" 
(1997) 33 Ocean and Coastal Management 173-204. 
"Minister warns of royalty threat to oil, gas billions" The Weekend Australian, 21-22 
December 1996. 
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from being able to participate in continental shelf decision-making, and does 
appreciate a royalty gain in fixed proportion to the value of wellhead oil, 
being exluded from reaping a greater dividend perhaps seriously constrains 
the regime [notwithstanding, of course, that continental shelf resources 
accrue exclusively to the Commonwealth]. 
Less certain, however, is the scope of this perceived inequity. Barnett's 
view suggests that Western Australia is seeking compensation for providing 
essential shore-based services to the Commonwealth, which currently go 
unaccounted in policy making. A more expansive interpretation is that the 
steady state of jurisdictional maturity attained by the regime now permits the 
state to challenge other dimensions, such as revenue arrangements. Chapter 
Five recounted how Victoria sought to realize a greater share of offshore 
revenue by directing the rate of production to be increased, at the 
inopportune moment when the Hawke Government was contemplating 
wholesale reform of offshore arrangements. Western Australia has possibly 
been more patient in this respect, having consolidated its position in offshore 
policy and administration before attending to fiscal aspects. 
A final observation from the present offshore arrangements would seem 
to support such an interpretation. In addition to the frustations expressed 
over revenue-sharing, Western Australia is also decrying the lack of any 
obligatory local content requirements for operations in Commonwealth 
waters.34 Projects operating in Western Australian coastal waters are required 
under State Agreement Acts to source a certain portion of goods. labour, 
materials and services from local suppliers. Minister Barnett has noted that 
no similar requirements apply in respect of continental shelf activities, "one 
of the least attractive outcomes of the present system."' Western Australia's 
"Local content proposal buoys oil and gas industry hopefuls" The Australian, 18 August 1998. 
35 "Minister warns of royalty threat to oil, gas billions" The Weekend Australian, 21-22 
December 1996. 
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long history with onshore resource development, its experience with 
providing shore-based facilities for offshore activities in both state and 
Commonwealth waters, and its administrative load as the designated 
authority, has undoubtedly enhanced the state's understanding of the 
technical demands of offshore development. When put in this perspective, it 
is unsurprising that Western Australia feels it is not being adequately 
compensated for its role in offshore policy making. 
6.3 EXTENDING AUSTRALIA'S OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES 
6.3.1 Redrawing territorial sea boundaries 
In parallel with policy initiatives in relation to offshore petroleum, efforts are 
underway to redraw territorial sea baselines and expand the area of sea under 
Australian jurisdiction. Chapter Four described how baselines were 
proclaimed early in 1983 delineating the territorial sea, thereby bringing the 
OCS into effect. It was noted that these baselines were drawn very 
conservatively compared with those permissible under the newly concluded 
Law of the Sea Convention. In 1998, the Commonwealth embarked upon an 
exercise to draw the territorial sea baseline further seaward relying upon the 
relevant provision of LOSC pertaining to straight baselines.' Rothwell 
describes the importance of this move in the following terms - 
In 1983 Australia declared straight baselines around certain areas of the 
coast by reference to lowest astronomical tide ... While these baselines 
were considered suitable at the time, following the extension of 
Australia's territorial sea, and the Australian ratification of UNCLOS, 
there now exists the potential for the baselines to be reviewed ... If 
Australia redrew its baselines in conformity with UNCLOS there would 
be a number of consequences. First, new areas of internal waters would 
be created, thereby extending Australian sovereignty. Second, the new 
baselines would become the basis for all Australia's maritime claims 
with the result that these claims would be asserted further offshore. 
Third, the enclosure of certain waters within baselines would give 
Australia enhanced capacity to protect particularly sensitive marine 
'6 Law of the Sea Convention, Article 7. 
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environments, such as those found in the Great Barrier Reef and Torres 
Strait." 
The Commonwealth's enthusiasm in expanding the offshore areas under its 
jurisdiction has been criticised by at least one commentator." The particular 
criticism relates to the poor technical basis of the territorial sea baselines 
drawn around some of Australia's external territories. Notwithstanding 
criticisms about the technical content of these claims, the legislative 
framework is already being updated to absorb changes to resource titles that 
will be necessary as a result of baselines being redrawn, guaranteeing the 
validity of valuable offshore titles. 
The particular means by which this security is to be achieved is through 
amendment to the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act. The P(SL)A was 
amended in 1997 to enable pipeline licences granted thereunder to be 
continued intact regardless of the effect of changes to the boundary of the 
particular adjacent area of new baselines." That the Commonwealth should 
legislate in this manner—before new baselines are even drawn—reveals 
clearly its intention to maximize claims over offshore areas. Minister Parer's 
second reading speech for the legislation conveys this intention, and 
contextualizes future offshore claims within the OCS — 
The amendments to the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act will ensure 
that petroleum pipelines on the Australian continental shelf that carry 
petroleum from a source outside Australian waters come within the 
scope of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 ... The amendments 
will also ensure that changes to the territorial sea baselines do not 
impact on any offshore petroleum pipelines granted under 
Commonwealth jurisdiction. This will give certainty to holders of 
offshore pipeline licences if changes to baselines occur. Similar 
amendments relating to petroleum exploration permits, production 
licences and retention leases will be introduced after necessary 
37 D. Rothwell, 'The Legal Framework for Ocean and Coastal Management in Australia" (1996) 
33 Ocean and Coastal Management 41-61, p 45. 
38 V. Prescott, "Australia's Proclamation of an Exdusive Economic Zone (EEZ)" (1995) 10 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 95-105. 
"Primary Industries and Energy Legislation Amendment Act (No. 2) 1997 (Cth). 
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consultation with the states and the Northern Territory is concluded. 
Under the provisions of the offshore constitutional settlement, states 
and the Northern Territory are expected to mirror these amendments in 
their offshore petroleum legislation.' 
6.3.2 Claims over the extended continental shelf 
Complementing efforts to redraw the inner boundaries of Australian 
jurisdiction the Commonwealth is also engaged in redefining the seaward 
extent of the continental shelf. The ambulatory effect of the 1958 definition of 
the continental shelf has been treated at length earlier, so this wont be 
restated again here. Suffice it to restate that the absolute maximum rule for 
outer continental shelf boundaries provided by the LOS Convention are 350 
miles from the territorial sea baseline or not distant than 100 miles of the 
2500 metre isobath. Article 76 of LOSC permits coastal States to use whichever 
criterion is most suitable to particular continental shelf areas. 
Chapter Five described the Commonwealth's accesion to the definition of 
the continental shelf contained in the 1982 treaty, to ensure that its offshore 
policy is current with international practice. Having adopted the more 
expansive definition, it is now incumbent upon the Commonwealth to chart 
the continental shelf and deposit the necessary technical information with 
the Commission on the Limits on the Continental Shelf—established by. 
LOSC—for verification.' 
Following the election of the Howard Government and the resultanat 
budgetary restraints, grave concerns arose as to the ability of the 
Commonwealth to discharge its continental shelf obligations under the 
Convention. Substantial reductions in the budget of the Australian 
Geological Survey Organisation (AGS0)—the Commonwealth's primary 
Hansard, Senate, 16 June 1997, p 4227. 
41 Law of the Sea Convention, Article 76(8). 
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repository of geological information—threatened to curtail if not completely 
halt the offshore mapping program — 
The cuts include the likely beaching of the national marine geological 
survey vessel, the Rig Seismic, which has played a key role in the search 
for offshore oil and gas. Researches say this will seriously impair efforts 
to define Australia's new marine boundaries along the edge of the 
continental shelf beyond the 200 mile zone. That would leave unsettled 
the issue of exactly what ocean territory belongs to Australia under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—and what mineral 
and biological resources it contains.' 
Two years later, possibly out of recognition of the enormity of mapping the 
continental shelf, the Commonwealth endowed AGSO with increased 
funding expressly to expedite offshore mapping. 43 The 1998-99 annual 
appropriations allocated AGSO extra funding to analyse geophysical data 
collected at sea, in addition to the $17 million received in the previous budget 
to ensure that the survey vessel was able to continue offshore mapping. In 
allocating AGSO this additional budgetary funding, the personal interest of 
the minister again appears to be important. 
Parer at the time referred to the speculative nature of oil reserves located 
on the claimable continental shelf beyond 200 miles, noting that "It is 
imperative that we can mount a successful claim for this vast area of ocean 
floor.' The technical and legislative changes introduced here will ensure 
that both the baseline and continental margin will be the maximum 
claimable under the LOS Convention, securing Australian control over 
expanded offshore areas. 
"Scientists, miners warn on survey cuts" The Australian, 3 June 1996. 
'3 "Oil search boost" The Australian, 13 May 1998. 
44 "Oil search boost" The Australian, 13 May 1998. 
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6.4 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER SIX 
The period 1996-1998 coincides with the brief rule of the Howard Coalition 
Government. Probably the outstanding feature of this two year period is the 
seamless continuation of the administrative arrangements settled through 
legislation of the previous Labor Government. Because the statutory 
partnership between the Commonwealth and states has finally attained a 
climax steady state the government for the first time has not needed to attend 
to intergovernmental matters, and could instead afford the luxury of 
contemplating the revenue aspects of the offshore regime. 
The offshore industry was clearly expectant of special redress in terms of 
the resource rent tax, relying upon its close affiliation with the Minister for 
Resouces and Energy. However, whilst Minister Parer did respond to some of 
the demands of his constituents, his presence as the harbinger of potential 
reforms to the revenue system generally went unrealized. The Howard 
Government, although attentive to the demands of the resources sector, 
nonetheless maintained and affirmed the role of the Commonwealth 
relative to state governments and the offshore industry established 
previously. Given the mature condition of the offshore petroleum regime, 
little scope therefore exists for major change to the nature of offshore policy . 
and administration. 
The Commonwealth is unlikely to revisit the highly effective 
jurisdictional provisions of the P(SL)A. Future governments may 
nonetheless endeavour to refine the technical detail of decisions made under 
the legislation, or change the policy framework within which the P(SL)A is 
administered. In this respect, the Howard Government has initiated two 
ambitious policy proposals, the development of an oceans policy and release 
of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Policy Statement. 
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The important observation from these policies is that the sectoral 
resources regimes will continue in spite of any new coordinating oceans body 
which may be created. Morover, the resources policy statement has been kept 
carefully distant from the oceans policy—there is no articulation between the 
two—ensuring that decisions over offshore petroleum can continue 
unburdened by considerations extraneous to the exploitation of resources. If 
there is to be future stress upon the regime, this will possibly come from 
discontent by Western Australia over the Commonwealth's failure to share 
the pronounced benefits of RRT currently being collected from the 
development of new oil on the extended north west shelf. The sequence of 
recent events reinforces the argument advanced in this thesis, that the 
P(SL)A regime has evolved over a thirty year period to its current mature 
condition as the principal instrument by which the Commonwealth is able to 
advance its continental shelf resource policies. 
Chapter Seven 
The Commonwealth and Offshore Petroleum Policy — 
Some Conclusions 
This study has documented the history of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
Act 1967 (Cth), with emphasis on the evolving relationship between the 
Commonwealth and states. In particular, the research has explored both the 
characteristics of the legislative regime which make it a successful model, and 
the forces shaping the reform of this legislation over time. A number of 
academic works have reviewed the P(SL)A from a strictly legal perspective, 
and described the substantive elements of the legislation at major reformist 
junctures.' None of these works have attempted to explain why the 
Commonwealth originally vacated the policy field to the states in 1967, nor 
interpret the factors that motivated subsequent federal governments to 
redress this situation through legislation. 
To assist in analyzing reform of the P(SL)A, Chapter One introduced a 
framework comprising two sets of parameters, legal and contextual. The first 
tier of this framework consists of the two legal authorities enabling the 
enactment of offshore legislation, the Australian Constitution and the Law of 
the Sea Convention. Within this framework a number of contextual factors 
were also introduced to help in understanding the content of particular 
legislative proposals developed over time. Included in this second set of 
parameters are five factors: the extent of Australia's maritime domains; 
industry pressures and Commonwealth relations; uncertainties over offshore 
M. Croirustelin, "Offshore Mining and Petroleum: Constitutional Issues" (1981) 3 Australian 
Mining and Petroleum Law Journal 191-213; R. Cullen, "Bass Strait Revenue Raising: A Case 
of One Government Too Many?" (1988) 6 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 213- 
247; R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and Canadian Offshore Disputes (The 
Federation Press, Sydney, 1990); R. Lumb, "Sovereignty and Jurisdiction Over Australian 
Coastal Waters" (1969) 43 The Australian Law Journal 421-438. 
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jurisdiction; federalism and intergovernmental relations; and the 
Commonwealth's offshore capacities. By exploring the interaction of these 
different parameters the evolution of the P(SL)A is able to be more fully 
understood. 
The P(SL)A regime is shown to have evolved through two rather distinct 
phases. The first phase was one of protracted Commonwealth/state 
disputation over offshore responsibilities, revolving around questions of 
jurisdiction with respect to the territorial sea and continental shelf. This 
turbulent period stretched from the early 1950s until 1980 when the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement was reached, at which time lingering questions of 
jurisdiction as between the two spheres of government were finally resolved. 
Following the years of high politics and offshore turbulence, the P(SL)A 
during the mid-1980s entered a state of regime maturity. It is only since 
offshore jurisdiction has been satisfactorily settled that the petroleum regime 
has stabilized, enabling the Commonwealth to progress its petroleum policies 
through its superior ability to legislate in respect of the offshore. 
Concentrating upon jurisdictional difficulties as the impetus for legislative 
reform tends to discount the other influential factors introduced above, 
however. The thesis argues that the resolution of jurisdiction was a defining 
but not an exclusive influence on Commonwealth-state offshore interaction. - 
A second observation of the reform of the P(SL)A is that the participation 
of the states in Commonwealth offshore petroleum policy has never been 
seriously doubted.' Legislative changes have instead endeavoured to find the 
balance of responsibilities most reflecting the evolving interests and 
capabilities of the two governmental spheres, given prevailing political 
conditions and as modified by judicial decisions. The trend of this "policy 
soup" is the increasing dominance of the national interest as a 
2 B. Davis, "Environmental Management", in B. Galligart, 0. Hughes and C. Walsh (ed), 
Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1991) pp 146-162. 
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Commonwealth imperative, wherein both spheres of government determine 
offshore petroleum policy but the former jurisdiction may prevail in the 
event of disagreement over policy decisions and administration of the 
regime.3 Joint decision making therefore reflects the necessity of involving 
the states in continental shelf decision making while preserving the 
Commonwealth's capacity to exercise ultimate powers of veto. The P(SL)A 
model has succeeded in providing stability to the volatile policy area of 
offshore petroleum while being able to accommodate shifts in policy as 
between the two spheres of government, especially since its overhaul in 1980. 
7.1 JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES OVER THE OFFSHORE 
The factor which most influenced the evolution of the P(SL)A regime up 
until the OCS in 1980—at least as reported in the literature—was the 
uncertainty pervading offshore jurisdiction. Many authors writing both at the 
time of the 1967 Australian Petroleum Settlement, and retrospectively a 
decade later in relation to the OCS, belabour the uncertainties surrounding 
the assignment of offshore jurisdiction as between the Commonwealth and 
states.' The conventional view distilled from these contributions is that 
neither sphere of government could be confident of the outcome of any 
judicial determination of the question of offshore jurisdiction, however this 
3 Policy soup is a termed coined by Kingdon to describe how ideas float around within policy 
communities and either survive and prosper or disappear from the govemmetnal agenda. J. 
Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (HarperCollins, Boston, 1984). 
4 H. Burmester, "Australia and the Law of the Sea - The Protection and Preservation of the 
Marine Environment", in K.W. Ryan (ed), International Law in Australia (The Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1984) pp 439-455; E. Campbell, "Regulation of Australian Coastal 
Fisheries" (1960) 1 Tasmanian University Law Review 405-428; Crommelirt, op cit fn 1; R. 
Cullen, "The Encounter Between Natural Resources and Federalism in Canada and 
Australia" (1990) 24 U.B.C. Law Review 275-305; C. Harders, "Australia's Offshore 
Petroleum Legislation: A Survey of its Constitutional and its Federal Features" (1968) 6 
Melbourne University Law Review 415-428; R. Lumb, "The Continental Shelf' (1968) 6 
Melbourne University Law Review 357-369; Lumb, op cit fn 1; J. Taylor, "The Settlement of 
Disputes Between Federal and State Governments Concerning Offshore Petroleum Resources: 
Accommodation or Adjudication?" (1970) 11 Harvard International Law Journal 358-399. 
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was posed. Consequently, the Commonwealth enacted quitclaim legislation 
to grant to the states regulatory responsibilities for offshore oil development 
right around the coastline. 
Uncertainties pertaining to jurisdiction certainly influenced the 
Commonwealth's decision to leave offshore policy and regulation to state 
governments. The major limitation with these legal treatments of the subject 
is their failure to search for other explanatory factors which might better 
explain the original enacted form of the offshore petroleum regime. A more 
complete explanation is found in the meeting of industry demands, 
Commonwealth inexperience, and Australia's extensive maritime domain. 
With respect to industry influences, Chapter Two recounted how the 
offshore industry demanded and was granted generous access rights in respect 
of Bass Strait oil reserves. On the one hand, offshore operators sought a 
statutory guarantee of title to the seabed to enable exploration to occur with 
security of tenure. It was seen, however, that major overseas oil companies 
allied very closely with the Victorian Government, presenting a formidable 
alliance which was able to dictate with virtual impunity the terms of the 1967 
Settlement. In this regard, the personal strength of Premier Bolte relative to 
the Prime Minister emerged as particularly influential force on the form of 
the legislation and its administration. 
Equally deterministic of the original P(SL)A was the fact that the 
Commonwealth was unable to assume administrative or technical control 
over the offshore in the event of jurisdiction being settled. The 
Commonwealth is not a major landowner and certainly had negligible 
experience in managing natural resources. Indeed, the only previous foray 
into marine resources policy was enactment in 1952 of the Fisheries Act, 
which the Commonwealth immediately vested to the administration of 
states because of their historic role as fisheries managers. For these reasons of 
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incapacity, the Commonwealth did not desire either asserting or clarifying 
offshore jurisdiction with respect to offshore petroleum, while state 
governments avoided doing the same out of recognition of their own weak 
position at law. 
The denominator to these early policy development efforts—and indeed 
it is still as influential factor in inter-governmental relations today—is the 
extensiveness of Australia's maritime domains. Every Australian state 
possesses a lengthy coastline, an incident of geography that few observers 
have recognised despite being a fundamental influence on the nature of 
Commonwealth/state interaction over the offshore.' Insofar as petroleum 
policy is concerned, the fact of reserve discoveries in the 1960s being 
constrained to Bass Strait served only to inspire all state governments to 
settle on terms that would deliver similar benefits to all states, once prospects 
were discovered elsewhere around the coastline. As this expectation went 
unrealized, so too did the interest of all states in asserting claims to the 
continental shelf and achieving commonality in policy. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the tendency amongst scholars to overstate 
the uncertainties associated with offshore jurisdiction as a dominant policy 
factor is enactment of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) by the • 
Whitlam Government. As the thesis recounted, Whitlam had longed 
demanded that the Commonwealth assert its jurisdiction over the offshore 
through legislation, and his assent to office provided the opportunity to 
advance this policy. Put another way, enactment of the SSLA very much 
challenged the pretence of jurisdictional uncertainty that had hitherto been 
used to characterise offshore petroleum policy. At the same time, the 
Commonwealth under Whitlam's prime ministership promoted a very 
M. Haward, Federalism and the Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement (University 
of Tasmania, PhD thesis, 1992); B. Opeskin and D. Rothwell, "Australia's Territorial Sea: 
International and Federal Implications of Its Extension to 12 Miles" (1991) 22 Ocean 
Development and International Law 395-431. 
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centralist approach to government, and the SSLA was the offshore 
component of this political philosophy. 
The Commonwealth's interventionist approach to policy predicated a 
rapid deterioration in relations with state governments and industry. As 
shown in Chapter Three, an important point to arise in this context was the 
indifference of the Commonwealth to the concerns of state governments, 
even those of the same party. Enactment of the SSLA revealed the limits of 
party and policy alignment between jurisdictions when basic political 
philosophies—and substantial resources—are at stake. Stevenson is one 
author to remark upon this occurrence — 
The corollary to this is that federal-state relations are relatively more 
harmonious, all other things being equal, when the same party holds 
office at both levels of government. In such circumstances each level of 
government is reluctant to embarrass a 'friendly' government at the 
other level by open displays of hostility, and there are also avenues of 
informal liaison and negotiation not open to governments of opposite 
parties ... If both levels of government are non-Labor, the federal 
government will tend to share its adversary's belief in the desirability of 
preserving strong ties, while if both levels of government are Labor the 
state government will tend to share its adversary's belief in the virtues 
of centralization. However, Mr Gorton's desire to assert federal 
sovereignty over the continental shelf, and the resistance of state Labor 
governments when the Whitlam government tried to do the same, 
suggests that neither generalization can be pressed too far. 6 
Interaction between both spheres of governments became so acrimonious • 
under Whitlam that the Commonwealth ceased meeting both with the states 
through the ministerial council [AMEC], and peak industry groups such as 
APEA. The importance of this observation is that it again highlights the role 
of individuals in the debate over offshore petroleum, and natural resources 
policy more generally. Although the Commonwealth promoted a very 
centralised approach to government, the complete breakdown in inter-
governmental communication which occurred in the early 1970s was the 
6 G. Stevenson, Mineral Resources and Australian Federalism (Centre for Research an Federal 
Financial Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1976), p 66. 
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result of the personal style of Whitlam's resources minister, [O'Connor] who 
held states and industry in complete disdain. As occurred with Bolte in 1967, 
key individuals are seen to have played an influential role in exacerbating or 
moderating policy positions. 
The next period of debate over offshore responsibilities was driven by the 
extensiveness of Australia's maritime domains. All Australian states were 
dispossessed of territory and identity by the SSLA, and sought to have this 
situation remedied when a sympathetic government was elected to office. 
Chapter Four described how the Fraser Government provided the political 
capital to enact legislation returning coastal waters to the states, but did so 
under terms that were restrictive and narrowly defined. Having become 
accustomed to its newly found powers over the offshore, it appears that the 
Commonwealth was reluctant to abandon these to the states in spite of its 
pronouncements to the contrary.' 
Unlike the earlier petroleum Agreement, the Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement of 1980 was developed without the influence of industry, but was 
very much refined by law officers. Because it was excluded from 
developments the offshore petroleum industry was convinced that the new 
legislation would, be simply another chapter in the offshore saga.' The • 
following editorial reflects the sentiments of the OCS held by a number of 
commentators — 
Moreover, the legislation is to a large extent a framework within which 
administrative practices must perforce develop if there is to be 
harmonious co-operation between the Commonwealth and the States. 
Unforeseen problems can still arise, and the settlement should not be 
regarded as definitively marking the end of all negotiations between the 
R. Kay and C. Lester, "Benchmarking the Future Direction for Coastal Management in 
Australia" (1997) 25 Coastal Management 265-292. 
K. Orchison, "Petroleum Exploration Offshore", in Australia's Maritime Horizons in the 
1980s (Occasional Papers in Maritime Studies, Australian Centre for Maritime Studies, 
Canberra, 1982) pp 66-71. 
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Commonwealth and State Governments concerning this area of 
offshore responsibilities.' 
Some observers of the OCS did, however, impart a more hopeful prognosis of 
its potential as a new legislative framework. Saunders and Wiltshire 
remarked "It is likely that it will form the permanent basis for the regulation 
of activities offshore Australia.' Subsequent to its enactment, the OCS has 
proved remarkably resilient in providing stability to an otherwise volatile 
area of policy. 
7.2 REGIME MATURITY 
The exclusion of industry from OCS negotiations, coupled with the fact that 
the Commonwealth under Fraser only returned to states some of their 
former capabilities, represents the beginning of the formation of a 
Commonwealth offshore petroleum policy. As well as being generally 
excluded from - developing the OCS, the offshore industry was kept distant 
from discussions over the formative Law of the Sea Convention proceeding 
in parallel. This observation is important in revealing that the oil 
industry—which in 1967 had been so influential in offshore policy—became 
marginalised as a factor shaping offshore legislative reform. The content of . 
the Commonwealth's offshore petroleum policy was instead sharpened try 
inter-governmental negotiations over offshore jurisdiction. It was the nexus 
between the foreign and domestic dimensions of continental shelf policy that 
helped to define the form of the amended regimes arising under the OCS. 
9 Anon., "The Offshore Constitutional Settlement" (1980) 54 The Australian Law Journal 517- 
519, p 519. 
'° C. Saunders and K. Wiltshire, "Fraser's New Federalism 1975-1980: An Evaluation" (1981) 26 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 355-371, p 363. 
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Much has been made of the cooperative spirit of the OCS, and the return 
to states of significant offshore capabilities thereunder." As argued in this 
thesis, analyses have tended to enthuse over the gloss of the broad offshore 
framework and overlook the detail of some of the particular legislative 
provisions settled in 1980. Upon closer review, it was seen that the 
Commonwealth under Fraser's prime ministership returned to the states 
only some of the functions they previously enjoyed while retaining their 
assistance in regime administration, relying upon the desire of state 
governments to be involved in offshore policy. 
During the immediate post-OCS years, the extent of the states' maritime 
domains became much less important in shaping Commonwealth policy at 
least insofar as offshore petroleum is concerned. Around the time that the 
OCS was being concluded, the north-west shelf emerged as a highly 
prospective oil-bearing region, and soon exceeded Bass Strait as the major 
productive offshore province. Elsewhere around Australia the continental 
shelf was proven to be devoid of viable oil reserves. The effect of this 
exploration activity was that state governments lost interest in maintaining 
the common offshore mining code that had hitherto served as the basis for 
offshore exploration. As a result, individual regimes evolved in relation to 
the two productive fields adjacent to Victoria and Western Australia, the - 
details of which were shaped by local influences within a national 
framework. For example, with respect to the latter the strength of the 
Western Australian premier [Court] was seen to be instrumental in securing 
an offshore arrangement peculiar to that state which constrained the 
Commonwealth's ability to dominate petroleum policy in adjacent waters. 
Crozrunelin, op cit fn 1; R. Cullen, "Canada and Australia: A Federal Parting of the Ways" 
(1989) 18 Federal Law Review 68-83; C. Harders, "Commonwealth and State Jurisdiction 
Over Off-Shore Areas" (1977) 1 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association Journal 
7-16. 
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The OCS therefore signals the beginning of the maturity of the P(SL)A 
regime. Offshore jurisdiction was finally settled, and the influence of the oil 
industry on offshore policy-making in recess. Because the foundations of 
offshore petroleum policy were set, the Commonwealth could devote greater 
attention to modifying offshore relations through formal inter-governmental 
mechanisms, such as the joint authority and ministerial council structures. 
The first test of the efficacy of the OCS arrangements occurred 
immediately upon proclamation of the relevant legislation. Chapter Five 
detailed the election to office of the Hawke Labor Government, which was 
implacably opposed to the OCS and threatened to overturn the arrangements 
reached thereunder by the previous Commonwealth. This policy was 
enunciated in Parliament in unmistakable terms – 
It should be well understood that a future Labor government will have 
no bar of this arrangement or the arrangement under the Petroleum 
(Submerged Lands) Act for the establishment of joint Commonwealth-
State authorities over petroleum mining. The likelihood is that the 
coastal waters legislation will fail upon its first test before the High 
Court, thereby obviating the need to introduce amending legislation.' 
Notwithstanding its hostility towards the OCS, the Hawke Government did 
not alter the basis of the offshore accord settled in 1980. On the one hand, very 
real—perhaps insurmountable—constitutional constraints ensured that the 
OCS would withstand alteration by a future Commonwealth government, as 
was explicit in its development. However, as this thesis argues, the 
Commonwealth under Hawke learned to advance its policies within the 
broad parameters of the OCS by amending the P(SL)A to ensure that the 
Commonwealth would ultimately prevail in the event of disagreement with 
the states over offshore petroleum policy. As detailed in Chapter Five, the 
12 Hansard, House of Representatives, 1 May 1980, p 2533. 
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Hawke Government also imposed new revenue regimes upon offshore 
activity, against the wishes of Labor states." 
That the Commonwealth could legislate in this manner without 
reopening basic jurisdictional questions testifies to its improved capabilities 
as a policy maker following proclamation of the OCS. Moreover, internal 
regime reform confirms the growing maturity of the P(SL)A, as commented 
upon by Hunt — 
Because the inexperience ... with offshore petroleum laws is relatively 
limited, there is value in having a system under which amendments 
can be easily procured in response to identified deficiencies. That such 
needs will arise in an immature legal regime is underscored by the 
number of amendments to the (Cth) Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
which have been deemed necessary since 1983." 
The OCS arrangements endured intact under the Hawke Government 
because these were sufficiently flexible to allow shifts in political priorities 
within the offshore jurisdictional framework settled in 1980. This shift 
amounted to an acceleration of Commonwealth policy direction established 
previously under the Fraser Government. The P(SL)A has now been 
amended to firmly empower the Commonwealth as the final arbiter in a 
joint decision-making regime for continental shelf policy. 
There is little scope to further refine the legislation through amendment, 
given the mature condition of the regime and its separation from basic 
jurisdictional questions. Chapter Six suggested that the policy bases for 
administering the legislation are less developed, however, and it is in this 
area that considerable scope exists for evolution. Following the election of the 
Howard Government in 1996, the Commonwealth prepared and released two 
policy statements as the next phase in the Australian offshore saga. The first 
13 B. Head, "Economic Development in State and Federal Politics", in B. Head (ed), The 
Politics of Development in Australia (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1986) pp 3-55. 
14 C. Hunt, "The Offshore Petroleum Regimes of Canada and Australia: Some Comparative 
Observations" (1990) 9 Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association Bulletin 103-111, 
p 107. 
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of these initiatives was the inaugural oceans policy, released as a draft 
document after exhaustive consultation with maritime stakeholders in- and 
outside the Commonwealth. 
In terms of the argument made in this thesis, the most significant aspect 
of the oceans policy is that the OCS regimes will be retained unchanged but 
an increased attempt will be made to harmonize sectoral activities under a 
strategic umbrella. Complementing the oceans policy initiative is the release 
of the first ever Commonwealth resources policy. This policy 
complementarity derives from a commitment in the resources policy to 
retain the P(SL)A and amend it in response to emergent needs, such as 
longterm production licences and to effectuate offshore boundary changes 
made pursuant to the LOS Convention. The Commonwealth is also 
committed to reviewing the RRT regime applicable to adjacent areas, but it 
seems unlikely that this impost will be removed, portending of some future 
tensions with Western Australia. 
The preparation of a document specifying the government's intention for 
the offshore petroleum sector logically follows the history of legislative 
reform. It seems likely, though, that the development of the oceans policy 
provided the impetus to the petroleum sector to prepare a policy protecting 
its own interests. To be sure, the P(SL)A regime is promoted within the 
oceans policy as model legislation supporting enhanced cross-sectoral 
integration. However, as described in Chapter Six, thorny issues relating to 
oceans policy delivery are now being contemplated by Commonwealth 
agencies. The resources policy statement has better positioned the offshore 
petroleum sector to contribute to this debate, if not allow it to even expand its 
interests relative to other offshore sectors. 
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7.4 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
To help conclude this thesis, it is useful to return to some of the 
contributions in respect of the P(SL)A made by other analysts. A concise 
summarization of the offshore situation from a legal perspective is made by 
Crommelin, who frames the offshore petroleum legislation in the following 
manner - 
Offshore the Commonwealth occupies a predominant position with 
respect to mineral exploration and production, at least beyond the 
territorial sea. For historical and political reasons the States continue to 
participate in the administration of the Commonwealth petroleum 
regime, and they also share in petroleum royalties and other revenues. 
In contrast with the onshore position, however, they enjoy their 
offshore status at the will of the Commonwealth.' 
Despite adopting a strictly legal assessment of the P(SL)A regime, Crommelin 
is nonetheless sensitive to the Commonwealth's need to involve the states in 
offshore decision making less out of reasons of law than for purely functional 
requirements. Like many other analyses, though, Crommelin overlooks the 
elements of the regime that have ensured the participation of state 
governments in setting offshore petroleum policy, such as making 
exploration and production decisions as the joint authority. Revenue 
collection flowing therefrom is a related but separate aspect of offshore policy, 
one which the regime is now ripe to address. Other authors have also tended . 
to confuse these elements of offshore petroleum policy making.' 
Another, more recent, analysis is attentive to the success of the joint 
authority structure as a device for formalizing interaction over offshore 
petroleum policy - 
M. Crommelin, "The Mineral Exploration and Production Regime Within the Federal 
System", in P. Drysdale and H. Shibata (ed), Federalism and Resource Development: The 
Australian Case (George Allen and Unwirt, Sydney, 1985) p 104. 
Cullen, op cit fn 1; E. Fitzgerald, "The Seaweed Rebellion: Federal-State Conflicts Over 
Offshore Energy Development in the United States, Canada, and Australia" (1992) 7 
Connecticut Journal of International Law 255-309. 
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When one moves further offshore, as is the case for most of the 
offshore oil exploration and production this jurisdiction problem does 
not arise ... The co-operative approach among them all is one of the 
success stories as to inter-governmental structures so that the various 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts provide a sensible legislative 
structure under which this important commercial activity can be 
conducted without the needs of the marine environment placing 
undue burdens on it.' 
The important contribution made by White to this area of scholarship is his 
appreciation of the P(SL)A as a mechanism for resolving policy between the 
two spheres of government. This analysis neglects, however, the broader 
public good dimensions of offshore petroleum policy, namely environmental 
protection. The thesis has shown that offshore development has escaped 
serious environmental review, an area of policy that could be informed by 
the United States experience. 
As introduced in Chapter One, this study was motivated to understand 
the differences between the offshore petroleum regimes of the two 
federations, as has been suggested by earlier studies.' Whilst production 
continues apace off Australia—indeed, in a global survey the north-west shelf 
was identified as the preferred place for offshore investmene—activity along 
the U.S. west coast is in a state of gridlock. This breakdown in decision 
making is due to the absence of meaningful avenues for state input to federal 
decisions, and the multiplicity of statutory environmental requirements. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the Commonwealth could borrow some of 
the more interesting mechanisms available under U.S. laws pertaining to the 
environment.' Adopting the consistency rule found in the Coastal Zone 
17 M. White, Marine Pollution Laws of the Australasian Region (The Federation Press, Sydney, 
1994), 262. 
R. Hildreth, "Managing Ocean Resources: New Zealand and Australia" (1991) 6 
International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 89-126. 
19 "Price drop no barrier to offshore oil fields"The Australian 22 June 1998. 
" N. Evans and J. Bailey, "Jurisdiction and Offshore Petroleum in Australia: Creating 
Symmetry Between the Commonwealth and States by Sharing Benefits and Avoiding Costs" 
(1997) 33 Ocean and Coastal Management 173-204. 
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Management Act would enhance efforts at integrating oceans policy, 
notwithstanding the Commonwealth's repeated resistance to this 
proposition. Similarly, relaxing rules of standing, or granting disaffected third 
parties greater access to the courts, would ensure that offshore development 
proceeds with greater environmental diligence than his currently the case 
where responsibility for the environment is effectively internalized to the 
petroleum sector. 
Clearly, there are lessons to be exchanged from the collective offshore 
experiences of coastal federations. A useful first step in this direction would 
be to conduct comparative regime studies across sectors and• countries, to 
distill those features worth emulating and those which should be abandoned. 
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Resources, and certain other Resources, of the 
Continental Shelf of Australia and of certain 
Territories of the Commonwealth and of certain 
• other Submerged Land. 
Australian Government Publishing Service 
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• 
; 
Agreement relating to the Exploration for, and the 
• Exploitation of, the Petroleum Resources, and 
certain other Resources, of the Continental Shelf of 
Australia and of certain Territories of the 
Commonwealth and of certain other Submerged Land: 
THIS AGREEMENT is made the sixteenth day of October, One 
thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven, Between THE GOVERNMENT 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (in this Agreement called 
"the Commonwealth Government ") of the first part, THE GOVERNMENT 
OF THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES of the second part, THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF VICTORIA of the third part, THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND of the fourth part, 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA of the 
fifth part, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF WESTERN 
AUSTRALIA of the-sixth part and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE 
OF TASMANIA of the seventh part (each of the parties of the second, third, 
fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh parts being in this Agreement referred to as 
a "State Government" and the expression "the State Governments" in. 
this Agreement meaning, unless the contrary intention appears, all those 
State Governments). 
WHEREAS in accordance with international law Australia as a coastal 
state has sovereign rights over the continental shelf beyond the limits of 
Australian territorial waters for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting 
its natural resources: 
AND WHEREAS Australia is a party to the Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf signed at Geneva on the twenty-ninth day of April, One 
thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight, in which those rights are defined: 
AND WHEREAS the exploration for and the exploitation of the 
petroleum resources of submerged lands adjacent to the Australian coast 
would be encouraged by the adoption of legislative measures applying 
uniformly to the continental shelf and to the sea-bed and subsoil beneath 
territorial waters: 
AND WHEREAS the Governments of the Commonwealth and. of the 
States have decided, in the national interest, that, without raising questions 
concerning, and without derogating from,. their respective constitutional 
powers, they should co-operate for the purpose of ensuring the legal effective-
ness of authorities to explore for or to exploit the petroleum resources of 
those submerged lands: 
AND WHEREAS the Governments of the Commonwealth and of the 
States have accordingly agreed to submit to their respective Parliaments 
legislation relating both to the continental shelf and to the sea-bed and sub-
soil beneath territorial waters and have also agreed to co-operate in the 
administration of that legislation: 
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NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED as follows:— 
PART I.—PRELIMINARY. 
• 1.—(1.) Subject to sub-clause (2.) of this Clause, the provisions of this 
Agreement. shall take effect upon the signature of this Agreement on behalf 
of all of the parties. 
(2.) Except as provided in sub-clause (3.) of this clause, Part III. of 
this Agreement shall not have any force or effect in relation to the -adjacent 
area of a State until the Acts of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth and 
of the States contemplated by clauses 3, 4 and 5 have come into operation. 
(3.) Part Hr. of this Agreement may by agreement between the Com-
monwealth Government and a State Government be brought into force and 
: effect in relation to the adjacent area of the State when the Acts of the 
Parliaments of the Commonwealth and of the State contemplated by clauses 
3, 4 and 5 have come into operation in relation to that adjacent area. 
2.—(1.) In this Agreement, unless the contrary intention appears- 
" clause " means clause of this Agreement; 
" Commonwealth " means Commonwealth of Australia; 
" Government" means a Government a party to this Agreement and 
the expression "the Governments ". means all those Govern-
ments; 
" State " means one of the States aforesaid and the expression "the 
States " means all those States; 
"the Common Mining Code" means, in 'relation to the 'adjacent 
area of a State, the Commonwealth Mining Code and the State 
Mining Code of that State in their application to that adjacent 
area; 
"the Commonwealth Mining Code" means Part III. of the Common-
wealth Act designated the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
and the Commonwealth Acts designated the Petroleum (Sub-
merged Lands) (Royalty) Act, the Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) (Exploration Permit Fees) Act, the Petroleum (Sub-
merged Lands) (Production Licence Fees) Act, the Petroleum 
• (Submerged Lands) (Pipeline Licence Fees) Act and the Petro-
leum (Submerged Lands) (Registration Fees) Act that are con-
templated by clauses 3 and 5; 
"the Commonwealth Minister" means the Minister of State of the 
Commonwealth for the time being responsible for the adminis-
tration of the Commonwealth Mining Code and includes a 
Minister or other Member . of the Federal Executive Council who 
is for the time being acting on behalf of that Minister; and. . 
"the State Mining Code" means Part . III. of the relevant State Act 
and any other relevant State Act or Acts that is or are contem-
plated by clauses 4 and 5.. 
( 2 
of a 
refere 
Agree 
an int 
or of 
word, 
have 1 
buted 
PA 
3. 
Comn 
tional 
Sched 
4.  
Bill fc 
provi 
•out ir 
5. 
passin 
6. 
wealth 
subm i 
(2 
in so 
7. 
Govei 
8. 
lation 
of thc 
nt and 
overn- 
" the 
ljacent 
State 
ljacent 
imon-
) Act 
(Sub-
terg,ed 
(Sub-
bleum 
Petro-
, con- 
)f the 
n inis-
les a 
' who 
; Act 
item- 
4 this 
behalf 
(2.) A reference in this Agreement to an Act of the Commonwealth or 
of a State shall, except where the contrary intention appears, be read as a 
reference to that Act as from time to time amended in accordance with this 
Agreement. 
(3.) Where a word, expression or reference that is defined, or for which 
an interpretation is given in an Act of the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
II. of 	 or of a State contemplated by this Agreement is used in this Agreement, the . 
jacent word, expression or reference shall, unless the context otherwise requires, 
h and 	 have for the purposes of this Agreement the meaning or interpretation attri- - 
ation. buted or given to it by those Acts. 
Corn-
e and 
)f the PART II.—THE COMMONWEALTH AND STATE LEGISLATION. 
lauses 	 3. The Commonwealth Government will submit to the Parliament of the 
3 
suszth.sio3 or 
Commonwealth Bills for Acts that contain, apart from any formal or transi- Cor=oronalea 
tional provisions, provisions to the effect of the draft Bills set out in the First 
Schedule to this Agreement.  
4. Each' State Government will submit to the Parliament of the State a 
Bill for an Act, or Bills for Acts, that, apart from any formal or transitional 
provisions, contains or contain provisions to the effect of the draft Bill set 
out in the Second Schedule to this Agreement. 
5. Each Government will use all reasonable endeavours to secure the 
passing and the coming into operation of the Bill or Bills introduced by it. 
6.--(l.) Except in accordance with an agreement between the Common-
wealth Government and the State Governments, a Government will not 
submit to its Parliament a Bill for an Act that would either— 
(a) amend or repeal an Act that is contemplated by the preceding 
provisions of this Part; or 
(b) in any material respect affect the scheme of the legislation that 
is contemplated by this Agreement. 
(2.) The last preceding sub-clause does not apply to a Bill for an Act 
in so far as the effect of its provisions would be formal or transitional. 
7. Except in accordance with an agreement between the Commonwealth 
Government and the State Governments— 
(a) regulations under an Act that is contemplated by the preceding 
• provisions of this Part (other than formal or transitional regula-
tions) in relation to the Commonwealth Mining Code or the State 
Mining Code shall not be made, amended or repealed; and 
(b) regulations under any Act of the P.arliament of the Common-
wealth or of a State that will affect .',in any material respect the 
scheme of the legislation that is contemplated by this Agreement 
• shall not be made. 
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PART III.—ADMINISTRATION TI1E COMMON MINING CODE. 
9. The Common Mining Code in respect of the adjacent area of a State - 
shall be administered by the person who is the Designated Authority for the 
purpose of the Commonwealth Mining Code and of the State Mining Code 
in respect ef that adjacent area. 
10. Where in special circumstances a Government requests another 
Government to provide assistance in implementing the legislation con-
templated by this Agreement, the other Government will, so far as it is rea-
sonably able to do so, provide the assistance. 
11.—(1.) Except in so far as the Commonwealth Government has 
informed the State Government that it is not necessary to do so, a State. 
Government will consult the Commonwealth Government— 
(a) before a'permit, licence, pipeline licence, access authority or 
special prospecting authority under the Common Mining Code 
in relation to the adjacent area of that State is granted, renewed 
or varied; 
(b) before approval is given to any transfer of a permit, licence, 
pipeline licence or access authority that has been so granted; or 
(c) before approval is given to any instrument by which a legal or 
equitable interest in or affecting an existing or future permit, 
licence; pipeline licence or access authority (being a permit, 
licence, pipeline licence or access authority under the Common 
• Mining Code in relation to the adjacent area of that State) is or 
• may be created, assigned, affected or dealt with, whether directly 
or indirectly. 
(2.) The Commonwealth Government will, in considering a matter 
referred to in the last preceding sub-clause, take into account the following 
Commonwealth responsibilities under the Constitution, namely— 
(a) trade and commerce with other countries and among the States, 
including navigation and shipping; 
(b) external affairs; 
(c) taxation, including taxes in the nature of duties of customs and 
' excise; 
(d) defence; 
• (e) lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys; 
• (I) fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits; and 
(g) postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services, 
and will, with all due expedition, give a decision accordingly. 
• (3.) In coming to a decision, the Commonwealth Government will take 
into account only matters reasonably related to the responsibilities specified 
in the last preceding sub-clause. 
(4.) When giving a decision that is not consistent with the action pro-
posed by the State Government, the Commonwealth Government will specify 
the Commonwealth responsibility orresponsibilities with respect to which the 
decision is given and,. unless it is considered by the Commonwealth Govern-
ment undesirable in the national interest to do so, inform the State Govern- 
ment of the grounds of the decisicin. . 	. 	. 
(5.) A. State Government will acceptL and will ensure that effect is given 
to, a decision of the Commonwealth Gc4rnment with respect to a respon-
sibility. of the .Commonwealth taken into account as aforesaid. 
• 
.• 	 • 
• 12. Each State Government will, in the administration of the Common convention • 5 
Mining Code in relation to the adjacent area of the State, take all reasonable ocIttiliental 
steps to secure compliance with the obligations of Australia under the 
Convention. 
.• 13. A State Government will, when so requested by the Commonwealth Provision of 
cm. Government, ensure that copies of the returns, reports, maps, notifications, Returns,  
logs, records and the like material and adequate portions of all cores, cuttings 
and samples that are received by it or its authorities by virtue of the opera-
tion of the Common Mining Code in relation to the adjacent area of the State 
are, as soon as reasonably practicable after receipt, forwarded to the 
Commonwealth Government. - 
14.—(1.) A condition may be included in a permit or licence under the 
Common Mining Code ip its application to the adjacent area of a State to 
the effect that the permittee or licensee shall comply with any requirement 
of the Designated Authority administering the Common Mining Code that 
•all or any of the petroleum produced pursuant to the permit or licence shall 
be refined in the State, or, in the case. of petroleum in a gaseous state, shall 
be used, before or after processing, within the State. 
(2.) A requirement referred to in sub-clause (1.) of this clause shall not 
be made unless there has been consultation between the Commonwealth 
Minister and the appropriate Minister of the State concerning the require-
ment and the Ministers are in agreement that the requirement should be 
made. 
(3.) When consulting, the Commonwealth Minister and the State 
Minister shall consider the interests of the State and of the Commonwealth 
generally and the Commonwealth Minister shall not be entitled to withhold 
his agreement to the making of the requirement unless it is reasonable in the 
national interest to do so having regard to the economic and efficient 'exploita-
tion, processing and use of the petroleum resources to which the requirement 
would relate. 
• 15.—(1.) If, for a reason reasonably related to a responsibility of the 
Commonwealth specified in sub-clause (2.) of clause 11, the Commonwealth 
Government so requests, an area or areas of the adjacent area of a State will 
for the time being be made not available for the granting therein of permits,' 
licences or pipeline licences under the Common Mining Code. 
(2.) When making a requirement for the purposes of sub-clause (1.) of 
this clause, the Commonwealth Government will specify the Commonwealth 
responsibility or responsibilities with respect to which the requirementis. made 
and, unless it considers that it is undesirable in the national interest to do•so, 
inform the State Government of the grounds upon Which the requirement is • 
made. 
16.----(1.) If a petroleum pool extends or is reasonably believed to extend 
from an adjacent area of a State or Territory intc)---: 
• (a) lands of the State or Territory not being part of the adjacent area 
of that State or Territory;. 
(b) lands of an adjoining State or Territory, not being part of the 
adjacent area of that State or Territory; or 
Unit 
Development. 
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(c) the adjacent area of an adjoining State or Territory, 
the Designated Authority or Authorities concerned and, where appropriate, 
the other petroleum mining authority or authorities involved shall consult 
concerning the exploitation of the petroleum pool. 
(2.) Directions for the exploitation of the petroleum pool in accordance 
with the provisions in relation to unit development of the Common Mining 
Code or of the Commonwealth Mining Code in its application with respect 
to a Territory shall not be given to a licensee until after a scheme for the 
exploitation of the petroleum pool has been agreed upon or - approved by the 
relevant authorities or otherwise than in accordance with the scheme so 
agreed upon or approved. 
17. Where, for the purpose of conveying petroleum produced from the 
adjacent area of a State or Territory, the Designated Authority in respect of 
the adjacent area has granted, or proposes to grant, a pipeline licence in 
respect of a pipeline that extends, or will extend, to the boundary between 
the adjacent area and an adjoining adjacent area, the Designated Authority in 
respect of that adjoining adjacent area shall accord all appropriate and rea-
sonable consideration and treatment to an application for the grant of a pipe-
line licence to enable the pipeline to be continued across that adjoining 
.adjacent area. 
Directions and • 
Es:emotions. 
SharicfF of 
Royaluea. 
18.—(1.) A direction under the Common Mining Code that is inconsis-
tent with the regulations made in relation thereto shall not be given and an 
exemption from compliance with the conditions of a permit, licence, pipeline 
licence, access authority or special prospectino
° 
 authority shall not be granted 
by a Designated Authority unless there has been consultation between the 
Commonwealth Minister and the appropriate State Minister or their delegates 
concerning the proposed direction or exemption.• 
(2.) Consultation as provided for by sub-clause (1.) of this clause is not 
required--. 
(a). in cases concerning which the Commonwealth Minister has 
informed the appropriate State Minister that he does not con-
sider consultation to be necessary; or - 
(b) in a case of such urgency that consultation is not reasonably 
practicable. 
(3.) The Designated Authority shall, as soon as reasonably practicable 
after a direction or an exemption referred to in sub-clause (1.) of this clause 
has been given or granted, whether or not following consultation in accor-
dance with the sub-clause, give a notice in writing accordingly to the Corn-
monwealth Minister together with particulars of the direction or exemption. 
19.--,-(1.) After the coming into force of the Common' Mining Code in 
relation to the adjacent area of a State, royalties received in respect of 
petroleum produced from that adjacent area shill, subject to sub-clause (2.) 
of this clause, be shared as follows— 
(a) as to so much as is royalty, not being over-ride royalty, payable 
at a rate that does not exceed ien per centum of the value at the , 
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—four-tenths shall be allocated to the Commonwealth and the 
• remaining six-tenths shall be allocated to the State; and 	• 
(b). any royalty consisting of over-ride royalty in addition to the 
royalty referred to in paragraph (a) of this sub-clause shall be 
• allocated to the State. 
(2.) If the rate at which royalty is payable under a licence includes over-
ride royalty and that rate is reduced by the Designated Authority in accor-
dance with the relevant provisions of the Common Mining Code and of the 
next succeeding clause, the royalties received at the lower rate so fixed shall 
for the purposes of the operation of paragraphs (a) and (b) of sub-clause 
(1.) of this clause be deemed to be composed of royalty other than over-ride 
royalty and of over-ride royalty in the same respective proportions as those • 
that comprised royalty other than over-ride royalty and over-ride royalty 
before the reduction. 
(3.) Any additional amount received by reason of late payment of royalty 
shall be allocated between the Commonwealth and the State in the same 
respective proportions as the royalty in respect of which the amount is 
payable is to be allocated in accordance. with the preceding sub-clauses of 
this clause. 
20. The rate at which royalty is payable in respect of petroleum recov- Reduction at 
ered from a well in the adjacent area of a State shall not- be reduced by the ItnYaltY.  
Designated Authority except by agreement between the Commonwealth 
Minister and the appropriate Minister of the State. 
21. The Designated Authority shall consult the Commonwealth Minister Determination 
before exercising the power under the Common Mining Code . to determine, grvituylity. 
otherwise than by agreement with the permittee or licensee, the value of. any 
petroleum. , 
22. As between the Commonwealth and the State, the State shall be Moneys other 
entitled to the benefit of all moneys, other than royalties, payable under the- lb' l'°"16' 
Common Mining Code in relation to the adjacent area of the State, including 
moneys paid in respect of the grant of a permit or licence over a block or 
blocks within the adjacent area of the State with respect to which a permit 
or licence was previously in force but which has or have again become avail-
able for the grant of a permit or licence. 
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PART IV.—GENERAL PROVISIONS. • 
23. The Commonwealth Government and the State Governments will 
confer from time to time concerning the operation and administration of the 
legislation of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth and of the States 
contemplated by this Agreement and concerning any other matters that may 
arise out of or in connexion with this Agreement. 
24.—(l) This Agreement shall no kt affect any right of the Common-
wealth or of a State, by itself or by an authority or corporation on its behalf, 
in an adjacent area to carry on petroleum mining operations. 
(2.) Where the Commonwealth Government or a State Government 
proposes itself, or by an authority or corporation on its behalf, to carry on 
• •: 	- 
Governments 
to confer. 
Commoovredtb 
and State 
Operations. 
petroleum mining operations in an adjacent area, the State Government and 
the Commonwealth Government will confer in relation to the proposed opera-
tions and; in the case of proposed operations by or on behalf of a State 
Government, the provisions of sub-clauses (2.), (3.), (4.) and (5.) of 
clause 11 shall, with appropriate modifications, apply to the State Govern-
ment and the Commonwealth Government as if the carrying on of the pro-
posed operations were a matter referred to in sub-clause (1.) of that clause. 
(3.) A Government by or on behalf of which petroleum mining opera-
tions are carried on in an adjacent area shall ensure, as far as appropriate 
and reasonably practicable, that those operations are carried on in conformity 
with this Agreement and the Common Mining Code and that all acts and 
things relating or incidental to those operations shall be done which the Com-
mon Mining Code, if it applied, would require to be done. 
(4.) If petroleum is produced from the adjacent area of a State by the 
Commonwealth Government or a State Government or by an authority or 
corporation on behalf of either, the Government concerned shall ensure that 
the share of the other Government under paragraph (a) of sub-clause (1.) 
of clause 19 to the moneys' that would be payable by a private producer as a 
permittee or licensee in respect of the petroleum is accorded to the State or 
to the Commonwealth, as the case may be. 
• 
Variatson. etc.. 
of Agrounent. 
.• 
(5.) In this clause" petroleum mining operations "means— 
(a) prospecting for petroleum; 
(b) recovering petroleum; 	• 
• (c) constructing and operating pipelines; and 
(d) doing all other things incidental thereto. 
•25.—(l.) This Agreement shall iaot be capable of being varied or revoked-
or of being determined by any Government except by agreement between all 
of the Governments for the time being parties thereto. 
(2.) The last preceding sub-clause shall not prejudice the right of any 
Government to determine this Agreement in relation to a Government that is 
in default thereunder. 
f•' 
Centtruction 
and Effect of 
Agreement. 
26. The Governments acknowledge that this Agreement is not intended 
to create legal relationships justiciable in a Court of Law but declare that the 
Agreement shall be construed and given effect to -by the parties in all res-
pects according to the true meaning and spirit thereof. 
■••• ■••••VIP 
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The offshore constitutional 
settlement between the 
COmmonwealth and the States 
At the Premiers Conference on 29 June 1979, the Commonwealth and the 
States completed an agreement of great importance for the settlement 
of contentious and complex offshore constitutional issues. The agree-
ment marked the solution of a fundamental problem that has bedevilled 
Commonwealth–State relations, and represents a major achievement 
of the policy of co-operative federalism. 
International background 
Particularly since the Proclamation by President Truman in 1945 of 
jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf adjacent to the United 
States, the international law of the sea, as it relates to offshore areas, 
has been one of the great growing points—one of the areas of major 
change—in the law of nations. 
The factors inducing change in the substantive law were basically 
technological in character: rapid technological developments in the 
means of communication, in the methods of fishing and in the techniques 
of seabed mining and drilling. The technological revolutions of the 20th 
century brought under the influence of man's new capabilities great 
areas of the high seas and of the seabed beneath them. These develop-
ments have been spurred on by a sharp increase in the demand for 
resources, both biological and mineral, of the sea and the seabed. 
Australian continental shelf 
Australia's major national interests in the law of the sea are based on 
its geographical and economic position as a great island continent, 
relatively, though not completely, remote from other countries. In 1953 
Australia by Proclamation declared its sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf contiguous to its coast, thus distinctly enlarging its 
asserted sovereign authority in the offshore area. This jurisdiction was 
in effect confirmed by the First United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea held at Geneva in 1958, which drew up four Conventions 
including the Convention on the Continental Shelf, to which Australia 
is now a party. 
The Second United Nations Conference in 1960 failed to secure 
agreement on two major issues left unsettled in 1958—the extent of 
1 
fisheries jurisdiction and the related question of the breadth of the 
territorial sea. 
Australian 200 nautical mile fishing zone 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea began 
in 1973 what has turned out to be a lengthy consideration of a broad 
range of related issues. The Ninth Session of the Conference began on 
3 March 1980. An informal composite negotiating text has been drawn 
up and revised. It provides, among other things, for fisheries jurisdiction 
in a zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the coastline. Con-
sistently with this text, and relying on the emerging international law on 
this matter as evidenced by the practice of nations, Australia, with 
effect as from 1 November 1979, established its 200 nautical mile fishing 
zone, in which all fisheries activities must be licensed under Australian 
law. 
The enlargement of offshore rights also involves responsibilities 
on the part of the coastal nations concerned—one of the important 
matters that has concerned the Third United Nations Conference is 
the balance of these rights and responsibilities, including the issue of 
freedom of passage and transit through international straits. However, 
it will be amply evident, even from this brief survey, that the overall 
trend has been to enlarge the jurisdiction of nations in offshore areas 
over both the sea and the seabed. 
Use of straight baselines and bay closing lines 
Also, the 1958 Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, to which Australia is a party, permits substantial enlargement of 
'internal waters' by the use on deeply indented or island-fringed coasts 
of 'straight baselines' for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, 
and by the adoption of a 24-mile closing line for bays. The effect in 
particular areas can be to move some parts of the external boundary of 
Australia's territorial sea some tens of miles seawards. 
Commonwealth State issues —Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts 1967 
The international developments have raised acute issues in a number of 
federations as to the appropriate division of responsibilities in the offshore 
area. For Australia these issues crystallised first of all in the Com-
monwealth–State negotiations in the sixties in relation to the legislative 
basis for offshore petroleum mining. The course finally chosen was to 
seek to avoid raising questions concerning the respective constitutional 
powers of the Commonwealth and the States by agreeing in the 1967 
Offshore Petroleum Agreement to the enactment by the Commonwealth 
and each State of a common petroleum mining code for the 'adjacent area' 
of each State (see the map opposite) to be administered by a 'Designated 
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PETROLEUM (SUBMERGED LANDS) ACT 1967 (asamended) 
ADJACENT AREAS 
NOTE: 
1. The Act applies only in relation to exploration for, and exploitation of, the petroleum resources of such submerged 
lands included in the adjacent area as have the character either— 
(a) of seabed or subsoil beneath territorial waters, or 
(b) of continental shelf within the meaning of the Convention on the Continental Shelf signed at Geneva on 
29 April 1958.   
2. Adjustment of the Adjacent Area in the Torres Strait area will be necessary when the Torres Strait Treaty enters 
into force. 
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Authority'. In practice, the Designated Authority in respect of the 
'adjacent area' of each State has been a State Minister, with consultation 
with the Commonwealth resting not on the legislation but on the 
Agreement. 
However, in 1970 the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill was 
introduced into the Parliament in pursuance of the then Government's 
view that it would serve Australia's national and international interests 
to have the constitutional position resolved as soon as practicable by 
the Courts. That Bill was not proceeded with, but its reception served 
to indicate the highly controversial nature of the subject. 
A further development was the 1971 report of the Senate Select 
Committee on Offshore Petroleum Resources, which concluded that, 
notwithstanding the advantages which the legislation and its underlying 
concepts had produced, the national interest was not served by leaving 
unresolved and uncertain the extent of State and Commonwealth 
authority in the seabed of the territorial sea and on the continental shelf. 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 and the High Court's decision 
The passage of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 followed, and 
the constitutional issues were resolved by the High Court in 1975 when 
it upheld—in New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1976) 135 CLR 337— 
the Act's assertion of sovereign rights on the part of the Crown in right 
of the Commonwealth, as against the States, over the continental shelf. 
Also, it upheld the Act's assertion of sovereignty on the part of the 
Crown in right of the Commonwealth over the territorial sea, and also 
over internal waters outside State limits as at 1901, including the seabed 
beneath the territorial sea and those waters. In effect, this meant that 
Commonwealth sovereignty extends, generally speaking, right into 
low-water mark. 
Need for readjustment 
The 1975 decision did not mean that States have no power to regulate 
offshore activities. The subsequent ruling of the High Court in Pearce v. 
Florenca (1976) 135 CLR 507 upheld the application of State fisheries 
laws in the territorial sea. However, a reordering and readjustment of 
powers and responsibilities—as between the Commonwealth and the 
States—were clearly required to take account of the 1975 decision. 
History, common sense and the sheer practicalities of life mark out the 
territorial sea, in particular, as a matter for local jurisdiction—that is to 
say, State jurisdiction—except on matters of overriding national or inter-
national importance. On the other hand, revision of existing petroleum 
mining arrangements is required to properly reflect the Commonwealth's 
paramount rights over the continental shelf. 
Australia's experience in this regard _is by no means unique. Similar 
questions arose earlier in the United Stales, and subsequently in Canada. 
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In their case—as in the case of Australia—the ruling by the Courts was 
ion 
	
	 that jurisdiction on the part of the central government extended to low- 
water mark. In the cases of these other federations, as in the case of 
our own, it has been found that the constitutional ruling is not the end 
IS 	 of the matter and that adjustment is necessary. 
:s 
A practical and co -operative solution 
The resulting discussions with the States have now produced a solution 
agreed to by all States. The talks at both Ministerial and adviser level 
have focused in a practical way—and in a spirit of co-operative federalism 
that has taken full account of international, national and State interests- 
ig 	 on what matters are appropriate for Commonwealth or, on the other 
7 hand, State administration, what matters are appropriate for joint 
administzation, and how the various agreed arrangements should be 
elf. 	 implemented. 
The appropriate Commonwealth–State consultative bodies have been 
fully involved, including the Australian Minerals and Energy Council, 
the Australian Fisheries Council, the Australian Environment Council 
and the Council of Nature Conservation Ministers. 
ht 	 Standing Committee of Commonwealth and State Attorneys -General 
f. The legal aspects of the exercise have been the responsibility of the 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General. It has devised innovative 
and flexible legislative Measures to carry out the arrangements that have 
been agreed. These are now described. 
v. 
o . 
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Agreed arrangements 
Extension of the legislative powers of the States in and in 
relation to coastal waters 
The Commonwealth Parliament will pass legislation, based on section 
51 (38) of the Constitution, to give each State the same powers with 
respect to the adjacent territorial sea (including the seabed) as it would 
have if the waters were within the limits of the State. 
The legislation will also give each State powers outside the territorial 
sea in respect of port-type facilities, underground mining extending from 
land within a State, and fisheries. The power with respect to fisheries 
will apply to fisheries that, under an arrangement to which the Corn-
rnonwealth is a party, are to be managed in accordance with the laws 
of the State concerned, under the offshore fisheries scheme described 
below. 
The status of the territorial sea under international law is to be 
expressly preserved. Also, savings provisions are to be included: 
– to safeguard existing State extra-territorial powers in the offshore 
area; 
– to ensure that laws of the Commonwealth that apply in the 
territorial sea prevail over any inconsistent State law in accordance 
with the paramountcy given to Commonwealth laws under section 
109 of the Constitution. 
The intended use, for the first time since federation, of section 51 (38) 
of the Constitution is of considerable significance for federal relations 
as its exercise requires the request or concurrence of the Parliaments of 
the States concerned. All States have agreed to pass Acts requesting 
the Commonwealth legislation. A copy of the Victorian Bill is in the 
accompanying booklet, Offshore Constitutional Settlement—Selected 
Statements and Documents 1978-79. 
Vesting in the States of the title to seabed beneath the territorial sea 
The Commonwealth Parliament will pass legislation to vest in each 
State proprietary rights and title in respect of the seabed of the adjacent 
territorial sea. 
This grant of proprietary rights and title yv ill both support the ex-
tension of the powers of the States in the territorial sea and provide an 
assurance to the States that the arrangements relating to the territorial 
sea will have permanency and stability. 
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As in the case of the 'Powers' legislation, the status of the territoriil 
sea under international law is to be expressly preserved. Also, it will 
be necessary to except from the grant any seabed owned or used by 
the Commonwealth or by a Commonwealth authority for a specific 
Commonwealth purpose at the time of the grant. In addition, the Com-
monwealth legislation will reserve the Commonwealth's right to use 
the seabed for such national purposes as: 
— defence 
— cables 
— navigational aids 
— quarantine 
Amendment of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 
Consequential amendments will be made to the Seas and Submerged ial Inds Act 1973 to ensure that State laws passed under the other legis- 
The area involved 
The above legislation—and also the petroleum and fisheries arrange-
ments referred to below—will be limited to a territorial sea of 3 miles 
breadth, irrespective of whether Australia subsequently moves to a 
territorial sea of 12 miles. 
On the other hand, the baselines from which the territorial sea will 
be measured will be drawn in a way that takes advantage of the inter-
national principles authorising the drawing of 'straight baselines' 
where the coast is deeply indented or fringed by islands, and of closing 
lines where bays are not more than 24 miles wide. Thus 'straight base-
lines' will be used to enclose the waters of Investigator Strait adjacent 
to South Australia. The 'internal waters' on the landward side of these 
lines will be included in the grants made by the legislation. The result 
will be to enlarge the area in which the States will enjoy the benefits 
of the legislation. 
The baselines to be adopted are being prepared in close consultation 
with the States and will be promulgated in due course under the Seas 
and Submerged Lands Act 1973. 
Offshore petroleum arrangements outside the 3 mile territorial sea 
These will be regulated by Commonwealth legislation alone, consisting 
of an amended Commonwealth Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act. 
Day-to-day administration will continue to be in the hands of the 
'Designated Authority' appointed for the 'adjacent area' of each State—
that is, the State Minister—and State officials. The existing mining code 
will be retained and existing permits and licences will not be affected. 
lation will not be invalidated by that Act. 
)n 
38) 
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However, the legislation will establish for the first time a statutory 
Joint Authority for each adjacent area consisting of the Commonwealth 
Minister and the State Minister (Commonwealth–Victoria Offshore 
Petroleum Joint Authority, and so on). The Joint Authorities will be 
concerned only with major matters arising under the legislation 
including: 
— determination of the areas to be open for applications for 
permits; 
— the grant and renewal of exploration permits and production 
licences; 
— approval of instruments creating interests in permits or licences; 
— determination of permit or licence conditions governing the 
level of work or expenditure. 
In the event of disagreement within a Joint Authority the view of 
the Commonwealth Minister is to prevail.. 
Having regard to the remoteness of Western Australia and its other 
special circumstances, special conditions were agreed in its case. A copy 
of the agreement is in the accompanying booklet, Offshore Consti-
tutional Settlement—Selected Statements and Other Documents 1978-
1979. However, Commonwealth views based on the national interest 
are still to prevail in the Joint Authority, as in the case of other States. 
Summing up, the new arrangements will ensure that: 
— the national interest in offshore petroleum activities can be 
asserted; 
— the valuable role 'of the States is continued; 
— dislocation of ongoing projects is avoided. 
The present arrangements for the sharing of royalties between the 
States and the Commonwealth will be retained. 
Offshore petroleum arrangements inside the outer limit 
of the 3 mile territorial sea 
This will be regulated by State legislation'alone, administered by State 
authorities, in recognition of the fact that local matters within the 
territorial sea are primarily matters for the States. However, the 
common mining code will be retained as far as practicable, and existing 
permits and licences, and appropriate arrangements will be made for 
`transitioning' existing permits to the extent that they fall within the 
outer limit of the territorial sea. 
Offshore mining for other minerals 
Arrangements for the mining of offshore minerals other than petroleum 
will be the same as for offshore petroleum. 
Commonwealth and State legislation embodying a common mining 
code will be needed to implement the arraiigements. Arrangements will 
also be made for sharing royalties. 
8 
Commonwealth-Western Australian Offshore 
Petroleum Joint Authority 
out 
Special Agreement relating to its establishment, Premiers Conference 
1. Present Commonwealth legislation would be amended to provide 
for the establishment of a Joint Authority consisting of the State 
Minister and the Commonwealth Minister. Under these arrangements 
applications will be made to the State Minister. The day-to-day adminis-
tration will remain with the State. 
2. Having regard to the special position of Western Australia, special 
provisions are agreed in the case of the Western Australian Joint 
Authority as follows: 
(a) Headquarters of the Joint Authority will be located at Perth. 
(b) In the event of disagreement, the Commonwealth has power 
to veto decisions proposed by the State where the decision 
would endanger or prejudice the national interest. 
(c) If the Commonwealth Minister proposes to recommend the 
exercise of the power of veto, he shall communicate this pro-
posal to the State Minister as soon as practicable but within 
30 days and he shall specify in what respect the national interest 
would be endangered or prejudiced. 
(d) Should the State Premier wish to do so, he may make repre-
sentations to the Prime Minister who after consideration by 
the Cabinet shall be responsible for resolution of the issue. 
(e) Distribution of functions would be the same as for other States 
but subject to the above. 
29 June 1979 
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AUSTRALUVS'OCEAN 
IVIRONMENTS 
marine resources presents both an opportunity 
and a challenge for ensuring long-term ecological 
sustain ability. 
Australia's vast marine jurisdictions range from the 
Torres Strait in the north to Antarctica in the south, 
Norfolk Island in the east to Heard and McDonald 
Islands in the southwest. As part of three large, 
interconnected ocean areas—the Pacific, Indian and 
Southern Oceans—our waters cover all of the 
Southern Hemisphere's ocean temperature zones. 
The Australian mainland is surrounded by a 
continental shelf between 15 and 400 kilometres 
wide, with major marine canyon systems of the 
continental slope leading to the deep seabed and 
abyssal plains of our deeper waters. 
Australia is one of the most biologically diverse 
nations on earth and our marine environment is 
home to a spectacular array of species, many of 
which are unique to Australian waters. In the 
southern temperate waters as many as 80 per cent 
of species are not found elsewhere, that is, they are 
endemic. In the north, which is connected by 
currents to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, although 
overall diversity is higher, the proportion of 
endemic species is lower, at around ten per cent. 
, OFFSHORE PETROLEUM: . 
PARTNERSHIPS IN -MANAGING' RESOURCES ACROSS JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES ; 
In Australia, as in some other countries, considerable effort has been invested in developing arrange ; 
ments: for .coordination between Federal and State Government responsibilities offshOre. One of the 
	
mo 	
• 
successful examples is the arrangement for managing offshore petroleum exploration and 
'development activities. 
There are two main features of the Australian offshore petroleum regime that account for its • 
success—mirror legislation and Commonwealth State co management 
The Commonwealth Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (the P(SL)A) . applies in Commonwealth 
waters—areas more than three nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines. Mirror legislation, 
that:is, essentially identical State or Northern Territory legislation, applies landward of this, adjacent, 
to the relevant State or the Northern Territory. This means that a common set of arrangements is in 
place from the low water mark to the edge of the continental shelf. This creates a consistent policy 
framework regardless of the location of petroleum activity and implements the "common mining 
code" requirement of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement.. • 
The second feature, co-management, is achieved through Joint Authorities for the adjacent areas in 
Commonwealth waters off each State and the Northern Territory under- the •P(SL)A. Each Joint 
Authority, comprised of the Commonwealth and relevant State or Northern Territory resource 
ministers, is the peak decision-making body responsible for managing petroleum exploration and 
production in its adjacent area. This means that both levels of government are jointly involved in the 
management of offshore petroleum development in Commonwealth waters. 
In summary, a nationally consistent regime for managing Australian Offshore petroleum activities is 
ensured through the Commonwealth membership of all the Joint Authorities and the u'se of mirror 
legislation. 
The,Australian offshore petroleum regime is a highly successful system for managing offshore 
•resources. It recognises that management of offshore petroleum resources requires cooperation 
between the Commonwealth, States and the Northern Territory, and provides the basis for achieving_ 
this _on a nationally uniform basis. It is a leading example of joint Commonwealth-State natural • - 	.• 	• 	., 
resource management. 
• 
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